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This dissertation contains a description and analysis of the

initial twenty-six months of an attempt at rapid and thoroughgoing

change at the School of Education, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst.

Particular emphasis is placed upon the change leewiership

strategies employed by the Dean, the success of which depended both on
viniquely effective aspects of the strategies themselves and on the

Dean's domination of the major sources of power in the organization.
Preliminary chapters include a summary of the literature of
change in higher education and of organizational change and a

chapter

in which the scope and magnitude of the changes at the School of Edu-

cation are delineated by means of a comparison of the School at the
significant
beginning and end of the period under review along as many

aspects, tangible and intangible, as possible.
analyses which
The body of the study is comprised of four case

instructional staff
describe and analyze the actions of the Dean and

organizational challenges of
members in response to the four principal

summarized as follows;
of the initial change period, which are
to change rather
the building of an institution committed

than maintenance of the status quo

Vll

the mobilization of members of that organization, most of

whom were new to it, to develop new progreims and policies in a short

period of time

—the conceptualization,

development, and legitimization of

new programs and policies by the organization

—the development

and legitimization of appropriate governing

mechanisms to support the change effort and facilitate continued inno-

vation in the School
The final analytical chapter focuses on the change strategies

pursued by the Dean, beginning with a force-field analysis demonstrating the importance of these strategies to the change effort, continuing

with an analysis of how domination of the major power sources, formal
and informal, in the School was achieved, and concluding with a descrip-

tion of the specific strategies employed.
The final chapter consists of summary and conclusions drawn

from the case analyses and in the perspective of the literature pre-

viously summarized.
Some of the major conclusions of the dissertation are:

—

^that

the School was able to accomplish substantial reform in

a system which has historically been highly resistant to change

—that the academic reforms accomplished were

in the directions

the
auivocated by the major national commissions on higher education of

last five years
was
that the principal factor in the successful change effort

which included a
the uniquely effective change leadership of the Dean
those within the
wide array of strategies whose effect was to motivate

viii

organization toward creative innovation, to protect the
organization
from premature restraint from without, and to counteract the
conservative tendencies of collegial decision-making structures

—that

at the end of the period under review a number of sig-

nificant problems remained, particularly the potential difficulty of

converting the organizational focus from conceptualization of programs
to implementation and evaluation, the unresolved tension between par-

ticipative and leader-dominated governance, and the potential problems
inherent in the course of growth on which the School was embarked, par-

ticularly in the implications of growth for the maintenance of the

Dean's leadership style and of a shared sense of purpose and community
in the School.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Significance of the Study

Radical reform occxirs only rarely in large institutions and perhaps most rarely of all in large educational institutions, particularly

institutions of higher education which have proven themselves to be

uniquely resistant to rapid and thoroTighgoing change.

Normally change,

when it does occur in such institutions, takes the form of slow, often
reluctant, evolutionary alterations which become apparent over a period
of years.

Such reforms have generally been sufficiently small in scope

and substance as to not significantly affect, except when viewed in the

perspective of decades, the fundamental assumptions, structures, and educational policies and processes of the institution.

There is clear evidence that this evolutionary process of change
in the large Universities which form the basic strands of the fabric of

the higher education system in the United States has not kept pace with

the revolutionary changes which have taken place in the social and tech-

nological environment in which the University exists and for which its
students must be appropriately prepared— in effect creating, in these
institutions, a serious "debt to time."

For Universities to repay this

require
debt, to close the gap and become current with the present, will

have hisfar more rapid and thoroughgoing change than such institutions

torically been willing or able to achieve.

3

But merely closing the gap will not be enovigh.

There is every

indication that environmental change will continue and that it will
occur
at an increasingly rapid rate.

This fact of time and change will make it

incumbent upon Universities to maintain their capacity for rapid and

thoroughgoing change

—

^will

demand that change, often radical change, be-

come the norm rather than the exception in the conduct of the university.

In the face of the pressing need for rewiical change now, and for
the institutionalization of change in the futvire, the collective knowledge of the means by which these goals can be accomplished appears woe-

fully inadequate.

We have learned that change cannot successfully be

forced upon a reluctant educational community, but how to involve such
a community in an honest attempt at re-evaluation and reformation remains

more an art, subject to many trials and more errors, than a science claiming reasonably reliable maps for reasonably describable territories.

During the period September 19^7 through November

the School

of Education, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, underwent a period
of change marked by explosive growth in numbers and diversity of faculty

and students, rapid expansion in scope and substance of educational programs, and thorough reformation of academic and organizational policies

possibly unparalleled in the history of American higher education.
This study represents an attempt to contribute to the collective

knowledge of change in higher education and of organizational change in
general by a critical examination and analysis of the significant actions,
events, and processes which contributed to the effort to bring about

radical change at the School of Education.

4

Implications of the Study

The data, analysis, and insights of this study are intended
to
be specific in that they pertain to a particular change effort
in a par-

ticular school under a particular kind of leadership

—specifically,

radical, leader-d.ominated change in a university sub-component.

to

However,

this study has been pursued in the expectation that many of its findings

would also be generalizable to less rsuiical attempts at change, pursued

under other leadership styles, in other kinds of organizations.
Further, it is expected that the content of this study will be

useful both to organizational theorists, since it provides specific insights into the dynamics of this organizational change effort, and to

practicing administrators, since it describes and analyzes a specific
and potentially replicable change effort and delineates a set of change
strategies successfully employed to bring about change.

Description of the Period Under Review

The period under review in this study covers the major change

period of the School of Education, September 19^7 through November 1969 »
d\xring which time the fundamental personnel decisions, operating and

governance structures, and academic policies and programs which were to
characterize the School in future years were conceived and brought to
various stages of consummation.
This period begins with the opening of the

1

967-68 School year

under a new Dean appointed the previous May; encompasses that year in
prowhich the groundwork for the changes to come was laid by the Dean;
academic policies
ceeds to the 1968-69 "planning year" in which the major
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and programs of the School were designed and the major
governing struct\xres emerged; and

culminates in November of the

I

969 -7 O school year when

the final business of the period, the formal adoption of a
''permanent"

governing document for the School, was completed.

Objectives of the Study

As an active participant in the change effort,

I

believe that the

period under review here was the most challenging and important in my
life and that the events of the change effort were of enormous signifi-

cance to higher education and to the understanding of organizational
change.

I

have therefore set out in this study to describe the signifi-

cant actions, events, and processes of the period, come to an \xnderstand-

ing of the major factors operating to bring about change, make tentative
judgments about the successes and failures of the change effort, and

finally to attempt to view the implications of the change effort at the
School of Education in the larger context of educational and organizational change.
It became clear early in the study that of the approximately 200

people involved in this attempt at radical reform, the actions and change

strategies of one man, ]>wight W. Allen, named as Dean in May of 1967i
stood out clearly as the single most important factor in the change effort.

Any attempt at understanding the success of the change effort at

the School would thus have to look closely at his actions and strategies

both separately and in the context of their impact upon the period under
review.

Therefore, a major focus of this dissertation will be on the

description and analysis of change strategies employed by the Dean.
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A final goal of this study relates specifically
to the School of
Education at this point in time, and is one of considerable
importance
to the writer.

This goal is to provide a history of the origins of the

School for the hundreds of faculty and doctoral students
who have joined
the School since the planning year.

In an organization whose operations

are as informal, flexible, and often as chaotic as are those of the School

of Education it is important for all involved to have a shared sense of

what came before, of how policies and decisions which continue to affect
them in the School were made, and of how the School came to be as it is.

The hundreds who have joined the School have not had that sense, and

many seem to want it.

I

have, for example, been asked many times to ex-

plain "the spirit of Colorado," a spirit which they sense has considerable

meaning for those who were there, but little (except perhaps a sense of
exclusion) for those who were not.
I hope, therefore, that this dissertation will provide for those

not involved in the planning year at least some sense of that exciting

year which can be shared as a common bond with those who were there.
For this reason

I

have, at times, gone into greater detail and analysis,

and introduced anecdotal material, beyond that needed simply for the case
analyses.

Definition of Terms

Two important terms in the title of this dissertation require

further definition.
Radical Reform ;

My use of these words denotes extreme change

the
from the usual or traditional—change so thoroughgoing as to "affect

7

fundamental character of the thing involved."^

In the case of the School

of Education, changes so thoroughgoing as to make it
fundamentally dif-

ferent from the traditional school of education.

Radical reform also

implies rapid reform, as indicated hy the use of these terms
in the initial paragraph of this chapter.

These terms, however, are not intended

to indicate reform in any particular direction.

There is, for instance,

no intent to imply that radical reform bears any relation to the radical

movements in the United States.

Leader Domination ;

"Leader domination," as used in this disser-

tation, describes a structure of governance and organizational decision-

making characterized by unilateral decision-making power on the part of
the leader and the absence of an effective countervailing power structure

by which members of the organization can, through institutionalized means,

legitimately overturn a decision of the leader or make a decision for the
organization without the approval, explicit or tacit, of the leader.

All

power and legitimacy tend to run to the leader and persons designated by
the leader.

The leader has, whether he employs it or not, the power to

make or overturn any decision at any level of the organization.

The

leader* s power is derived both from the legitimization of his position

by higher powers and from his control over the most important sources of

power in his organization.

Webster’s Dictionary of Synonyms (Springfield, Mass.; Merriam,
1951), P. 376 *
'^
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Organization of the PiBser-bation

On the basis of the objectives described above,

I

have organized

this dissertation as follows:

Chapter II

—Contains

an overview of the relevant literature on

resistance to change in higher education, on the state of contemporary

higher education, on case studies of change in higher education, and on
organizational change theory.

This overview is undertaken to provide a

perspective on the significance of the change effort at the School of

Education in the larger context of educational and organizational change.
Chapter III—-Contains a comparison of the School at September
1967 and November I969 along as many significant aspects, both tangible

and intangible, as possible as a meajis of establishing the specific scope
and ma^itude of the changes which took place at the School during the

period under review.
Chapters IV-VII--Contain case analyses of significant actions,
events, and processes organized both chronologically and around the four

major challenges faced by the School in its attempt at radical change.
The purpose of these case analyses is to describe what took place, explore the import and implications of significant actions and events and
the dynamics at work in those events, and make tentative judgments about

the strong and weak points of the change effort.

These case analyses

focus both on the actions and strategies of the Dean and on other factors significant to the change process.

Chapter VIII

—^Focuses

on the change strategies employed by the

field
Dean, first assessing their impact through the medium of force
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analysis, then describing the means by which the
domination over the

organization on which most of these change strategies
depend was achieved,
and finally detailing the various specific strategies
and their impact
on the success of the change effort by specific reference
to material in

the case analyses.

This chapter concludes with an attempt to generalize

these strategies for replication by others by deriving some general
principles on which these strategies are based and delineating points at

which organizations appear to be susceptible to change based on the success of these strategies.

Chapter

IX—Is

devoted to recapitulation and summary of the major

analytical insights and conclusions of the study, to an examination of
the implications of some of the findings for the future of the School,

and to an exaunination of the study in the perspective of change in higher

education and of organizational change.

Methodology of the Study

I

have chosen what I term historical case analysis as the basic

methodology for dealing with the events of the period under review.

Case

analysis is similar to case study in that it focuses on the description
of significant events, but differs in that it includes an attempt to
trace causes and effects, describe implications, and make judgments based
on the data available.

In addition, the data presented in case analysis

is organized more according to major interpretive foci than as an attempt

to chronologically delineate significant events.

Also in this case analysis

I see my function more as

than as a researcher in the sense that the events with which

an historian
I

am concerned

10

occurred in the past and were not subject by me or
anyone else to any
systematic attempt to collect data during the period.

Thus, whatever

data is available exists only in undifferentiated
form in the minds of
participants and in recorded and written records of the time.
Since

I

was, as will be described below, an active participant

in many of the events to be described, this study belongs to
a subcate-

gory of history, often referred to as eyewitness history.

As such, it

is necessary first to distinguish this history from memoir, and secondly

to attempt to deal with the extent to which my participation in events

has biased my presentation and interpretation of them.

As to the first, Arthiir Schlesinger, Jr. in his essay "The Historian as Participant" distinguishes memoir from history as follows:
"Memoirs are part of the raw material of history, but they are written
for their own purposes—to set down one man's experience or to chronicle

notable events or to discharge v^ulities or rancors—rather than to discern causation in the flow of events over time [which is the function of
the historian]."^

My intent in this study is to be the eyewitness historian
trace causes and effects in the flow of events in which
pant.

The principal lenses through which

I

I

—to

was a partici-

view these events are drawn

from the fields of organizational and leadership theory.

As to the biases inherent in the fact of my own participation in
the events of the period.

Let me first point out that

2Uiy

"historian,"

in the sense used by Schlesinger, by his very attempt "to discern

^Daedalus , Spring 1971* P« 340.
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causation in the flow of events over time" is introducing a bias
in his

accounting of events.

Since it is a practical impossibility to recount

all events from all viewpoints, a historian necessarily focuses on those

events which relate (either pro or con) to his interpretation of those
events.

Thus, for example, an analyst of the French Revolution who, by

his study of the data, concludes that there were five major causes of
that revolution will, in relating his findings, present to the reader

only that data which bears on his interpretation

—necessarily

phrasing

the data in a way which emphasizes its relation to his findings and ex-

cluding other data which he believes not relevant to his interpretation
and thus, for him, not relevant to the causes of the revolution.
In this process there is a presumption (and an inaccurate one,
I

believe) that because of his distance in time from the French Revolu-

tion the historian can be considered an objective viewer.
I

have followed, as will be described further in this section, a

process quite similar to that of the historian
fact that the events I

ajn

—with

the exception of the

attempting to interpret are considerably closer

in time and I was a participant in many of those events.

My "objectivity,"

therefore, is open to greater question.
To help the reader arrive at his own judgment of the extent of my

objectivity and thus of the validity of my recounting, interpretations,

and conclusions,

I

shall first outline below the nature and extent of my

participation in the events under review and subsequent connection with
the School and then attempt to explore my own biases.^
has only
^Since much of the data on my involvement with the School
I would
review,
under
period
the
limited meaning for those unfamiliar with
has
he
when
section
suggest that the reader make a note to reread this
finished the study.
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I

joined the School in September of I968 as one of the
85 plan-

ning doctoral students, having had no contact with or knowledge of Dean

Allen prior to my interview with him in August, I968 (at the sviggestion
of a friend who had accepted a faculty position for the fall).

I was

fresh from a highly disenchanting experience as Dean of a private boarding school and Dean Allen's description of the kind of school he was
pleuining to build was enormously exciting to me.

My involvement with the planning year included;

—Present at the initial (Sept.

4) faculty meeting and most fac-

ulty and community meetings thereafter.

—Present at the Retreat, a member of the Sunday night group
which instigated the racial awareness sessions, facilitator at
the racial awareness sessions, present at all community meetings, involved with the structure committee and a number of

interest groups, present at parties described, participant in

late-night bull-sessions.

—Consultant to,

ajid

informal member of, the Executive Committee

with major concern constitution—writing, school organization,
emd fund raising.

Present at most Executive Committee meetings

including the October 23 Northfield meeting.

Co-author (with Robert Woodbury and Richard Coffing) of the

Ten-Year Projection.
Co-author (with Richard Coffing) of "The School of Education
and a New Corporate Design."

—Co-author (with Lloyd Kline and Arthur Eve) of

"A Thrust Toward

^8
Relevance," the first attempt, undertaken in late October 19 ,
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to describe the School and intended primarily for
funding

agencies.

—^Writer

of Tabula Basa (Dec. 6 , I968) lead editorial

“Some

Inconclusive Observations on Direction."

—Active

member of Administration and Humanistic Education plan-

ning committees (and author or co—author of funding proposals
for both) and closely in touch (through my wife’s membership)

with the Aesthetics Education planning committee.

—^Primarily

responsible for initial draft of the Interim

Catalogue .

—A.lso

held the following positions and memberships during the

period under review;

Member of Finance Committee, School Man-

agement Committee, Editorial Board of UMass Series on Education,
and elected member of the Graduate Faculty Assembly.

Also

Coordinator of Fund Raising during a portion of the planning
year.

—Member of Writing Committee for the Interim Catalogue .
—Present at the University Faculty Senate Meeting at which the
Interim Catalogue was approved.

Author of "A Thrust Toward Relevance:

The Year in Review," an

attempt to summarize the planning year, published in Trend
magazine. Spring 1969*

—Subsequent activities which may bear on my interpretation of
events include;

during the I969-7O academic year coordinator

of planning for an innovative program in educational leadership; in winter I97I the general editorship of Profile

,

an
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extensive description of the School and its activities
intended
for outsiders; in spring I97I consultant to the "President's

Committee on the Future University of Massachusetts," and in

winter I973 preparation of a draft copy of a report on the
first five years of the School for the Board of Trustees.

—Since September 1970

I have not been actively engaged in the

day-to-day affairs of the School, but have, as implied by the
previous paragraph, taken the role of observer and interpreter.
I

would summarize my involvement with the School during the plan-

ning year as follows.

I

was in a position, often as active participant

and often as witness, to observe closely what
events of the planning year.

I

believe were the central

My participant role was always as member

of groups acting euivisory to the Dean or the School Community, but I do

not consider myself to have been a close insider or confidant of the

Dean—nor

was I ever in substantial conflict with the Dean or any other

group in a confrontation-type situation.

In sum, in attempting to explore my own biases,

I

do not believe

that, as a result of my participation in the planning year,

I

have either

a personal ax to grind or a desire to protect anyone or any group.

It

is clear that many of the issues I was involved in during that year, par-

ticularly the issue of governance and of the adoption of new academic
programs, are issues which

I

deal with in considerable length in this

study.

It is possible that my concern with them during the year has

colored

ray

School

view of their relative importance to the development of the

15

Clearly my work on the charter during the fall and
on the "Interim Catalogue" writing committee during the spring
gave me a perspective on the process and importance of those efforts
which others might
not share.

And finally,

I

am aware of a personal philosophical bias which

was present during the planning year and has grown firmer since,
and
that is that I am convinced of the necessity of effective participative

governance in higher education.

My ideas on this subject are profoundly

influenced by, and well summed up in, Warren Bennis' Changing Organizations .

This conviction has certainly influenced my decision to focus in

on the School's abortive efforts to achieve participation in governance.

However, it should also be noted that as a result of the insights gained
in preparing this st\idy, I have become far more sympathetic to the ap-

proach which I describe as leader domination and which, it now appears
to me, may be appropriate under some circumstances.
It should be emphasized that this study is in no way an "author-

ized" recoxinting of the development of the School.

All statements about

School thrusts, purposes, intentions, goals, and priorities are my own

perceptions as are descriptions of the strategies and activities of the
Dean.

This study represents my best attempt, based on the data

I

have

acciunulated and on my observations as participant, to reliably portray
aind

interpret the major factors in the development of the School.

it should be emphasized that these are my own perceptions.

But

Others occu-

pying different positions during the planning year or viewing the plan-

ning year as an outside observer or holding different philosophical biases
would probably see different issues and conceivably arrive at different
conclusions
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My principal method of organization for the case
analysis sections of this study (Chapters IV through VII) has been
to begin the

chapter by describing what

I

saw as the major organizational challenge

to be met during the specific period being reviewed and
then, in the re-

mainder of the chapter, to trace the efforts of the Dean and
those in
the organization in meeting those challenges.

My choice of each of these

challenges arose out of my experience, my interviews with Dean Allen,

and my review of the documentation of the period.
In Chapter VIII I focus on the change strategies pursued by Dean

Allen as a result of my conclusion, based on the evidence presented in
prior chapters, that these strategies were the most important factor in
the success of the change effort at the School and should therefore be

presented in greater detail both because of their importance to the development of the School and as potential models for chajige strategies to
be pursued by others.

Data Sources

Beyond my own contact with the events of the planning year, my
most importajit source of data was a series of twelve discussions, aver-

aging about one and one—half hours each, with Dean Allen held from July
1971 through May 1972.

These discussions, which

I taped,

were devoted

in some part to the recollection of events, but were primarily focused
on discussions of Dean Allen's philosophy of educational leeuiership and

on the strategies which he followed to bring about change at the School.

Much of the material contained in Chapter IV, "Establishing a Foundation
for Change," and Chapter VIII, "On Leader-Dominated Change," was derived
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from those discussions, but the constructions and
interpretations pre-

sented in this dissertation are entirely my ovm.

Vfhat I

have described

is my ovm interpretation of the philosophy and strategies
of Dean Allen

based on my discussions with him together with my observation
of his be-

havior during the planning year, and I do not purport to have described
his philosophy and strategies as he would.

Since I was not present during the I967-I968 year,

I

have relied

on interviews and written and audio records of the period for my data.

My interviews included six hours (taped) of intervievre

vfith

two

members of the original group who arrived with Dean Allen in January
1968 .

Those interviews, held in February and March 1972, focused on the

recruiting effort and on fund raising for the planning year.
I

also formally interviewed three members of the existing faculty

(taped, approximately two hours each) focusing on the organization of the

School prior to the arrival of Dean Allen, the personality and leauiership
style of Dean Purvis, the faculty "personality” and morale, the curricuIvun,

the student population, and the transition period following Allen's

arrival in January I968.

These interviews were held in May and June of

1972.
I interviewed Oswald Tippo, Provost of the University during the

period under review.

This one-hour taped interview was held in May 1972

and covered the nature of the School prior to the arrival of Dean Allen,
the selection process which resulted in the hiring of Allen, the kind of

University support given to the Dean during the planning year, Tippo 's
views of the progress of the planning year, and a discussion of the Interim Catalogue approval process in University channels.
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A major source of data on the state of the School
prior to
Allen's arrival and particularly on the effect of hie
behavior and actions on the existing faculty came from a transcript
of the testimony of
the tenured faculty members who had brought an extensive
grievance

against Dean Allen in April I968.

This transcript also included Allen's

responses—and School files include copies of the grievance itself and
preliminary memoranda exchanged between Dean Allen and the tenured faculty*

also listened to a tape of the grievance hearing of a faculty

I

member whose contract had not been renewed.
of

Much of the final section

Chapter IV and portions of Chapter III were derived from these docu-

ments*
I

reviewed the documents in the central School files for data on

the 1967-1968 school year, which appear incomplete but did yield the

Annual Report, faculty meeting minutes, recruiting correspondence, and
docianents pertaining to the planning doctoral program.

These files also

contain an evaluation report prepared by the School in November I966 for
the National Coiuicil for Accreditation of Teacher Education and Dean
Purvis' final Annual Report

( 1

966-67) which summarized his thirty-one

year tenure at the School and included his analysis of the state of the
School in late 1967 *

The latter two dociunents were extremely helpful in

understanding the School prior to the arrival of

Also, while not strictly qualifying as data,
the "old"

ajid

Allen*

Deaji
I

have discussed

"new" School of Education with a number of University and

School of Education faculty members over the years, their observations

being part of and consistent with the picture
tation

I have

drawn in the disser-
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Most of the statistical data in this study,
particularly in

Chapter III, was drawn from School and University
publications including
the School of Education grofile , the I970 report of the
Faculty Senate

Long Range Planning Committee, the I967 "Blue Book" prepared
by the University Office of Institutional Studies and its I972 supplement,
and the
Report o f the President »s Committee on the Future University of Massachusetts *

My sources of data on events subsequent to my arrival includes

—
—My

previously described interviews with Dean Allen.

^The

own recollection of events together with some very sketchy

notes made at the Retreat and at some meetings thereafter.

—What

I

believe to be a complete set of all written communica-

tions distributed to the faculty and doctoral students during the plan-

ning year—which

—A

I kept

and filed.

complete collection of Tabula Rasa , the School newspaper,

published twice weekly during the planning year.

(Bound collections in

School central files and the Archives of the University Library.)

This

collection provides a fairly complete compilation of the important documents of the period, including agenda for and minutes of most Executive

Committee and Faculty meetings.

—A
agencies,

copy of the Interim Catalogue prepared for University approval
(in central School files.)

^Video-tapes of some of the Retreat events including Dean

Allen's Tuesday afternoon discussion of racial issues, his Wednesday
morning "What Makes Dwight Tick" speech, the discussion of the structuregoals-^iecision^aking issue, the Joseph Rhodes speech to the group, the
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WSSC presentation, the departure from the
Colorado Springs airport, and

miscellaneous others.

It is reported that other video records
of the

year were reused for teaching p\irposes because
of a lack of funds for
new tapes.

—I

was given free access to the central School
files, but did

not find them a particularly illximinating source of
data on the period.

Material I did use included Annual Reports for

I

969 and

I

97 O, the com-

pilation of votes for the Executive Committee, reports of votes
on each
of the Constitution ballots, and a description of the entire
Constitution

balloting process prepared by Allen, and a summary of doctoral students
and stipends.

Other data, peripherally useful, in the files includes

communications between Dean Allen and various faculty members, letters
to and from outsiders including recruiting correspondence, and letters

and memoranda to and from the University administration.

—Some data not generally available

is in my personal files as

a result of my participation in the activities of the School.

Such data

includes data on the planning committees in Ootober 19^9 used in preparing the "Ten Year Projection," a series of preliminary drafts of the

Executive Committee "charter," some position papers prepared for the

October 23 Executive Committee Retreat, and preliminary drafts of the
Interim Catalogue .

—I

submitted a draft copy of this study to six faculty members

who participated in the planning year, most in central roles, with a re-

quest that they comment upon its accuracy.
as to facts, vdiich have led to

scxne

I

received a few questions

revisions of this final draft, and a

number of questions as to perceptions and relative emphasis on certain
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aspects of the change process, but received
general agreement that
factual data was reliably presented.

ray

While I certainly do not consider

this procedure as providing a rigorous test
of the validity of my data,
it does provide at least some indication
as to its general accuracy.
I

have, in the text of this study, footnoted all
material derived

primarily from outside sources.

Unfootnoted material can be assumed to

be derived primarily from my own experience and
perceptions.

Limitations of the Study

The major limitations of the study are those described in the

previous section on methodology, particularly the fact that data was not

systematically collected during the period and the potential biases in"trinsic to my participation in the events of the period under review.

Two other limitations to be considered are;
First, the limited time period covered in the study
of reasons:

— for

a nximber

(1) the success of many crucial aspects of the change effort

cannot be firmly judged on the basis of the short time period involved,
(2) the success and implications of the Dean's change strategies simi-

larly must be viewed over a longer term, and (3) the quality of the

School's programs and personnel can only be judged over the longer term.
It is my hope that someone will choose to do a subsequent study of the

progress of the School focusing on further examination of the issues and

tentative conclusions contained in this dissertation.
Second, it can be argued, with some justification, that because
of the overwhelmingly large number of faculty and doctoral students added
to the School during the period under review this study is not, in fact.
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a study of organizational change but of the
development of a new organization.

I

have chosen to view the change as one of
organizational change

primarily because the School did exist as a substantial
body prior to

Dean Allen's arrival and his dramatic expansion of
it can be considered
as only one of many options for change of that
organization, and because
the controls over the organization maintained by the
University clearly

mark it as an ongoing organization for which change was not merely
the
agreement upon new policies, but a change from existing policies which
required the approval of appropriate agencies.

Chronological Summary

A difficulty of the case analysis approach to the description of
events is that chronological sequence is not as clearly delineated as it

would be in a conventional case study.

I

am therefore including below a

chronological summary of events as a guide to the reader.

Academic Year

1

966-1 967

- Dr. Allen hired as Dean
June - Dr. Parody becomes Acting Dean

Academic Year

1

967-1 968 (Chapter IV)

September 22 - Dr. Allen first appears before School faculty
(Sweetheart Tea Room); annovinces discontinuation
of all courses, programs, degrees, and requiredeclares 1 968-69
ments as of September 19^9
a "Planning Year."
Janxiary 2 - Dr. Allen arrives on campus to assume Deanship

January through March - Faculty recruiting period.
faculty members hired.

Thirty new
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^

- Planning Doctoral Program approved by
Graduate
Faculty, 85 doctoral students subsequently
recruited,

Fgbruary and March - Personnel actions for
existing faculty
‘’Q

Academic Year

1

- Tenured faculty grievance filed

968-1 969 (Chapters V, VI, and VII

September 4 - Planning Year begins.
ple arrive on campus

Approximately 120 new peo-

September 15-21 - Colorado Retreat
October 3 — First Marathon

September through January — Major emphasis on interest group
planning committees

January — Beginning of Interim Catalogue preparation process

March - Allen assumes leadership of preparation process
March 25 - First faculty vote on "Interim Constitution"
April 2 — Straw vote on significant parts of academic aspects
of package
April 8 - Final faculty vote to approve "Interim Constitution"

April

1

— Approval of Academic program by School community

May 29 - Approval of Academic program by University Faculty Senate

Academic Year 1969-1970
November 26 - Approval of Constitution by School of Education
faculty
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CHAPTER

II

SUMMARY OP THE LITERATURE

Introduction

The purpose of this summary of the literature is
to support and

elaborate upon the generalizations with which

I

began this study, to pro-

vide a context in which the significance of the achievement
of the School
of Education during the period under review can be considered,
and to

offer some perspectives on the means by which the change was
accomplished.
This chapter will contain four major sections, as follows:
First, I shall explore the need for change in higher education,

focusing on the fact that significant reform occurs only rarely in institutions of higher education and its result, that the activities of con-

temporary institutions of higher learning are inappropriate to student
needs in the face of present realities.
Second, I shall describe in detail the findings of four recent

case studies of attempts at change in higher education to determine the

extent to which change was achieved and the major determining factors
in the change

— or

lack of change.

Third, I shall review the evidence of change in schools of edu-

cation.

And fourth,

I

shall explore the literature of organizational

change and describe some change models which may provide some insight
into the change effort at the School of Education.
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The Need for Change in

Hifi^her

Education

Much of the literature of higher education
points to a pressing
need for change in America's colleges and
universities.

It describes a

system which has historically resisted
significant change in its activities and which, as a result, is at present
generally described as fail-

ing to meet the needs of today's students in today's
society.

On Resistance to Reform

There are strong indications in the literature that resistance
to reform is a fundamental and chronic problem of American
higher educa-

tion

— one

as evident in earlier years, when environmental change was

relatively slow, as it is at present in the face of an exponential increase in the pace of environmental change.

For example, in his classic survey of the history of higher education in America, Frederick Rudolph sums up attempts at reform as
follows:

Resistance to fundamental reform was ingrained in the
American collegiate and university tradition as over three
hundred years of history demonstrated ... the historic
policy of the American college and university [has been]
drift, reluctant accommodation, belated recognition that
while no one was looking, change had in fact taken place.
This view of the xmiversity as fundamentally change resistant is

shared by many other analysts of the field.

For instance, in his analy-

sis of change in higher education. The Dynamics of Academic Reform

Frederick Rudolph, The American College and University:
tory (New York:

Alfred Knopf and Random House, 19^2), p. 49

,

A His-
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J. B. Lon Hefferlin quotes the terse
conclusions of two students of

higher education, Bernard Stern, who summed
up his historical analysis
of academic change by terming the process
one of "defensive concessions

and progressive adjustments" to the demand
for change2 and Irving Kristol
who observed that "the university has
been-with the possible exception

of the post offioe~the least inventive (or
even adaptive) of our social

institutions since the end of World War II.

And in the preface to their case study of six attempts
at institutional reform, Joseph Fashing and Steven Deutsch observe
that:
regard, to the basic educational process, there has
been little alteration except in the faculty— student ratio,
since the very beginning of American higher education. 4

Perhaps the most succinct statement of the rigidity of universities of all was quoted from "one frustrated administrator" by Samuel
Baskin;

"It is easier to move a cemetery than overhaul a curriculum."^

The Newman Task Force offers a thoroughgoing indictment of higher

education on this score;
The [higher education] system, with its massive inertia,
resists fxindamental change, rarely eliminates outmoded programs, ignores the differing needs of students, seldom questions

2

Bernard J. Stern, "Historical Materials on Innovations in Higher
Education" (unpublished manuscript. May 1953), p« 25, quoted in Dynamics
of Academic Reform (Ssin Francisco; Jossey Bass, 1969), P» ?•
^Irving Kristol, "A Different Way to Restructure the University,"
in The New York Times Magazine , Dec. 8, 19^8, p. 5, quoted in Dynamics
of Academic Reform , p. 6.
^Academics in Retreat;
The Politics of Educational Innovation
(Albuquerque; University of New Mexico Press, 1971), P* ‘•2.

York;

^Samuel Baskin, Higher Education;
McGraw-Hill, 1965), P* 331

Some Newer Developments (New
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its educational goals, and almost
never creates new and different types of institutions.®

This historical resistance to change
has continued to the present,

intensified, in fact, by the increasing
rapidity of change in the sur-

rounding environment, and in the face of
increasing pressures for change
from outside on university decision-making
bodies.

Since 1968 three major case studies of
university reform have

been published, at least five major commissions
on higher education have

been convened, and a vast number of analytical
and evaluative works on

higher education have been written by scholars, educators,
and educational writers of all persuasions

—and

the overwhelming consensus has

been that contemporary institutions of higher education have
moved little,
if at all, to adapt their activities to current needs.

The major case studies include Dwight Ladd's Change in Educa-

tiona l Policy (1970)5 J. B. Lon Hefferlin's Dynamics of Academic Reform
(1969); and Joseph Fashing and Steven E. Deutsch's Academics in Retreat
(1971)»

These studies share a similar conclusion

— that

very little change

of significance has taken place in the institutions surveyed, as will be

described in a later section of this chapter.
The commission reports of recent years generally concur in the

judgment that inability to change in response to changing social and en-

vironmental conditions is one of the major problems facing higher education today.

^Newman Task Force, Report on Higher Education Frank Newman,
chmn. (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971 )i P» ^
(hereafter referred to as Newman Report ).
,
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The Ha^en Report

,

for example, obeerves that -[the
university b]

sprawling size and organizational structure
stand in the way of innovations needed.
One of the major findings of the Newman
Commission, was
that -the decade of the sixties produced
many changes in higher education,
but their combined impact was to homogenize
institutions— the more they

changed, the more they became alike"® and
the Newman Report's indictment
of the "massive inertia" of the higher
educational system has previously

been cited.
Other scholars, educators, and analysts of higher
education have

lamented the lack of movement in higher education despite
the ferment

around it in recent years.

For example, Harold Taylor, in How to Change

Colleges , observes:
Seven years after the Berkeley uprising, the American university and its system of control and instruction remains substantially the same. The few changes that have been made do
not get to the heart of the matter, which ... is the question
of the role of the university in contemporary life, including,
first of all, the life of the student.

And Alvin Eurich, summing up his work in higher education, pessimistically observes:
While it is true that some colleges and \miversities have
conducted experiments and demonstrations designed to improve

^Committee on the Student in Higher Education, The Student in
Higher Education , Joseph P. Kauffman, Chairman (New Haven: Hazen Foundational 1968 ), p. 4 (hereafter referred to as Hazen Report ).
®From Harold L. Hodgkinson, "Reflections on the Newman Commission,"
Magazine
May, 1972, p. 35*
Change
,

^Taylor, How to Change Colleges (New York:

Holt, 1971

)»

P* 6.
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instruction, the cumulative and enduring
impact is practically
imperceptible.

and
Clearly, a very large majority of our
institutions of
higher learning and faculty members have no
commitment to
change or to improve college and university
teaching.

On Present Inadequacies

This failure of the institutions of higher
learning in America
to find the means of reforming their activities
has resulted in the situa-

tion in which these institutions find themselves today

— out

of joint with

the times.

This condition has been noted in the reports of the commissions
as well as in an avalanche of boohs and articles authored by ’’critical

lovers and unloving critics” representing what appears to be a total

spectrum of perspectives and persuasions.

The data below represents a

sample of the general scope of criticism of contemporary higher educa-

tion beginning with the findings of the commissions and continuing with
a sampling of individual criticisms from a variety of perspectives.

The 1968 Hazen Report was direct and emphatic in its criticisms
of the contemporary system of higher education ’’for not being more con-

cerned about the total personality development of its students,” and

among its conclusions are the following terse and comprehensive indictments:

^^Alvin C. Eurich, Reforming American Education: The Innovative
Approach to Improving our Schools and Colleges (New York: Harper, I968)
p.

135 *
^

p. 8.

^Eurich, quoted by Hefferlin in Dynamics of Educational Reform

,
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Despite the huge sums of money poured
higher education
ma^ If not most students are poorly into
housed, poorly fed.
an live in a physical and social
environment which is hardly
conducive to moral, cultural, or esthetic
growth.
’

,

do little to help students in their search
for commitment,
despite our knowledge that they are at precisely
the age when
commitment is of critical importaince.

•We

The Linowitz and Scranton commissions, while
confining themselves
to reporting "major accounts" of the underlying
causes of student dis-

satisfaction and not taking an explicit stand on the failures
of the

higher education system, do in their recommendations point to
specific
areas in which they feel \miversities and colleges have not fulfilled

their responsibilities.

Por example their recommendations include:

Prom the Linowitz Commission:

—^Everywhere

there is need to reexamine existing disciplines
and to allocate resources for the design of new forms of
intellectual inquiry.

—New

curricula and resources are needed to further the selfdevelopment of students in ways traditional curricula have
failed to do.

—

collegiate institutions in the past have been heavily
oriented to the purposes of the white majority. More attention must be given to the needs of ethnic minorities.

^Most

and from the Scranton Report:

—The

university, and particularly the faculty, must recognize
that the expansion of higher education and the emergence of
the new youth culture have changed the makeup and concerns
of today's student population. The university should adapt
itself to these new conditions.

^^

Hazen Report

,

pp. 4»

13-H*

^Special Committee on Campus Tensions, Caunpus Tensions: Analysis
and Rec ommendat i ons Sol M. Linowitz, Chmn. (D.C. American Council in
Education, 1970)i PP« 49“50*
^

,
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Large xiniversities should take steps to
decentralize or
reorganize to make possible a more human
scale.

—University governance systems should be reformed
to increase
participation of students and faculty in the
formulation of
university policies that affect them.H

And finally, the Nevrman Report

,

published in I971, is perhaps

the most comprehensive and thoroughgoing in its
indictment of the con-

temporary system of higher education in America.
It begins with a comment on the work of previous
commissions, a

comment which emphasizes the radical kinds of changes which
members of
the Newman commission feel must come to higher education:

Several commissions have examined the state of higher education within the past few years. Their recommendations, ranging from expanding community colleges to spending more for
research in the graduate schools, are intended to strengthen
and extend the existing system.
We have talcen a different approach. We believe that it is
not enough to improve and expand the present system. The needs
of society and the diversity of students now entering college
requires a fresh look at what "going to college" means.

The commission then goes on to summarize conditions in higher education

which they feel call for more radical reforms than those proposed by
previous commissions.

As we have examined the growth of higher education in the postwar period, we have seen disturbing trends toward uniformity
in our institutions, growing bureaucracy, overemphasis on academic credentials, isolation of students and faculty from the
world a growing rigidity and uniformity of structure that makes
higher education reflect less and less the interests of society.

—

Rather than allow these trends to continue, means must be found
to create a diverse and responsive system.

^^Campus Unrest Panel, Report of the President's Commission on
Campus Unrest Will W. Scranton, Chmn. in The University Crisis Reader
Vol. II, ed. by Immanuel Wallerstein and Paul Starr (New York: Random
House, 1971)1 P» 507*
,

,

,
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And the commission concludes its
preface with a question which
reflects
perhaps their most serious and
pervasive criticism of the institutions
which make up the American higher
education system.
What will make higher education more
likely to reflect the real

-

i::e^el7l5

intemal"^^^

A review of the criticisms of scholars,
educators and analysts
of higher education reveals a wide
panorama of dissatisfaction with the

existing system.

For the purposes of this review,

criticisms into three general categories:

going indictments,

(

2

)

I

have divided such

(l) quite general and thorough-

criticisms based on research on the effects of

higher education upon students, and

(

3)

criticisms based on lack of

morality and/or relevance in institutions of higher learning.
General Indictments

In the annals of scholarly examination of the state of higher

education, the most shocking and dramatic indictment of contemporary

higher education came in Sanford's The American College

,

a massive com-

pilation of articles pertaining to the state of higher education published in 1962, soon after the end of the complacent fifties.

An

unexpecting reader had only to progress to the fourth paragraph of the
introduction to find the following terse and unequivocable summary of
the review:

One does not need any fixed conception of educational goals
in order to be convinced that American colleges are failing

15 pp. vii

& X.

33

rather badly* They fail to achieve their own stated purposes;
and they fail by other reasonable standards of accomplishment
and Harold Taylor, summing up in Students without Teachers
The dilemma of the university is that everything it
late. ... In the 1950's and the first half of the
was almost impossible to convince those responsible
trol and advancement of higher education that . . .
sities were becoming educationally bankrupt.

,

angrily notes:

does is too
1960's, it
for the conthe univer-

In any case, the facts about the universities are now out in the
open.
It is not necessary to repeat again that the big universities have become huge bureaucracies with an academic mind and
no heart, careless and ignorant about students and their intellectual needs, organized by managers and managerial professors
absorbed in their own pursuits giving service to the existing
social order and dispensing its conventional wisdom, bereft of
a philosophy and the social imagination to create a new and compelling conception of their own future. The literature of education and social criticism has dealt with that, events have affirmed
it, the students have found their voice to proclaim it."*8

Prom Arnold Toynbee, in his preface to Eurich's Ceimpus I98O :
There seems today to a worldwide consensus that the traditional system of higher education does not meet, any longer,
the educational needs of a more and more rapidly changing society. ^

Prom Sheldon Wolin and John Schaar:
The only hope for the university lies in replacing the
narrow and fatal premises which have produced the present impasse with others more appropriate to the general social sitiaation in which the university now stands. That social situation

and
^^Nevitt Sanford, ed.. The American College: A P sychological
Wiier,
1962),
York:
Social Interpretation of the Higher Learning (New

^Taylor, Students without Teachers:
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 19^9)1 P* ^ ^ ^
^

^^

Ibid .

,

p.

The Crisis in the University

10.

Change," in Camp^
^^"Higher Education in a Time of Accelerating
ed. by
Education,
The Shape of the Future in American Highe r
1980:
xix.
Alvin G. Eurich (New York: Dell, I968), p.

2
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IS one that can be called revolutionary
in the sense that while
the forces of change gather momentum, the
society cannot find
the appropriate response either in thought or
acts. ... The
troubles which beset American society are unprecedented
and
paradoxical. . . .<^0

and Eurich censures what he sees as a pervasive
hypocrisy in higher education:
The greatest gap in education has always been that between
theory and practice, between what we claim to be doing for
young
people and what we actually are doing. This gap, unlike the
missile gap, has not been closed. Educators tend to be bold in
thought but timid in action* All too often educators have built
grand theories while the schools and colleges stayed in their
comfortable ruts.*^^

And finally Dwight Ladd, in his summary of the findings of the selfstudies of eleven different colleges and universities,^^ provides an

excellent list of generally agreed upon failures in higher education
today, as described on page 49 of this chapter.

Research-Based Criticism

In 1957 the first comprehensive review of research on the impact
of the college experience on students was published by Phillip E, Jacob.

This review, entitled Changing Values in College:
of the Impact of College Teaching ,

An Exploratory Study

sent waves of shock and disbelief

through the academic community since it concluded that college

h2ui

very

little effect on students.

^^Wolin and Schciar, The Berkeley Rebellion and Beyond (New York:
N.Y. Review, 1970) » P« 64.
21

Reforming American Education , pp. xiii-xiv.

^^Dwight R. Lauid, Change in Educational Policy: Self-Studies in
Selected Colleges and Universities , The Carnegie Commission on Higher
Education (New York: McGraw-Hill 1970).
,

^^Jacob (New York:

Harper, 1957)*
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William Arrowsmith siunmarized the book as follows:
Certainly it is hard to imagine a more deimningly documented
indictment of the liberal arts college than that of the Jacob
study . . , with its bleak conclusion that, apart from three
or
four colleges the effect of college teaching on student values
is simply nil, zero, and that what small change occurs comes
from the student subculture. ^4
,

And Joseph Axelrod elaborates:

... the studies of college and university students . . .
reveal the crushing fact: the primary effect of college and
university experience on students was simply that they had become more like one another. ^5
The Jacob study, with its bleak conclusions about a process con-

sidered central to life in the United States, the value of which had

previously been considered beyond question, naturally provoked a substantial outpouring of new studies, many of which are summarized in Kenneth

Feldman and Theodore Newcomb's The Impact of College on Students .

These

studies are considerably more positive in their findings, although ap-

parently never really resolving the question of the extent to which the
changes observed can be attributed to the college experience.
The authors begin their 1970 s\immary of research with a reference to Jacob's study.
In some respects this report resembles Philip E. Jacob's
much quoted Changing Values in College published in 1957»
We have hewi the advantage, however, of an euided decade, characterized by more voluminous output, probably, than all of the
previous years taken together. Our conclusions, moreover,
differ in many ways from his.^°
,

^^Arrowsmith, "The Future of Teaching," in Ceunpus

1
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,

p.

126.

^^Axelrod, "New Organizational Patterns," in Higher Education in
the Revolutionary Decades , ed. by Lewis B. Mayhew (Berkeley, California:
McCutchen, 1967)i P» 169»

^^Feldman and Newcomb, The Impact of College on Students (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969Tr'p^3^
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In summarizing the implications of the research
analyzed in this

book, the authors present the following conclusions:

Preshman-to-senior changes in several characteristics have
occurring with considerable uniformity in most American
colleges and universities, in recent decades
LAuthor's italics.]
.

Men

And go on to describe the nature and directions of changes found
as follows:

Declining "authoritarianism," dogmatism, and prejudice,
together with decreasingly conservative attitudes toward public
issues and growing sensitivity to aesthetic experiences are
particularly prominent forms of change as inferred from freshmansenior differences* These add up to something like increasing
openness to multiple aspects of the contemporary world, paralleling wide ranges of contact and experience. Somewhat less consistently, but nevertheless evident are increasing intellectual
interests and capacities, and declining commitment to religion,
especially in its more orthodox forms. Certain kinds of personal
changes particularly toward greater independence, selfconfidence, and readiness to express impulses are the rule
rather than the exception.

—

—

—

This study includes, however, a possibly significant caveat, that

those who do not attend college (although eligible and acceptable) "often

change in the same directions, though in lesser degree."^®

Criticisms based on moral
and relevancy issues

A substantial number of critics of contemporary higher education
base their criticism on the institutions* unwillingness to come to grips

with the central moral, political, human, and environmental issues of
the day.

A few examples of this type of criticism are as follows.

^^ Ibid .

,

p.

326,

28 Ibid.

,

p.

327.
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Both Gardner and Taylor censure the universities
for their neglect
of the problems of the cities—which both see
as a crucial national problem.

Prom Gardner:
.
.
.
our cities today are plagued with every conceivable ill:
apathy, crime, poverty, racial conflict, slum housing, air
and
water pollution, inadequate schools and hospitals, and a breakdown in transportation. Coping with these problems is going to
be very near the top of the national agenda for the next decade.
There are no institutions better equipped to serve as a base for
that struggle than the colleges and universities, but they have
played a negligible role thus far. ^9

and Taylor accuses the universities not merely of neglect, but of com-

plicity in the problems of the city:
While the
situation
versities
disrupted

problems of the cities were multiplying and their
was mounting to the level of catastrophe, the uniwere busy with the construction of buildings which
the lives of citizens and whole commvinities.30

Fashing and Deutsch point to the universities' neglect of moral
issues:

...

a refusal of the academic community to come to grips, or
at least make an attempt to come to grips, with moral issues
such as war, racism, and poverty.

And the "radical left" has made university morality a central
issue in its attack on it

—a

sampling of such criticism includes:

The University functions as a production line, of servanttechnicians to operate our inhuman, economic oriented system.
... It treats people (students, faculty, employees, and
neighbors alike) as objects serving this system of inhuman
value s.^^
^9*»Agenda for the Colleges and Universities," in Campus

^^Stxidents without Teachers, p.

113»

^ Academics in

^^University Crisis Reader, Vol. I, p. 120.

I

98 Q 1 P* 5*

Retreat

,

p.

13.
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It IS not a violation of the purpose of a
university that some
activity serve society; but . . . The university
is
at this moment an ideological institution, a
mask for systematic

dominance and privilege.

The collegiate wing of privilege could not shield
us from the
decay and violence in our society. The University was
not, as
we first believed, a sanctuary from the world; it was,
in fact,
a proponent of the most violent system the centuries have
created—the system of capital. It was that system that led
to fascism in Greece, starvation in India, ruin in Vietnam,
and
racism in America.

And Harris Wofford has observed:
The federal government knows, the State Department knows, the
Pentagon knows, the CIA knows, [^andj our adversaries around the
world know——that American universities are and have been agents
for research and recruitment in support of America's world
policies and military efforts. 35

And finally two others, older critics, make criticisms very similar in tone and substance:

Prom Harold Taylor:

[Universities] have been organized for efficiency, not for true
public service. At the time they should have been creative centers for the development of strategies for peace, disarmament,
and world xmity, they were expanding their work with Defense
Department contracts. When the educational problems of the
black community were getting worse by the day, they were busy
making admission requirements more and more favorable to white
students with high scholastic aptitudes.3^

And from Alvin Eurich, succinctly:
We cannot tolerate another generation that knows so much about
preserving and destroying life, but so little about enhancing it. 37

^^Ibid.

,

p.

^^

119.

Ibid .

.

^^Quoted in Academics in Retreat , p. 285*
^^ Students without Teachers

,

p.

113.

^^ Reforming American Education , p.

122.

p. 24.

39

Most writers and scholars who deal with issues
of the ecology

and global survival join in indicting the universities
for neglecting,
and indeed by their technological output often contributing
to, the
threats to human survival and quality of life facing contemporary
civilization.

For example:

Prom Paul Ehrlich, Stanford ecologist, population biologist, and
author;
In the United States and around the world there clearly has been
an almost total failure to prepare people to understand and make
decisions relating to the population— environment crisis. The
universities, which should be leading the way in education, have
been too conservative and compartmentalized.

from Alvin Toffler in Future Shock ;
What passes for education today, even in our ’’best" schools
and colleges, is a hopeless anachronism. . . . our schools
face backward toward a dying system, rather than forward to
the emerging new society. Their vast energies are applied
to cranking out Industrial Men people tooled for survival in
a system that will be dead before they are. 39

—

and finally, from Garrett De Bell, editor of The Environmental
Handbook:

Education, particularly higher education, is critically important to solving our ecological crisis. At present, universities do much of the specialized research which develops the
technology that is raping the earth and threatening our survival. They do this job devastatingly well. Yet the knowledge
and wisdom to apply technology wisely is neglected. . . . Very
little research is aimed at developing alternatives to our
present disastrous pattern of existence with excessive production-waste; conspicuous consumption; manipulative advertising;
growth for its own sake; poverty in the midst of plenty; and

^®Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, Population/Resources/Environment (San Francisco; W. H. Freeman, 1970) » P* 264*

^^Toffler, Future Shock (New York;

Random House, 1970 ), pp. 353-54*
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the destruction of the air, water, soil, and
organisms that are
the basis of the life-support system. 4-0

C^ase

Studies of Change in Higher Education

My attempt to discover case studies of change in higher
education has led me to a conclusion similar to that of Joseph Fashing
and

Steven Deutsch:

Considering the magnitude of the problems facing higher education, there has been relatively little systematic study of the
change process and its response to these problems. In the past
decade, for instance, there has been very little study of the
process of educational innovation in colleges and universities,
and almost none with reference to some of the most important
developments, (p. 5)
There is nevertheless a small, and hopefully growing, body of

literature which recounts and analyzes recent attempts at change in

American institutions of higher education.

Chief among these are J. B.

Lon Hefferlin's The Dynamics of Academic Reform (1969)» Dwight R. Ladd's

Change in Educational Policy (1970), Fashing and Deutsch' s Academics in
Retreat (1971)| and two chapters in Warren Bennis' The Leaning Ivory

Tower (1973)«

In total these studies provide a distressing panorama of

limited aspirations and failed attempts to bring about change at the
institutions studied

—and

offer some surprisingly similar conclusions

as to reasons for those failures.

and Ecology," in The Environmental Handbook , ed. by
Garrett De Bell (New York: Ballentine, 1970), pp. 129-30.
40ti Education
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The Dynamics of Academic Reform^ l

In the first of these J. B. Lon Hefferlin studied curriculum

change and its sources from ^^62 to I967 in 110 selected
institutions
to try to determine what factors (which he called indicators
of insti-

tutional vitality) tended to distinguish those who changed more from
those who changed less.

A major finding of his study is that a relatively small amount
of change in fact took place at the 110 institutions during the five

years of the survey—as evidenced by the low rate of change in courses:
By 1967 1 the 110 institutions that we siirveyed had reorganized or substituted, on the average, one out of every five
courses that they had offered in I962. Their rate of course
reform, according to our measure, was slightly over 4»4 per
cent a year . . . theoretically, at least, this means that the
content of the undergraduate curriculxun is being reconstituted
completely at least every twenty-two years, (p, 54)
In the face of the need for reform described in previous sections

of this chapter, this indicated rate of change appears clearly insufficient.

Hefferlin begins his attempt to trace the causes of this low rate
of change with a survey of the literature of change

change

—and

and of educational

from this study derives a list of resistances to change that

appear to be operating in institutions of higher education.

He sees

these resistances as arising both out of the general resistances to
change common to most institutions and out of a set of resistances unique
to educational organizations

—as

follows:

(San
B. Lon Hefferlin, The Dynamics of Aceuiemic Reform

Francisco:

Jossey-Bass, 1969T^
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RESISTANCES AS AN INSTITUTION/ORGANIZATION

Organizations are inherently passive—
they exist for
routinization of behavior
Voliintary organizations attract members
who agree with

their activities

Organizations tend toward institutionalization
and ritualism
Organizations that are livelihoods for people tend
to
come to exist only as livelihoods for those
people
The maintenance of institutional effectiveness
or
achievement (such as students' learning) is only one
problem that organizations must face in order to survive.
Other problems must take precedence over it. The squeaky
institutional imperative, in short, gets the oil.

RESISTANCES AS AN ACADEMIC ORGANIZATION

Their purposes and support are basically conservative
The educational system is vertically fragmented

Within higher education institutional reputation is not
based on innovation
Faculty members have obsez^ed their vocation for years
as students before joining it
The ideology of the academic profession treats professors
as independent professionals

Academics are skeptical about the idea of efficiency in
acctdemic life

Academic institutions are deliberately structured to
resist precipitant change, (pp. 10-16)

Hefferlin then, in his study of the literature, moves from that
on "the problems of reform" to that concerned with the "processes of

reform" to determine how change, when it has been successful, seems to

have been brought about.

He concludes from this study that the three

dominant sources of change in higher education have been "(t) the resources available for it, (2) the advocates interested in it, and
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(

3 ) the openness of the system to them."

He goes on to summarise, "In

every case of academic change, these
factors together appear to determine
its outcome." (p. 49)
In elaborating upon these findings,
he points out that new re-

sources appear essential for change because
of the unwillingness of in-

stitutions to divert resources from existing
programs to new ones:
.
.
.the first key to academic reform is that of
resources:
an existing program will continue to exist as
long as it can
find support. A new program will be tolerated
if it costs no
money or brings its own support. It will be
resisted if the
new funds it requires could be used for the
expansion of existing programs. And it will be actively opposed
and accepted
only under duress if existing resources must be
divided to include it.
(pp. 39-40)

He further points out that this requirement of new resources
for

new programs tends to create a situation in which control of change
in
universities is held by aigencies outside the university since "the resources that support the system overwhelmingly come from outside the
schools themselves." (p. 4I)
In his discussion of "advocates" for change, he finds that some

have come from inside the institution being changed, but more often are

new to that organization, observing that

New members of an institution will naturally tend to alter the
organization unless they deliberately avoid or are constrained
from doing so, simply because newcomers disrupt tradition by
being unaware of it. (Thus the members of any group who wish
to preserve their status quo generally resist the recruitment
of new leaders or members from outside. . . .) (p. 45)
and pointing out that

Unlike some other organizations, colleges and universities are
almost completely dependent on turnover of personnel to accomplish major reforms. Thus the process of acawiemic reform
occurs of necessity through change of persons the replacement
persons, such
and rotation of individuals rather than change
skills,
as changes in their attitudes or
(pp. 145-46)

—

—

^
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For this reason he finds that the
’’openness" of an institution
to change depends primarily on the
introduction of new people into that

institution which, in turn, depends primarily
on the growth of the institution.
The recruitment of such individuals as
catalysts of change
accounts for much of the process of reform.
One result of
this fact is a generally higher level of
academic innovation
at institutions that are expanding in contrast
to those staying the same size. Expansion permits new programs
and the
hiring of new faculty at a rate faster than replacement,
(p. 48)

Hefferlin then moves from his study of the literature to
an suialysis of the data derived from hie survey of curricular
change at 110 in-

stitutions in an attempt to further define those factors which tend
to

contribute to academic innovation.

He first looks at the general insti-

tutional characteristics which seem to separate those that changed more
from those that changed less, and finds that the more innovative insti-

tutions tend to be characterized by small size, financial instability,

dependence on student tuition, high faculty turnover and urban location. (p. 127)

He also summarizes the results of a questionnaire sent to selected faculty and administrators at the institutions eliciting their

perceptions of the source of changes at their institutions, and in his

concluding chapter combines the data from his review of the literature,
the study of general institutional characteristics, and the questionnaire
to delineate ten factors which he sees as "likely contributors to con-

tinuous academic change" (p. 154) summarized as follows:
(1)

A market is essential .

a demand for improvement

— is

"Above all, a market for new ideas

necessary

.

.

.

resources and rewards must
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be available for academic reform!'
(pp, 154-155)

aS« "-oaelB are needed for

’•Academic refom consists far more in the diffusion of
educational ideas from one institution to another than in the creation
of new ideas." (p. 156)

need circulation.

"Educational refo™ has traditionally

depended on the circulation of individuals
from job to job
mechanisms can be used.

.

,

,»*

(pp,

.

.

but other

I57-I58)

A niimber of "mar ginal" members are helpful
.

(4)

.

A marginal

member is someone "associated with it whose
livelihood is not dependent
on it.

Such people "can affect [the institution's]
operations by mediat-

ing between the institution and its environment.

members

.

.

consultants.
(

5)

.

.

.

Typical marginal

are trustees, alumni, visiting lecturers, patrons,
and

.

.

.

."

(p.

159)

For major reorganization, new members seem necessary——for

the reasons described above, (p. 161

)

Hefferlin sums up these first five factors as follows:
these
ment:

...

"...

all have in common an element of openness to the environ-

openness to outside influence, openness of competition, and to a

variety of ideas, individuals, and new members." (pp. 162-164)
He then goes on to five conclusions about the effect of insti-

tutional decision-making processes on the achievement of academic reform.
(

6

)

The right people must be retained .

The institution must not

systematically reject or exclude from its decision-making processes those
who do not subscribe to the maintenance of the status quo. (p. I64)
(7)

Initiative is decentralized .

Faculty and students have the

opportunity to take initiative for curriculum changes.

Hefferlin observes:
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e suspect that the major
restriction to continuous reform
on many campuses is the debilitating
effect of a sense of
powerlessness, whereby initiative
seems impossible, (p. 166)

inetiiutions appear'by and Lrgl to
off.; IT.
students greater latitude of behavior
lor.
They select faculty whom they consider
competent and
students whom they deem able, and then
they trust them. (p. 168)
Pgi^ri^rchy is avoided.

Hefferlin defines a patriarchal

in-

stitution as one in which "power is not
merely concentrated in one person or group, but it is assigned on the
basis of seniority and is thus

held interminably or indefinitely by senior
members."

In this structure

initiative tends to be restricted to senior
members of the faculty,
those least likely to desire any change in the
institution, (p. I69)

Collegia l consensus is also avoided .

(9)

Hefferlin sees col-

legiality as the opposite of patriarchy because
"(1) Initiative is dis-

persed throughout the organization rather than being
concentrated in one

person

.

,

,

(2) High status is achieved through renown rather than

ascribed through seniority

.

.

.

and (3) Positions of high status rotate

among members of the organization." (pp. I74-I75)
Hefferlin believes that collegiality has become the "ideal model"
of academic decision-making for many professors and he expects that in
the future more institutions will move toward it.

He is, however, very

skeptical of the appropriateness of the collegial model to the achievement of academic change, pointing out that in many institutions the

collegium permits no initiative on the part of individual faculty members without the approval of the faculty at large, a situation which he

refers to as "the tyranny of the collegium."

He is also highly suspicious

of collegiality because, vinder such a system, "academic reform

.

.

.

47

hinges almost entirely on the quality
of the new professors that
the
faculty allows or attracts into the
School."
(pp.

institution is avuncular.

I75-I77)

According to Hefferlin,

who employs this anthropological
term to describe the decision-making

processes which he sees as most conducive
to academic change, the

avuncular institution has three general
characteristics:
Initiative is neither permanently centralized
( 1 )
nor dispersed.
All members of the institution as well as
outsiders are considered to be advocates, and while power is
generally diffused,
It IS occasionally centralized
... ( 2 ) High status is assigned
on the basis of expertise. Responsibilities
are delegated to
individuals because of their special competencies,
(3) Positions
of status shift according to different tasks
rather than in
strict rotation, (pp. I78-I79)

Hefferlin views the avuncular form of institutional
decision-

making as the most effective compromise between patriarchy
and collegiality , observing that in this system "expertise tempers the
authority
of patriarchy and the equality of the collegium."
(p. 181

)

Change in Educational Policy

Dwight Ladd’s Change in Educational Policy:

Self-Studies in

Selected Colleges and Universities^ ^ is based on the analysis of case
studies of eleven^^ institutions which attempted to reform themselves
by self-examination, usually by a select committee, described by Ladd
as "the study and report method."

The book "describes and evaluates

^^Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (New York:

McGraw-Hill,

1970).

^^Univ. of California at Berkeley, Univ. of New Hampshire, Univ.
of Toronto, Swarthmore College, Wesleyan University, Michigan State Univ.,
Duke Univ., Brown Univ., Stanford Univ., Columbia College, and UCLA.
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both the educational policy changes
proposed in [these] institutions

between I965 and I969 and the processes
by which these proposed changes
were developed and disposed of by the
institutions involved.- (p. 2)
Ladd's conclusions are most succinctly
summed up by Fred M.

Hechinger in a Time magazine review of the
book:

After more than five years of labor, the
university reform
movement has brought forth mountains of committee
reports but
only little actual change. This is the essence
of a report by
the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education [Ladd's
book] made
public here last week. 44

And Ladd himself, after observing that "In the context of the
extreme changes in the environment of higher education, the policy
proposals, on the whole, strike me as being neither very imaginative
nor

very radical," reaches the following general conclusions:
There is little indication in any of the experiences to support the idea that the study—and— report technique is an effective way of gaining acceptance of the need for change or of
creating enthusiasm for involvement in developing new policies.
Where the study—and—report processes were intended primarily
to challenge the status quo, they largely failed to do so.
(pp. 197-198)
The situations reviewed here suggest that these studies
have rarely succeeded in bringing about any fundamental change
in educational policies on the campuses involved except where
a significant portion of the faculty had accepted the desirability
of some change before the study began or where pressures for
change from outside the faculties were much in evidence, (p. 200)

and
Except to the extent that consideration of these studies has
made several of the institutions more ready to change in the
futxire, the changes which have thus far resulted from the proposals seem, with some exceptions, to be only modest disturbances of the status quo, (pp. 211-212)

August 9

1

1970*
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The lack of success of these reform efforts
is particularly sur

prising in the light of the fact, noted by Clark
Kerr in his foreword,
that most reports seemed to agree on the areas
in which changes were

needed and on the direction of those changes.

Teaching

Specifically:

—

**0n the whole, the several reports candidly pointed to the often routine and
sometimes deplorable quality of the
teaching done by many college and university professors. (p. 162)
••

Advising

— ".

Curriculiim

— ".

Grading

—Was

Academic structure

—"It

.
,
the advising system tends to fail
both as a channel of information and as a
basis for significant contact between students and faculty members." (p. I 65 )

.
.
structured general education requirements have virtually no support and distribution requirements only reluctant support
[from the various study committees]." (p. I 78 )

seen as "threatening" and did not give
students an adequate "sense of their standing,
strengths, and shortcomings." (p. v)
seems high time for some university to
challenge the concept that the department
is the sole context within which scholarship
can flourish. "45

Yet despite this apparent agreement on the important areas of

concern, which might be construed to indicate strong consensus among

academic leaders on such issues, the actual change achieved, as Ladd has
observed, was quite small.

Ladd ascribes this resistance to change primarily to the collegial structures by which these institutions were governed.

In his last

chapter, titled "The Limits of Collegiality ," he suggests three ways in

which the collegial structures hampered the reform efforts.

^^Quoted by Ladd from Wesleyan Report, p. 193.
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First

The faculty decision-making bodies tended
to adopt only

those recommendations "which would have little
effect on the behavior

patterns and value systems of most individual faculty
members," in the
face of the more thoroughgoing reforms recommended
by the study committees. (p. 212)

Second

—Most

reports called for a reassessment of the basic goals

and objectives of the institution and, as Ladd observes, "The
record of
the cases makes quite clear that

,

for the most part , faculty never con-

fronted these basic questions about goals and objectives at all."
(p. 214)
Ladd ascribes this failure to the departmentalization of the faculty

which had focused their interests, concern and allegiance on their department and professional field rather than on the institution as a whole.
Thus the faculty had neither the interest in, nor perspective for, dealing with the institution-wide issues of goals and objectives, (p. 214)

And third

—The

departmentalization of the faculty also made it

nearly impossible, for similar reasons, for the faculty as a whole to
deal with the institution-wide issue of new approaches to undergraduate
education, (pp. 212-213)

Ladd therefore concludes, much as did Hefferlin, "The evidence
from the studies

.

.

.

does suggest that we have passed the limits of

collegiality as an effective system of decision-making." (p. 212)

He

elaborates "The ability of our colleges and universities to respond to
a need for change except when faced with severe pressure or the threat
of such press\ire

— is

frighteningly limited," (p.

9)*'*

•

•

real change

in educational policy will require significant reallocation of resources,

and, at present, resource allocation is controlled for the most part by
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those who most benefit from the status quo "
(p. 211), and "Given these

conditions, a primary task of academic leadership
is to try to counter
the pressures favoring the statue quo by
creating or maintaining an at-

mosphere of receptivity to change." (p. 206)

And finally, in concert with Hefferlin,

Laxid

concludes,

.

,

the essential issue raised by this study is the
apparent need, in the

foreseeable future, for a new basis for decision-making in relatively
large and diverse iiniversities." (p. 215)

Academics in Retreat

Joseph Fashing and Steven Deutsch^^ provide case studies of attempts at reform in six colleges and universities on the West Coast.
These studies do not purport to be objective, as appears to have been
the intent of Ladd and Hefferlin, but rather to focus on changes made in

what the authors see as the "right" direction

—toward

increased human-

ness, student participation, and institutional responsiveness to the

needs of both students and society.
The author's bias is clear in the following critical account of
the kinds of change which has taken place in American higher education
to date.

While there has been an apparent organizational rigidity
within the university in this country, it has not been totally
unresponsive to demands for change. The nature of such change
has rarely, however, been oriented toward the actiial or perceived needs of stxidents, but to the more general demands of
the outside conununity, especially government and industry. ...
Thus while the xmiversity cannot be characterized as having

^^Academics in Retreat; The Politics of Educational Innovation
(Albuquerque : Univ. of New Mexico Press,
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been totally unresponsive to the demands
for change, it is
exactly in those areas where it has been
responsive that the
problem lies. (pp. 12-13)
In many senses this study is marred by a
pervasive pessimism.

One senses that the authors do not want to find
evidence of successful
innovation.

Thus, while they find encouraging trends at Western
Washing-

ton State (primarily in the apparent success of its
experimental satellite

colleges and their positive influence on changing other parts of
the uniiu the institution's extensive student participation poli-

t

cies) and Stanford (in its curriculum innovations and Black Studies

Program), they also take pains to point out the fact that these insti-

tutions are not typical of most institutions of higher education in

America.
Thus, in introducing the Western Washington case, they begin,

"Of all the institutions discussed. Western Washington departs farthest
from the group norm [primarily in size, location, and student composition]." (pp. I56-I57)
the observation:

presents a problem
ferent world.

And their analysis of change at Stanford contains

"Attempting to compare Stanford with other institutions
.

.

.

because in many respects Stanford is in a dif-

It is private.

It is wealthy.

Its resources are magnifi-

cent, and its students overwhelmingly upper middle and upper class."
(p. 214)

For the other four university change efforts studied. Fashing
and Deutsch record a highly distressing panorama of the failure of ini-

tially promising attempts at reform and innovation

—which

no doubt should

be read somewhat skeptically in the light of their previously described

pessimism, but which nevertheless appears to have considerable validity.
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Their conclusions read as follows:
At San Francisco State
cannot escape the conclusion .
.
that San Francisco
State College, if it is deserving of a postmortem,
has been
laid to rest, a victim of successful educational
innovation,
autocratic administration, and reactionary politics,
.

(p.

II 3 )

At the University of Oregon

After an impressive beginning, the University has joined
the retreat in the face of intensified community
pressure, (p.

I

55 )

At Berkeley
The history of educational reform at Berkeley has been one
of expressed commitment without action, of study without folIcw—through, and of a facade of innovation in what may be one
of the most thoroughly conservative institutions in the nation.

Increasingly demoralized, cynical, and embittered as a consequence of their experiences with one another and the outside
community, students, faculty, and administration at Berkeley
may have finally abandoned the last vestiges of constructive
effort at educational reform. It is not inconceivable that the
University has passed beyond the point of salvation at least
if it is to retain any semblance of honor. Whether this matters any more appears doubtful, (p. 244 )

—

At UCLA

Despite its record [of being "at the front of educational
innovation and change among the established major institutions
in California"] . . . UCLA like each of the other institutions
has been faced with virtually insurmountable barriers to progress.
Even with a committed administration and a more constructive
approach to vital educational problems than most, the battle to
move forward has been a losing one. At best perhaps UCLA has
managed to creep forward on some fronts and has not regressed
as far on others as have some campuses we have examined.
(pp. 182-183)
In their analysis of the causes of these failures in reform.

Fashing and Deutsch join Ladd and Hefferlin in ascribing primary responsibility to the limitations of collegial decision-making and to the de-

partmentalization of the faculty.
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Of the faculty, the authors state that »ln each
of the institutions visited, the faculty was at best a neutral force
in educational

innovation.

More often, though, they constituted the center of resist-

ance to change," and also that "Faculty resistance to
innovation appears
to have grown in each case almost in direct proportion
to the success

of the innovative prograun." (p. 26 o)

On departmentalization, they observe in their opening chapter
that:

To the extent that the focus of the faculty of the various
disciplines is so constricted by narrow disciplinary interests and to the extent that they are unwilling or unable to
address the problems of the larger university community, there
is likely to be a situation in which nothing is altered even
under intense pressvire. This is often so because: 1) nobody
is interested in the larger problems; 2) the faculty member's
energies are so taxed with the problems revolving around discipline and department that there is nothing left for more
general problems; or 3) factional disputes severely limit, or
make altogether impossible, a resolution of general community
problems, (pp. 16-17

On collegial decision-making, they point out that:

... a major dilemma in the structural organization of most
colleges and universities is caused in part at least . . .
by the quasidemocrat ic procedures which have become increasingly characteristic of college and university government . .
(pp. 239-240)

.

The authors' analysis of the limitations of collegiality is

similar to those proposed by Hefferlin and Ladd, but generally takes a

more political view, implying that these processes are used by "conserva'
tive interests" to impede cheinge and by university administrations to

mask inaction:
There is a genuine dilemma in any democratic or quasi-democrat ic
system with multiple interests. Competing constituencies, with
fundamental, and perhaps irreconcilable, conflicts of interests
extent
may effectively veto any administrative action. To the
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that this is true, moving the organization
in any direction
that involves altering the status quo may be
very nearly
impossible. . . . Given that this is the case,
the highly
democratized, and in this case highly inefficient
structure,
acts as a barrier fostering the conservative
interests of
those hiding behind it. ... The strategy
of avoiding decisions through the construction of elaborate
deliberative
mechanisms is an integral feature of almost any action
taken
at the faculty level.
In this respect, it has often been the
case that institutions have given the appearance
of taking
action while, in effect, nothing was happening,
(pp. 241 - 242 )
The Leaning Ivory Tower

The final two chapters of Bennis' book^^ are devoted to personal

reflections on an attempt to bring about radical reform at the State Uni-

versity of New York at Buffalo (SUNYAB).

Since the goals of the change

effort at Buffalo were very similar to the goals of the change effort

described in this study and since some of the means employed and problems which arose were also quite similar, the conclusions which Bennis

arrived at as a result of his experience have considerable significance
for this study and will, therefore, be described in some detail below.
The goals and fate of the attempt to reform Buffalo are con-

cisely summarized in Bennis' two chapter heads, "The Berkeley of the
East" and "What Went Wrong."
Bennis joined Buffalo as Provost of the Social Science Faculty
as part of a dramatic revitalization effort undertaken by its new Presi-

dent, Martin Meyerson.

Meyerson had come to Buffalo after compiling a

highly successful record as a leading scholar in urban planning, first

director of the Harvard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies, and Acting

^ ^Warren Bennis, The Leaning Ivory Tower (San Francisco: JosseyBass, 1973).
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Chancellor at Berkeley.
••the

It was Meyerson who intended to make
Buffalo

Berkeley of the East," and to do so through
academic reform.

In

his inaugural address, for example, Meyerson
had stated, "If we have the

courage to be different, we shall not long be
different because the
model of State University of New York at Buffalo
will become a model for
many." (p. 124)

Meyerson •s "Ace in the hole," as Bennis describes it, "was
a
truly monumental plan for redesigning Buffalo's conventional
departments

—schools —and

colleges academic structure."

His plan for doing

BO had been ratified by the Buffalo Faculty Senate two months after
his

arrival and included:

—The reorganization

of the ninety existing departments into

seven new faculties, each with a provost as chief academic and administrative officer.

This structure was intended to encourage the develop-

ment of interdisciplinary programs and each provost was to have ample

resources and administrative leeway to implement new academic programs.

—The

building of thirty new colleges on campus, each to act as

living-learning centers for 400 students and 6OO commuters.

These col-

leges were intended to "offset the apathy and anomie characteristic of

an enormous campus" and to "counteract the stranglehold that traditional

departments have on the typical university."

—The

development of "University-wide action-research centers

or councils on international studies, urban studies, and higher educa-

tion studies [which] would act as magnets for scholars and students drawn
from the entire university (and outside) to work together on such vital

central issues." (pp.

1

17-118)
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A new $650,000,000 campus was planned
and Meyerson had assured
Bennis "that with the new campus sufficient
resources would be available
to build quality on top of the university's
inevitable deadwood, the less

competent holdovers from previous administrations."
(p. II9)

And the following year was indeed a year of
change.

Seventy-five

per cent of the total faculty were Meyerson
recruits, many raided from
Harvard, Yale, Princeton and MIT.

Bennis himself recruited forty-five

new faculty members for his unit and replaced nine
chairmen and two
deans (changing about 90 per cent of the leadership in his
area).

As

he reports, "The tiny crowded campus barely seemed able
to contain all
the excitement within it." (pp. 125-126)

And Bennis also reports some "rumblings in paradise."

The col-

leges, six of which had gotten under way, were getting a reputation for

low academic standards.

The Centers were not doing well.

The new faculty

structures were being resisted by many faculty members, (p. I27)
In Axigust 1968 Bennis was made university Vice-President for

Academic Affairs, (p. 128 )
Bennis concludes his first chapter with the terse statement,

"Camelot lasted barely a thousand days" and picks up that theme in the
next chapter, "I had gone to Buffalo seeking Camelot.

moment was brief indeed.

.

.

.

Three years after

was a different university." (p. I30)

ray

Ceunelot's shining

arrival, Buffalo

He goes on to describe the mag-

nitude of the disaster:

—President Meyerson and the university chancellor had resigned
—Two of the three new provosts had resigned (Bennis was the
third).
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•'The

BIX colleges were struggling for their
existence, the

initial energies and ideas behind them
dissipated."
"All directors of the three special centers

and only one center

...

,

.

.

had resigned,

was still in operation."

—Construction of the new campus had not gotten under way
until
late 1970.

The faculty was beginning to lose its "superstars."

—Most

Meyerson appointees had resigned.

A conservative president had been named, and he had appointed
primarily "old" Buffalo people to important posts,
(pp. 130—131)
In attempting to assess the reasons for the precipitous failure

of the attempt to reform Buffalo, Bennis observes, ''Nothing is so hard
to change as a university, and Meyerson'
(p.

136)

s

attempt was courageous."

"Whether anyone could have turned UB into a permanent academic

Utopia in three short years is doubtful.

But the warning signals of

weaknesses that would ultimately prove fatal were there early in the attempt, and we in the Meyerson administration consistently ignored them."
(p.

133)

Bennis particularly points to some observations made earlier by

Ladd (who had visited the campus as a part of his work on the study of

change in higher education described above) which included:

—The

fact that the reoi^anizat ion, although highly dramatic and

visible, did not necessarily affect the behavior of individual faculty
members.

—The

fact that many educationally conservative faculty remained

in informal positions of influence.

59

The fact that a major outcome of
the reorganization had been

merely to add another layer to an "already
baroque" bureaucratic structure. (pp.

133-134)

Bennis, however, lays the majority of the
blame on the failures
of the leadership to effectively direct
the change effort.

He summarizes

his findings in a set of eleven guidelines
which he would follow if he

"were asked today to bring about change in a
\miversity setting." (p. 136 )
The guidelines, together with a brief summary
of their rationale,
is included below.
^ )

Reci^i t with scrupulous honesty

—Recruiting

at UB focused

on thehopes of the future rather than the realities of the
present.

We had raised expectations as high as any in modern educational history.

When our program met only a part of these expectations, the disillusionment which followed was predictable and widespread.

The disparity be-

tween vision and reality became intolerable." (pp. 136-138)
2) Guard against the Crazies

—

Innovation ... attracts interesting people. It also attracts
people who will take your ideas and distort them into something
monstrous. . . . Change-oriented administrators must be able to
distinguish the innovators, however eccentric they may be, from
the crazies, (p. 138) [Bennis is never more specific about the
effect of "crazies" at Buffalo.]
3)

Build support among like-minded people, whether or not you

recruited them

—"We

succeeded in infusing new blood into Buffalo, but

we failed to recirculate the old blood." (pp. 138-139)
4)

Plan for how to change as well as what to change

—"Buffalo

had a plan for change, but we lacked a clear concept of how change should
proceed.

A statement of goals is not a program."

And Bennis also ob-

serves, under this heading, "If change is to be permanent it must be
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gradual." (pp. 139-141)
settle for rhet orical change— "We allowed
ourselves to
be swept along by our rhetoric and neglected
the much more demanding

business of building new constituencies and
maintaining established
ones." (p. 141)

Don’t allow those who are opposed to change to
appropriate
such basic issues a s academic standards— "We allowed
the least change-

oriented faculty members to make the issue of standards
their own.

They

persuaded a great majority of moderate faculty members that the
administration was committed to change for change's sake."
(pp. I4I-I42)

Know the territory

T)

chauvinism.

university

,

—"We

never mastered the politics of local

At the same time that the national press was romancing the
one of the two local dailies was libeling her unmercifully.

We devoted too little energy and imagination to public relations at the
local level." (p. 142)
8)

Appreciate environmental factors

—"Like

any other human

activity, change proceeds more smoothly under optimal environmental con-

ditions."

The problem at Buffalo was that, in the absence of its new

campus, facilities were overcrowded, often primitive, and increasingly

scattered, (pp. 142-143)
9)

Avoid future shock

—

Buffalo aspired to be The University of the Year 2000. The future
limited the campus just as the past limits the neurotic. The
future insinuated itself into every attempt to deal with current
issues and distorted our perception of the present. The unfinished
new campus became an albatross, reminding everyone of the limited
progress that was being made toward limitless goals. We put so
much stock in the vision of future greatness that our disillusionment was inevitable, (pp. 143-144)
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”*0)

Allow time to consolidate gains

The average tenure of a university
president is now 4-4 years
and decreasing.
It is impossible to transform a
university
in so short a time. ... The campus
had, in effect, undergone
major surgery and did not have sufficient
time to heal. . . .
(p.

144)

^

^member that change

is most successful when those who are

affected are involved in the planning
This is a platitude of planning theory. . . .
Buffalo's academic
plan was not popularly generated. Students and faculty
did not
contribute to its formulation. People resist change, even
of a
kind they basically agree with, if they are not significantly
involved in the planning. A clumsier, slower, but more egalitarian approach to changing the university would have resulted
in more permanent reform, (p. I 45 )

Change in Schools of Education

Schools of education are subject to all the resistances to reform which flow through the university and have, if anything, been more

resistant to change and find themselves more antiquated in their content
and methods than other departments of the university.

I

have found

little in the literature directly relating to the process of change in
schools of education, but would speculate that there are at least two

resistances to reform beyond those operating in the university as a
whole which are unique to most schools of education.

First, the public

school system is a major client of a school of education.

must be prepared for teaching in these schools.

Its students

If the schools remain

unchanged in their operations and their expectations of the graduates of
the school of education, it is very difficult for the school of educa-

tion to change its own content

—and

as a generality, the public schools
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remain conservative in their methods
and expectations.
Secondly, as previously described,
schools of education tend to
be second-class citizens in the
university cornmunity, considered, at

worst, as second-rate scholars teaching
in a vocational school.

The de-

sire to become accepted as first-rate
citizens demands an allegiance to
the dominant values of the collegium
(witness, for example, some of the

"research" carried on in schools of education)
which in most oases leads
to an overdose of the kind of conservatism
attributed to university fao-

ulties above.
The two major studies of schools of education came
out, perhaps

more than coincidentally, in I963 carrying the complementary
titles The

Educatio n of American Teachers and The Miseducation of American Teachers
.
The former, written by James B. Conant,^^ ex—President of Harvard, in-

cluded a study of state teacher certification policies (which he found
inconsistent and often inappropriately derived and supervised) and of

teacher training procedures in schools of education (which he finds wanting in many respects) and concludes with a series of recommendations for

reform on the part of the states, local school boards, schools of education, and the National Association for the Accreditation of Teacher Edu-

cation.

^®This condition could, should the schools change, become a source
of innovation. But to a large extent what happens in schools of education determines what happens in schools. In effect, then, the schools
and schools of education exist in a closed circular system which supports maintenance of the status quo.
^ 9 conant, The Education of American Teachers (New York: McGrawHill, 1963).
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There is little evidence that this
book, which initially caused
a considerable stir in educational
circles, brought about any significant

change in most schools of education.

For instance, in June

I

964 the

editors of the Phi Delta Kappan had 21
reporters check the effects of
the report on the educational system and
schools of education in their

areas—and the consensus was that very little had changed
the book.

as a result of

Its strongest effect seems to have been to
cause some states

to set up study committees.

Other responses to reporters included com-

ments along such lines as criticism of Conant, he was
not to be taken
seriously since he was not a part of "education*' (all hie
experience having been at the university level); that "no one was going to dictate

changes to me"

;

that the time since the study had been too short to

achieve any change in response to the report; and that "it was a good
study that needed to be closely studied."
It seems clear that heads of schools of education, who could have

used a book by as highly respected a man as Conant as a lever for reform
in their own university and school, did not choose to do so.

In fact,

the Phi Delta Kappan editors wryly conclude with the observation that:

Special evidence of the esteem in which Dr. Conant is held lies
in the fact that a large number of Deans professors of education, and others, with a fine balance of pride and indignation,
make this assertion: "Our college . . . probably comes closer
than any other to following Mr. Conant *s recommendation. "50
,

Koerner's book. The Miseducation of American Teachers
pears to have left schools of education unaffected.

,

also ap-

This book amounted

The Education of American Teachers Influencing the Education
of Teachers?" Phi Delta Kappan June I964t P» 433.
50»»is

,
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to an acrosB-the-board denunciation
of the activities of most schools

of education and, despite some very
perceptive insights, was generally

dismissed, and

believe with justification, as supercilious
and intem-

I

perate>-as evidenced by the following
quotations from his summary of
findings:

.

the inferior quality of the Education
faculty is the

frmdamental limitation of the field,"

[Education] has not yet developed a corpus of knowledge
and
techniques of sufficient scope and power to warrant the
field's
being given full academic status. . . . That it has been
given
this status in most of our colleges . . . does not
make Education a genuine discipline; it only makes possible the
building
of more academic empires on sandy foundations, 51
and Koerner alleges that educationists have abandoned the English
language for "a pernicious patois that can most charitably be called Edu—
canto.

...

Educanto masks a lack of thought, supports a specious

scientism, thrives on slogans and incantations, and repels any educated

mind that happens upon it, "5^ and, "in Education, as opposed to other
fields, there are as yet insufficient forces to oppose the policy of

stagnation. "53
I

have made an extensive, but by no means comprehensive, search

through the Education Index 5^ an index to articles in 200 education,

related journals, for the 1968-1973 period to find evidence of substantial change in schools of education.

There are clearly no case studies

of such changes and of almost equal clarity is the fact that the type of

51 james D. Koerner, The Miseducation of
Houghton Mifflin, 1963), p» 17*

5 ^ Ibid .

,

53 j^^,

pp. 20-21.

^^Julie W. Ehrenreich, ed.
Wilson, 1969-72).

,

American Teachers (Boston:

^

p,

I’y,

Education Index (New York:

H. W.
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thoroughgoing reforms being attempted
in other parte of the university
are not as prevalent in sohoole of
eduoation. In sum, it appears that
eohools of eduoation as a whole are not
engaged in a period of subetantial reform of their activities.

This observation is confirmed by Harry
Resnick in his article
in the Saturday Review. "Are There Better Ways
to Teach Teachers?" when

he observes;

Despite years of protest and criticism, unimaginative
courses
in the history, philosophy, psychology, and
methodology of
education continue to be standard fare in teacher-training
programs throughout the country. Lately some schools have
shovm signs of enlarging their view of teacher training
by
offering such options as group dynamics and sensitivity
training, and including specialties such as ethnic studies
or urban affairs, But the basic framework is the same. 55
Resnick then goes on to describe three institutions that have
made basic changes

—^Harvard,

versity of Massachusetts.

the University of North Dakota, and Uni-

My review of the literature indicates that he

probably has chosen the most significant examples of change in schools
of education in the last five years.

According to Resnick, the changes at Harvard have been dramatic
and thorough, and include;
1)

A consolidation of academic areas from twenty-two to eight.

2)

A curriculum devoted less to teaching conventional school

subjects and more to developmental psychology, social policy, planning,
and "the premise that schools in their present form need full-scale

revision and that teachers and graduate students must join in taking a
more activist role in bringing it about*'

55 saturday Review , March 4i

^972, p» 46.
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3)

The departure of twelve faculty

„,en.bere

and an increase in

proportion of doctoral students from
20 per cent to 50 per cent
Increased involvement in off-campus
projects. 56

4)

It appears from Resnick's article
that these changes were

brought about, in contradiction to Ladd's
conclusions, by self-study
and through the collegial decision-making
process.

For example, he de-

scribes an 18-month Patrick Moynihan seminar
to study the findings of
the Coleman Report as "a crucial factor in
[the] drastic reorganization

now taking

within the Harvard ed. school

iJace

.

.

.«

and goes on to

state that "the changes at Harvard [were] engineered
by a student-

faculty committee set up by Dean Theodore R. Sizer to
re-evaluate the
entire school.

..."

It also appears, however, that the Dean himself

was a strong motive force behind these changes since. Resnick observes,

"Sizer has decided to step down, after seven years as dean, hoping that
a period of calm and consolidation will ensue. "57
At the University of North Dakota, change in the preparation of

teachers appears to have been brought about by what has been called the

"end— run strategy"

— that

is by the creation and development of an inno-

vative progTcim outside the pre-existing structures of the organization.
Thus, in

I

968 the New School of Behavioral Studies in Education was

established "as an experimental college component of the University. "58
This school, under "the astute political guidance of its Dean, Vito

Perrone," became committed to the open classroom approach to education

^^ Ibid .

,

pp. 47-48.

^^ Insights

^'^

Ibid ., p. 47.

Newsletter of the New School of Behavioral Studies in
,
Education, University of North Dakota (Grand Porks), May 1972, p. 1.
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and, according to Resnick, "abandoned

.

.

.

required courses and built

its curriculum around the principle
that, in order to teach students how
to be autonomous learners,

.

.

.

teachers first would have to master the

art themselves.”

Resnick states that “There are virtually no
course requirements
at the New School, and students plan and organize
their curriculums in

close consultation with their advisors. ”59
The end run appears to have been highly successful, so
successful in fact that in July I972 the New School and the College
of Educa-

tion were merged into a new teacher training entity called the Center
for Teaching and Learning

—^with

Vito Perrone as Dean.^^

Beyond these two brief summaries, there is little evidence of

significant reform in schools of education available in the literature
surveyed

On Organizational Change

A review of the literature of organizational change leads me to

the conclusion that although some theories offer useful insights into
some aspects of organizational process, as a whole organizational change

theory has not provided organizational leaders with the tools they need
to bring about change in their organizations.

Warren Bennis appears to agree with this observation.

book Changing Organization

,

In his

written shortly before he accepted the posi-

tion at Buffalo and perhaps foreshadowing some of the difficulties of

59Resnick, p. 46.

60 Insights

,

p.

1.
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the leadership in successfully
bringing abcut change there, he describes
the lack of useful theories for bringing
about organisational change.

If there is one truth most social theorists
agree on and on
wnich they can arrive at a quick consensus,
it is the lack
of a viable theory of social change. .
.
.
.
.
.
what . . . [is] so curious about the present
state of
theories of social change ... is that they
are silent on
matters of directing and implementing change ....
they
tend to identify and explain the dynamic
interactions of a
system without providing a clue pertaining to the
identification of strategic leverages for alteration. They
are theories
suitable only for observers of social change, not theories
for
participants in, or practitioners of, social change. They are
theories of change and not theories of changing .
Bennis cites the statements of three prominent sociologists to
support his contention that there are no viable theories of social
change, quoting

Wibert E. Moore, who stated "The mention of 'theory of
social change' will make most social scientists appear defensive, furtive, guilt-ridden, or frightened."
K. D. Naegele who, in preface to his "monumental" Theories
of Society Volume II, observed "At the gate of the study of
social change stands a host of half truths."
and D. Martindale who reports an admission made by ". . .
leading sociologists that its theory of social change is the
weakest branch of sociological theory .
.

Bennis elaborates on his thesis by reference to the work of

Robert Chin, who has delineated seven prerequisites of a viable

theory of changing, and concludes that no existing theories meet
these prerequisites.

"Such a theory does not now exist, and this

probably explains why the change agents
'theoretical orphans.'

.

.

.

appear to write like

More important," says Bennis, "it also explains

why so many change progreuns based on theories of social change have
61

Bennis, Changing Organizations (New York;

p. 99.
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Ibid.

McGraw-Hill

,

I966)
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been inadeqviate,”^^
Louis M. Maguire seems to concur with
Bennis' view of the weak-

ness of change theories, beginning
his comprehensive summary of change

literature for educators
The past decade has witnessed a profusion
of writings addressed
to change in education and a substantial
increase in the number
of projects designed to effect educational
change. There exist
however, few scientifically developed (i.e.,
theoretically based,
empirically tested and revised) tools for use in
the task of
administering change . , ,
The overarching observation is that the
practicing school
administrator can find very little practical help in
the
t^e fog^planning and managing, and dealing with problems literaof

In the absence of the consistent, theoretically based
model for

change which Bennis, Maguire and no doubt all leaders would like
to have,
we do have a substantial number of theoretical and strategic lenses.

These constructs can provide useful insights into parts of the change
process, although not the whole, and are therefore of some use to prac-

titioners.

William A. McClelland has summarized the situation as fol-

lows:
It is premature to do more than wish
alone a general theory of change and
researchers have developed a variety
each of which deals with some aspect
or with some specific setting. ^5

In the pages which follow

I

for a general model, let
changing. Accordingly,
of subsystem models,
of the change process

shall describe some of the major

theoretical and practical lenses available to practitioners.

^^ Ibid .

,

pp.

My choice

100-101.

^^Louis M. Maguire, Observations and Analysis of the Literature
on Change (Philadelphia: Research for Better Schools, 1970), p. H
^^Ibid.

,

p.

12.
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of lenses to describe is based
on my estimate of usefulness
in understanding organizational change, on
my estimate of the general aco.ptanoe

and use of the construct by
practitioners and students of change,
and on
my estimate of appropriateness for
use in educational settings.
I

shall divide these constructs into
three general categories,

realizing that the boundaries between
these categories will often be
fuzzy and ill-defined.

—The

first category will consist of "analytical
models," con-

structs which offer useful ways of looking at
organizations and organizational change processes.

The practitioner can devise appropriate

change strategies or attempt to adopt appropriate
leader behavior based
on the insights provided him by these models.

—The second category

will be made up of "descriptive models,"

descriptions of patterns of change in organizations derived from obser-

vation and analysis of change efforts in a variety of organizations.
Such descriptions can be useful to the practitioner in assessing the
potential for change in his organization and in developing effective

change strategies in his organization.

—The

third category consists of "change strategy models," in

effect partial blueprints to guide the practitioner in bringing about

successful organizational change.

Analytical Models

Levels of change

In their Management of Organizational Behavior Paul Hersey and

Kenneth Blanchard look at the process of organizational change in terms
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of four sequential levels,
(,) toowledge ohanges.
(3) individual behavior ohanges, and

(

(

2

)

altitudinal changes

4 ) group behavior

changes-^s in-

dicated in the following illustration
from their book.

GROUP BEHAVIOR
INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR

0>

>

0
>

c

T0

ATTITUDES

KNOWLEDGE
(Short)

^ (Long)

Time involved

(c)^Paul Mersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard,
Management
of Organizatio nal Behavior Second edition,
PrenticeHall, Inc.
.

They postulate that both the time required
for and difficulty
of these changes increases as the organization
moves through the various levels.

They go on to describe two methods of bringing about
or-

ganizational change in terms of these levels.

"participative change cycle."

The first they call the

This cycle, as described in the illustra-

tion below, begins with the introduction of new knowledge, usually by
the "personal power" of the leader.

This new knowledge will, if accepted,

tend to change individual attitudes, which will then affect individual
behavior, and ultimately the changes in individual behavior will aggre-

gate themselves into changes in group behavior.
the difficulty of

and time lapse between changes in level will increase

as the organization moves through the cycle

follows.

According to the model,

—^which

they illustrate as
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(c) Paul Hersey and Kenneth
H. Blanchard, Management

Organizational Behavior
Hall, Inc.

,

Second edition, Prentice—

The second cycle, which they
describe as the -coerced change

cycle,- begins at the fourth level
by a forced change in group behavior,

usually imposed by a leader relying on
his position power,

(i.e.,

"Henceforth there will be no more talking
or horseplay while the pro-

duction line IS in motion.
be

...

)

Any employee engaging in such behavior will

According to the theory, changed group behavior will
require

changes in individual behavior, which in turn will
require the assimilation of new knowledge to support that behavior, which finally will
result

(c) Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Management of Or—
ganizational Behavior Second edition, Prentice-Hall, Inc.
.

Comparing the two change cycles, the authors postulate that
participative change is slower than coerced change, but also tends to
be more permanent since changes are better integrated into participants'

behavior and thus do not depend on continued enforcement by the leader.
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They further postulate that the
participative change cycle appears
to be
most appropriate for mature groups
(to be described below) since
they
are more independent and also more
likely to assume responsibility
for
implementation, and that the coerced
change cycle is most appropriate
for
immature groups, which tend to be
passive and dependent and which,
acocrding to the authors, "might prefer
direction and structure. "66

A somewhat similar, although less
comprehensive model, is proposed by Art Oallaher, Jr. in his description
of the three interrelated

processes which lead to culture change.

These processes are described

as
(l)

innovation, the process whereby a new element
of culture
or combination of events is made available
to a group, (2) dissemination, the process whereby an innovation comes
to be
shared, and (3) integration, the process whereby
the innovation becomes mutually adjusted to other elements
in the culture . °
•

Maslow’s need hierarchy

Abraham Maslow's theory of the hierarchy of human needs is often
used by practitioners of change to determine the most effective motivators of change and to attempt to reduce the personal threats which often

accompany change efforts.

Maslow's hierarchy was developed to describe

levels of individual motivation but has also been applied by analysts to

organizations as a whole.

^^Excerpted and summarized from Paul Hersey and Kenneth H.
Blanchard, Management of Organizational Behavior Second Edition (New
Jersey, Prentice-Hall
1972) pp. 159-161
,

,

^ ^Maguire,
p.

9»

74

MasloWB hierarchy, as described in
his Motivaticn

and

2iit£, proposes that man's needs can be viewed
as a hierarchy which begins with physiological needs (food,
clothing, shelter), and moves
through
security (assurance that physiological
needs will continue to be met),
to affiliation, esteem (recognition),
and finally to self-actualization.
The theory postulates that a person's
primary motivation will arise out
of the lowest unmet need in the hierarchy,
and that when a need becomes

relatively satisfied, the satisfaction of
the next highest unmet need
will become his major source of motivation.^®
A practitioner might use this theoretical
construct, for example,
to ascertain appropriate rewards for new
behaviors in his organization.

For instance a man (or a group) operating primarily at
the esteem level
will probably respond to added recognition from
management, while another, operating at the affiliation level, would probably
resent such

recognition, since it would tend to set him off from the rest of the

group from which his major motivating need was being met.

The Hersey-Blanchard synthesis

Kersey and Blanchard have developed a theoretical construct of
orgemizational behavior and change which integrates what they call

*'

life-

cycle theory” with a number of other theories of change, motivation, and

leadership behavior.

The Hersey-Blanchard synthesis is significant in

that it pulls together a variety of theories which previously, primarily

because of differences in nomenclature, were treated as relatively
CO

”°Summarized from Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality
(New York: Harper, 1954 )*
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discreet and unrelated.

The fact that these theories
have sufficient

ooo».onallty to be synthesised. ™ay
also increase the practitioner's
con-

fidence in their validity.

I will describe only the life
cycle theonr

in detail, for more explanation
of the other theories the reader
is

recommended to Mersey and Blanchard's
Management of Organisational
ioT, Chapter 9 stud references.

Life cycle theory postulates four phases
in the growth of an or-

ganization and describes appropriate behavior
on the part of the leader
in each stage.

The illustration below delineates the stages
and effec-

tive leadership styles.
EFFECTIVE STYLES

if

(c) Paul Hersey and
Kenneth H, Blanchard,
Management of Organizational Behavior
Second edition,
Prentice-Hall, Inc.

[21
Highl?elaHonships

and

Low Task

IHigh Relationships

T-owTask
1

i

.

Hi^^^sk^

Lo w^e a t 0 ns h ps

(Low)-

High Task

and

i

an^k
Low Relatiowhips

TASK BEHAVIOR-

(Mahjr

\
(High)

(Immature)

According to life cycle theory an organization moves from immaturity (passivity and dependence) to maturity (initiative, responsibility,
and independence) in four phases.

In stage one, the theory postulates,

the leauier needs to focus on the task (high task), particularly in pro-

viding structure for the fulfillment of the task, but need not concern
himself with personal relationships between himself and the group or
among group members (low relationships).

As the group begins to mature
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(phase 2), the leader „uet concern
himself with both task and
relationships (high task-high relationship),
since personal relationships
have

begun to affect the maturation of
group members.

As it matures further,

the group begins to develop its
own structure for task accomplishment,
and
any direct interference from the leader
would only be dysfunctional to
the task (high relationship, low task).
In the final stage the group

has matured to the point where members
provide each other with personal
support and the group as a whole structures
its own activities,

m

this phase interference by the leader
in either the task or the group

relationship would be dysfunctional.

He is not needed to accomplish the

task nor is he a part of the functioning work
group.

He thus adopts a

low task, low relationship behavior style.

Life—cycle theory is thus useful to practitioners of change
in
that it defines appropriate leader style to bring about
change in each

of the four phases.

Hersey and Blanchard use this life— cycle theory as the basis
for their integration of other theories.

This integration is useful in

many ways, chief among them that it gives practitioners more lenses
with which to look at organizational growth and change, secondly because
the other theories so synthesized tend to extend and validate the life

cycle theory and each other, and thirdly because life—cycle theory gives
insight into appropriate leadership behavior under various conditions

described by the other theories.
The following is an attempt to summarize Hersey and Blanchard's

synthesis of life cycle and other related concepts. 69

^^Excerpted and smnmarized from Hersey and Blanchard, pp. 134-138,
174-179.
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Life Cycle Theory

Leadership style
Task
Relationships

Maslow*s Need Hierarchy

Phase

Phase

Phase

Phase

1

2

3

4

High
Low

High
High

Physiolog cal
«
-Sj. fety
.

}

Low
Low

_
Soi; ial

Eiiteem

I

selfactuali-

zation

Herzberg's MotivationHygiene Theory '/*^

Argyris ImmaturityMaturity Continmun^^

(

Low
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Hyg:, ene

Below
Average

Motivators

jAveraj

lAbovi

(Matur ty

I

(

Average

Dependent

•

Independent

Passive

-

Limited

Active
Multiple
behaviors

behavio]'
I

Other din cted

.

Short tim<
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McGregor Leadership Theory 7 ^

Tt

eory X

Inner
directed

Long time
perspective
T leory Y

Likert Management Systems ^^

Schein's Motivation
ParadigmV 4

Lewin’s Change Cycle

^^ Ibid .
7

^

Ibid .

54 *

,

p.

,

pp. 50-51*
pp, 46-48.

^^ Ibid .

,

pp. 60-64.

^^ Ibid .

,

p.

176.
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-
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Force field analysis

Force field analysis is used, retrospectively,
in this study
of changes at the School of Education
and is described in detail in

Chapter VIII.

When used prospectively as an analytical
tool to guide

the practitioner in his change effort, the
following general approach
is normally followed.

First the practitioner charts as best he can the

nature and strength of the driving forces toward
innovation in the or-

ganization and the restraining forces toward maintenance
of the status
quo.

He then surveys the forces he has described to determine
which

forces can be altered in appropriate directions (increase
driving/reduce

restraining) and also attempts to determine what new driving forces can
be added.

In effect, he is looking for "strategic levers," as described

by Bennis.
In looking for strategic levers, he focuses first on the possi-

for reduction of restraining forces, since the theory postulates
that change achieved by the reduction of restraining forces will tend to
be easier and more permanent, since change through an increase in driving

forces tends to increase the level of tension in and volatility of the
organi zat i on . ^ ^

Force field analysis is a very useful lens for systematically

analyzing the change potential of an organization and developing appropriate strategies.

Generally specific strategies will be derived from

other ways of looking at organizations such as those described above.

75summarized from David H, Jenkins, "Force Field Analysis Applied
to a School Situation," in Warren Bennis, Kenneth Benne, Robert Chin,
eds.. The Planning of Change (New York: Holt, 1961)1 pp. 238-244.
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Descriptive Models
Dennis* summar;y of planned
change techniques

BenniB in his Changing O rganizations
has evumarised and categorised techniques used in planned change
efforts.

The term "planned change'

has come to be associated with an
approach to organisational change de-

veloped by Ronald Lippett, Kenneth Benne,
and associates of the National

Training Laboratories (NTL).

This approach normally implies a consul-

tant "change agent" working with a
client system.

Chin defines planned

change as follows:
planned change [is] a deliberate and collaborative
.
process
involving a change agent and client system that are
brought together to solve a problem or to plan and attain an
improved
state of functioning in the client system by utilizing
and applying valid knowledge.^®
.

.

^o^pils^ion, then^ is limited to collaborative planned

change techniques, and is not intended to cover the entire range of
change techniques.

Thus, for example, coercion does not appear on his

list, although it is probably far and away the most common organizational

change strategy.
am including Dennis' summary as a descriptive model because it

I

provides a model of alternative strategies for the achievement of planned
change.

He describes seven types of planned change techniques:
1 )

Exposition and propagation

— (which

Dennis sees as the most

popular type of plajined change technique) assumes that knowledge influences behavior and therefore that behavior change can be brought about

7%a.guire, p. 11.
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by the exposition and propagation
of new knowledge.
2)

me

Elite Corps-assumes that the
"right people" introduced

into appropriate positions in the
organization will bring about appropriate changes.

Relations Traininff-~assmnftR that the
necessary insight,
wisdom, and diagnostic sensitivity for
appropriate changes can be facili-

tated in key executives through such training.
4)

^aff Analysis—assumes

that if sufficient data in well

analyzed form is made available to the key executive
by his staff, he
will be able to appropriately guide change efforts.
5)

Scholarly Co nsultations

— in

which a change program is devel-

oped on the advice of an "expert" (sociologist,
organizational theorist,

psychologist, etc.) on the basis of the outstanding theory and
literature of that expert's field rather than on research into the organiza-

tion to be changed.

Circulation of ideas to the elite

—which

assumes that change

can be brought about by "converting" the powerful people in the organization.
7)

Action Research

—which,

once a goal of change has been

agreed upon and initial strategies adopted, closely monitors (gets feed-

back from) the system being changed as a guide to the maintenance of
appropriate strategies throughout the change effort.^^

^^Bennis, Changing Organizations , pp. 101-103.
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The pa ttern of planned change

Ronald Lippett and his associateB,
in their book The Dynamioa of
Planned Change , desoribe the
pattern of Buooeseful planned change
through
the use of a "change agent" in
seven steps:
1.

The development of a need for
change

2.

The establishment of a change
relationship

3.

The clarification or diagnosis of the
client system's

problems.
4.

The examination of alternative routes
and goals:

establishing

goals and intentions of action
5»

The transformation of intentions into actual
change efforts

6.

The generalization and stabilization of change

7.

The achievement of a terminal relationship. 78

The Greiner change sequence

The most comprehensive descriptive model available is that
pro-

posed by Larry E. Greiner derived from his analysis of case studies
of

eighteen successful and unsuccessful change programs.

Based on this

study, he postulates seven sequential components of a successful change

effort

—as
1

)

follows:

The organization and especially top management is under con-

siderable external and internal pressure for improvement long before an

explicit organizational change is contemplated.

Performance and/or

7^onald Lippett, Jeanne Watson, Bruce Westly, The Dynamics of
Planned Change (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958), pp. 131-143*
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morale are low.

Top management seems to be

groping for solutions to

problems.
2)

A new man, known for his ability
to introduce improvements

enters the organization, either as
[its] official head, or as a consultant who deals directly with the head
of the organization.
3)

An initial act of the new man is to
encourage a reexamination

of past practices and current problems
within the organization.
4)

The head of the organization and his
immediate subordinates

assume a direct and highly involved role in
conducting the reexamination.
5)

The new man, with top management support,
engages several

levels of the organization in collaborative
fact-finding, problem-

solving discussions to identify and diagnose current
organizational
problems.
6)

The new man provides others with new ideas and methods for

developing solutions to problems

—again

at many levels of the organiza-

tion.
7)

The solutions and decisions are developed, tested, and fo\ind

creditable for solving problems on a small scale before an attempt is
made to widen the scope of chcuige to larger problems and the entire organization.
8)

The change effort spreads with each success experience, and

as management support grows, it is gradually absorbed permanently into

the organization’s way of life.

Greiner also observes, on the basis of his analysis, that the
less successful efforts at change tended to differ from the more successful primarily because of one or more departures from the "successful"
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pattern described above, specifically:
1)

They began at different starting
points-i.e., there was

not strong pressure for change
both externally and internally.
2)

They missed one or more of the
above steps.

3)

The change effort was either
unilateral or delegated by the

leadere^9

Change Strategy Models

Change process model strategies

Kurt Lewin has postulated that successful
organizational change

moves thro\igh three stages, which he describes
as unfreezing (desire and
readiness for changed behavior), changing (the
adoption of changed behavior), and refreezing (the full integration of
changed behavior).

This

cycle of change can be applied to individual, group, and
organizational

change

Blanchard and Hersey describe some specific strategies used by

managers to move their organizations through these cycles.

Their de-

scription is based primarily on studies of change processes by Edgar

Schein and H. C. Kelman.

Unfreezing ;

Schein has found some common elements in his survey

of unfreezing strategies including:
(1)

The physical removal of the individual[s] being changed

from his accustomed routines, sources of information, and social rela-

tionships

^^Excerpted and summarized from Larry E. Greiner, "Patterns of
Organizational Change," in Harvard Business Review, May-June 196? PP»
i

122-126.
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(2)

the iinderroining and
destruction of all ssocial supports

(3)

demeaning and humiliating experiences
to

help” the indi-

vidual being changed to see his
old self as unworthy and thus
to be

(4)

the constant linkage of reward
with willingness to change

and of punishment with unwillingness
to change
C hanging :

Once the individual or group has
become "unfrozen"

they are ready to adopt new forms of
behavior.

According to Kelman,

new behaviors tend to come from three
sources
id-entification

—with

a model from whom the individual can

learn new behaviors by identifying with him and
patterning his behavior

after him
internalization

— of new

behaviors in response to changed

social or environmental conditions.
coercion^——usually by the continuation of a reward system

which supports changed behavior and punishes unwillingness to
change.
Refreezing :

Refreezing is accomplished primarily by the mainte-

nance of an environment which reinforces and supports the new behavior.

Such an environment may often evolve relatively spontaneously in a group
that has gone through the unfreezing and changing cycles together pro-

vided management is supportive of the new behaviors, and can often be
institutionalized by management through the development of an appropriate organizational reward system.°^

80Excerpted and summarized from Hersey
and Blanchard, pp.

I

6 I-I 64 .
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Planned change strategies

NTL has delineated six etrategio
principles to guide change
agents in their attempt to
facilitate change in the client
system-as
follows:
1.

To change a subsystem or any
part of a subsystem, relevant

aspects of the environment must also
be changed
2.

To change behavior on any level
of a hierarchical organiza-

tion, it is necessary to achieve
oomplementaty and reinforcing changes
in organization levels above and
below that level.
3.

The point to begin change is at those
points in the system

where some stress and strain exist.
4.

If thoroughgoing changes in a hierarchical
structure are

desirable or necessary, change should ordinarily
start with the policymaJcing body
5.

Both the formal and informal organization of an institution

must be considered in planning any process of change
6.

The effectiveness of planned change is often directly related

to the degree to which members at all levels of an institutional
hier-

archy take part in the fact-finding and the diagnosing of needed changes
and in the formulating and reality— testing of goals and programs of
change . ® ^

®%aguire, pp. 19-20.
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In the concluding chapter of this
study

I

shall attempt to pro-

vide perspective on the change effort
at the School of Education by
reference to the literature on resistance
to reform and change in higher

education presented above and to refer to
the organizational change
models as a means of gaining insight into the
change process at the
School of Education,
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CHAPTER III
SUMMARY OP CHANGES

SEPTEMBER I967 - NOVEMBER I969

The purpose of this chapter is to
delineate the scope and niagnitude of the reformation of the School
of Education in the period September 1967 through November I969 by
comparing the School at each time along
as many significant dimensions, tangible
and intangible, as possible.

Physical Facilities

September 196?

The School is a low, flat-topped, many-windowed
brick structure,

late 1950's New England rural elementary school
in architecture, located
at the out-of-town end of a 1-^-mile university campus.

The School of

Education portion of the building is L shaped with three floors of
usable
space including the basement, a portion of which is devoted to the Uni-

versity media center.

The short section of the L contains 48 faculty

offices on three floors and the long section houses I5 classrooms and a
20,000^ volume library.

A number of faculty have offices in a small ad-

jacent building.

Attached to the top of the L in a flattened V shape is the Marks

Meadow Observation School, an elementary school run jointly by the School
of Education and the Town of Amherst.

At the intersection of the two

^Albert W. Purvis, Annual Report [I966-67] (June 15i 1987)i P*

1 •
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schools is a 350-seat auditorium used
jointly by the two.

Upon entering the building through
the main door one finds himself in a vast, flagstone-floored
foyer, neat, olean and bare.

One is

struck by the subdued, orderly, and
professional tenor of the place, its
bare walls and straight lines, the lack
of movement in the halls, and
its placidity and quietness except
during class change periods when the

sound of shuffling feet and young voices
temporarily echoes through the
building.
Outside, the parking lot, University Lot
#7, is, at

11

a.m.,

comfortably filled by some 50 recent vintage Fords,
Chevrolets, Plyraouths,
and Oldsmobiles, most bearing Massachusetts license
plates and #7 stickers, neatly parked before signs declaring Faculty and
Staff Only, By

Order of the Board of Trustees .

November I969

Still the vintage 1950's building at the edge of the campus, but
inside all the classrooms save two are gone, converted into offices (some

by their occupants, some by normal university channels) for most of the
faculty, others of whom have spilled out to fill two small buildings

nearby.^

The library remains, scheduled for conversion to offices the

following year.

The media center section of the basement has been turned

over to the School of Education media center, equipped with a "micro-

teaching" laboratory and a plethora of photographic, film, and audio and

video tape equipment.

^Derived from Memorandvun from Richard T. Coffing, Subject:
70 Space Allocations," August 11, I969 (School files).

"I969-

89

Entering the building, one finds
the majority of the foyer
converted into a busy secretarial pool
and is immediately struok with
a
sense of movement and activity in
the
building.

Walls, doors, and an

information kiosk are a clutter of
posters of all descriptions, meeting
and course notices, general announcements,
picture collages, and personal
notices. The halls are filled with people,
moot in motion, usually with
hands filled with folders and papers; others
talking animatedly in knots;
others sitting in chairs, on tables, or on the
floor, talking, waiting
or watching.

The parking lot remains, but behind it is
another lot for 250

care where before there had been fields.

And cars are littered every-

where, Volkswagen beetles and buses, Opels, Renaults,
Volvos, pickup
trucks, brilliant Dodge Chargers, a substantial smattering
of battered

hulks, as well as a standard collection of recent G.M., Ford,
and

Chrysler models— regular parking spaces filled, no—parking zones filled,
spilling out to line the street in front of the building.

The signs

have been modernized. Staff Parking Only, Board of Trustees. Univ. of
Ma^s.

,

at all.

and many of the cars carry student parking stickers or no stickers

There is a rainbow of license plates.
The activity and motion inside the building extends outside,

with groups and individuals constantly going in and out, meeting other
groups, melding and reforming, with conversations carried on gunong the
cars.

On the grass inside the L, among a group of free-form sculptures,

are a number of class-size groups talking, moving and gesturing.
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Faculty

September 196?

The School of Education faculty in
September I967 ie 35 in number; all white except one who is to
leave the following year; predomi-

nantly male (there were six women faculty,
two of whom had reached the
rank of associate professor); seventy per
cent possessing doctorates;
nine with tenure; and with an average age
of 42.3

faculty members

had been public school teachers or administrators
before getting their

doctorates and entering university-level teaching,
There were three vacant faculty positions throughout
the year,
and the University had not granted the School any new
positions for the
past three years, 5

However, the faculty composition had not been static,

seven new faculty members having joined in 1967^ as a
result of resignations.

The average time at the School for the total faculty was 3.2

years.

Faculty are assigned to one of the five curriculvun areas of the
School (Elementary Education, Secondary Education, Curriculum and Instruction, Administration, Counseling and Guidance) and teach all their

^See September 19^7 Faculty Profile, Appendix A.

^All but three of the 1 966-67 faculty had had prior public school
experience. See Evaluation of the School of Education [prepared by the
School of Education] by National Coiuicil for Accreditation of Teacher
Education (November I966), appendix,

derived from Purvis, 1 966-67 Annual Report , p, 24; and interview
with Oswald Tippo, May 31, 1972.
^See Appendix A.

^Derived from Appendix A.
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courses in that area.

Areas are the major organizational entities of the

School and are responsible for hiring new faculty when
vacancies occur,
for administration of area courses, and for proposing changes in
form or

content of their courses to the rest of the faculty and administration.

All indications are that nearly all interaction of faculty members, both
academic and social, was limited to those in their particular Area.
Form, content, and even time of each course are, almost without

exception, predetermined and then faculty assigned to fill the teaching
slots in this pre-set curriculum.

The faculty address each other formally.

Dr. or Professor, in public and, it is reported, most informal relations

as well.

The Dean is almost invariably addressed as Dean Purvis.

There appears to be little interest among the faculty in change

and innovation.

In the previous year some minor changes in curriculum

and educational processes had taken place, but it seems clear that the

major interest of the faculty is in fulfilling its teaching commitments
and publishing.

(Each article or book published is reported in faculty

meetings and suitably applauded.)
The faculty at this time seems to hold a generally low opinion of

itself and a lack of ambition for professional advancement outside the
School.

When asked how many of the faculty would have gladly moved to

higher-status institutions such as Coltimbia, Harvard, or Stanford, most
faculty interviewed replied that very few would, primarily because of the
Q

competition intrinsic to the higher— status institutions.

®Data for preceding four pareigraphs derived primarily from exist
ing faculty interviews. May and June, 1972.
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The picture of the faculty which emerges from my
interviews was
one of a majority reasonably competent, but disinterested
in innovation

or advancing their own careers outside the School; a few
generally in-

competent and living out their failure at the School; and a very
few,

ambitious and using the School as a stepping stone to more prestigious
institutions.
The low opinion which the faculty holds of itself is shared by
the University administration and by most of the University faculty,

product of (a) a general academic bias against schools of education

whose faculty are not seen as sufficiently competent to meet the demands
of teaching in their major field

(i.e,, a good historian teaches his-

tory in a history department—a second-rate historian teaches methods of

teaching history or the history of education)

,

and (b) a shared feeling

that the School's faculty is inferior even among schools of education.

Many faculty members sense a condescending and patronizing attitude toward them by members of the University faculty.

It is reported

that there is very little interaction, either academic or social, between

School of Education faculty

euid

faculty of the rest of the University.

^Dean Purvis, in his final Annual Report, was not particularly
complimentary about the quality of the faculty: "Another problem which
must be solved if the School is to gain higher prestige is the problem
of quality of faculty. The School currently has several very high quality
faculty, but not nearly enough." ( 1966-6? Annual Report )
^^Prom existing faculty interviews and Tippo interview.

James B. Conant, The Education of American Teachers (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 19^3) » PP* 1 & 2.
'’^'See

^^Prom existing faculty and Tippo interviews.
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November 1969

The faculty has more than doubled to 70 of which
50 have been

hired since September I967, remains predominantly white
(there are four

black faculty members, all lecturers), and has become even more
solidly
male (the number of women faculty has dropped to four).

The percentage

of faculty members with doctorates has remained at about
70 per cent,

thirteen now have tenure, and the average age has declined substantially
to 37 years old.

The average tenxire at the School of faculty members

has fallen to 2.2 years.

The five curriculum areas have been replaced by eleven "centers”
of teaching and inquiry and a number of other "programs."

The eleven

centers include:

Leadership in Educational
Administration
Aesthetics in Education
Foundations of Education
Humanistic Education

Coxmselor Education
Innovations in Education
International Education
Educational Media
and Technology

Educational Research
Teacher Education
Urban Education

and the major programs are:

Higher Education

Vocational Education

Early Childhood Education^^

This diversity of curriculum mirrors the diversity of faculty

members whose interests span the centers and progreuns and whose backgrounds and training are uniquely diverse for a school of education.

The

faculty includes film and television specialists, psychologists, ex-peace

“•^See

November I969 Faculty Profile, Appendix C.

transmitted to Academic
,
Council, from Dwight W.
Graduate
and
Matters Committee, Faculty Senate,
files), pp. 97-106.
School
I969]
Allen, Dean, School of Education ([April
^^ School of Education Interim Catalogue
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corps officials, historians, group facilitators,
specialists in inner-

city education, research specialists, computer specialists,
former lawyers, former USOE members, and specialists in affective
education. ^5

The center and program form of organization is not as restrictive as the Areas had been and faculty members often belong to more
than
one center or program, although usually concentrating their efforts
in
one.

Typically the staff of each center offers both structured and in-

dividualized degree programs at both the graduate and undergraduate levels.

New faculty can be hired by a center or program by petition to the

Dean and School Council.

Faculty interaction, both academic and social,

although often focused on others in the center or program, is on a considerably more diverse, school—wide basis than previously.
In addition to teaching semester courses, usually of their own

choosing and design, faculty are also acting as classroom facilitators

putting students in touch with appropriate educational resources and offering modules, usually defined as shorter than semester length educational experiences.

They are also directing research projects, preparing

proposals for projects, traveling nationwide as consultants, and many
are participating in the governance of the School through the School
Council, which meets weekly.

Most of the faculty are also spending a sub-

stantial amount of time with graduate students serving on advisory, comprehensive, and dissertation committees and supervising teaching of School
of Education courses by graduate students.

^^Lyman B. Brainerd, Jr., "A Thrust Toward Relevance:
Review," in Trend, Spring, 19^9» P» 5»

The Year in
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The faculty almost without exception address each
other and stu-

dents on a first-name basis and the Dean is on all
occasions, formal and
informal , ’’Dwight • ”
Change, experimentation, and innovation have clearly become a

major pursuit of the faculty.

The previous year had been a year of plan-

ning culminating in thoroughgoing reform of the School’s curriculxim and
organization.

Most faculty are teaching courses which they have developed

themselves and are teaching for the first or second time.
are involved in planning for future years.

All centers

Some have grants for new pro-

grams and others are developing funding proposals.

Many faculty are ex-

ploring new avenues of cooperation with public school systems.
The influx of new faculty, most young, the success of the plan-

ning year just ended, and the national publicity which the School has
received seemed to have changed the tenor of the faculty as a whole from

passivity and complacency to one of activity, energy, and ambition.

Pub-

lishing of faculty members has dropped substantially, both because the

planning year has focused the faculty’s energies inward on the development of the School and because publishing has become a less valued ac-

tivity (in a Saturday Review article on the School the previous year,
the author had quoted a staff member as saying that ’’Education will not

be changed by throwing books at it.”).

1

There appears to be far more social interaction between the

School of Education faculty and that of the rest of the University

—and

the condescending and patronizing attitude has for the most part

“•Wallace Roberts, ’’Clean Slate at UMass,” in Saturday Review ,
January 18, 1969i P*
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disappeared.

As one School of Education faculty member put it:

"They

like what we are doing| but they know we are to be reckoned

n.o't

with.

Indeed I the balance seems to have changed

|

the common criti-

cism of the School faculty by University faculty members having become
focused on their "arrogance" and disinterest in cooperating with other

departments.

Administration

September 196 ?

September I967 marks the beginning of a short transition period
in the School's administration.

Dean Ralph Purvis, who had headed the

School since it had been raised from department status in 1956^® had re-

tired the previous June, and Ovid Parody, previously head of the School's

Administration Area, is acting Dean pending the arrival of a new Dean in
January.

Dean Purvis' administration appears to have been authoritarian
in style and bureaucratic in purpose as well as form.

Most agree that

"he ruled with an iron heind" and that the major purpose of that rule was

the maintenance of order, stability, and predictability.

He scheduled

all faculty meetings, prepared the agendas, and chaired the meetings

himself.

He was apparently not reluctant to reverse faculty decisions

when he did not

^

eigree

with them.

^Existing faculty interview.

^®Office of Institutional Studies, University of Massachusetts,
12 (HereAmherst, Facts and Figures: I967 (Amherst, n.p. [I968]), p.
after referred to as Blue Book).
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It is reported that "He had a housekeeper
approach to adminis-

tration," and rumor had it that he checked on all
faculty offices at

8:30 a.m. to make sure everyone was in.

A symptom of the pervasive

bureaucracy was the fact that one of the major powers in the
School was
his secretary, chiefly because she was the repository of
knowledge of

appropriate procedures for whatever action was to be taken.

Dean Purvis put great emphasis on "good" teaching of the curriculum in the School and on publication, but is reported to have been gen-

erally disinterested in actively pursuing outside funding or in promoting
changes of any significance in the curriculum or acsulemic requirements.
It is also clear that during at least the last two years of his tenure

Dean Purvis had gotten a very strong message of non-support from the
University^ 9

vrtiich

might explain some of his unwillingness to undergo

the risks associated with innovation.

Dean Purvis' Assistant Dean during this period was Ralph Pippert,
who it appears was among the most flamboyant of the faculty and who, it
is reported, was the subject of rather extensive criticism from some

faculty members for actions like "drinking beer and going tobogganing

with his students" and "dating his secretary."

Dr. Pippert also left

the School, for personal reasons, in the spring of 1967*

"In summary. In
^9ab he observed in his final Annual Report:
three years our enrollment has increased 69^ but our faculty has increased only 12^ and our budget in the operational categories has actually decreased by 13^." (p. 11) "The inevitable conclusion is that for
understatea period of time ... the School has not had, to use a gross
ment, adequate support." (pp. 9 & 10)

^^ata
interviews.

in previous four paragraphs derived from existing faculty
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November 1969

The Dean is Dwight W. Allen,
37 years old. flamboyant in dress,

mannerism, and speech—with a national
reputation as an educational innovator.

Some have called him the P. T. Barnum of
education.

He also

rules the School with an iron hand, but the major
purpose of his rule is

change rather than stability and his major activities
revolve around the

conceptualization, staffing, and funding of new educational
programs.
His organizational orientation is clearly entrepreneurial
rather than
bureaucratic.

In University dealings he is clearly out to beat the sys-

tem rather than conform to it, and the School organization
puts a premium
on aggressiveness, risk-taking, and personal power rather than
the smooth

functioning of the system.
Many in the School, including the Dean, talk of shared power

among the faculty, students, and administration, but at this time none
of the attempts to create mechanisms for such power sharing have worked
so, controlling most of the financial resources of the School and know-

ing far more of the School, its programs, and its people than anyone
else, all power runs from the

Dean—and

he is a highly controversial

figure, both within and without the School.

He is often away from the campus consulting and speechmaking,

negotiating with fimding agencies in Washington and New York, visiting
school sites nationwide to explore collaborative relationships with his
School, and attending conferences.

When in Amherst his days are long

and frenetic, often ending after midnight and beginning before dawn (he
has a standing guarantee that he will see anyone who asks within three
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days when he is on campus, providing
that person is willing to meet him

before hie next earliest appointment ). 21

Most weekends find him either

traveling or working on School business in
Amherst.
There are three Assistant Deans, all chosen
by Dean Allen, all
31, all new to academic administration, and all at
this point appearing

to be overwhelmed with their

jobs— often described

as "picking up the

pieces after Dwight has done his thing."
Students

September 1967
The School's major efforts are devoted to the preparation of

undergraduates for teaching positions in elementary and secondary schools,
most going to positions in the Massachusetts public school system.

Uni-

versity records show a total enrollment of approximately 862^2
graduates and the prior year 157 received degrees from the School of

Education as elementary education majors. 2^

The School's undergraduate

enrollment at this time was overwhelmingly female, 24 white, 25 and from
rural and suburban Massachusetts.2^

Videotape, "What Makes Dwight Tick," Florissant, Colorado,
Sept. 19i 1968 (School of Education, Media Center).
22 Blue Book
p. 45«
,

^^ Ibid

. ,

p.

'JO,

^^There were only 24 males out of the 862 enrolled ( Blue Book , p. 45)»

^^There are no figures for the black population of the University
in September 19^7 available. However, in 1971 after a concerted effort
to recruit black students, the black population had. risen to 4 per cent.
University of Massa( Report of the President's Committee on the Future
chusetts , Vernon R. Alden, Chairman [Boston, n.p., 1971 ]» P» 2).
»

26

~

As may be inferred from Blue Book

,

p.

99*
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The School also offers gradviate programs
at the Master's,

G.A.G.S., and doctoral level through the
Administration, Curriculum and
Instruction, and Counseling and Guidance Areas.

The previous year five

doctorates and 99 Master's degrees2? had been
awarded and there is presently a total of 604 graduate students enrolled, 28
most of whom are at-

tending on a part-time basis, us\ially in conjunction
with full-time
teaching, counseling, or administrative positions in
nearby schools. ^9

For the three years previous no doctorates had been awarded,

and an

estimated 25 doctoral students are in full-time residence.
In the previous year students had, for the first time, begun to

have some voice in the School's educational policy.

Undergraduates,

through an Education Club, had been granted minor changes in courses and
graduate students had gotten a change in comprehensive examination procedures, but in general student interest in participation in the School
was low. 82

November

I

969

The undergraduate population has grown to a full-time equivalent

of about 1,325 students, of which 25 O received elementary education de-

grees the previous year. 88

^^ Blue Book pp. 70
,

increasing number of men had joined School

&

71

•

^^ Ibid

^^From existing faculty interviews.
8 ^Estimated from "Doctoral

.

,

p. ^ 2 »

80 B]^^e Book p. 71
,

•

Student Support, IO/8 / 68 " (School files).

82prom existing faculty interviews.
88»a View, A Review, A Vision," in School of Education Profile ,
ed. Lyman B. Brainerd, Jr. (Amherst, n.p.. May 1971 )i P» 30 .
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programs, but the group remained primarily
female, 34 „hite (although a
substantial number of the black population
of the University took courses
at the School) and from Massachusetts
(the result of University policy
limiting out-of-state acceptances to
5 per cent of the total student
body).

Major growth and change has occurred at the
graduate level, although this fact has not yet been fully
reflected in degrees granted

which the previous year had amounted to nine
doctorates and 132 Master's
degrees. 35

comparison with the twenty-five doctoral students
in

full-time residence in I967, there were some
265 full-time doctoral students, about 10 per cent of which were from minority
groups, I5 per cent
of which were female^^ and most of whom were from
outside the State of

Massachusetts, the 5 per cent rule not applying to graduate students.

University records show a total of 1,048 graduate students enrolled at
the School.

Doctoral students are considered part of the instructional staff
and as such develop and teach undergraduate courses, assist faculty in

teaching graduate courses, and teach graduate courses of their own design under the supervision of a faculty member. 37

Full-time doctoral

34Approximately 200 men were now enrolled.

View," Profile , p. 30.

3^Derived from voting list for Graduate Faculty Election [prepared
by Office of Director of Graduate Studies] included in memorandum from;
Ad Hoc Grawiuate Faculty Election Committee, to: Members of Education
Assembly, Subject; "Election" (Sept. 19» ‘19^9» School files).
37"Degree Programs," Profile

,

p. 7*
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students and representatives of other
students also participate in the
governance of the School as voting
members of all School committees and

assemblies,^®
The Master's programs have also expanded
and taken on more full,
time students, but not nearly so
dramatically as has the Doctoral program

Curriculum

September 196?

The School's undergraduate curriculum design and
course offerings
are those that could be found in the best and worst
of Schools of Educa-

tion throughout the country.

There appeared to be a very narrow range

of coxirse options available to undergrewiuates.

For example the I966-67

catalogue lists only I4 vindergraduate credit courses offered by the
School's faculty, most under names such as History of Education

.

Princi-

ples of Elementary Education , Elementary School Curriculum , Teaching of

Elementary Reading and Language Arts , Teaching of Elementary Arithmetic
and Science ,
rigid.

Also, the total curriculum itself is highly prescribed and

The catalogue, for example, lists all the courses (both education

and general) to be taken by Freshman elementary majors, and is rife with

statements like "During the junior year the student takes Ed. 251

,

054i

and 264, Psychology 260 or Home Ed, H.D. 272" and "All candidates for

secondary school teaching will major in the subject field to be taught

and minor in education,
minor,

A maximum of 18 credits should be taken in this

Ed. 25I and Psych. 301 are required during the junior year."

38"a View," Profile, p. 21,
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Doctoral students have five major hurdles
to jump:

(l) the ac-

cumulation of 90 credits of classwork,
(2) the satisfaction of a -toolsrequirement either by mastering a foreign
language or of research statistics, (3) the passing of a "comprehensive"
exam including a standard

written test and an oral portion,
(4) the writing of a researchoriented dissertation, and (5) passing an oral
examination based on the
dissertation.

All courses for all students are graded on an ABCDP
basis, are

presented in semester-long segments for three credits each,
and are pri-

marily lecture courses.

November 1969

For undergraduates the rigid specificity of courses to be taken
has been replaced by a more general "guidelines" approach in which the

student is expected to do one—half his undergreuiuate work in the college
of Arte and Sciences, one-quarter in the School of Education, and another

quarter divided between the two at the option of the student.

Prepara^-

tion for elementary and secondary teachers is no longer administratively
divided, but organized on a K-12 basis.^®

For students wishing certification, state laws require a semester
of student teaching and courses in educational foundation, educational

psychology and educational methods.

These requirements can, however,

^^erived from 1967-1968 Bulletin, Graduate School , University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass.
^^ Interim Catalogue pp. 73-75
,

^^In September I967 the School offered one course for satisfaction
of each of these requirements.
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be fulfilled by a number of course and
experience options which give stu-

dents greater latitude in what they want
to learn in each area, how. and
from whom.

Undergraduates can choose from among

II 3

courses, including,

for example, "Aesthetic Experience and
Cognitive Growth," "The Learning

Theater," "The Education of the Self," "Educational
Media, Technology,
and Systems," "Student Revolution

ajid

Curriculum Change," "Race Rela-

tions in Education," "Affective Human Development,"
"Urban Community

Relations," "Sexuality and Education," and "Alternative
Structures in

Higher Education.
In addition, many of the centers are developing, or have developed, undergraduate programs focusing on their area of concern.

November of 19^9

"this

In

multiplicity of options is a source of considerable

confusion and dissatisfaction to undergraduates, primarily because there
is not an adequate advising system to guide them through the maze of

possibilities.
The School has also begun non—teaching majors in some centers
for st\idents who do not wish certification but who desire training and

experience for educational work in certain fields.
In addition to credit for semester courses, students can receive

credit for educational experiences of other lengths, locations, and for-

mats through the modular credit system.

Under this system students are

awarded, in effect, fractional credit (accoxinted for in modules;

I

5

modules equaling one credit) for experiences such as single lectures,

4^Pall 1969 course schedule in attachment to memo from Earl Seidman,
to Faculty and doctoral students, subject; School of Education Course
Schedule for Spring 19^9 (mimeo [fall 1969]i School files), n. pag.
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films or concerts, short lecture series,
conferences or workshops, shorter long-term internships, a paper on a
given subject or guided readings,
or any other experience that the student can
devise and get accepted by

a faculty member and the Modular Arbitration
Committee,

All modular experiences are graded on a pass-no
record basis

0^44

and all courses are graded on a pass-fail basis only ,^^

Master's programs are offered both through the various centers
and on an individualized basis in which a student can design his own

program in conjunction with a faculty member.
At the doctoral level the "tools" requirement has been dropped,
the oral examination requirement retained, and the other three hurdles

redefined in the direction of flexibility and appropriateness to student
needs.

In place of the 90-credit requirement, a student is asked to

aggregate the equivalent of 90 hours in educational experiences as evi-

denced by a portfolio in which he has charted his educational goals, and

described hie educational experiences relevant to these goals with commentary by himself, faculty members, and others involved in the experience.

In fact, although most doctoral students are enthusiastically pursuing
appropriate educational experiences, few are keeping formal portfolios

and the School has no administrative means for facilitating or overseeing the process.

The standard written and oral comprehensive has been replaced
by a comprehensive whose form and content are chosen by the student in

^ Interim Catalogue , pp. I09 & 110.

^^Ibid.

,

p. 66.

^^ Ibid .
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conjunction with, and subject to the
approval of, a three^an comprehensive committee chosen by the student.
The definition of a dissertation
has been expanded to include project
dissertations, which include re-

ports, analyses, and evaluations of field
educational programs in which

the student had been involved.

An additional guideline had been insti-

tuted defining the normal time span for the
degree as two years beyond
the Master’s degree and three years beyond
the bachelor's. 46

Funding/Outside Activities

September I967

During the year

1

967-68 the School, in ad.dition to its State

funds budget of $275»000,47 received approximately
$500,000 in outside
funding, the major funded projects including the management of the

Tororo Girls School, a vocational school in Tororo, Uganda under a ten-

year USAID contract providing approximately $120,000 annually; the direction of a $100,000 applied research training grant; and a $152,000
Upward Bound grant. 48
The other major outside activities of the School are the direc-

tion of the Cooperative Schools Service Center, an association of school

superintendents in Western Massachusetts, and an administrative
^^ Ibid

. ,

pp. 66-72.

^^Derived from School records. Office of Administrative Dean,
School of Education.

^®From William C. Wolf, Jr., "Research, Development and Training
Projects Administered," by the School of Education, University of
Massachusetts, during Fiscal Year, I966 (School files).
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internship program in which a dozen doctoral
candidates do a year of
internship in a New England school
superintendent's office in place of
the normal one year of residency required.

November I969

During the

I

969 -7 O year the School's state fund budget had

nearly quadrupled to 11, 000, 000^9 and outside
funding had nearly tripled
to some * 1 , 250 , 000 .

The largest grant, a *266,000 Office of Education

grant, was used to develop and maneige a series of leadership
training

institutes for educational administrators.

Other major outside grants

include a Head Start Leadership Training Program, another applied
re-

search training program, support of the Tororo Girls School, a Teacher
Corps grant, a planning grant for a new program in educational leaxier—
ship, and the Contemporary University, a year of field experience for

undergraduates
Off—campus programs have become a major component of the School
and have expanded significantly.

The School had cooperative relation-

ships with public schools in Temple City, California; New York City;

Philadelphia; Hartford, Conn.; Springfield, Worcester, and Lowell, Mass,

other suburban Massachusetts towns; and a small network of rural New

England schools.
^^Derived from School records. Office of Administrative Dean,
School of Education*
50..A

View," Profile , p. 38.

^ ^nnual Report,

1970, School of Education. University of MassaW. Allen, Dean (mimeo, July 1970* School
Dwight
chusetts, submitted by
files) , pp. 25-29*
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Governance

September 1967

Given the low level of innovation in the
School and the routinization of activity, very little governance is
needed and what is comes

primarily from Dean Purvis

—^whom

small group of faculty members.

some see as unduly influenced by a

Faculty meetings are held monthly,

based on an agenda prepared by the Dean, and by
all reports very little
in the way of significant decision-making occurs at
these meetings

which are made up primarily of "Dean's Announcements" and
reports on
faculty activity, centering mainly around publications.
At the Area Level there is more decision-making, primarily on
the procedural rather than the policy level.

Areas do have some lati-

tude in the filling of replacement positions and make recommendations
to the Personnel Committee on promotions, tenure, and merit increases.

Probably the major faculty influence centers in the Personnel
Committee, whose seven members at that time are heavily weighted toward
age (five of the seven members are over fifty) and tenure (four of the

nine tenured faculty members are on the committee), and two of the six
female faculty members are represented.
It appears that this outwardly smooth-running bureaucratic or-

ganization does mask a considerable level of hostility and backbiting

52preceding two paragraphs from existing faculty interviews.
^^Derived from Raymond Wyman, Memo to Faculty and Doctoral Students, subject: "Personnel Committee History" (mimeo. Sept. 23| I968),
p. 5.
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among faculty members.

In my interviews and in other
discussions

I

have heard strong criticism of the
administration and other faculty
bers that indicate that life as a faculty
member at the School in

I

mem-

967

was not as peaceful and calm as one
might expect from the apparent

smoothness of the organizational functioning.

November

I

969

In November

I

969 the School faculty, students, and administration

voted to approve a Constitution with the following
significant stipulations:

~The Dean has agreed to share his authority with the School
Council, ... a 31-member body consisting of faculty and students elected by the centers and at large, plus the Dean,
Assistant Deans, and three representatives from outside the
School.
—Students have extensive opportunities for participation
in all decision-making bodies of the School, including membership in the School Council, the Graduate Faculty Assembly, and
all standing and ad hoc committees.
—The entire School community acting as the Educational
Assembly, has become the major advisory body and general forum
of the School with legislative authority in the most important
and controversial issues. 54
Despite the words of the Constitution, however, the fact remains
that the vast majority of the power flows from and to the Dean who can

control most decisions made in the School.

Faculty meetings are no longer held, their purposes having been
replaced by meetings of the School Council and School Assembly.
The Centers have become the principal vehicle of academic or-

ganization, including the development and administration of student

View,” Profile , p. 21, and Constitution, School of Education ,
December 19^9i P» 16 (School files).
54..A

I

A
V
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programs, research and teaching, and
the supervision of student
work in
their field.

With the increase in power of the
Dean, the Personnel Committee,
which now has two student members, has
become of less importance to the
faculty.
The smooth surface of the well-functioning
bureaucracy of the

earlier era has disappeared, replaced by a
surface disorganization and
chaos which puts a high premium on entrepreneurial
functioning (which
some call "hustling").

This new organizational environment combined

with the power of the Dean has engendered in some
a sense of distrust,
fear, and paranoia, while others, probably a majority,
find the environ-

ment highly exhilarating and uniquely appropriate for the
pursuit of

their educational and professional goals.

Summary

In brief, the School of Education in September I969 was a far
I

larger, far more diverse organization than it had been in September I967.
I

I

Faculty had doubled in size and multiplied significantly in background
and training.

j

Undergraduate enrollment had risen some 50 P©r cent and

I

had become more diverse, and the full-time doctoral student population

had grown astronomically.

A spare, generally prescribed and inflexible

I

curriculum had been replaced by a more diverse, multi-optioned and often
chaotic one.

Under a continued concentration of power in the Dean's

j

I

j

hands, the predominant organizational characteristic had moved from

1

I

bureaucratic maintenance, stability, and predictability to experimenta-

I

tion and innovation.

Grading and other academic record-keeping had been

j
I

I

I

•

Ill

thoroughly reformed.

School of Education faculty statue
in the Univer-

sity had changed from inconsequential
to one of perceived threat and
students had moved significantly toward
involvement and participation in
School affairs. A sharing of power between
the School community and the

Dean had been approved by both.
Prom a quiet, well-behaved, but somewhat dull
stepchild of the

University community, the School of Education
had metamorphosed itself
into a rampaging, high-spirited enfant terrible
of the University commu-

nity and an incipient force on the national educational
scene.
In the perspective of the historic resistance of institutions
to

reform and in contrast to other attempts at institutional reform
described
in Chapter II, these changes, carried out over a 26-month period,
appear
to be unique in scope, rapidity, and substance.

Many of these changes

also appear to be in the directions proposed by the major analysts and
commissions, particularly in their emphasis on diversity of faculty and

programs , student responsibility, and experimentation.

The scope

cind

direction of change is highlighted in the follow-

ing comparisons:

Academic
September 19^7

November 19^9

Undergraduate

Grading

ABCDP

Pass-Pail/Pass No Record

Requirements

Specific with limited
options

Multi-options at student's
choice

Programs

Certification only—
Elementary & Secondary

Certification K-12 plus
non-teaching major

112

September

196"^

November 1969

Unde rgraduat e

Credit Units

Semester courses

Semester courses plus modules

Course Options

Undergraduate only

Graduate & undergraduate

Course Availability

14 semester courses^^

113 semester courses^^
and various "modules"

ABCDP

Pass-Pail/Pass-No Record/
Portfolio

Doctoral

Grading
Requirements

1 yr.
full-time
residence

1

yr. full-time residence;

2 yrs. beyond Master's and
3 beyond B.A.

90 units

Portfolio and "equivalent
of 90 units"

"Tools" or language
requirement

No "tools" or language requirement

Standardized comprehensive exam

Individualized comprehensive exam

Research dissertation

Project or research dissertation

Teaching

Can teach undergraduate sections of
faculty course

Can teach ovm undergreui
course and gradviate courses
under supervision of faculty
member

Programs

Administration/Counseling & Guidance/
Curriculum & Instruction

Choice of programs of 1
centers, 4 programs, or
individxialized

Influence

None formally

Voting membership on all
decision-making School
bodies

Course options

9357

170 semester courses^®

^^Above data derived from Undergraduate Catalogue of the University
of Massachusetts t Amherst, 1967-1968 , pp« 233-239*

^^Above derived from Interim Catalogue and "Schedule of Pall 19^9
Courses."
^^Above derived primarily from 1967~68 Graduate School Bulletin
University of Mass.

,

^^Above derived from "Degree Programs," Profile , and "Schedule of
Pall 1969 Courses. H
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Organizational

September 1Q6j
1 )

Dean has total fonnal power

2)

Students have no vote

3)

Administrative & curriculum
units located in 5 Areas

4)

No formal appeal procedures 59

November 1Q6Q
Formal power shared - Dean and
School Council

All students represented on councils and committees
Administrative & curriculum units
include 11 centers, 10 programs
Formal appeal procedures including
ombudsman and conflict resolution^O

Change and Growth Statistics

Undergraduate

Fall *67

Fall *69
0

Total PTE Undergraduate Enrollment

771

1,264

2,005

4,489

Courses Available^^

14

84

Elementary Majors^5

862

1,212

1967-68

1969-70

Total Courses Taken^^

Undergraduate Degrees (Elem.)^^

205

332

59Above derived from existing
faculty interviews.

60

Above derived from "A View," Profile .

61

Faculty Senate Long Range Planning Committee, Directions for the
Seventies (Amherst, n.pub. , Sept. 1971), p. 9.
62

"A View," Profile, p. 30.

^^rom 1966-67

63
Ibid.

,

p.

30.

UndergT2uiuate Catalogue and "Schedule of Pall, 1969i

Courses."

^^irectiion for the Seventies,

66
p. 9»

"A View," Profile, p. 30.
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Graduate
'67

Graduate Students Enrolled^^

Fall '69

604

1,048
68

Pull-Time Doctoral Stizdents

69

25 (Est.)

265

Graduate Degrees^^
1965-66

Doctorates
Master's

58

66-67

67-68

68-69

^9-70

^

10

10

29

81

II7

120

143

237

297

Pall *67

Courses Available^^

Number of Students
Amount of Ptinding

Outside Funding^ ^

1

967-68

$494,270

^'^

Pall '69

93

Graduate Student Support^^

70-71

170

1966-67

1969-70

48

244

$232,000

$649,000

1968-69

1970-71

$1,240,625

«3, 595, 552

Ibid .

^^Estimated from "Doctoral Student Support, IO/8/68" (School files).
^9j)erived from voting list for Gradiiate Faculty election. Sept. I9,

1969.
70,

1965-70 derived from Direction for the Seventies
"A View," Profile , p. 30.

^Vrom 1967-68 Graduate Catalogue and "Schedule
"A View," Profile, p. 30.

73 Ibid.

,

p.

11,

1971 from

of fall, I969,

courses."
72

,

p. 38.
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Facility Statistics'^^

Total Faculty
at
3/67

Professor
Assoc. Prof.
Asst. Prof.

Lecturer

New Faculty
at

9/68

Total Faculty
at
11/69

3

4

11

12

6

17

9

15

25

2

6

13

Instructor
_3

Jl

35

34

70

23

23

50

Number women

6

1

4

Number w/t enure

9

2

13

1

3

4

42

34

37

Total Faculty

Number w/Doct.

Number minorities
Average Age

^^Derived from Appendices A-C
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CHAPTER

IV

ESTABLISHING A POUNMTION FOR CHANGE

Backgroimd

The State of Higher Education in
Massachusetts

A significant factor in the growth and
change at the School of
Education was the fact that prior to and during
the change period the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts was rapidly expanding
its funding of the
University.

For example, during the I965-I97O period state funding
rose

from $15.5 million'' to $55 million. ^

This high growth rate created a

condition which permitted the School to double its faculty
in two years
without significantly affecting faculty availability for other
departments of the University.

This rapid increase in funding for public higher education was
the result of a situation unique to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Historically, the state had been uncommonly blessed with the most extensive and prestigious system of private higher education in the world, its
80 private institutions^ including such nationally famous universities as
1

Office of Institutional Studies, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, Facts and Figures;
I967 (Amherst, n.p. [I968]), p. I46 (Hereafter referred to as Blue Book ).
*^

Report of the Treasurer : Summary of Operating Funds [Univ. of
Mass.], Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1970 (mimeo. School files),

derived from Fall Enrollment in Higher Education,

Supple1 969 j
103~^08«
PHEW,
mentary Information, Summary Data (Washington,
1970)t PP«
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Harvard, M.I.T.. Brandeia. Boaton
Univeraity. Boaton OoUege,
Northeaatam.
and Tufta and collagea such aa AaJierat,
WiUia«,a, Smith, Mt. Holyoke,
and Wellealey, Thie emphaaia on private
inetitutiona waa reflected in
the fact that ae late aa I955 only
10 per cent of etudente in higher edu-

cation in the state were in the public
sector.
The abundance and quality of these
private institutions had for

many years blinded citizens and the legislature
to the fact that the state
was not providing higher educational facilities
to all its citizens, par-

ticularly those who did not have the financial
capability to go to private institutions or the background, education, and
academic ability to
compete successfully for what scholarships were available.

Thus, Massa-

chusetts had been last in the country in per capita spending on
higher
education, and even in 1971

1

despite more than a quadrupling of enroll-

ment capacity over the previous ten years, the state still ranked
49 th,

with a $16 per capita expenditure on higher education as compared to a
national average of $31

It has been estimated that in I97I between

6,000 and 9|000 eligible Massachusetts residents were denied higher edu-

cation for lack of places in the system.^

And in I97O 50 per cent of

Massachusetts students in higher education were attending private colleges^ compared with a national average of 75 P©r cent of students in

Report of the President's Committee on the Future University of
Massachusetts , Vernon R. Alden, Chairman (Boston, n.p.. 1971 ^. P. 15
(Hereafter referred to as Future University ).
^Ibid.

,

p.

15.

^Ibid.

,

p.

21.

^Long Range Planning Committee of the University of Massachusetts,
The Future ... Our Commanding Concern (Draft copy, summer 19 ^ 8 ) i P» 1 *
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public supported institutions .
Thus, in the late 1960*s, in a
concerted effort to close a gap
oaused by earlier neglect, the
University was growing at the unusually
high rate of some I 5 per cent a year.9
it was this growth which permitted the doubling of the School of
Education faculty in two years without the necessity of directly
requisitioning faculty positions from

other departments which would have resulted
in, at best, strong resistance from those departments, at worst, the
unavailability of the positions necessary to support the radical changes
and explosive growth of
the School of Eiducation.

Background of the School of Education

The initial impetus for the changes at the School of
Education

can be traced to Oswald Tippo, Provost of the University,
who had guided
the University through most of its growth period.

Armed with the availa-

of new positions and the expectation of continued growth which

provided unus\ial opportunities for faculty promotions and tenure, he had
successfully attracted an unusual number of excellent scholars, primarily
in the Arts and Sciences, to the University and had transformed it from

the "Mass Aggies" to a position of high respect in the nation-wide com-

petition among the "Avises" to catch up with Harvard, Yale, Stanford and

^ Future University p.
,

15*

derived from Blue Book

,

p. 42, and "1971-72 UM/A Data Sheets,"
Office of Institutional Studies (mimeo, June 1972), p. 4«
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the few other •Hertz.' institutions
of Academia. 10

^

the success of his effort is the
fact that between I965 and I970
Univereity of Massachusetts graduate
programs improved more than any
other

University as rated by the American
Council on Education.

1

However, the School of Education had
not benefited from this

program and was generally regarded as one
of the weakest links in the
University.

Dr. Tippo, in my interview with him,
recalled.

^e

School was universally, by the Arts and
Sciences departments,
by the administration, and by the outside,
recognized as pedestrian, non-progressive, dull. We couldn't
even claim it was
second rate. It was one of the weakest parts
of the University
and one of the poorer around the country.

Much of the blame for the School's low estate was
laid upon Dean
Purvis by the University administration.

("He had to start from scratch.

He did a good job of getting where he was, but he didn't
seem to want to
go f\irther.")‘>2

The administration for the three years previous had been

reducing the School's budget (relative to numbers of students served)

“I

and had not granted the School any new faculty positions for the past two
years, an indicator of its dissatisfaction with the School as well as,
in effect, stockpiling positions for the new Dean.^^

In late I966 Dean

Purvis decided to take early retirement.
10

An apt analogy coined by Jencks and Riesman. Christopher Jencks
and David Riesman, The Academic Revolution (New York, Doubleday, I969),
p. 540.
1

12

Future University , p.

1.

Interview, Oswald Tippo, Amherst, Mass., May 31

1

1972.

^^Albert W. Purvis, Annual Report [I966-67] (Jxine I5, 1967)1 pp. 7-H»

^^Derived from Tippo interview and from transcript, "Testimony of
the Tenured Faculty" [before the Faculty Senate Tenure and Grievance Committee], May 12, I968, pp. 3 & 5» s-nd Purvis, Annual Report [I966-67].
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A search oomnittee to nominate
a new Dean was formed
consisting
of Tippo as chairman and six
School of Education
faculty members, two

Deans, and two representatives of
other departments. '5

it was the con-

sensus of this group, it is reported,
that they were looking for a man
who would make progressive changes
at the School, one who would
"take

an entirely new view of things," and
one who would make things happen
at the School.

An indication of the extremely high
expectations that the

committee held for the new Dean was that
they made informal approaches
to Harold Taylor, Harold Howe, and Francis
Keppel, among the most promi-

nent names in American education.
The Hiring of Dean Allen

Dwight Allen was first approached by Tippo during
a visit to
Stanford,

Allen was at that time Associate Professor head of
Stanford's

Flexible Scheduling and Curriculum Project, and a member of
the Executive Board of the School's Research and Development Center.

Dr. Tippo

was impressed by his energy, imagination, articulateness, and
commitment
to improving education and, after consulting with the Search Committee,

invited him to visit the Amherst campus. ^7

Allen, for his part, had only recently begun to consider leaving

Stanford where he had received all his degrees and had intended to spend
his career.

He was by no means dissatisfied with Stanford although, in

his words, "It was getting to be less fun and I had begun to respond a

little more positively to feelers from other Universities."

He had made

^^Tippo interview and "Testimony of Tenured Faculty," p. 27.

interview,
^^Tippo
Tippo interview.
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one eerioue plunge into the
aoade™ic „.arket which had
neeulted in the
offer of a Vice-Chanoellorehip
in charge of teacher
retraining in a
large, statewide university
system—which he had declined. 18

At the time he came into contact
with Tippo he was interested in
moving, but by no means committed
to leaving
^9
Stanford.

It IS significant to look briefly
at the events of Allen's re-

oruitment, since some of the conditions
he set and the understandings

reached with the University administration
at that time were to set very
useful precedents for him in the future.
One can speculate that a reason
he was able to make such demands was
the fact that he was not particu-

larly interested in taking the job-unless
it was on his own terms.

During his interviews he talked with the Search
Committee, the
School of Education faculty, Tippo and other
administrators, and the
Trustee Selection Committee.

All groups were highly impressed with him

and unanimously supported his selection. 20

According to Allen, in his

interviews with these groups he talked of his educational
philosophy, of
his desire for change, and of his plans for the School as
openly and

straightforwardly as possible.

For example, he told the Trustee Selec-

tion Committee not to hire him if they wanted a cheap dean or a safe dean.

And he set a number of conditions for his hiring, in particular
(1) a substantial increase in faculty members at the School,

1 ft

'°Prom interviews with Dwight W. Allen, July

‘'9

ibid .

^^rom Tippo and existing faculty interviews.
2

Tippo and Allen interviews.

I

97 I - May

(2) the

I

972 .
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appointment of two assistant deans and an administrative assistant,
(

3)

a University commitment to micro-teaching, a teacher training
method

which Allen had pioneered at Stanford, (4) the continuation of a
$325|000 grant upon which he was working, (5) the approval of some specific kinds of new faculty members (by area of specialty

—many

of which,

such as psychologists, it could be argued, belonged in other departments),

and (6) a delay in his arrival on campus vmtil January I968 together with

approval of monthly trips to Stanford during that spring,
The approval of these conditions created a number of useful

precedents which were exploited by Allen in the future

—among

them

(1) the expectation of increased faculty and the inclusion of people

from other disciplines on that faculty,

(

2)

the legitimization of a rela-

tively large administrative staff for the Dean and the beginning of a

presumption that he would personally control those positions,

(

3)

a com-

mitment of the School to the technical skills of teaching approach to
education, (4) the beginning of a legitimization of extensive use of
soft money in the School and, (5) the establishment of Allen’s geographi-

cal mobility while functioning as Dean of the School.

Thus in May of I967, Dr. Allen was formally neuned the second

Dean of the School of Education with a strong mandate to bring about substantial change at the School.
As a part of this study of change and of Allen’s leadership

strategies it is interesting to speculate about the extent to which he
described
had a ’’plan” for the School and the extent to which that plan

^^Letter:

Dwight W. Allen to Oswald Tippo, May 16 , I967.
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the actual changes which took place at the
School—and it seems clear

from my discussions with him and from his
public pronouncements that his

plans in late I967 were extremely modest in comparison
to the changes

which in fact took place at the School.
three priority

He wanted the School to pursue

areas—higher education, international education, and

teacher education, with a concern for and focus on the
problems of educational administration and urban education running through the
programs
of these three areas.

Also, he expected that the School would do con-

siderable work on the technical skills of teaching and innovations in
education, which had been his major fields of interest at Stanford.
That the School in fact became far more diverse in priorities

than he had planned and that it concerned itself far lees with teacher

education and the technical skills of teaching than he had hoped

—^while

at the same time developing under his domination, provides some insight

into one of the unique characteristics of his leauiership style

—

^his

ability to learn, grow and change.
This characteristic of his style will be explored more fully in

Chapter VIII

,

but at this point it is useful to note that some of the

general views he held about education at this point in time, although

with no specific expectations of implementing them, were highly conducive
of growth, change and development of hie idea of what the School should
be.

For example, he had a strong conviction that students should have a

^^Prcrni Allen interviews; also from transcript, "First Dean Dwight W.
[before the Faculty Senate Tenure and Grievance CommitTestimony"
Allen
tee] [May, 1968], p. 35, and from transcript, "Second Dean Dwight W.
Hereafter
Allen Testimony" [before same committee] [May, 19 ^ 6 ]f P*
"Allen
and
Testimony"
First
"Allen
transcripts will be referred to as
Second Testimony."
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larger voice in decisions about their
education; a belief that formally

structured programs stifled the potential
creativity of faculty and
stifled and discouraged most students; a
conviction that most of what
was being done in education had not been
proven worth doing; an impa-

tience with the inertia of conventional university
attempts at change;
a conviction that the changing of structures was
the most promising way
to gain new perspectives on the educational process;
a conviction of the

need for social change and the centrality of educational
change as a

vehicle for social change; and a strong predilection toward flamboyant
behavior. ^4

All these values contributed to the seemingly paradoxical situation of a change effort wholly dominated by the Dean but whose outcome
was both different and larger than his own vision for it.

Achievement of the Critical Mass

Introduction

If Allen was to be successful in bringing about significeint
change in the School of Education his primary task during the I967-68

year would be to bring together a faculty which would support and guide
that change.

This task would appear to have two elements:

first, the

hiring of a significant number of new staff who were chauige-oriented and
secondly, by some manner to convert the existing faculty from a status

quo orientation to one of change and innovation.

This latter task, as

^4i)erived from 1972 Allen interviews, I972 faculty interviews, and
writer's August I968 recruiting interview.
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indicated in the case studies surveyed
in Chapter II
fortnidable one in the

,

was clearly a

Ught of the fact that most studies
point

to uni-

versity faculties as the locus of resistance
to change.
The former challenge Allen accomplished
beyond all expectations,

bringing in 34^5 new faculty members to
join the 28 old faculty who remained and also recruitinar
j
o:?
® 85^^
"planning doctoral
students" to join
.

equally with the faculty in charting changes
at the School.

The latter

task, that of converting existing faculty to
a change orientation, the

Dean by and large did not accomplish.

In fact, he alienated many of the

old faculty so thoroughly that they became highly
resistant to most change

proposals.

However, their attempts to restrict change proved to have

little effect upon the success of change process, primarily
because re-

sistant faculty members were outnumbered on the order of eight to one
by

change— oriented people.
This strategy of overcoming resistance by adding support in over-

whelming numbers is what

I

will call the critical mass strategy, and it

was this strategy which permitted Allen to avoid the difficult if not

impossible task of changing the values and philosophy of the old faculty
and to focus the energy of the School on the planning and achievement of

change

Allen's critical mass strategy had two corollaries.

First, in

order to achieve this critical mass, he did not depend merely upon the

25see "Appendix B, "Faculty Profile:

New Faculty September

I

968 ."

^^erived from Doctoral Candidates, School of Education (mimeograph
[January 1969]i School files).
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financial resources provided by the
University, but raised an additional

1450,000 from outside sources and $170,000 from
University sources to
recruit, pay, and support the projects of
both new faculty and planning

doctoral students, allowing him to recruit
many more change-oriented
people than was originally possible.

And secondly, his choice of new

staff members was in fact an initial act of
change and redirection,
since the diversity of background, experience,
and field of interest
was unprecedented eunong schools of education.

In the remainder of this chapter

I

shall detail the process by

which this critical mass of change-oriented people was achieved
by focusing first on the recruitment of new faculty and planning doctoral students

and then on the fund-raising strategies by which the new staff members
were recruited and financed.

In the final section of this chapter

I

shall describe the reactions of the existing faculty to Allen's activities.

Faculty Recruitment

Faculty recruitment was by far the most crucial task of the new
auiministration, both because of the necessity of building a critical

mass and because the quality and diversity of the initial group of fac-

ulty would to a large extent determine the quality of the School and its
programs in the years to come

—and

the difficulties of that task cannot

be underestimated.

The task of recruiting, which began upon Allen

's

hiring in May

1967 and moved into high gear when he arrived on campus in January 19^8,

was carried out by Allen and a staff of five (three of whom were doctoral
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students) whom he recruited prior
to January, only one of whom,
a doctoral student, gave his full time
to the recruiting effort.
The announced goal of Allen and
this group was to hire the best,

most exciting people in the country.

Knowing that the School could not

compete either in status or remuneration
for the big, established names
in educational circles, Allen consciously
decided to seek out young people, the most promising in the country.27

difficulties were

enormous
He was trying to recruit the best people for
an undistinguished

school in a second-level university—a school with
little soft money and

few ongoing projects.

He was trying to recruit innovators for a school

whose reputation was conservative.

He was looking for urban-oriented

people for a school located in the country.

He was talking about a

school with a national and international focus in rural Western Massa-

chusetts.
In sum, he had primarily hope to offer, a vision of what those who

dared to join him could do together——if he was successful in persuading
enough good people to join him.

Aside from this hope for the future, all

the situation had to offer of any solidity was the unique growth position

of the University and Allen's promised support from the University and

Trustees

—for however

long that might last.

Provost Tippo was also cognizant of the difficulties of recruiting top-rate new faculty, especially given the January start, very late
in terms of the normal academic recruiting calendar.

27»Allen First Testimony," pp. 32 & 33.

He had originally

no
agreed to allocate ten new faculty
poeitions to Allen, but with January
having come and only three of these
poeitions having been filled, he began to reconsider. His principal goal
in faculty hiring had always been
quality, and since he was not certain that
Allen could find even seven

people of appropriate caliber, he did not
relish the prospect of having
to accept inferior people to fulfill his
pledge of ten new faculty slots.

Therefore he rephrased his pledge to Allen as follows:

that rather than

guarantee ten positions to the School of Education,
he would accept all
"good people" whom Dean Allen proposed to him.

Tippo withdrew that pledge on March 25th with thirty new faculty

members hired^® and seven offers outstanding^9 and before
September four

additional faculty members were to be hired.

Faculty hired, by rank, were as follows:
4 Pull Professor

6

6 Associate Professor

3

Lecturer
Instructor

15

Assistant Professor

^

major field of interest, new faculty included:

8 Teacher Education

2

5 Urban Education
5 Educational Research

2
2
2

4 Educational Administration
3 Counseling and Guidance
I(y

1

Higher Education
International Education
Educational Media
Vocational Education
Computer Assisted Instruction

nearly all measures the recruiting campaign mounted by that

small group was an incredible success.

The absolute number of people re-

cruited, about two a week for the January to March period, speaks for
itself; the quality, in accordance with Provost Tippo 's demanding

^®Allen interview.
^^The seven offers were a package offer to seven Harvard Graduate
School of Education graduates——who subsequently decided as a group not
to accept.
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standards, very high;^° the average
age, consistent with Allen's emphasis on youth, was 34 (the oldest
59, the youngest 24); and the range and

diversity set a tone and direction for the
future of the School. 31
Before going into specific examples of the range
and diversity
of the new faculty , it is well to point out two
gaps in the initial re-

cruiting year.

First, only one woman was hired and, as far as the
writer

can determine, no others were interviewed.

Secondly, although three blacks

were hired, none had doctorates and thus were hired as
lecturers meaning
that there were no black members of the senior faculty

—a

situation seem-

ingly inconsistent with the School's declared intention to concern
itself

with improving education in the cities.
However, although comparative statistics are not available, it

appears that compared with most schools of education, the new faculty
was indeed unprecedentedly diverse.

For example:

—There was Daniel Jordan,

36, a Jungian psychologist. Phi Beta Kappa
and Rhodes Scholar with Bachelor's degrees in Music from the University
of Wyoming and Oxford, a Master's in Music from Oxford, and Master's
and Doctorate in Human Development from the University of Chiceigo.
Jordan had previously been Director of the Institute for Research in
Human Behavior at Indiana State University and Director of their Upward
Bound program.

—There was David Schimmel,

Beta Kappa from Duke, with bache35, slor's degrees in political science, law, and Hebrew Literature who had
previously been a practicing lawyer and then director of the Virgin
Islands Peace Corps Training Center.

—^There

was Gerald Weinstein, 38, hired as a full professor although he
held only a master's degree (an unusual event in academia). An author

^^Tippo interview and, as one standard, 3 doctorates from the University of Chicago, 2 from Yale, and 1 each from Harvard, Cornell, and
UCLA in addition to the 9 Stanford doctorates.
^^See Appendix B for derivation of the above data.
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of three books on urban education,
he had previously been a lecturer
in urban education at Teacher's College,
Columbia and consultant to

Natha^el French, 59 , for 32 years teacher and
headmaster at
the highly regarded Northshore Country
Day School in Chicago, who had
participated as a student in one of the first
experimental studentoentered colleges, Black Mountain, and consequently
had no accredited
bachelor's degree*
There was Atron Gentry, 33, Black, with a B.A.
from California State
College at L.A., and founder of the Westside Study
Center, one of the
first commxmity action agencies in the Los Angeles
area. Gentry had
received nine community service awards for his work in Los
Angeles.
There was Robert Woodbury, 30, Phi Beta Kappa in American
Studies at
Amherst, Ph.D. in U.S. History as a Danforth Foundation fellow
at Yale.
He came to the School from the California Institute of Technology
where
he had been an Assistant Professor of History and extremely active
in
campus politics (minority and student rights), developing programs
which linked the institute with the Pasadena community and he also had
been a prominent member of the campaign staff of a successful California Assembly candidate. 32
In the face of the difficulties previously described, how was

Allen able to assemble so quickly such a large and diverse group of
highly competent educators?

How was he able to bring people looking for

the mainstream of educational change to what was at that point a back-

water

—^urban

educators to the country, black educators to a predominantly

white university, young academics on the move to a low-prestige school?
Three major factors seem to have been instrumental to the success
of Allen's recruiting campaign.
1)

The Dean's personal commitment to the recruiting, the energy

and determination with which he went about recruiting people, and hie

success in persuading people to take the risk of participating in his

vision of what the School could be

32Derived from individual vitae.
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2)

Allen-s personal contacts, developed
in previous years, with

people who were vitally interested in change
and innovation in educationand, in turn, their contacts with other
such people

and (3)

A number of uniquely appropriate and effective
recruit-

ing strategies employed by Allen.
I

shall explore these three factors separately
below.

Personal activities

One of the most significant problems of
recruiting was that the

new School of Education existed only as a
vision in Dean Allen's head.
Therefore, as chief architect and dreamer of the
dream he assumed the

responsibility for communicating it to others, for a
visit to the campus
was merely a visit to the fallow ground, the
uncultivated garden in which
the dream would hopefully bear fruit.

And to this task of personal re-

cruiting the Dean directed most of his energies.

Wherever he went

throiighout the co\intry from the classroom to committees to conferences

he talked of his vision for the School and asked of everyone he
met "Who
is the most outstanding and exciting person you know?"

Three new faculty

members eventually joined the School as a result of follow-up of this

kind of questioning and four more whom he first met in Washington and at
various educational conferences also were successfully recruited,
As Allen toured the country, he arranged to meet candidates in airports, in restaurants, at hotels, and on airplanes at all hours of the day

and night, and when visits to the campus were to take place he made sure

^^See Appendix B.
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that he was in attendance in spite of
his hectic travel schedule.

Dean Allen’s energy and intensity in the recruiting
venture are
apparent in anecdotes like a seaplane ride to a remote
Caribbean Island
to recruit David Schimmel; a breakfast-time call
to Robert Woodbury which

begaUf "Hello, I'm Dwight Allen.

Would you like to join a revolution?";

and the time when, as a result of his questioning of
students at a New

York university about who was the most exciting teacher
there, he walked
into the office of the teacher who had been nearly unanimously
named

offered him a

job—and then

eind

spent the next three months getting him to

accept it.^^

Personal and professional contacts

Secondly, a major part of the success of Allen's recruiting cam-

paign can be ascribed to his wide range of personal and professional contacts, especially among innovative educators, their faith in him and

respect for him, and his faith in their judgment about other potential

faculty members.

For example, Allen's students or ex-students clearly

made up the nucleus of the new faculty.

Seven were initially hired, and

of these three recommended associates who were subsequently hired.

One

of these associates hired was then responsible for the recruitment of

three other new faculty members.

Perhaps the most impressive example of this kind of multiplication begins with Richard Clark, a student of Allen's at Stanford who

strongly recommended Robert Woodbury, a close friend of his in his

^4Allen interviews.
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undergraduate years at Amherst.

Woodbury was hired, and recommended

Atron Gentry, with whom he had been working
closely in Pasadena, who was
also hired. Subsequently, four planning
doctoral students joined the

School as a result of their contact with
Gentry.

Woodbury also himself

recommended three doctoral students who were
accepted, including his
brother, to whom can be traced three faculty
members and three doctoral
students.

And there the string ended, at least in the
first year.

But

it is clearly imique that from one new faculty
member should come five

other faculty members and ten doctoral students

—and

the Clark case was,

although the most outstanding, by no means an isolated instance
of this
kind of multiplication.

Another source of faculty and students was Dean Allen's religious
affiliation.

Allen's deep and energetic commitment to the Baha'i faith

had resulted in his election to the National Spiritual Assembly, the

nine-man ruling body of the Baha'i faith in the United States.

In such

a position he was highly visible to Baha'is nation-wide, spoke often at

religious gatherings, and was highly accessible to Baha'is.

He hired

Dan Jordan, another member of the National Assembly, as a full professor,
and there were eleven^^ Bedia'is among the doctoral students.

A summation of the first recruiting year by source of contact
shows the extent to which Allen relied on his own contacts and also the
extent to which he relied on his faculty for new people.

^^Author's estimate

136

New Faculty - Total 34^^
Allen Stanford Students
On recommendation of Stanford Students
On recommendation of those recommended
by Stanford Students
,
,
Allen Washington contacts
From "Who is most exciting"
Baha'i associate
From conferences/professional meetings
Recommendations of other new faculty
Recommendation of old faculty «...
Allen friend as Stanford undergraduate
Stanford Students, not Allen's , , ,
Allen Stanford staff member
Allen

7
3

4
3
3
1
1

3

4
1

2
1

34

The same principle appears to have been at work in the recruitment of planning doctoral students whose basis of recruitment appears to
have been as follows:

Planning Doctoral Students - Total 85
Recruited by Allen
Recruited by new faculty
Recruited by new doctoral students
Switched from Regular Doctoral Program
Recruited by existing faculty
Other and not known

26
20
12
12
3
12

85

In sum, it seems clear that a majority of the faculty and plan-

ning doctoral students joined the School as the result of previous personal and professional association with the Dean or other new faculty

members and doctoral students in contrast to the more conventional faculty

recruiting strategies in which job descriptions are made up, advertised,
and respondents screened, at least initially, primarily on the basis of
credentials.

^^oth compilations derived from Allen interviews.
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There are a number of very strong
arguments in favor of Allen's

personal approach to recruiting based on the
specific situation of the
School at that time.

First, the pressures of time, the recruiting
having

begun late in the recruiting year, made it nearly
impossible to follow
the less efficient published job description
route and still achieve the

numbers necessary for a critical mass.

Secondly, the job description

route was also inappropriate to Allen's plan to develop
a new school and,
in effect, new job descriptions for faculty members.

To hire new people

by job description would have, in effect, locked the new school into

whatever pattern was decided upon in the hiring.

Thirdly, Allen's repu-

tation as an innovator had given him prior access, through personal
associations, to those most interested in new approaches to education.
Therefore, in his associations there was a built-in selection mechanism

and in his judgment a built-in screening mechanism for those best suited
to the School.

In effect Allen had, during his previous professional

career, been his own recruiting and screening device for innovative peo-

ple—the

kind he was determined to have at the School.
Finally, it is probable that under the circumstances personal

and professional association was a more accurate indicator of appropriate

competency and potential for contribution to the development of the new
School of Education than credential checks, interviews, and letters of

recommendation would have been.

Since Allen's vision for the year of

planning and subsequent years tended toward a creative, flexible, freeflowing organizational model depending to a large extent on the ability
of participants to work effectively with each other without rigid b\xreau—

cratic controls, an important ingredient of the new School would be the
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ability of its people to work
well together.

To hire people with whot

Allen was familiar and had worked
with before and to, in turn,
enoourage
them to recommend people whom they
respected and felt that they could

work with, was one way of developing
an organisation which could work
creatively and effectively through
informal rather than formal relationships.

Recruiting strategies

Dean Allen's recruiting strategies were
designed to accentuate
the strengths inherent in the School's
situation while devaluing the

weaknesses as much as possible.

One problem previously described was

the low prestige of the School and the second-level
statue of the University.

One method used by Allen to combat these weaknesses
was to offer

top salaries.

These salaries somewhat covinterbalanced the low prestige

of the position for new faculty, first because of the clear
financial

advantages, and secondly because they represented prestige salaries
on
a nation-wide basis.

This strategy was especially effective for the

yoiinger faculty on which recruiting efforts were being concentrated.

Another strategy directed at the low—prestige problem was that
of "first class" recruiting, both as it reflected an attitude toward the

candidate and as a harbinger of the way in which the School intended to
operate in the future.

Thus Allen willingly and enthusiastically flew

to people or flew them to the campus, hired private planes, often paid

for dinners and other gatherings, and took care of moving expenses—all

without the penny-pinching often characteristic of academic recruiting.
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The problem inherent in the fact
that the new school was only
a
vision and could become a reality only
if a sufficient number of new
faculty decided to join the school was solved
serendipitously in a situation which normally would have been a
recruiter’s nightmare-a day when
five prospective faculty members arrived
at once.

highly successful day.

It turned out to be a

Since the five were aware that there were
posi-

tions available for all of them, there was little
sense of competition

among them, and it became obvious that they enjoyed
talking with each
other, that they were talking in the language of the
new school, and that

they were already exploring possible relationships with each
other at the

school.

It occurred to Allen that here was an excellent way to
recruit

because the reality of the school he envisioned was embodied to a far

greater extent in the people visiting the school than the people already
there.

It thus beceune standard recruiting strategy to make sure that

people visited in groups and to give them time to recruit each other.
This strategy reached its apex on a day in late February when

nine prospective faculty members were on campus

—and

all subsequently

joined the School.

Other problems in recruiting, particularly the School's rural
location, its dearth of black educators, and its lack of soft money projects were obviated as much as possible by Allen's forceful and enthusi-

astic presentation of his vision for the School, one which would be far

more mobile than most, operating satellite centers in large cities, and
perhaps someday even having its own airplane.

As for financial support.

^^Preceding three pareigraphs from Allen interviews.
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Allen talked of projeote already
funded ae a result of his
joining the
Sohool, of plans for new funding-and
his oonnections with funding
soxirces and prior success as
a fund raiser were well known.

Finally, there was the fact that
Allen was not selling just vision, there were some hard realities
to which he could and did point
and
to which potential faculty members
could look for indications of the
po-

tential for realization of his vision.
he had brought to the School.

Ihere was the new funding which

There was the Planning Doctoral Program,

to be described below, for which the
School had waived conventional re-

quirements (and which, incidentally, also was
an added inducement for

new faculty to join the School since it gave
them an opportunity to bring
promising students to the School with them).

There was the recruiting

process itself, so startlingly atypical that it was
almost inconceivable
that its outcome would lead to a "normal'* school of
education.

And fi-

nally , there was the number of new faculty positions available
and the
fact that Allen had clearly discontinued all programs, courses,
require-

ments, and degrees as of September, I969

—indicative

both of the potential

scope and direction of the School and of the support of the University

administration for the new school.

Planning Doctoral Program

In retrospect it becomes apparent that the Planning Doctoral Pro-

gram (originally called the Special Doctoral Program) was essential to
the achievement of a critical mass of change-oriented people at the School

and that it may have been the single most importajit factor in the success
of the change effort.

It was originally devised by Allen not as a change
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strategy, but as a device for keeping one of
the students in his original

group of five at the School,

This doctoral student, who had joined Allen

after a number of years in the higher echelons of the Peace
Corps, was
unwilling to stay at the School taking standard courses and denied
any
real power to affect the course of the School,

To encourage him to stay

the Deanes devised a special program with the following major
ingredients;

the waiver of normal School, but not University, requirements for

the doctorate; credit for work on planning committees; equal vote with
the faculty on planning matters; an individualized preparation program

worked out with three faculty members chosen by the student, who could
change this committee at any time; and a dissertation, which came to be

defined as a major piece of work in communicable form,^^
This program was approved by the School of Education grsuiuate

faculty in an early morning meeting on February 5i 19^8, with the suided

stipulation that such program be reserved only for those students of out-

standing ability and maturity,

Also, although the minutes do not so

indicate, it was agreed by all concerned that the progreun would be limited
to fifteen to twenty students,

Later in the spring it was proposed

38j)erived from Allen interview and interview with Gordon Schimmel,
member of original staff, February 1972.

^^Dick Ulin and Earl Seidman, Memorandum, "Procedures for Planning
Doctoral Students,” October 23 » 19^8 (mimeo. School files),
^^"Minutes of the Graduate Faculty Meeting, February
Phillip L, Bdgecomb, Recorder (School files),

5,

I

968 ,"

^^See Albert S. Anthony, "Memorandum to Gradviate Faculty" on "Profiles).
posal for Increase of Special Doctoral Students," p, 1 (School

14a

that up to forty Special Doctoral
Students be admitted, 42 and by the
fall eighty-five had been admitted.
The Special Doctoral Program did indeed
draw a unique kind of

student.

In this group, almost one-quarter black,
the youngest 22 and

the oldest 46, with an average age of
approximately 30, were artists,

dancers, musicians, computer specialists, a
former salesman and a former

investment officer, a former Harlem gang leader
and three leaders of a

California black community center, ministers, school
administrators and
teachers from a wide range of schools and fields,
community workers,

former business executives, former housewives, a
draft-resistance leader
and ex-military officers, media specialists. Peace Corps members
and

Office of Education employees, politicians, and psychologists. 43
The major vehicle for recruitment of these people was personal

contacts, the majority coming from relationships with either Allen or a

faculty member.

A significant number of others were recruited by the

students themselves. 44

j-t

yjas

as if there was a grapevine of innovation-

oriented people throughout the coxmtry, and the news spread rapidly along
it.

A few others joined the program as the result of chance meetings at

conferences, lectures or even, in at least one case, a chance meeting

with Allen on a plane.

4^”Minutes of the Graduate Faculty Meeting, May 9i 1968," Joan
Chenault, Recorder (School files).
43])erived from Lyman B. Brainerd, Jr., "A Thrust Toward Relevance:
the Year in Review," in Trend , Spring 1969» P» 5» 3-nd School of Education
Interim Catalogue , transmitted to Academic Matters Committee, Faculty
Senate, and Graduate Council, from Dwight W. Allen, Dean, School of Education ([April 1969 ] School files), p. 7*

^See

p. 136 .
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In fact, as the spring progressed
the personal nature of
reoruiting for the Planning Dootoral
Progras, beoan,e erplioit in an
informal

guideline which based admittanoe on the
willingness of one faculty „ember
to put his name on the line in the
support of that student.
This program, as previously pointed
out, was a signifioant incentive in the recruitment of new faculty
members.

It also turned out to be

an excellent way of recruiting "semi-faculty,"
highly competent people
without doctorates, especially in the case
of black and minority group
members, but also among young, innovative, and
successful teachers and

administrators.

And most important, it tapped a group of people,
bright,

energetic, and committed to reform who, disenchanted with
the public

school system and with schools of education, had previously
had no place
to go a

They were, as a group, idealistic, independent, strong-willed

people who saw in the School an opportunity for realistic credent ialing,
for having their ideas heard, and for making a difference in education*

My belief that the Special Doctoral Program was the single most
important factor in the change effort at the School of Education is based
on the following set of outcomes of the program:

—that

it was a significant incentive in the recruitment of new faculty,

—that

it incontrovertibly swung the balance of faculty power toward re-

newal and innovation.

Haul

Dr. Allen entered the new year with a faculty

split almost eq\ially between old and new, the resistance of the old to
the types of change espoused by the Dean and the new would have repre-

sented a strong restraint to achievement of the changes envisioned.

Also, the balance of power having swting, many of old faculty put their

energies into change, which otherwise would have gone to resistance.
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—that the new doctoral students provided both

the manpower and the ex-

pertise without which the planning year would have had considerably
less scope and depth,

—that

the program was a vehicle for the admission of black and minority

students and for giving them a voice in the School's program.

Without

this vehicle and power it is difficult to see how the strong anti-

racism focus which came to be at the center of the School could have

ever gotten its start,

—that

the structure of the program set precedents for some of the most

important innovations of the School including student participation

and vote in all School matters, relaxation of traditional doctoral re-

quirements, individualized programs negotiated with faculty members,

redefinition of the dissertation, non-course alternatives to academic
preparation, redefined admission standards, a less judgmental approach
to the work of students, and a more peer-oriented relationship between

faculty and students.
One drawback of the Special Doctoral Progreun, in retrospect, was

that it did not go far enough as regards inclusion of all students in the

planning process.

Master's students and undergraduates were pretty much

excluded from the planning, and the Interim Catalogue reflected its creators as it was primarily oriented to the needs and aspirations of the

faculty and graduate students.

Fund Raising

Salaries for most new faculty members were provided by the Uni-

versity, but additional funding was crucial to the achievement of critical
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mass (1) to provide stipends for the
planning doctoral students,
(2) to
provide secretarial help and other support
services to the administration
and faculty (secretarial help and other
support was frozen by the University at the old faculty
uxojr level
xcvej. 01
of jp, 45^ and

4
j
3 ) to provide the money for
.

(

the "first-class" recruiting efforts, University
funds for such travel

being manifestly inadequate.
As with the recruiting effort, the fund-raising effort
was highly
successful.

In the period September I967 through April I969 approxi-

mately $450,000 in additional outside funds and $170,000 in University
funds were generated, permitting the School to support all doctoral stu-

dents who needed such support, employ an adequate (although barely) support and service staff, and finance the recruiting ceunpaign.

The two most significant proposals funded during this early

period were a $120,000 Model Elementary Teacher Education planning proposal and a $180,000 Education Professions Development Act proposal, both

Office of Education grants.

January

1,

The Model Teacher proposal was due on

I968, and thus was developed at Stanford primarily by Allen

and three of the Stanford group who were coming with him to Amherst,

Money from this successful proposal was available in the spring of I968,
The EPDA proposal was written in the spring of I968 at the Amherst ceunpus,
but was not actually funded iintil early in 1969*

In addition a Compensa-

tory Education grant of $50,000 brought to the School by Dan Jordan and
a $45 ,000 Comprehensive Achievement Monitoring grant broiight by Allen,

together with a number of smaller grants, provided the basic incremental

45Allen interview
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funding sources for the recruiting and the
planning year. 46
The difficulties of attaining such financing
were potentially

large as it is a risky proposition for outside
funding agencies to make

substantial grants to a new, untested school of education.

It seems

probable that these grants were made primarily to, and
because of, the

Dean as a result of his reputation and previous experience
with these
funding agencies.

For instance, he was chairman of the committee which

had drawn up the guidelines for the EPDA program and was well known
among
the people who controlled the METED? funding.

In addition, while at

Stanford he had had a n\imber of successful dealings with the Kettering
Foundation, which funded the Comprehensive Achievement Monitoring Project, and was a close friend of Chuck Kettering who had been, in fact, the

person who had recommended that he look into the University of Massachusetts offer. 47

Allen's success in raising $170,000 in additional money from the
University is an example both of an imaginative approach to funding and
of his high-risk approach to leadership.

The money came at two differ-

ent times and for two different reasons.

An additional $45|000 was com-

mitted in the spring of
S 125 fOOO came in the

I

968 for support of doctoral students and

spring of

I

969

"to

underwrite all the activities of

the School.

The $45,000 in incremental doctoral student support money was
Upon

part of Allen's overall effort to support all the doctoral students.
his arrival, he fo\ind that there was University money available for 20

4^Ibid.

47ibid.

147

doctoral students.

As it became clear that the planning doctoral
pro-

gram would attract many more than that, Allen began to look
for other
sources of funding.

He found a University allocation of $15,000 for

supervision of student teachers.

Most of this money had been going to

faculty wives who provided such supervision.

Allen then persuaded the

administration that supervision was excellent preparation for doctoral
students and that $15»000 was an irresponsibly inadequate sunount to super-

vise some 400 practice teachers, and consequently the University increased
the supervision allocation to $60,000, an amount sufficient to support
20 doctoral students at the average stipend of $3,000 a year.

Twelve

more were supported by a program of tutoring for minority students in
the University and by the Compensatory Education grant.

In this manner Allen was able to support 52 doctoral students,
but that still left some 20 students unfunded for the planning year with

receipt of the EFUA money, which would cover the unfunded students, a

probability but by no means a certainty.

Some students were able to wait

until the receipt of this money, but most were not.

To create money for

them, Allen officially terminated the grants of many of the previously

f\mded doctoral students at mid-year; in effect using much of the year's

stipend money during the first semester and counting on new grants, particularly EPDA, to cover the second half of the year.

And the new grants

did arrive. 4^9

4&y j^(ig()-tapes of speech, Dwight W. Allen, "What Makes Dwight Tick,
Florissant, Colorado, Sept. 19i I968 (Media Center files under title
Dwight Allen, "I have a Dream" speech).
49ibid.
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Had Allen not taken the risk of, in effect,
fxmding graduate

students when there was not money available, perhaps
some 20 planning

doctoral students could not have joined the School, with
possibly serious consequences for the progress of the new school.

In speaking of

this highly risky strategy Allen observes.
It was a choice. Either I had to take the risk or they did.
It
seemed to me that the personal risk of moving to Amherst with

support uncertain was more onerous to the student than was my
risk in guaranteeing money especially since I was optimistic
that it would come through or that I could somehow do something
to continue paying those people. 50

—

Or, more succinctly, and with a puckish grin, "I had a choice between

ending up with lots of people and no money or lots of money and no people.

And that really wasn't a choice for me." 51
This risk-oriented approach to financing the development of the

School is characteristic of Allen's style, and was nowhere more evident
than in hie financing of the School during the planning year in which he
overspent his budget by approximately $125|000, knowing that the University

had.

some unallocated funds and confident that the administration

would bail him out

—which

was what, in fact, took place, with the corol-

lary benefit of establishing a new level of funding for the following

year . 52
In siimmary, Allen's recruiting and fund-raising efforts had been

enormously successful.

He had unquestionably achieved his goal of assem-

bling a critical mass of competent, change-oriented educators in the

50Allen interview.

5Ullen, Videotape,
52Allen interview.

"Vfhat

Makes Dwight Tick?"
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School and this critical mass was to be extremely
important in the plan-

ning year, since his relationships with the existing faculty had
deteriorated continuously and seriously over the first five months of his
leadership, culminating in the filing of a formal grievance against him
by most of the tenured faculty and leaving the faculty for the most part

antagonistic, alienated, and distrustful of him.

Dealing with the Existing Faculty

Dean Allen's first full-scale encovmter with the faculty he had
inherited took place on September 22,
in nearby Shelburne

I

967

,

at the Sweetheart Tea Room,

Falls—a meeting which most involved generally refer

to as the Sweetheart Tea Room disaster.

For this very important initial

meeting, Allen had invited the entire faculty for dinner at the Tea Room.
The mere circvimstances of his talk were symbolic of new things.

dinner at School expense was unprecedented

—and

To have

the fact that cocktails

were served and free left many of the faculty incredulous.

In this situa-

tion, there was, to Allen, a symbol of new beginnings, to the faculty a

symbol of the new Dean's unique powers over the School budget. 53

The purpose of his speech was to let his faculty know his stand
on educational issues and his dreams for the School.

He had every expec-

tation that the faculty would share his dreams.
Memories of that speech on all sides are hazy, one indication
talked of
perhaps of the trauma of that event, but it is clear that he
change to the School
"a mandate from the University administration to bring

53Allen and existing faculty interviews.
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of Education," of his distaste for conventional schools
of education,
of his view that the doctorate in education comes too late
for most
(

The median age of the award of the EDB is
39

»

bo half those who get

it are older than that, and by the time they are reaxiy to do
something

they are ready to retire”), of his dissatisfaction with the existing
School building (our present school building is impossible and should
be replaced), of his desire to have six "wild card" new faculty members

for which he would be the sole decision-maker, and of his intention to

discontinue all existing programs of the School in September 1969.54
He expected the faculty to be excited and enthusiastic about the

opportunity to begin anew.

The result was just the opposite.

unvalued, frightened, and threatened.

Many were in the 39“Pl^s

They felt
sig®

range and felt that they were being written off; his indictment of con-

ventional schools of education clearly seemed to apply to many of those
present; the mandate and the wild card were clear indications to the

faculty that the Dean had, and intended to use, the power to ride roughshod over them; and the discontinuation of programs implied clear and

specific disapproval of the School of which they were the central part. 55
In summary, the entire speech had the effect, as described in a later
petition, of making the faculty feel "just about as useless as the other

things he was in a hurry to discard. "56
S.
54i)erived from Allen and existing faculty interviews and Albert
Allen),
Dwight
Anthony, "Memorandum to Provost Oswald Tippo (Copy to Dean
2 &
Subject: Grievances , Peb. 21, 1 968 " [memo sent only to Allen], pp.
11

(School files).

inter55prom videotape, "What Makes Dwight Tick," existing faculty
11.
memo,"
p.
views, and Anthony, "Peb. 21 Grievance

5^Anthony, "Peb. 21 Grievance memo," p. 11.
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In retrospect Allen summed the impact
of the speech up by saying,
"I wanted to tell them what I believed in;
I wanted to tell them my

dreams for the School;

I

wanted to turn them on as much as

I

was turned

on; but instead I alienated them because
they could see no place for

themselves in my dream."

To compound the problem, Allen flew back to

California early the next morning, giving the faculty
no opportunity to

communicate their fears to him, thus creating a breeding
groxind for
anxiety.

The tra\una of the speech lingered, rankled and festered
in the

minds and conversations of the faculty, with no immediate way
of relieving the pressure. 57
In the interim between this speech and Allen's arrival on campus

the faculty saw very little of him and the void was filled primarily with

rumors about the new Dean:

"He is being eased out of Stanford," "He is

going to have an administrative assistant and she's Black "

;

about new

faculty being hired, "He was his roommate at college and is going to
the

—

Area"

templated by the Dean.

heaid

and about catastrophic personnel actions being conIn short, while not physically at the School dur-

ing these months, Dean Allen constituted a mysterious and menacing

presence to the old faculty. 58

Allen formally took over Deanship of the School on January
1968.

2,

With him were six people, five of whom were to form his staff for

the remainder of the year.

All were from California and none were ac-

quainted with any of the Amherst faculty.

The group was made up of Wilma

5Tit is perhaps significant to note that the Sweetheart Tea Room
burned to the ground three weeks later.

58exi sting faculty interviews.
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Brady, black and also a BahaU,
who was his executive secretary,
Richard
Ooffing, the new Assistant Dean for
Administration, previously a county

administrator; Richard Krasno, a student
of Allen's who held the rank of
Visiting Lecturer; and three doctoral
students, Gordon Schimmel, Peter
Wagschal, and Todd Eachus.
The group quickly set about the recruiting
and fund-raising

tasks which were their major effort for the
remainder of the semester.

There was a strong sense of urgency about the tasks
to be done, and the

pace was fast, frenzied, and disorganized.

The group had located itself

in the former Dean's office and the two adjacent, and
it soon became

apparent that these offices had become a sort of West Berlin,
surrounded

by first neutral and then hostile territory and almost completely isolated from the life of the surrounding area.

One member of the group

has said that it felt like being in the middle of an armed camp. 59

There appear to have been three major reasons for the deteriora-

tion of relations between Allen and the existing faculty:
1)

Isolation:

The fact that there was little contact between

the Dean and the faculty led to a conviction on the part of the faculty

that Allen was making vinilateral decisions in areas where they should

have been consulted and that he did not value them or their opinions.
2)

Alleged Favoritism:

The fact that Allen was perceived as

unfairly favoring certain faculty members who, in general, were not
liked or respected by other faculty members.

59prom interviews with Allen and two initial group members.
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and 3)

Alleged Bias in Personnel Decisions!

The fact that cer-

tain personnel decisions Allen ™ade
in the spring were perceived
as unfair, biased, and in some cases
dishonest.
I

shall below describe and explore
each of these three factors

in greater detail.

Isolation

Available evidence seems to indicate that
neither Dr. Allen nor
members of the new group made any serious efforts
to open up contact with
the existing faculty.

For example, in a memorandum in early February, a

member of the faculty reported on his perceptions of
the arrival of Dick
Krasno.
The faculty was first aware of this individual's existence when
he was assigned office space on the second floor. For a matter
of a few weeks he moved quietly through the halls without ever
formally meeting the faculty or any indications given as to
what his status might be. It finally came out that he was appointed a Visiting Lecturer. It seems that no credentials were
ever circulated on Mr. Krasno nor was any group asked to pass
judgment as to his qualifications for joining our staff.

For a small faculty group careful and jealous of its status, the addition
of an unannounced outsider clearly constituted a major breach of trust.

During the later grievance hearings the powerful effect of the
isolation of the new group on much of the rest of the faculty

csune to

light.

One incident mentioned was what was described as "the humiliation
of Mrs. Horton" (the previous Dean's secretary).

The description of this

^^Albert S. Anthony, Memorandum to Dean Dwight Allen (Copy to Prov"Responsibility for Faculty Personnel Decisions,"
ost Tippo), Subject:
Feb. 12, 1968, p. 3 (School files).
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incident at the hearing alec highlights
the paranoia of the existing
faculty about the new group.
In the minutes of the hearing, one
of the existing faculty mem.

hers (EPI

)

describes the sitxxation:

Answer, EPI;

Question;

Answer, EPI;

EP2;

Question;

Answer, EPI;
Question;
Answer, EPI;
EP2;

"Mrs. Horton was moved out of the office
some time
before the new secretary came on board,
his, what
he calls his Executive Secretary, whom
he brought
with him from California. And she (Mrs.
Horton)
had been working with the administrative
group on
the second floor and is under orders not
to come
down to the first floor."
"Is this what you mean by the humiliation of Mrs.
Horton?"
"Well, I think this is partly the case . . . Mrs.
Horton has some thirteen years experience at this
institution. I think she is certainly entitled to
a little more respect than the \mceremonious
ushering her out of her office up to another region and ordering her to stay away ..."
"A week and a half ago was the first time that, according to Mrs. Horton, that Dean Allen ever asked
her a question ..."
"Por easy future reference, what is the name of the
secretary he brought from California?"
"Mrs. Brauiy."
VHow had she served him there?"
"She had been hie private secretary, I believe."
"This is just a part of the total takeover by a
California group, you might say, and he (Allen)
wonders why anxieties and hostility is aroused.
The old group is not to be trusted apparently.

And later, talking of the communications gulf between Allen and
the old faculty and its effect on the existing faculty;

Dean Allen did not call a general meeting of this faculty for
over a month after he came here in January. He remained in his
office, aloof from his facility ... behind closed doors most of
the time. There had been built up such a backlog of anxiety and
relative to this man, and the plans that were leaking out,
.
•
•
etc., that Dr. Parody, who was no longer Dean, happened to be in
the office one day, and Dr. Allen asked him how things were going. Dr. Parody very honestly said, "Terrible, terrible." And

^ ^Transcript, "Testimony of the Tenured Paculty," pp. 7

& 8
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so he went on and said~"What
do you mean?" and he said
"Well
you are just not getting through
to this faculty.
You
should
have a meeting immediately with
them and try to^convey some

*

of
involve them in these plaL." So
he said, Oh , I goofed again,
all right." So usually what he
token kind of adjustment-getting
a meeti^
irwhiLT®^^^®
in
which he dominates things, talks down
to his faculty, th^
he goes away assuming that everything
is wonderful.
He never
stops to listen to people; he never
stops to inquire what's
eating at people, never tries to understand.
He's got his own
plan that he is impatient to implement,
and I think he reganis
the old people as an impediment.
I'm sure that he would have
loved not to have anybody, to have started
with a clean slate,
a clean program, a clean faculty, and
we're a nuisance to him.
I think this reflects on action after
action that he has taken. 62

A concomitant to the faculty's sensitivity to Allen's
seeming
aloofness, was the belief that he was making unilateral
decisions in
areas of faculty prerogatives.

The recruitment of new faculty was es-

pecially subject to criticism in this regard.

Among the complaints

registered was the fact that Dean Allen did not consult the faculty in

deciding whom to recruit and in fact that he ignored faculty suggestions;
that he did not recruit people by slot, but rather as "good people" in
such a manner as the faculty could not compare proposed appointments with

other possibilities in a field; that new people were being paid too much;
that his emphasis on youth was creating an inferior faculty; that cer-

tain specific people appointed were inferior in quality; and that, in

certain specific cases, Allen had broken agreements he had made with the
Personnel Committee.

^^

Ibid .

.

p.

13.

^^Above complaints described in Anthony, "Peb. 21 Grievance Memo";
in Some Tenured Faculty Members, " Grievance Against Dean Dwight Allen,"
submitted to the University Tenure and Grievance Committee, April 10,
1968 ; and in transcript, "Testimony of the Tenured Faculty," pp. 13-19i
22-37 (all in School files).
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other comments made during the
grievance hearing are indicative
Of the faculty.s feeling that they
were not being appropriately
consulted
For instance;
The faculty learns about much of
the Dean's activity on
crucial matters of concern to the whole
School fait accompli . ^4

Althoj^h much of the decision making
of the School should
be done through the various coordinators
in the areas. Dean
their leaders and pretend that
neither they nor the areas exist.
Favoritism

In fact Dean Allen did make contacts with a n\w>ber
of old faculty
and also attempted to reward and promote those who
he thought had the
greatest potential for contribution to the new school.

However, both

attempts turned out to be extremely divisive, only acerbating
the situation with the remainder of the faculty.

For one thing, those faculty members with whom the Dean attempted
contact appear to have been the outsiders in the faculty.

One was away

from campus much of the time doing fund raising, taught very little, and
was characterized by some of his peers as being arrogant in his relationships with them.^^

Another was viewed as unconcerned and irresponsible

in his teaching and School and University responsibilities (absent from

classes, refused to serve on the Personnel Committee, rarely attended
the Faculty Senate

and the third was a part-time instructor working

^^enured Faculty, Grievance

,

p.

11.

^^Transcript , "Testimony of Tenured Faculty," p. 11.

^^Tenured Faculty, Grievance , p. 8 .

^^ Ibid .

,

p. 9 »
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for a doctorate in the English
Depart,„ent.

That Allen ohoee these three

only confined the rest of the faculty-s
worst suspicions about what kind
of school he was creating and what kind
of people he would value.

Acrimony over his support of these people
came out during the
grievance hearing in statements like;

Prom the very start Dean Allen tended to
favor certain faculty
members. He was already connected with
[Dr. A] through conned
tions both had with the
Foundation. The two
in
c^unication during the spring I967 at which time Dr. A were
gave
the new Deem his estimate of the School. 68
It is common knowledge in the School that
[who had been
given a merit raise despite a low Personnel Committee
rating]
has made a point of ingratiating [himself] with the
Dean. 69

Bias in personnel decisions

As serious as were the aforementioned factors in the minds of
the faculty, Dean Allen's personnel actions with regard to the old fac-

ulty appear, from my interviews, and as reflected in the minutes of the
grievance hearings, to have been the single most important factor in the

creation of hostility and distrust on the part of the old faculty toward
the Dean.

Nearly every person on the faculty was affected, in one way

or another, by Allen's decisions about existing personnel.

These deci-

sions included promotion, merit increases, tenure, and non-renewal of

contracts.
The most serious general criticism of Dean Allen in these actions
was that he had agreed to follow the guide of the Personnel Committee and

University policy in making them

68'Ibid.

,

p. 7 «

—and

then, in a large number of cases.

^^ibid.

,

p.

9*
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had not done bo.

Most of the specific decisions enumerated
below are

decisions that the Dean made, apparently
in contradiction to the Personnel Committee decisions.

On merit increases—Dean Allen had asked the
Personnel Committee
to arrive at a composite rating for each faculty
member, which he would

turn into a dollar figure for compensation purposes . 70

vftxen

the actual

dollar figures were awarded many old faculty believed
that (1) the increases were not in accordance with the ratings given by
the Personnel

Committee,

(2) that those whom the Dean favored were given unfairly

large increases, 7^

that those who opposed Allen's policies were

given either an unfairly small increase or none at all. 73
On promotions and tenure——In two cases promotions and/or tenure
were granted to people who, it was contended, had not been recommended
by the Personnel Commit tee. 74

On non—renewals——It was contended that two people who had been
recommended by the Personnel Committee to receive tenure, had been, in
effect, fired by the Dean. 75

one of these was to bring a grievance

against him, later denied, and the strong feelings aroxind this grievance
further widened the gap between Dean Allen and most of the faculty.

7^Transcript , "Allen Second Testimony," pp.

17 - 22 .

7

^Tenured Faculty, Grievance , pp. 6-10; Transcript, "Testimony of
Tenured Faculty," pp. 34 & 36.

7^Tenured Faculty, Grievance , pp. 6 - 9 .
7^ Ibid .

,

p. 9*

^^ Ibid .

,

p. 6

75por one, see Tenured Faculty, Grievance, p. 6. For the other,
see transcript, "Testimony of the Tenured Faculty," pp. 34 & 35*
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Svutimary

The hostility and antagonism which
the actions of Allen engen-

dered in the existing faculty are aptly
summarised by the follcwing
statements, excerpted frcm the grievance
proceedings and an earlier,

highly critical, raeraorandum.
I think most of us throughout his
tenure as Dean have bent
over backwards trying to cooperate with him.
I think most of
us, through frustrations, have lost confidence
in this man.
Week after week things come up which constantly
set the faculty
in turmoil, which introduce a distrust and feelings
of frustrations and alienation on the part of the faculty.
I think we
conduct a great give-away—and I would be the first to admit
this, and I participate in give-aways of faculty
prerogatives
in order to gain peace, but I find that these things, instead
of insuring peace, just whet his appetite for more concessions.”^^

—— —

I think Professor
—
clearly speaks for the tenured
faculty and what is more important, I think he clearly speaks
for the vast majority of the untenured faculty who are held now
in a kind of aceuiemic version of a reign of terror [the last
statement was subsequently retracted by the speaker]. 77

In over twenty— five years of teaching I have never had any
occasion where an administrator treated me in the disparaiging
and insulting mauiner as Dr. Allen did. 78
I am one of the tenured faculty who deeply resent the humiliation and the shock of being evaluated as though we have
been and are detrimental to the growth of the School of Education. Like other faculty members I hsid expected that "a new
broom would sweep clean.” However, I did not anticipate being
relegated to a refuse pile. 79

Up to this time I had never worked for a man who has shown
such utter contempt for hie associates. He obviously feels that
he neither need keep his word nor work as a team with his faculty. My obvious conclusion is that he has never worked

^^Transcript, "Testimony of the Tenured Faculty," p.
^^ Ibid .

,

p. 20.

^®Anthony, "Feb. 21 Grievance Memo," Exhibit D.

I

9.
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I have had a number of contacts with
Dean Allen and I get
the impression of a man who is profoundly
indifferent to those
people he does not feel can be of service to
him. Hie general
attitude toward his faculty is one of contempt.
I find his
arrogant manner most distasteful.

Faculty conflict with the new Dean reached its apex
in the late

spring when eight of the ten®^ tenured faculty
of the School of Education brought a grievance against Dean Allen to the Faculty
Senate.

This

grievance, dated April 10 , I968, was based on the AAUP statement in
Government of Colleges and Universities which states (p. 12 "Faculty status
)

and related matters are primarily a faculty responsibility:
includes appointments

.

.

."

this area

and went on to detail grievances in the

areas of faculty and administration recruitment and hiring and personnel

actions on existing faculty—primarily those described in the preceding
pages.

The University Faculty Tenure and Grievance Committee disallowed

all grievances, apparently ruling that the tenured faculty had not been

able to prove conclusively their allegations.®®

However, their decision

did nothing to alleviate the distrust and hostility of the old faculty
toward the new Dean which they were to bring with them to the opening of
the "new school," September I968.

®Q lbid .
® hbid .

®^The ninth had recently been granted tenure by the Dean and the
tenth was on leave.

®®From Allen interview; I was not able to find a report of the de
cision of this committee in School files.
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Gonclueion

And thus, with the achievement of a
critical mass of changeoriented people through a highly successful
recruiting effort and the
prospect of sufficient funding for a major
planning effort to its advantage, and a hostile and antagonistic faculty
to its disadvantage, the

nucleus of the new School of Education looked
forwaid to its first summer
in the town of Amherst, a university town
noted for the peace and quiet

of its summers.

And the summer was, indeed, a relatively quiet transition
period.
Many of the old faculty had departed for siommer appointments at
other institutions or to study and write away from the School,

Some members of

the new faculty began drifting into town and began to work into the ac-

tivities of the School as the summer progressed.

The major activities

of the School were devoted to plaiming for the following year, especially

for the Retreat j to the development of relationships with other parte of
the University, especially the central administration; to swimitting new

planning doctoral students; to work on the Model Elementary Teacher Education planning grant; and to the sponsorship of a program of siimmer
workshops at the School,
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Part II

THE PLANNING YEA.R

September I968 - November I969

INTRODUCTION

Ab Slimmer began to wane, from all around the coiintry
came a
formication of moving vans, U-Haul trucks, and overloaded
cars carrying

new faculty and doctoral students and their households toward
Amherst
causing, among other things, the tightest real estate market
in the

town's history.

Gradually, as the fall arrived, they began to sift into

the School——if faculty, to take possession of their new offices;
if stu-

dents, to make a place for themselves both personally

euid

physically in

the School, physically in the sense that planning doctoral students had

no offices or even an area, and the best strategy for finding a place to

hang one's coat and store one's lunch, and occasionally find something
to write upon, was to attach oneself to a faculty member and proceed to

carve out a small part of his office for oneself.

Throughout the building there were signs of renovation and reconstruction; two-by-fours, paneling, buckets of nails, paint cans, tools,
wires, and equipment which were to remain a part of the gestalt of the

School throughout the year, physical symbols, one could easily feel, of
the renewal and reconstruction going on within the organization which

inhabited the building.
There were three major tasks to be accomplished during this year

which had been designated by Dean Allen as a "Year of Planning."

The
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first was to find an effective means
for getting the large and diveree

group of strangers who had been recruited
for the change effort moving

together in an organized way to accomplish
the objectives of the planning
year.

The second was that of aoademio reform—
to design new curriculum

and academic policies for the School which
would be more relevant to the
needs of students and of society.
tional reform

The third task was that of organiza-

to devise organizational struotures which promoted
vi-

tality and renewal and which would encourage continuing
development in
the academic program.

The task of organizing for the planning process was primarily

accomplished through a week-long, school -wide retreat held in late
September.
The academic task included identifying the appropriate clientele

for the School} defining the major educational focij creating appropriate

curriculum, content, and educational processes} devising appropriate

grading and evaluation techniques } and determining relevant standards of
degree granting and credent ialing.

This \indertaking reached its cul-

mination in April of the planning year with the submission (and subsequent approval in late May) of a 2,400-page Interim Catalogue to

appropriate University approval agencies.

This package featured:

— 159

courses sponsored by eleven "Learning Centers,"
and ten "special progreuns."

—a

school far more committed to graduate education than
formerly, with undergraduate education (teacher training)
specifically listed as a second priority.

—pass-fail

grading for all courses.
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credit module format which provided
credit, graded on a
l^ee no record baeie. for educational experi^nfee
of
different from regular oouree length
and
forSt

T

-graduate ^ograme organized along the lines
of the Planning
Doctoral
normal

Program, with a student "portfolio"
replacing the

crod.i't

accumulaliion forma'te

a request for a mandate for experimentation
in all the
School's programs with evaluation at the end
of a twoyear period.

The organizational task, which had become
focused on the crea-

tion of an appropriate constitution for the School,
was formally com-

pleted in November of the following year with the formal
adoption by
the faculty and administration of the Constitution
which featured:

—a

sharing of the Dean's powers with the community as a whole.

—the

inclusion of students as voting members of all School
decision-making bodies.

—the

establishment of an ombudsman and a number of other
appeal mechanisms.

—the legitimization

of the center— oriented organizational

structure.
The case analyses of the events of the planning year will be

presented in three chapters.

Chapter V will focus on the initial organizing stsiges of the
planning, particularly a School-wide, week-long Retreat, in which the

major thrusts of the School in both academic programs and orgeinizational
policies were developed.

Chapter VI will focus on the process by which academic reform
was achieved.

Chapter VII will focus on the process by which governing structures for the School were developed.
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CHAPTER

V

INITIAL ORGANIZING STAGES/THE RETREAT

Opening School Meeting
The first formal meeting of the "new school" took
place on
Monday, September 4 ,

I

968 .

It was an all-day meeting, beginning at
9 a.m.,

with luncheon provided by the School.

The meeting began with a faculty

meeting in which Dean Allen, without notes, introduced each member of the

new and old faculty to the group.

At 10 a.m. the planning doctoral stu-

dents joined the meeting and were individixally introduced by the Dean,

again speaking without notes.

Allen then spoke to the group for approxi-

mately one-half hour, confirming for the first time to the total School
things that he had been saying individually to School members for the
past year.

He spoke first of his conviction that the room contained the

most outstanding assembly of educators in the country and then of his
hopes for the year and vision for the future.

He re-emphasized the fact

that the School had a mandate for change, that all courses, programs,

degrees and certification offered by the School were discontinued as of
the following September, and that the coming year was to be a planning

year in which the options for innovation were practically limitless.

He

also outlined the deadlines for the task, the major goal being the prepa-

ration of a new "catalogue,” in effect the final step of the reconstruction of the School, for University approval by March 15»

^

9^9 *

He also

spoke of his hopes that the planning doctoral students would play a

major role in this task.
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The meeting then moved on to preparatory
business for the year.

Although none of the actual decisions could
be said to have had a major
impact on the year to come, this initial
meeting clearly set the tone

and laid the groundwork for much of the year
to follow.

For example, a number of the decisions reached
tended to reinforce the power of the Dean over the faculty.

He was to chair faculty

meetings at least until after the Retreat and was to be
responsible for
agenda.

Further, graduate faculty would no longer meet separately
on

graduate issues

—^which

were to be discussed at general faculty meetings

with only graduate faculty voting.
In addition, Allen proposed changes in the Personnel Committee,

which at that point was made up entirely of old faculty—an action which
the old faculty viewed as a continuation of the Dean's attack upon them.^

Finally, a strong opening wedge for the inclusion of planning

doctoral students in all faculty decisions was driven when the faculty

voted first to admit them to faculty meetings "with voice but no vote"
and then to "express its intent to include students on all faculty com-

mittees this year."

2

For many the import of the meeting
as its message.

caune as

much from its medium

There was Dean Allen speaiking with confidence and messi-

anic enthusiasm of things that most in the room had dreamed of for years.

There was the sense of exhilaration and power inherent in the fantasy

Vacuity interviews. May and June,

I972.

^Prior paragraphs derived primarily from Minutes of the Faculty
Meeting , Monday, September 4 » I968, prepared by Earl Seidman, edited by
Robert Wellman (miraeo. School files).
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that here was an auditoriun full
of highly competent people
talking in
strong, confident tones of the
kind of academic revolution that
was
usually discussed in guarded tones
among small knots of people. And
there was a strong sense of potential
and adventure in the veiy appearance of the people, black and white,
dress ranging from conventional
suit to patched jeans, smooth-shaven to
expansively bearded, crew-cut
tc Afro to shoulder-length hair-all
startling and exciting to those

accustomed to the homogeneity of conventional
academic assemblages.
Also, the fact that there were two tape
recorders and a videotape camera recording the events of the meeting
strongly reaffirmed a
sense that, indeed, in this room were gathered a
group about to under-

take a momentous and earthshaking step in the reform
of education in

America.

On September

11

,

a School-wide convocation to mark the official

opening of School was held.

At this meeting Dean Allen again focused on

his hopes for the School and again the meeting was punctuated by recording

equipment and dramatic diversity of appearance of those present.
The period from September 4 to September

I

5,

when the group left

for its one—week retreat in Colorado, was primarily a time of settling
in, of preparation for the Retreat and of putting off significant deci-

sions "until we have decided at the Retreat."

Prom early May when Allen

had adopted the idea of the Retreat it had beccane the most visible and

tangible symbol of the intentions and style of the New School, an event
toward which the psychological energies of most in the commiinity had

been focused for months.
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The Retreat

Introduction

The idea of a Retreat for the entire
planning group (faculty and

planning doctoral students) to mark the
beginning of the planning process, particularly a retreat to a distant
and exotic location (originally

a Virgin Island setting had been planned and
then Puerto Rico was seriously considered) had special appeal to Dean Allen.

clivity for the symbolic and dramatic.

It piqued hie pro-

It was, to him, an ideal way of

clearly declaring the beginning of a new kind of school—
of saying to
participants and outsiders "here is a special group of people
engaged in
a uniquely important crusade."^

In effect, Allen saw in the Retreat an

opportunity to promote in his organization what has been called the

Hawthorne Effect.*’^

In addition, the trip served as a way of clearly

stating the high priority which he put on the planning component of the

year by his willingness to make a substantial investment, $30,000 and
152 man/weeks, in the planning.

It is also likely that Allen saw in the Retreat an opportunity
to focus the group's energy on resolving some of the potentially divisive

areas of conflict in the organization, particularly those of old faculty
vs. new faculty and Dean, Black vs. Vfhite, and conservative vs. experi-

mental .

^Prom interviews with Dwight W. Allen, July 1971 - May 1972.

^he

Hawthorne effect, in brief, describes a situation in which
superior task performance on the part of an individual or group is the
direct result of the fact that that individual or group is being treated
as a separate, unique and important entity by someone of importance to
the group or individual.
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And finally, the Retreat was expected
to provide a strong beginning for the year, an opportunity
for the entire group to get to know
and work with each other, and a chance
to "dream big" unhindered by the
normal day-to-day pressures of the regular
school environment.
It is impossible to define the specific
expectations of Allen

and the School for the accomplishments of the
Retreat.

It is certainly

true that they were extremely high and that most
felt that many of the

specific issues about the scope and direction of the
School would be

virtually decided— leaving the remainder of the year for
refinement and
implementation of those decisions.
The only before-the-fact written statement of expectations ap-

pears in a July 23 memo from Allen to planning participants in which he

describes the Retreat as a time to "discuss needs and operational assumptions and specify objectives for the School of Education with a time
frame" and also to "develop and adopt planning organization differen-

tiated on the basis of objectives

auid

support requirements. "5

After the

fact, an article on the Retreat written for Tabula Rasa states that "One

of the proposed conclusions of the planning retreat was the creation of

an on-going structure for the planning year."^
The events of the Retreat did, indeed, provide the basis for the

planning structure of the year, although the structure was by no means

^Dwight W. Allen, Memorandum to Faculty and Planning Staff, Sub"Strategies and Logistics for Planning" (mimeo, July 23, 19^8)
files).
(School
p. 5
ject:

Rasa ,

^James Black, "Executive Council—Formation and Function," Tabula
Sept. 26, I 988 , n.pag.
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as organised and apeoifio as that
apparently contemplated by Allen in
his memorandum, and no agreement
on needs, operational assumptions,
and

ebjeotives was reached.

These major issues were discussed
to the point

of frustration, and nothing firmly
decided.

However, the Retreat was unquestionably
the most significant

event of the planning year.

The group went into it strangers, a
form-

less, relatively disorganized and
inchoate mass and emerged with con-

siderable group identity, with close relationships
under way, and with
a planning process and the mechanism to support
that process in the year
to come in a stage of dynamic development.

In sum, the group of stran-

gers had come together and begun to move together.
of this chapter will focus on a description and

analysis of the major events and outcomes of the Retreat

and will be

organized as follows;

A narrative description of the journey to Colorado

—an

at-

tempt to recapture and communicate a sense of the spirit of the time
the excitement, high spirits, and sense of mission which were to charac-

terize both the trip and the Retreat itself.
II »

An analysis of the significant outcomes of the Retreat,
specifically;
A.

Development of a planning process for the remainder
of the year.
1 .

2.
3«

B.

adoption of the "Center” model of organization.
adoption of the organic growth model.
election of the Executive Committee.

Development of facilitating mech 2misme for the planning
process.
1.

development of informal relationships.
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2.
3.

in.

development of shared goals and
esprit.
expansion of the Dean's informal
power.

C.

The rise of the "myth of community"—
a dysfunctional
outcome.

D.

Acceleration of the planning process.

E.

The genesis of a commitment to
combat institutional
racism.

A narrative description of the return trip

—the

spirit of

the Retreat and a return to reality.

"The Ten-Year Projection"—An insight into
dreams dreamed
at the Retreat.

En Route

As the sunshine broke through the mist, 8 a.m., on Sunday,
September 15 1 the I52 people, of whom no one person except Allen, who

knew them all, knew more than 20, boarded four buses in front of the
School.

E!ach

received a maroon soft—plastic case containing a name tag,

a packet of work to be done on the plane, including a list of possible

topics for discussion at the Retreat from which each was to choose the
three most important to him, and two large, colorful, psychedelic but-

tons to be worn, one inscribed "No is Not the Right Answer" and the other

"Now is the Right Answer."

Although the group was made up primarily of School faculty and
doctoral students there was a smattering of other guests including six
UMass undergraduates, seven faculty members of other universities, three
of whom had been hired to arrive in January, four of whom were being re-

cruited, the Superintendent of a New York State School System and an
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Assistant Superintendent of the Hartford
School System, two young California blacks, two faculty members of
other departments of the UniverBity, and a consultant from Synectios,
a creative problems-solving

consulting

Arriving at Bradley Field in bright sunshine,
the group swarmed
off the buses, through the lobby to the
departure gate, milled about

briefly, and then boarded its chartered American
Airlines intercontinental 707, filling it to capacity.
The plane was flown by, it turned out, a vmiquely
hip pilot and

crew who allowed unrestricted use of the plane's cabin's
communications
system for increasingly high-spirited announcements from the
group;
Ladies and gentlemens, zis is your leader shpeaking. I
know dot you are vondering vhy I haf called zis meeting. You
vish to make a revolution, ya? Ve haf zherefore made shpeschal
arrangements to fly you to Habana vhere you are most needed.
Next year ve retreat to Amherst, eh?

and
Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to introduce a very
special stewardess to you, Mary Joe Malvernia. Mary Joe did
her elementary work at Watkins Qlen Combined Super School,
Watkins Glen, Alaska, where she amassed a perfect record in
all subjects except clay, maintained her fine record in Johnson
City Junior and Senior High, where she was finally permitted
to drop clay, and graduated summa cum laude. Phi Beta Kappa
from the American Airlines Stewardess Academy in Dallas, Texas.
Miss Malvernia will be serving you in the forward ladies' room.

The pilot encouraged visits to the cockpit and introjected his own com-

ments into the intercom competition.
The stewardesses provided some with aprons and assistant stew-

ardesses pins and by "accident" left the remainder of the liquor bottles
^Prom "Retreat Participants," memorandum distributed at the Retreat (School files).

!
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in the aisle after the
twoKlrink-per-person li»it had been
passed. Dean
Allen made his way up and down
the aisles in a vivid
red. yellow and
green African shirt accompanied
by a humming videotape camera
Over the
plane's in-flight film system,
two educational films and
a series of
films on innovation starring
Dwight Allen were being shown.
In sum, both by design and by
accident, the Hawthcrne effect was
alive and well and flcurishing on
the Boeing ^ 0 ^ winging its way
high
over two-thirds of the oountry_and
Allen's charisma quotient appeared
to be fast approaching the altitude
of the plane.

For many, the events of the trip also
provided a beginning of a
concern which was to affect them increasingly
at Colorado and thereafter—
the race issue.

Generally quiet and subdued in the academic
atmosphere

of prior meetings of the School, the
blacks were very much in evidence

during the plane trip.

Apparently less inhibited than most whites about

walking the aisles of the plane, meeting new people,
and using the intercom, the blacks, particularly Doctor Ne Gar,
sinister-looking in his per-

manent shades, African shirt and hat; Willie in his
Black is Beautiful
shirt; Chuck with his 200-plus pounds of concern and good
humor; Maiso,

cool, handsome, and debonair; and Nate with hie enthusiasm and ever-

present videotape camera, maxie it very apparent that they were to be a

substantial presence in the week to come.
Five hours later the plane descended into the Colorado Springe

Airport, was met by a new fleet of buses, and shortly after noon the

group emerged into the clean and rarified air of Florissant, Colorado,
to find a bunk in one of eight cabins at High Trails Caump, a girls' summer

camp complex.

After lunch, served as were all meals at rectangular tables
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for twelve with .embers of
each table handling the
waiting chores, the
group spent the rest of the
afternoon settling in, exploring
the camp,
and beginning to get to hncw
each other. Dinner was
at 6 p.m. , followed
by a general meeting in which
Dean Allen discussed his
ideas about the
organization of the Retreat,
followed by discussion and a
multimedia
film presentation by one of the
doctoral students.
The general plan of each day
included a morning session of
activities at 9 a.m. and an afternoon
session at 3 p.m.
Heals were used as
general announcement and discussion
periods, and each evening a general
community meeting was held. Richard
Clark, a young Assistant Professor
just finishing his doctorate at
Stanford was put in charge of the organization of the Retreat. Under hie guidance,
in consultation with Allen

and the two Assistant Deans, the Retreat
moved from a hi^ly organized
and "controlled" structure to a more
loose and flexible structure based
on the interests of those present.

Analysis of the Specific Outcomes of the Retreat

Development of a planning process
for the planning year

One of the most important accomplishments of the Retreat was
the

development of a planning process for the remainder of the year.

This

process grew out of two relatively imrelated developments, the ewioption
of the interest group model of academic planning and the rise of the or-

ganic growth model of organization building, and culminated in the deci-

sion to elect an Executive Committee to guide the planning for the remainder
of the year.
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Adoption of the Center model
of academic organization

Initial expectations were to have
the entire group addrese the
major issues of the future of the
School. The frustration over the
lack
cf success of this approach during
the first day of meetings (to
be described below) combined, on the part
of many, with a low level of interest
in such areas, was manifested in
an expressed desire among participants

to meet with others of similar
professional interests to work out the de-

velopment of specific programs in their
shared field of interest—a task
more consistent with their professional
concern, one which was viewed as
less ambiguous than the attempt to plan for
the entire School, and one

which offered the personal satisfactions of
contact with people of similar interests.®

Some suoh interest groups had, in fact, had their
genesis

in Amherst before the Retreat, most particularly
among those interested
in international education, urban education, counseling,
and micro-

teaching.

3y the second day of the Retreat these interest group meetings

had moved to become the dominant organizational structure of the Retreat,

with people representing the various areas of interest announcing, either
at meals or via a bulletin board, times and places for meetings of those

with similar interests.

The morning and afternoon sessions for the re-

mainder of the Retreat were primarily devoted to such meetings.
Q

°This tendency among academics to neglect institution-wide concerns in favor of their own fields is well analyzed in Dwight R. Ladd,
Change in Educational Policy (New York, McGraw Hill, 1970), p. 214.
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By the end of the Retreat Tabula Rasa
a biweekly school news,
paper born at the Retreat, could
report that 22 separate interest
groups
had been formed at the Retreat.

And there

vrere

—The genesis

some surprises, three in particular:
of an interest in Aesthetics
which was to grow into

the Aesthetics Center, although no
faculty member or doctoral student had

been recruited specifically for his
interest in that field.
The beginning of what was to become the
Hiunanistic Education

Center which grew out of an interest of a
faculty member who had been
recruited for his experience in urban education.

An approach to education called "The Learning Theater"
which
grew out of a Synectics creative problem-solving session
at the Retreat
and which was later to become the School's major program
in the Open

Classroom/integrated day.
These 22 interest groups were to become the planning "committees"

around which the planning year was organized, and by a process of amalga-

mation and elimination, the

11

"centers" and four "programs" around which

the academic program of the "new school" as described in the Interim

Catalogue was organized.

Rise of the organic growth model

It was, as I have previously observed, initially expected that

the entire group would concern itself with school-wide policy decisions.

^"Committees Formed at the Retreat," Tabula Rasa, Sept. 26, 19^8,
n.pag.
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These policy decisione were
subdivided into three general
areas:
goals,
(1)
(2) structure, and (3) decision-making.
Two assumptions appear to have been implicit in
this approach:
(1) that the School should
proceed on a predetermined planning
model and (2) that such planning
should take place in the context
of previously agreed upon
goals and
planned structures and decision-making
processes by which those goals
would be accomplished.
Two major factors operated, early
in the Retreat, to frustrate

this approach.

First, as described, only a minority
of participants were

interested in discussing such policy issues,
preferring to work with those
of similar interests on specific program
planning; and secondly, even for

those committed to such issues, the circularity
of the three major elements became almost unbearably frustrating.

For instance, in a group so

diverse in concerns and expectations it became
impossible to agree on
goals at any satisfactory level of specificity without
a formal decision-

making process

—and

any attempts to develop structure and decision-making

processes were thwarted by the absence of clearly articulated goals.

As the interest group meetings began to attract imagination and
energy, most participants moved away from the School—wide policy issues,

leaving a hard core divided into three committees;
Making, and Structure.

Goals, Decision-

However, the problem of circularity remained,

exacerbated in fact by the separateness of the three groups, and deliberations beceune increasingly confused, abstract, frustrating, and unsatisfactory.

^^There is a videotape of one such discussion in the files of the
Media Center, School of Education.
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By late Tuesday, some members
of those committees began
to see
the beginnings of a structure
for the School in the emerging
interest
groups and also, in those groups,
a process for defining
organizational
goals since the interest groups
clearly represented the goals
of their
members and presumably the sum of
the goals of interest groups
could be
construed to represent the sum of the
goals of those in the School.
Thus, out of frustration with the
difficulties of developing a

planned growth model, and in hopes that
the interest groups as they became more defined would provide
important data for structure and goalsetting, the planned growth groups decided
that further discussion of the

issues would be unprofitable, at least for
the time being.

The Structure

Committee thus proposed, on Wednesday, the
election of an Executive Com-

mittee which would oversee, but not control, the
planning process until
such time as the emerging goals and resources of
the School became more
clear.

^ ^

However, the tension between planned growth and what

I

am calling

organic growth re-emerged at the first Executive Committee meeting
on

Thursday.

This tension was resolved primarily by the efforts of Richard

Assistant Dean for Administration, who convinced the group of
the desirability of depending on the emerging structure in combination

with some of the principles enunciated in Jay W. Forrester's "New Corporate Design" (described subsequently) for the delineation of important

organizational principles.

Thus, in the first Tabula Rasa published upon

1 1

Ibid . , "A Report Submitted by the Task Force on Structure to the
Entire Group for Consideration," Sept. 18, I 968 p. 2.
,
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return from the Retreat it
was reported

or

llTTZll,

its own struoturefl2

**'*

-“foZle

«>”tinued until that „omentur,
produoed

Election of the Executive
Committee
As proposed by the Structure
Oonmittee, the Bceoutive Oommittee
was to consist of seven members,
four elected at large and without
nomina.
tion and three named by the Dean.
The Committee would be
.
charged
with the responsibility for
structuring enterprise within the School
of
Education," and also
creating procedural structure, gather
information (utilizing reports and other
information generated
from committees and individuals at the
Retreat), and apprising
faculty and staff of developments. It
will be responsible for
bringing convergence to the array of options
via consulting
individ^ls, convening study groups, offering
open hearings,’
and so forth.
The proposal also created a deadline of
November

1,

I968, for the adop-

tion of a plan for the conduct of the planning
year.^^
The proposal was discussed, amended to include one
regular doctoral student and one undergraduate upon the return to
Amherst, and then

formally adopted at the Wednesday evening community meeting.

The voting

took place on Thursday morning, and three faculty members and one combination faculty/doctoral student were elected to the Executive Committee.

Dean Allen named two doctoral students and a faculty member, his
12
1 •^

Ibid., Black, "Executive Council," Sept. 26, I968, n.pag.

Ibid .

.

"Structure Task Force," Sept. 18, I968, pp. 2 & 3.
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nominations including the
fifth highest vote getter,
and two other.
Who had received a
substantial number of votes. '•4
This at-large method of
election would seem to have
assured that
the Executive Committee
would be made up of the
infonnal leaders of the

School-which was true, with the
proviso that because of the
relatively
short time the group had been
together the informal structure
had not
fully matured, tending to
put a premium on quick visibility
as the major
criterion of leadership,
fact, during the year other
infomsal leaders
did arise-and some of the
Executive Committee membersinformal status
declined_a fact not reflected in
changes in the Executive Committee
during the planning year. ^5

m

Since five of the seven chosen to
lead the School in the months

ahead were, in effect, elected at
large, it is useful to look more
closely
at what these people represented
to get an idea of the emerging goals,
values, and power structure of the School.

Six of the seven were new to

the School, indicating that the old faculty
had not become a major force
in the new group; none were tenured, indicating
that age and status did

not seem important to the group or were, in
fact, considered a negative

attribute; four were faculty, two doctoral students,
and one had dual
status, indicating that doctoral students had become
a major force in the

group; two were black and two others represented a major
interest in

urban education and race problems, indicating an emerging interest
in
^4Record of vote in School files.
^^vnien, with the adoption of the Interim Constitution in April I969,
a new Executive Committee was n€uned, only two members of the original
Executive Committee were included, one nominated by Bean Allen (derived
from Tabula Rasa . May 10, I969, n.pag. ).
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xnese areas on the part of the
group, six were ^le.
indioating that the
group was still highly
male^iominated , and all, with
the possible exoeption of one, had been highly
visible at the Retreat, openly
supportive of
Allen, and clearly committed
to his vision for the
School; four were from
California, It is also interesting
to note retrospectively,
that of the
original Executive Committee, three
have subsequently been named
assistant deans at the School and one
a Center Head, indicative
of their high
Standing with Dean Allen.
The Executive Council took power
Thursday evening, with one of
its student members, Louise Hall,
chairing the Community meeting, those

previously having been run by Dean Allen
or Dick Clark.

During this meeting the Council proposed a
further definition of
its decision-inaking powers as follows:

that the Executive Committee

...

be charged with the responsibility of
actively attempting
to sense the climate of opinion of the
faculty and student body
and when it feels there is a substantial consensus
it acts.
Further that when there is a sense that substantial
consensus
does not exist, it refrains from making the decision
in question
and refers it to the faculty as a whole.

The proposal goes on to state that anyone who objects to an
Executive

Council decision can take the decision to the faculty as a whole.
This very flawed proposal (reference to the faculty rather than
the total group as review board, the ambiguities of "consensus," and
the

option of review if even one person objects to a decision) was passed at
that meeting.

^

^"Committee of the Whole," Tabula Rasa , Sept. 20

,

I968, n.pag.
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The flaws of this
decision-making proposal can
be traced to a
naive hope for government by
a community ideal where
adversary proceeding
and voting were not a neoessaiy
prerecpiistte of decisions.
It might have
worked With a very small group
with easy and accurate
communication among
them. However, since the
group was made up of I50
people, since effective communication among all
that group of people had
not been developed,
and Since there were so many
divisive issues in the air.
decision-making

community model, in hindsight, was
clearly unworkable.

This very

ambiguous and yet demanding
requirement of consensus of the
community
model was probably a contributing
factor to the Ekecutive Committee
-s

difficulty in asserting positive leadership
during the remainder of the
planning year.
The Executive Committee met more
or less continuously throughout
the remainder of the Retreat, its
major decision, as previously described,

being to defer a decision on planning
structure in the expectation that
such a structure would evolve out of the
work of the planning committees.

Development of facilitating mechanisms
for the Planning Process

The decision to adopt an organic, unprogrammed approach to the

planning gradually solidified, although not without stresses and second
thoughts, in the early months of the planning year.

Two major functions of a programmed approach to organizational

planning are the specification of goals to be pursued by the organization
and the delineation of formal and structured relationships among members
of that organization to achieve those goals.

The organic model adopted
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by the School, however,
dieoarded formal epeoifioation.
of goale and
structured means to those goals
in favor of emerging goals
and infomnal
and flexible means. Thus, a
major risk of the organic
model was that
chaos would ensue if informal
mechanisms did not grow up to
replaoe those
usually imposed by formal
organisations. The Retreat did
faoilitate the
development of three mechanisms which
were to contribute signifioantly
to
the operation of the organic
model:

-The development

of informal relationships among
participants

sufficient to allow flexible and
effective working relationships among
people.
The development of a shared culture
and goals sufficient to

provide organisational cohesion to keep the
group working together.
The expansion of the Dean's informal power
to assure his leader-

ship of the planning.

The significance of these three mechanisms, and
the way in which
the Retreat facilitated their development, will be
described more fully

below.

Development of informal relationships

Among the wellsprings of the bureaucratic form of organization is
the fact that most people tend to have difficulty working with others,

especially strangers, in relatively ambiguous organizational situations.
Thus boxes, chains of command, and job descriptions are drawn up to tell

people their relative status and responsibilities each to each and to the
organization.

This form of artificially imposed relationships is useful

in that it tends to assure a certain predictable level of functioning.
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but it is also limiting in that it prevents the
use of one's total per-

sonality and talents in his job, restricting him
primarily to behavior
and relationships delineated by the charts.
Thus, while conventional bureaucracy tends to assure
a predictable

level of performance, it also tends to restrict the higher
level of per-

formance of which people are capable when they are, as personalities,

totally engaged in a task. '*7
liing

The School of Education throughout the plan-

year was able to maintain a relatively low level of bureaucracy and

high level of flexibility in its functioning, thus creating the potential
for fuller, more creative relationships among participants which appears
to have been reflected in many of the aspects of its new curriculum.

The fact that this flexible and non—bureaucratic planning structure led more to creativity than chaos at the School of Education can be

traced in part to the informal relationships developed among people during the Retreat.

These relationships were built through the random living

and eating arrangements; through the interest group meetings and through
randomly structured task group sessions; through the commvinity meetings
where many had a chance to be seen and heard; through the extracurricular
events, riding, hiking, swimming, fishing, volleyball, football, and card
geunes; and

through the evening social events, both planned and spontaneous.

A significant factor contributing to the success of the development of informal relationships was the reduction of status distinctions

among those at the Retreat.

Since faculty and doctoral students were to

for instance, Warren G. Bennis, Changing Organizations (New
York, McGraw-Hill, 19^6), pp. 5“7»
^"^See
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be working together on the planning, it was
crucial to the development
of creative and we 11 -functioning groups that
artificial status distinc-

tions among faculty and between faculty and students
be eliminated as

much as possible.

Differentiated status of work group members seriously

impairs the potential both for close, trusting relationships
and for

effective group problem-solving, since such distinctions tend
to limit
the range of behavior available to group members.

For exsunple, status-

oriented limitations upon behavior tend to maintain distances between
people which hinder the formation of close, trusting personal relationships

—and

in problem-solving it is usually difficult for those of higher

status to admit ignorance or uncertainty to subordinates and similarly
for subordinates to criticize the ideas or behavior of superiors.

In

this way whole areas of possibly useful feedback become unavailable to

participants.
At the Retreat there appears to have been a conscious effort to

play down artificial statue distinctions.

All wore similar name tags

which included only name with no reference to rank or title.

Since so

many of the new faculty were young and since a significant number of the

new doctoral students were older, it was very difficult to be certain of
the statue of new acquaintances.

Perhaps more important, Allen from the

beginning called all his associates, faculty and student, by their first
naunes

name.

and made it clear to all that he wished to be called by his first
This norm became firmly established at the Retreat.

^^Ibid.

,

pp. 6, 201 & 202
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While there is no objective data
available, it is the writer's

perception that by the time the group was
ready to return to Amherst a
strong foundation of informal relationships
among participants had been
built.

Most had made a strong beginning on the
development of close

working relationships with all others of
similar interests, had developed
personal contacts with many others in the School,
and knew, at least by
face and often by name, most in the School and had
some idea of their

professional interests.
The importance of all these kinds of relationships to
the success
of the planning year cannot be underestimated.

They provided a free-

flowing, flexible, informal structure for working relationships, an
easy

access through personal acquaintance to needed skills, and a sense of
^^i"ty ia multiple relationships in what was clearly a very diverse group

of people.

These relationships also made possible the "juxtaposition" of

people of different fields and interests, an important aspect of Allen's

strategy for creative planning.

Development of shared goals and esprit

Another function of bureaucracy is to assure the cohesiveness of
its members in pursuing a shared set of goals.

Typically, bureaucracy

achieves this cohesion by administratively specifying goals and struc-

turally enforcing cohesion,

since the School of Education chose to do

neither, these basic organizational needs had to be provided for in other

^^See, for instance. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic
zat
Organi
i ons (New York, Oxford Univ, Press, 1947 )» PP« 329-332 and
Bennis, p. 199 *
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ways-and the Retreat made a major contribution
in this respect.
Although, as previously pointed out,
no goals of sufficient

specificity for implementation were generated
at the Retreat, a generally
shared goal appeared to have arisen as a
result of the week.

This goal

could be stated as simply as "Our mission
is to change education."

emergence of this shared goal can be attributed
in large part

to

The

Allen's

powerfully articulated vision for the School, to his
obvious confidence
in the group to share and carry out the vision,
and to his strategic use

of the Hawthorne effect to make participants feel a
central part of a

crusade of unprecedented importance.

Along with the shared goal came a

sense of cohesiveness arising out of a shared culture

—partly

through the

simple fact that the group had spent a highly intense week in close contact together sharing very similar experiences, and partly through the

informal relationships which developed over the period.

Although, as I will describe below, the sense of shared culture
and goals was exaggerated into a "myth of community," the group did leave
Coloreuio with some real sense of shared purpose and cohesion which in

later days became known as the "Spirit of Colorado" which was to provide
a reserve of centripetal energy and commitment which was drawn upon when
the going got rough during the planning year.

And it was needed, since

that year was often stressful and chaotic, often personally threatening,

and at times fraught with conflict for participants.

Such tensions might

have blown the commxmity into irreconcilable pieces.

The fact that the

^^The controversy, to be described, over the euioption of an interim
constitution is an example of a situation with such potential.
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School was able to hold together in
such eituations is attributable,
at
least in part, to "the Spirit of
Colorado"—the oohesiveness and sense
of shared pixrposes generated at the
Retreat.

Expansion of the Dean's informal power

Another means of bringing order out of the
potential chaos of
non-bureaucrat ic organization is the development of
charismatic leadership in the organization which allows the leader
to influence the goals

and processes of the organization not so much
through legislated power,
but by his own personal power. 21

in a subsequent section I shall deal

in considerable detail with the means by which Dean Allen was
able to

accumulate extraordinary power in the School.

His behavior at the Re-

treat, however, made a significant contribution to the development of
his

charismatic role in the organization.

Quite simply, the close and prolonged contact between Allen and
School members at the Retreat gave him an opportunity to be himself in

an environment where all could be affected.

For most he is a uniquely

powerful and charismatic personality and his very presence, more often

than not, elicited awe, adulation and loyalty from participants.

It was

he who had the vision and the audacity to schedule the Retreat, which most

found such a powerful experience.

He chaired most of the early meetings,

and when he did not do so more often than not he quickly
the center of discussion.

ceune to be at

He was central to a Tuesday afternoon debate

over the scheduling of black-white discussion groups, spoke for two hours

21

Weber, pp. 360-63
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Wednesday morning on his background, on how
he came to accept the Deanship at UMass, and on his actions and
strategies during the previous
year, and could be counted upon to make
specific positive proposals,

which were accepted far more often than not,
when progress foundered.22
Also, he was not modest about creating a mystique
about himself or his

potential for power in the School, University, and national
educational
scene,

(Parts of his Wednesday speech, for example, included hie
rapid

rise under difficult circumstances at Stanford, his central
role in the

development of the Education Profession Development Act funding guidei®-

Washington, his demands and conditions prior to accepting the

Deanship, and the ways in which he had been successful, in Stanford,
Washington, and Amherst at getting what he wanted by manipulation of the
bureaucracy,

Equally significant, he was available and accessible throughout
the entire Retreat,

In his wild, brilliantly multi-colored African

shirts he appeared to be omnipresent—at interest group meetings, during
free periods, at meals, at Synectics sessions, and even at the late night-

early morning bull sessions, diet drink in hand, seemingly the last one
in bed at night and the first one up in the morning—a source of boundless

energy and enthusiasm.

The writer remembers particularly, at 2; 30 one

morning when all but three or four had gone to bed, Allen, during a lull

^^See videotapes, Colorado Retreat, School of Education Media
Center,
^^ Ibid

Dwight W, Allen, "What Makes Dwight Tick," Sept, I9, I968
(under title "Dwight Allen, 'I Have a Dream' Speech"),
, ,
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in the conversation, asking brightly,
"Suppose we abolished all schools?

What do you think would happen then?"-^nd
subsequently crawling into

bed at 5:30, brain aswarm with pre-Illichian
fantasies of a deschooled
society.

These personal contacts and ensuing loyalties developed
during
the Retreat appear to have built up a string of personal
loyalties which

were to stand the Dean in good stead in the months to come when
those

bonds were tested by his frequent absences from the School and inacces-

sibility while there.

Nor were they merely one-way bonds.

In a number

of cases Dean Allen's vinderstanding of, and confidence in, people as a

result of his relationship with them at the Retreat permitted him to re-

main confident of them and helpful to them when they encountered difficult times during the planning year.

A confirmation of the establishment of Allen's position as leader,
primary initiator, and major source of power in the School might be read
into the report of the agenda of the first Executive Committee meeting

upon return to Amherst,

"Today's meeting will be used to give Dwight the

opportunity to express his opinions on how the Council might function
most effectively."^^

On the one hand it does not seem unreasonable for

the committee to consult with the Dean on their functioning.

But on the

other hand, the fact that this committee, which was formed to reflect the
will of the total community, should devote its first Amherst meeting in
its entirety to the Dean appears as a clear sign of his enormous power in

2%ichard Clark, "Memorandum to all Faculty and Doctoral Students,"
Sept. 23, 1968 (School files).
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the School.

And there is no record of an Executive
Ooimittee meeting

called to allow community members to
express their opinions on how it
"might function most effectively,"

The r ise of the myth of community

A dysfunctional outcome of the Retreat from
which the School did
not recover for some six months, was the rise
of the myth of community.

The myth was born at the Wednesday evening
meeting of the entire group

which was devoted to discussion of the Structure
Committee's proposal for
election of an Executive Committee.

The discussion had been highly acri-

monious and legalistic until one of the doctoral students, who
had been

active in the draft resistance movement and was a strong advocate of the

community form of organization, made an impassioned, articulate, and comfor honesty and trust in dealings among the group because the

group had, as a result of the Retreat, become a community organized around
a single goal.

The speech was enormously effective, partly because of

the speaker's talent, partly because it was what people wanted to hear

since it offered them a way out of the conflict—ridden atmosphere which

had prevailed in decision-making situations.

As a result of the speech

the legalistic and specificity quotient of discussions dropped sharply,

replaced with a sense of "we are a community and will trust that these

decisions will be

meide

fairly

euid

for the benefit of all,"

The fact was that although the group had made progress toward

community, they had by no means reached it.

In the first case, because

there had not been time to build the close and trusting relationships

which are the basis of community, and secondly because issues of old
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faculty-new faculty, black-white,
traditional-experimental, and facultystudent-adminietraticn relatione had by
no means been resolved or even
addressed sufficiently to allow a
sense of community to arise.
Nevertheless, the speech had its effect
and for much of the plan-

ning process the group continued to
view itself as a community—with two
serious negative effects:

first, the pervasive myth that there
was com-

munity prevented the group from taking the
necessary steps (open forume,
group work, organization development work,
conflict resolution, etc.) to

develop a real community; and secondly, the
myth of community seemed to
require consensus decisions, 25 and since there
was no real consensus,
there was very little decision-making on the
part of the group during the

planning year.

Acceleration of the planning process

An important outcome of the Retreat was the acceleration of the
planning process for the year.
n.lng

Quite simply, the week of intensive plan—

work was worth a month and probably more of normal day—to—day func-

tioning in Amherst with normal teaching, academic, and family demands on
participants.

Further, such '•normal” demands would almost certainly have

affected attendance at meetings, further slowing attempts to organize the
group and implement planning.

One might also speculate that under normal

school conditions the opportunity to develop interest groups and informal

relationships with other school members would have been considerably retarded.

^5por example, the unworkable decision-making rule which the Executive Committee imposed on itself.
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The acceleration of the planning
proceee also provided an important psychological lift to
participants. Most felt, despite
s^e of the
frustrations of the Retreat, that the
planning had gotten off to a firm
start and there was a sense of
momentum carried forward to the rest
of
the year.

Genesis of conunitment to combat
institutional racism

Another significant outcome of the Retreat was
the beginning of
a heightened awareness of racial issues
in participants.

This awareness

was to begin a percolating process during
the planning year in which in-

dividuals were increasingly to grapple with their own
racial biases and

many of the interest groups were to begin to focus work
in their fields
on combatting institutional racism

—^which

pernicious problem in American education.

many

caune to see as

the most

During the planning year, the

most tangible, school—wide outcome of this concern was a decision
to de-

vote 40 per cent of recruiting funds for the following year to recruiting

black and minority faculty.
The process in which racial issues and concern became increasingly

important was to culminate in March of 1971 in a school—wide commitment
to the elimination of institutional racism as its first priority.

The beginnings of this heightened awareness seem to have taken

place, as I have previously described, on the plane trip to Colorado.

The next major step began at a late-evening bull session on the first

^°'*A

View, A Review, A Vision," in School of Education Profile ,
(Amherst, n.p., 1971)i P« 29*

ed. Lyman B. Brainerd, Jr.
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night of the Retreat and reached
fruition in the Tuesday evening
blackwhite awareness session for the
entire group. At the Sunday evening
bull
session, a small group of white
faculty and doctoral students got
together
with two of the black participants,
Atron Gentry and Leroy Ray, to express their concern over the fact that
it did not appear to them that
those at the Retreat intended to make
any effort to deal with racism-a

problem which this group felt was at the core
of the problems of American
education.

Out of this discussion grew a plan to use the
resources of

the West Side Study Center (WSSC) of Pasadena,
which Gentry had previously

headed, to run an evening of black-white awareness
sessions. 2 ?
The plan was broached to Allen the following
morning and received

his enthusiastic support

—and

Gentry proceeded to arrange for facilita-

tors from WSSC to come to Colorado.

The plan was not, however, accepted

so enthusiastically by some members of the total group who
questioned

whether race was of sufficient educational significance to justify the
commitment of an entire evening to it.

At a Tuesday afternoon meeting.

Dean Allen became the focus of the defense of the plan, and responded with
a very personal accounting of his feelings about racial differences and
the places in which he felt he' wanted to become more aware and sensitive.^®

The session was held on Tuesday evening, beginning about

due to the late arrival of the people from WSSC.

11

p.m.

It opened with a film

in which a number of blacks described their encounters with racism in

^^WSSC was a black community center with considerable experience'.in
facilitating black-white relations.

^^Videotape, Colorado Retreat, "Group Meeting of September 16,

I

968 ."
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society, followed by a tough,
earthy confirmation of the
major pointe of
the film by a WSSO staff member. ^9
Afterwaids there was a series of
black-white discussion groups led
by one black, one woman, and
a facilitstor. For many of those in the
groups, especially whites, who
had previously had only narrow interracial
experience, the events of that night
were very powerful. For the editor
of Tabula Rasa one of the most significant events of the Retreat was
"meeting myself Tuesday night at about
2 a.m.,"30 another person
was shocked at his assumption that
the two

blacks in his discussion knew each other,
when in fact they did not; and

many were affected by the recognition of
similar blind spots in themselves.

Some of these sessions continued until almost
dawn.^"'

Awareness of racial issues was re-emphasized at
the Thursday
evening meeting when Louise Hall, a black graduate
student, led the meeting as representative of the Executive Committee and when
later that eve-

ning Joseph Rhodes, at that time a senior and student body
head at Caltech,
black, highly articulate and confident, addressed the group
and told it,
the faculty , in unambiguous terms that they were criminally

shirking their responsibility as educators by ignoring the plight of
ghetto and minority students to focus on the more esoteric, ivory—tower

aspects of lily-white, suburban education.

Awareness of black—white issues was also provoked by an attempt
to create a Black Caucus early in the week.

Although this attempt was

^^videotape, "WSSC Presentation," Sept. I7, I968.
^ ^aplas

Rosa , Sept. 20, I968, p.

31 "Why Retreat," Tabula Rasa, Sept.
26,

I968, n.pag.
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ultimately nearly unanimously
rejected by the blacks present,
it shocked
many members of the white group
because up until that time there
had
existed a strong norm among
participants against the formalisation
of
epeoial interest groups in "non-academic"
areas in favor of a total community approaoh. For many, coming
to terms with the reasons why
some

blacks might feel that a caucus was
necessary was an important step in
the understanding of black problems
and the black perspective.

Because of the interracial mix of the total
group, all events of
the Retreat had the potential for increasing
racial awareness and sensi-

tivity by forcing racial interaction where
avoideuice had previously been
possible.

This fact was particularly important to those
with limited

interracial experience, as it tended to illuminate their
own previously

submerged racial attitudes.
The writer can recall a number of interest group meetings
in

which racial issues came to the fore.

But perhaps even more important

to the heightening of racial sensitivities were the social events.

The light Colorado air together with the intensity and excitement

of the planning meetings seemed to energize nearly everyone.

As a re—

I

I

suit there was always considerable activity going late into the night

after the evening community meeting.

There were always bull sessions

going on in various cabin living rooms, and in others open, free-flowing
parties were taking place.

Many of these late-night sessions also con-

I

1

tributed to increasing racial awareness and sensitivity on the part of

I

{

j

I

participants.
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For instance, on Monday
night there wae a party in
the living
room Of the Ponderoea Lodge32
was apparently initiated by
the
blacks and attended approximately
equally by blacks and whites,
most of
whom were new faculty and doctoral
students. There was music and
dancing.
and it soon became an exuberant,
loud, high-spirited, and smokey
party
which reached its peak in a writhing
snake dance through the sleeping
quarters of the cottage, directly and
unequivocally awakening the old

faculty who had surely felt themselves
unfairly assaulted by the noise

emanating from the living room for the
previous three hours.

Soon there-

after the group was informed by a sleepy and
undeniably angry head through
the living room door of its rudeness and
Insensitivity

quickly subsided thereafter.

—and

the party

For those involved, the party was a major

factor in closing the distance between black and
white, while at the same
time it surely exacerbated the tension between the
old faculty and the

newcomers.

Another party, held after the Talent Show on the final evening
provides another opportunity for insight into black-white relationships.

^ Which "by coincidence" housed most of the black
men and old fac-

—

ulty two of the three minorities at the Retreat.
nority, were also hoiised in a segregated lodge.

Women, the third mi-

^^Closing the gap between old and new was probably one of the implicit goals of the Retreat and there was some progress in this direction,
particularly in that some old faculty members were able, through the close
personal contacts, to, in effect, switch their allegiance from old to new,
no longer having to depend on the old for support. However, a hard core
of old faculty opposed to the new direction did emerge at the Retreat,
the events in Colorado, one might speculate, contributing more to their
alienation than to their integration. Thus, although some new channels
of communication were opened and some faculty did buy into Allen's vision,
closing the gap between old and new faculty cannot be considered as among
the significant outcomes of the Retreat.

—
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By that time a group of late-night
partyera had pretty muoh been established, and they 4
plans for what was to be the "best
party of
all" to be held in one of the lodges,
not Ponderosa. They had even imported beer for the occasion. The
affair was pretty well under way when
someone noted that there were no blacks
present. Another commented that
he had seen them meeting together and
that they would probably arrive

shortly.

However, they did not and someone went to
look for them, report-

ing that the blacks were partying in the
main meeting
real dilemma for those present.

hall—which

posed a

It was generally assumed that the blacks

had been invited, or at least knew of the party which,
like all the
others, was open to everyone—but clearly did not intend
to come.

All

previous parties had been freely and easily integrated and
it confused
most that the blacks had chosen to be separate that final evening.

There

was also concern expressed that whites would not be welcome at the blacks'
party.

After some more perplexed discussion, the party lapsed back into

what it had been before, although somewhat more subdued, until someone

angrily declared, in a voice that could be heard throughout the room,
"This is too much like too many things I've been to before.

down there."

I'm going

And he did, and within the hour most of the group at the

cottage had done the same.

A Talent Show, held following a steak roast on the final evening,
provided, for at least this viewer, an incident which seemed to indicate

perhaps some progress in resolving two major internal issues of the group
that of the old faculty and of the blacks.

An old faculty member appeared

^^As later became apparent, "they" were an all-white group.
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on stage in a carefully-lettered
T-shirt "Old Faculty is Beautiful" and

the audience burst first into laughter and
then into applause.

In summary, the events of the Retreat, both
planned and spontaneous, made it difficult for all but the most
encapsulated of participants

to remain untouched by some awareness of the
implications of racism in

his own attitudes and behavior and also for education.

The Return to Amherst
The Spirit of the Retreat
and a Return to Reality

The events of the last eight hours of the Retreat both exempli-

fied the spirit of the Retreat

ajid

provided a dreunatic contrast of pos-

sible outcomes when this spirit, which it was hoped would be the spirit
of the new school, clashed with two different types of reality.
It began at the Colorado Springs airport when the group assembled

to board the plane

—to

find that the 707 was to be an hour late.

Chad

got out his guitar, Gerry his melodian, Mark some drums and the singing

began

—"This

Land is Your Leuid," "We Shall Overcome," "Where Have All the

Flowers Gone," "Blue-tailed Fly" and the like.

In the foregroxind a par-

ticipant with videotape camera added to the scene with a series of precarious perches to secure \inusual perspectives on the scene.

Little by

little others in the airport, an airman second class and his wife and

young baby, a burly weathered Colorado rancher, a black Army corporal, a
huge woman with unbelievably curly hair, and even the two state troopers
in attendance at the airport began first to join the singing, later, many,

to join hemds with the UMass group in concentric semi-circles around the
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r.u.ic.35

It was a heady ti„e for many
participants, a result both of the

singing and the integration of the nameless
outsiders into the group_a
portent that perhaps the group could,
indeed, make an impact on the broad,
vast and countless numbers of people
in America.
The airplane was a different story.

Many, remembering the trip

over, knowing the group was now much more
together, anticipated it as the

climax of the entire trip

—but

the captain of the plane had other ideas.

The focus of ambitions for the return trip was
"the other group" which

periodically during the Retreat had met at "the other
place" and "the
other time."

A day earlier they had issued a manifesto to the community

which included;

Regulations for the Return Flight to Amherst
1.
All first-class cabin accommodations will be resei*ved for
members of the other group.
2.
Use of Public Address Equipment on the plane
A pre-screening apparatus (to be filled out in triplicate)
will be used to determine your qualifications for using the
P.A. system.
Use and Misuse of Stewardi
3*
a. All stewardi, with the exception of those making the
rank of junior stewardess on the last flight, will be
confined to the first-class cabin.
b.
Consequently, all misuse of stewardi will be limited to
the first-class cabin.

Reality intruded upon the first use of the public address system,

when the announcement reiterating the other group’s flight regulations
was cut off, and an angry voice from the flight deck intruded.
.
This is Captain
I will not permit unauthorized use of
the cabin communication system. That system is intended only for
routine announcements of the captain and crew, and emergency use.

^^ideotape, "Colorado Springs Airport," Sept.

1968 ,

21,

I

968 .

^^"Total Bag Sacks It to the Community," Tapias Rosa , Sept. 20,
pp. TR-1 & TR-2.
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attempt to interfere with the
normal operation of this aircraft's
equipment or its personnel.
The group had met its first uptight,
autocratic, traditional

School-master type in a week.

Many had forgotten such types existed
and

certainly did not expect to meet one on this
charmed journey to the West.
But, not about to admit defeat by one man
over I50, even if he

was the pilot, the group, through Dean Allen,
submitted three requests/

demands to the pilot.
1)

2)
3)

That the group be permitted to use the cabin communication
system—— since the captain clearly had an override switch
which would allow him to talk whenever he wished.
That passengers be allowed to visit the cockpit.
That in view of the full plane, passengers be permitted to
assist the stewardi in their assigned tasks.

The latter request elicited another lecture from the pilot sprin-

kled with references to the FAA, the enormous responsibility of the professional crew, and clear inferences of his conviction that if any one of
the 150 entered the cockpit the plane would soon, unquestionably, be wing-

ing its way to Cuba.

And so, powerless in their sullen defiance, and

somewhat shocked by the defeat of the previously all-powerful Dean, the

group solemnly repressed their high spirits, and with resignation per-

mitted themselves to be carried back to Amherst.

"The Ten-Year Projection "
The Dream that was Dreamed

Often during the Retreat Allen

held

talked of rapid and thorough-

going change, of "dreaming big" and audaciously, and of "going down with
flying colors if we have to go down."
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Kvidenoe that at the Retreat the group
did, in fact, "dreajj big"
and some of the specific hopes, plans,
and expectations which made up
that dream can be found in the -Ten Year
Pro jectiori' prepared in October
for the University Provost by members
of the Executive Committee at the

request of Dean Allen.
by the total community.

This projection was not subjected to any
review

However, in the writer's opinion it did reflect

the views of the majority of the group.

Among the proposals of this document are:
——We will be, in part, a resident center for teacher
training
for teaching at all levels from the two—year— old through
all
aspects of continuing education for adults.
We will not, as a school, espouse any one approach to education or one area of interest.

“At

present we have under planning twenty areas of activity
[the centers], and would expect to see that number at least
double in ten years.

—The

preparation of [educational personnel] will be characterized by pluralism, alternative entry and exit points, fluctuating roles and responsibilities, aesthetically pleasing
learning experiences, and a level of involvement and activity
that far exceeds the current norm.

—^Heavy use will be made of technology.
— less of our teaching at UMass will

tedce place in the classroom and far more will take the form of experiential learning.

^Par

—More

than half of our activities will be non-resident including
satellite schools of education throvighout the U.S. and abroad.
The projection goes on to predict in the tenth year a resident

faculty of 400 and a non-resident faculty of 1,050; 1,100 graduate assistants, 1,700 resident graduate students, 3,000 resident undergraduate

students, 1,500 non-resident graduate students in degree programs and
15,000 non-resident graduate students part-time; 200 secretaries; a

203

* 15 , 000,000 investment in technical
equipment, *35.000,000 in physical

plant, and a $17,000,000 annual
operating budget.^?

With dreams of such dimension, and
with a planning process and
the mechanisms to support that process
well begun, the group began to

undertake the rigors and decisions of the
planning year.

([Oct.

^^Summarized from The School of Education;
14i 1968 ] School files).

A Ten Year Projection
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CHAPTER

VI

ACADEMIC REFORM

Introduction

One of the two major tasks of the planning
year was that of aca-

demic reform

the creation of new educational programs together
with

overall academic policies to govern those programs
which would be more

appropriate to the needs of students and of society.
This task

—One

had.

two components;

conceptual in nature

—the

conceptualization and development

of the educational programs and policies.

—One

political in nature

—securing

approval of the new programs

and policies first by the School as a whole and then by the various Uni-

versity bodies which controlled academic programs and policies.

As described in Chapter V, the general organizational plan for

dealing with these tasks which emerged at the Retreat was to have the
development of specific programs primarily the responsibility of the

planning committees.

There was, at the Retreat, no specific allocation

of responsibility for the development of overall academic policy and for

political concerns, except that such matters presumably fell under the

mandate of the Executive Committee and were, of course, of vital interest
to the Dean.

A review of the events of the post-Retreat planning year shows a
relatively distinct chronological ordering of focus of the School's activities into the following three areas.
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Prom October through January major
emphasis was on the development of programs in specific interest
areas by the planning committees.

Prom late January throxigh mid-April
major emphasis was on the
synthesis of the individual programs into
a coherent whole and development of school-wide academic policies by
which to govern those programs.
^Prom

mid-April through May emphasis was on gaining
approval of

the finished product (called the Interim
Catalogue or "the package") by
the total School and appropriate University
bodies.

The remainder of this chapter will be organized along
these three

chronological divisions with a final section of summary and
evaluation.

Program Planning; The Planning Committees
October 1968 - January 1 969

Introduction

The conceptualization phase of the planning year contained two

distinct components:
Acaidemic Policy Pormulation
1

)

Identification of the appropriate clientele for the School

2)

Definition of the major educational foci of the School

3)

Adoption of relevant grading and evaluation techniques

4) Determination of appropriate standards of degree granting

Program Planning
1 )

Creation of appropriate educational programs including

curriculum, specific content, teaching methods, and program

evaluation
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In accordance with the organic
planning model adopted at the
Retreat, the initial focus of the
School's activities was on program
planning with the idea that viable
decisions about overall academic

policies could best be made in the
context of the specific programs developed by the planning committees.
In this way the academic policies
adopted could be made more nearly
consistent with the programs themselves

and appropriate to the clientele,
educational foci, and desired standards
of the aggregate of programs.

It should also be pointed out that the

decision to focus on specific programs was
consistent with the desires
of most participants, who appeared far more
interested in working on

programs in their own particular field of interest
than on the more diffuse problems of overall academic policy.^

However, as will be described, during the planning year
the School
as a whole was not able to shift its emphasis from the
program planning

phase to the overall academic policy formulation phase.

Program plan-

ning was in fact by far the major focus of the School's energies during
the planning year

— first

on the basis of time alone, since the initial

four months of the planning year were devoted almost entirely to program

planning and the final four months saw the work of these committees continue while the package preparation and approval process was going

on—

and secondly on the basis of participation, since nearly every member of
the planning staff was involved in prograun planning while only a rela-

tively few were concerned with the package preparation and approval
process.

Vs previously cited, Dwight R. Ladd, Change in Educational Policy
(New York, McGraw-Hill, 1970)i P» 214*
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To describe the work of the
planning committees is either
a ve.,
long story, tracing the development
of each, or a relatively
short one,
summarising the process as a whole.
Since the focus of this study
includes the process of organizational
reform and the change strategies
of
the Dean, I shall attempt to
work a viable compromise in
length by focusing first on the influence of
the Dean on the work of the
planning committees and then on a summary of the
processes by which these committees

developed their programs.

Influence of the Dean on
Program Planning Process

In retrospect, one can view major portions
of the outcome of the

planning year as primarily preordained by the
Dean but also channeled
and directed by his leadership, although without
attempting to directly
control the form and content of programs being
planned.
It was preordained in the sense that the Dean
had set the goals,

parameters, and to a large extent the style, tone, and
even much of the

content of the academic innovation of the planning year by his
choice of
faculty and doctoral students and his decision to constitute them as the

basic planning group.
Once this group arrived on campus, the Dean provided the direc-

tion and parameters of their efforts primarily by judicious use of his
change strategies (to be discussed in detail in Chapter VIII and by
)

articulately communicating the wide parameters under which this planning
group could operate.

208

The most dramatic statement
of possibilities for the
planning
year was intrinsic to the Dean-s
statement of the discontinuation
of all
courses, programs, degrees and
requirements as of September I969.
This
decision, which the Dean reiterated
many times to individual faculty
and
students and confirmed in the
initial School meetings and at
the Retreat
took written form in the Dean's
memorandum of July 23, I966, as
follows:

catalog of the School of Education
has been discontinued as of
September 1, I969 and the new catareplanning of the curriculum of the
School
opportunity among Schools
Of Education to be imaginative and
creative across the full
spectrum of educational concerns. We
have the capacity to design progr^s leading to quantum
improvements in the field of
education.*^
In addition, in both public and private
pronouncements the Dean

emphasized both the wide range of possibilities
available and his views
of what the future School might look like.

He talked often of innova-

tion and experimentation, especially of his
conviction that much of existing education was inappropriate and that new
programs were being stifled

because they were subject both to premature evaluation
and a standard of

evaluation not applied to existing programs.

He spoke of flexible pro-

grams, alternative routes to specific educational goals, of wide
ranges
of curriculum options and alternatives, and he encouraged the existence

of competing programs within the School.

He talked of a network of field

training sites and of the potential of the computer and videotape for

p

Dwight W. Allen, Memorandum to Faculty and Planning Staff, Sub"Strategies and Logistics for Planning" (mimeo, July 23, I968),
p. 1 (School files).
It is an interesting and significant footnote that
this decision, which had the effect of galvanizing so many into action,
was not within the Deein's power to make. It is also indicative of his
perceived power that no one chose to challenge it.
ject;
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off-ca„pus education.

He alec talked of hie
conviction that education

could and ehould be an inetrucent
of eocial refo™, with
particular eaphaeis on urban and racial
probleae, and of hie hope
that aan, of the new
programs would challenge the
basic assumptions on which
education had
been based.

All indications are that the
major influence of the Dean in
the
work of the planning committees
was of this type_to encourage
innovation, experimentation, and
creative thinking and to attempt
to set overall goals for the planning. He
did not, to the writer's knowledge,

attempt to influence membership of
the planning committees, the components of the specific programs being
developed, or the emerging education
foci of the School as defined by the
interests of the various planning

committees.

Faculty members thus had unprecedented (in
terms of conventional

academic organizations) freedom to direct their
own activities and to

develop programs in their field of interest, a
factor which tended to
increase the potential for the development of innovative
programs and

which also, in retrospect, had a dysfunctional effect
on the development
of governmental structures (to be described in the following
chapter).
The Dean clearly took a hands-off approach to the work of the

committees and, in fact, in its final form it seems clear that the School
was far more humanistically oriented than he would have preferred, less

interested in the technical skills of teaching, and more interested in

graduate education than teacher education.

On the other hand, it did

fulfill those goals of innovation, experimentation, and alternatives

which were hie major interest and toward which he put most of hie influence.

210

Work of the Planning Committees
The planning committees were the
outgrowths of the interest

groups formed at the Retreat.

In early October the following
planning

committees existed:^

Administration
Aesthetics

M.E.T.E.P. (Model Elementary
Teacher Education Progreim)

Compensatory Education

Reeuiing

Early Childhood

Research

Financial Support

Sociological, Historical, Philosophical Pormdations

Goals

Guidance and Counseling

Student Centered Teacher Education

Technology

Higher Education
Theater 2000

Human Relations
Urban Education

Humanistic Studies

Vocational Education

Innovations in Education
International Education
Most faculty and doctoral students focused their efforts in one

planning committee, while maintaining membership in one to three others.

During the fall and early winter the work of the planning committees
went

on—the

general goal being the development by the spring of specific

programs for students in the various interest areas.

Most committees met

two or three times weekly and were characterized by a core group of five
to eight people with others floating in and out.

New committees formed,

occasionally by the development of a new interest area, more often by
the merging of two or more existing groups, and also by the formation of

"rump" committees dissatisfied by the work of the original committee in
that interest area.

derived from data collected for The Ten-Year Projection (author's
files)
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Not all, especially among
the faculty, participated
equally i„
the planning process. Rslative
participation was determined to a
certain extent by interest in the
planning, but mere by a pre-condition
which existed primarily along old
faculty-new faculty lines-that
of
responsibility for the conduct of the
day-toMiay operations of the School.
Soon after the return from Colorado
it was formally decided in
a faculty meeting that both faculty
and doctoral students would divide
their time between "planning" (one-third)
and "maintenance" (approximately

two-thirds). 4

Maintenance activities were composed
primarily of servic-

ing the existing undergraduate and
graduate programs, teaching courses,

advising, and supervising student teachers.

Each person was to consult

his own conscience, as well as his own sense
of what the rewards of each
type of behavior would be, to decide specific
time allocations for himself.

In fact there was less choice for the old faculty members
than
the new.

The old faculty, in effect, were forced to take most
of the

responsibility for "maintenance."

Their courses were listed in the cata-

logue and students had been pre—registered for them the previous spring.

These courses comprised the major predictable offering of the School,
and thus the old faculty were in a position where whatever planning they

did was either at the expense of their regularly scheduled activities or
in addition to them.

^"Minutes of the Faculty Meeting," Tuesday, Sept. 24, 1968, Phillip
L. Edgecomb, Recorder, Tabula Rasa , October 4»

and University ArchivesTT

1968, p.

1

(School files
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The new faculty were in a
far better position to
devote their
efforts to planning. Few were
committed to, or needed for,
any maintenance courses at all. Many
of those who were so
committed turned their
courses either into
he types of innovation in
which they were concerned.

Most others ran

planning courses in their
xneir own fields of interest
or as planning seminars.
The planning doctoral students
were in the best position of
all
to participate in the planning
process. Approximately 65 were
receiving
stipends from the School .
Normally such stipends carry the
condition
that one-half time be devoted
to the speoific activity from
which the
funding was derived. In order to
emphasize the planning process Allen
had, from the beginning, made it
clear that for the planning year
doctoral
•

4.

students were not committed to the
specific activity from which their

funding was derived, but rather they were
to involve themselves with the

planning in whatever area most interested them
on the assumption that

manpower for funded projects would come from
students naturally interested in these programs—a situation which
put considerable strain on
some of the project directors.
:^y

and large the planning doctoral students responded
with com-

mitment and enthusiasm to the opportunity to follow their
interests and
talents and as a group came to play a central part in the work
and de-

cisions of most of the planning groups.
The planning was carried on in the planning groups in varying

ways with varying degrees of success.

Somey probably a minority, became

derived from internal summary of "Doctoral Student Stipends"
(mimeo [Pali, I968], School files).
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highly structured with strong
leadership, process charts,
routine assignments, and decision points while
most were far more loose and
freeflowing. Perhaps as a generalization
the least successful planning
was
done by those groups which viewed
the planning as entirely a
theoretical

undertaking_a program to be devised out
of "heads” of the committee in
combination with appropriate readings.

The basic difficulty of this ap-

proach was that its output, at best a
position paper or other written
material, provided little in the way of
tangible evidence of success to

motivate further effort.

This defioienoy was oompounded by the
fact that

many faculty and students, heady with a
feeling of freedom from what they
saw as overly rigid academic discipline, and
also feeling pressured by
time constraints, did very little in the way
of research or preparation
of position papers.

For instance, as one indioator, the number of books

loaned by the Education Library dropped 12§ per cent
from the previous
year, despite the substantial increase in enrollment
during the planning

year.^
In many cases planning committee meetings of the theoretically

oriented groups consisted of little more than ongoing bull sessions re-

flecting the biases of those present, and worse, since the meetings themselves were usually undocumented, the same issues were often being
addressed, without conclusions being reached as membership shifted from

meeting to meeting*
This combination of disorganized meetings, inconsistent attendance, and theoretical approaches was sufficiently prevalent so that by

derived from library records. School of Education Library, Louise
Addison, Head Librarian*
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December of the planning year eome
membere of the oommunity were
openly
predicting that the "new school*
would represent a massive
reinvention
of the wheel.

The more productive planning
activities appear to have been

carried out by those groups who took
a more action-oriented approach
to
planning. This action planning approach
involved the various groups in
one or more of three levels. Some
groups wrote proposals for outside
funding.

Although only one small proposal was
successful during the

first year, 7 preparation of these
proposals had the advantage over the

theoretical approach of providing "real world"
incentives for groups to
agree upon goals and specifics of programs.

back on their ideas from outside sources.

It also provided them feed-

This approach was used, for

instance, by the Administration, Aesthetics, Humanistic
Education, Human

Relations, and Urban Education groups as well as a niunber
of others.

A second, more action-oriented level of action planning was the
design and offering of new courses at the School itself.

Some of these

were designed and implemented in the fall by parts of planning committees

which had constituted themselves as seminars, others were planned in the
fall and offered in the spring.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of

this kind of action planning was the development of the first "marathon”

an alternative educational fonnat which was to become an integral part of
the School's curriculiun.

In an early planning session for a "block"

course in the history of the secondary school, a doctoral student teaching

^Many of these initial efforts did, in the second and third year,
turn into fully-funded projects, most notably those in Humanistic Education and Administrative Leadership.
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assistant suggested a ••smorgasbord"
day for the course-^ day
in which
students could go to a wide variety
of activities and events to
get an
idea of the range and variety of
the activities of the faculty
and doctoral students. The idea was
expanded to include activities
sponsored
by all faculty, doctoral students,
and even outsiders and open to all
at the School, University and outside.

Approximately 4,200 people at-

tended this ^rathon I, originally
intended for 225,8 and described as
"part carnival, part happening, part
educational fair.^^

The Marathon

proved to be a highly successful event which
dramatically commiinicated

much of the emerging ethos of the "new
schooP^-^ctivity, excitement,
experimentation, diversity, multiple options, and
non-linearity—and,

expanded to a week, became a semi-annual event in
the School's curriculum.

Another "action planning" event relative to the School's
academic
processes was the fact that at the end of the fall semester the
School
was surprised and the University surprised and shocked to
find that a

vast majority (75 per cent was the general rumor) of the grades for stu-

dents in School of Education courses were A's, including, it was said,

an A for a student who had not been to a class all fall.

A's was astronomically above the University average. 9

This ratio of

This situation,

Q

A Thrust Toward Relevance [mimeo, the first written description
of the "new school," written late October I 968 ] (School files), p. 6 .
have no documentation of the validity of this very prevalent
rumor. The closest validation I can find is in the minutes of the Faculty
Senate meeting at which the package was approved. A senator asked Dean
Allen if it was true that the School had given 75 per cent A's in the
fall, and Allen answered that he did not know the exact percentage, but
that an unusual nvimber of A's had been awarded.
( Minutes of the 143rd
Faculty Senate Meeting , Third Session, May 29i I 969 [.University Archives],
p. 38.
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which aroee spontaneously, was
apparently the result of a dissatisfaction with conventional grading on
the part of „ost of the School
of Education faculty.
One might speculate that this
situation may have played a major

part in the relatively easy acceptance
by the Faculty Senate of the

School's proposal in the "package" for
pass-fail grading for all courses

—since senators may have feared that

if they did not approve pass-fail,

they would be rewarded with an avalanche
of A's and a trickle of P's for

School of Education students in the future, thus
hopelessly corrupting
the all-important student cumulative average

—and

this issue was brought

up in the Faculty Senate Meeting at which the package
was approved.
(See footnote 9»

A third level of action planning was the design and implementation of programs in the field which was carried out by a number of
interest groups.

Perhaps the most notable example of this approach was carried

out by the Urban Education group which designed and ran a teaching
in-

ternship program in the Hartfordj Connecticut public school system under
a $10,000 grant secured from the New World Foundation.

As a generality, the action planning approach proved superior to
theoretical planning for a number of reasons.

First, it provided plan-

ning groups with clear goals toward which to direct their efforts and
feedback on the success of their work.

Secondly, it became clear that

developing programs on an entirely theoretical level, even if done rigorously, very quickly hit a point of diminishing returns without a testing

ground for the ideas generated.

Thirdly, with the extensive and often

conflicting demands made on participants' time during the planning year.
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the demands of commitments to action
programs tended to take priority

over hull session approaches.

And finally there was another, very
prac-

tical reason for the greater success
of the action approach.

It was

more visible to the Dean and also more
consistent with his approach to
planning.

Thus he tended to encourage and support
those programs being

developed on an action basis over those that had
not produced anything
tangible.

Perhaps the beet available interim review of the progress
of the

planning committees can be found in a series of committee
statue reports
submitted to Dean Allen in the late fall and published in the
January 28,
^9^9 I edition of Tabula Rasa .

Taken as a whole, these reports are a

disappointing reflection of the three months' work of I50 people (which
may, of course, be a reflection of the reporting rather than the work

itself).

Many contain only a description of purposes at a high level of

generality, high-soionding rhetoric, and little indication of specific

program components or resources available to or needed for carrying out
the programs.

Records of the products of the planning committees can be
in the "French Committee" proposals

fovind

(the original submissions by the

committees) and in the Interim Catalogue , Section I, pp.

(as these

submissions were amended by the committees and packeige writers).

In the

writer's opinion these documents, althotigh considerably improved over the
interim reports, are not as a group particularly impressive given the
time and manpower available to prepare them.

^^chool files

Many abo\ind in vague
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generalities, educational jargon,
pretentious rhetoric with small substance to support it—and precious
little documentation or evaluation

procedures—nor did many address the
problem of available resources.
The above, it should be pointed
out, is not necessarily an in-

dictment of the programs themselves,
but rather of the "paper product"
of the planning process.

In fact, in the writer's opinion,
some veiy

effective programs were written up very
badly and vice versa.
Preparat ion of the Interim Catalogue
January - March 1~9^

Introduction

The "Package"

vras

to be the culmination of the academic planning

portion of the planning year and was to contain a description
of the
School's academic organization, programs, guidelines and policies;
a

rationale for them; and a specific description of the courses to be
offered.

Work on the package began in January 19^9 under the direction of
the Executive Committee, faltered in mid—February, and picked up again

in early March when Dean Allen took a major role in the remainder of the

process which ended internally on April 11, I969, with the approval of
the package by the School of Education Assembly and externally on May 29,
19691 with the approval of the University Faculty Senate.

Preparation of the package had three major components:
1)

Collection of data from the planning committees on proposed

programs and courses in a form usable in the report.
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2)

Development of guidelines and academic
policies for the

School as a whole*
3)

Conceptualization and writing of the
document itself.

Collection of Planning Committee Data
Upon return from Christmas vacation, most
planning committees

had been aware that information on their
programs would be needed for

preparation of the package, but no specific directions
or outlines for
the package preparation process were given
them until January 29, when
the Executive Committee submitted a memo called
’’Programs and Offerings

for September;

Proposal for Refinement and Approval Process (for commu-

nity action, February 3, I969).”
This memorandum proposed that:

In essence, ANY and EVERY
in September, 1969* should be
on Friday, February 7, I969.
categories of submission will

anticipated offering of our School
submitted in five (5) copies . • .
It is anticipated that three (3)
be made;
(a) existing programs which are proposed for continuation
next year.
(b) new programs which are proposed for initiation dtiring
the next academic year.
(c) existing and new offerings which are basically independent of any particular program and which are proposed offerings
for the next academic year.
The memo went on to outline guidelines for submissions which were
to include:

a clear rationale
a definite statement of objectives
identification of student target groups
courses or experiences which would be included
personnel desired (using neunes, and indicating the level
of involvement of each).
fa^
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
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The memo also asked oommittees
to include, if possible,
anticipated enrollments, expected sources
of financial support for
graduate
students, personnel requirements
for the first year, and "a
comment regarding the utility of (a) a modular
system of course offerings and
(b) a
portfolio record for the proposed
offering."
The memo also proposed a two-step
process for review and approval
of submissions;
First, a reading committee, soon called
the French Committee

(after its Chairman, Nathaniel French),
was set up to review and rate

proposals on the basis of clarity and
comprehensiveness.

This committee

was to submit its review and ratings to
the community on February I4 and

continue to review and rerate rewritten proposals
through February 28.
This committee was made up of three new faculty,
two old faculty, and

two students (one black), one of whom was on the
Executive Committee.

Secondly, another review committee was set up to "make
written

recommendations to the community by March I4, I969, on which
programs
should be approved for September

1,

I969."

That committee was charged

with making its decision based on;
1 )

2)

3)
4)
5)
6)

The French Committee ratings
The Community's priorities, both implicit and explicit
as determined through hearings and/or solicited written
statements
Pre-existing commitments, if any
Available and potential resources
Students served
Any other factor deemed relevant.

This committee was also charged with defining "any processes
seen as relevant and desirable for [carrying out its charge in such a

manner] that community sentiment is accurately reflected and such that
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all offerings will reflect the
best quality which we can
prcduce at this
stage of development.” The E^cutive
Committee recommended that this
group consist of the three Deans
and four elected community members.
The proposal was passed at the
February 4 Faculty meeting, with
one amendment—that the second review
committee be the Executive Committee rather than the three-dean-plus-four
committee proposed. ’2

action on the part of the community
could be construed as indicating
their unwillingness to let the Executive
Committee turn the review process over to a group which the Dean
could presumably control.

In fact,

the Executive Committee never, as a whole,
acted as a review committee-

which function was handled by the writing committee,
which included the
three deans and was selected by Allen and the Executive
Committee (and

contained two Executive Committee members).
The French Committee was formed and performed its charge—-as

will be described below.
The Executive Committee memorandum of January
29 is indicative
of a condition that was prevalent throughout the planning year, but was

particularly characteristic of the package preparation process——one of
unpreparedness for decision points, extreme haste, and tight and often
unrealistic deadlines.

This memorandum was circulated on January 29, a

Wednesday, for approval by the faculty the following Monday (the meeting
was delayed until Tuesday) and submission of reports, expected to be a

^

^Summarized from "Memorandum from the Executive Committee," Jan. 29,
1969 (School files).
^^"Paculty Meeting, February 4i
corder, Tabula Rasa, Feb. 21, 1969» n.pag.

Phillip L. Bdgecomb, Re-
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summary of the entire planning
work of the committees, due
four days
later-with the French Committee to
complete its review of those
dooumerits a week later.
The haste, confusion and
unrealistic deadlines became evident
on February I 9 , five daysafter the
French Committee Report was supposedly

due-when the French Committee reported
orally to the Executive Committee
that there was a "misunderstanding
of what should be submitted.

All

courses old or new should have been
presented to the French Committee
by February 7 , 1969 .

Submit immediately if you have not as yet
done

This oral report also gave a first inkling of
a condition which
was to increasingly characterize most of the
package preparation process

that of low participation, when it observed that
"only one-half of the

community were represented in the proposals."

The committee's report

also pointed out three other factors which were to be viewed
by many as

significant weaknesses of the finished package, that little attention
was paid to the task of certifying teachers, that most proposals
did not

with many students, and that little attention was paid to evaluation.

The French Committee finally reported, a report which expressed

clear dissatisfaction with most of the proposals, in an undated memo

imder the title, "There is less here than meets the eye."

The report

^"Faculty Meeting, Feb. 19t ^9^9 t" Phillip L. Edgecomb, Recorder,
Tabula Rasa . Feb. 28, 1969i n.pag.
^

“•^ibid.
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did not refer to epeoifio proposals,
whioh had been returned to their

co^ittee rated 0-10, but the ™emo was
openly sarcastio in tone, inoluding a definition of the word
"rationale," for those who seeningly
did
not understand it, with a glossary
of 50 "amusing terms" found during
the reading, and a hope "that the
good ideas in the School of Education
can be translated into understandable
English." ^5
However, by February 24 the task of
generating somewhat \miform

committee reports was apparently under way,
and, as indicated in the

minutes of the faculty meeting that day,^6

Executive Committee had

turned its attention to the development of
overall guidelines, policy,

and rationale for the School and also developing
criteria for inclusion
or exclusion of programs for the package.

Development of Academic Policies

The task of designing overall acad.emic guidelines and policy
had

been handled primarily as a part of the conceptualization and writing
of
the package as a

whole—a task which had been handled beginning

in early

January by a doctoral student in consultation with an Executive Committee
member.

By February 24 they had produced two major products.

First, a

recommendation that the package be viewed as a "progress report" rather
than defended as a finished product and, as a part of this approach, to

propose a two-year experimental period to be evaluated by a 15-man

^^French Committee, "There is less here than meets the eye" (mimeo,
undated [February 1969]f School files).
1

^"Faculty Meeting, Feb. 24, 1969i" Phillip E. Edgecomb, Recorder,
Tabula Rasa, Feb. 28, 1969i n.pag.
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Evaluation Committee (made up equally
of School of Education, University,
and outside representatives). And
secondly, they had produced a rough
first draft of proposed major school
policies and guidelines, together

with a rationale.
The next step then was to find a method
for getting the partici-

pation of all School members in decisions about
the overall academic
policies and practices of the School.

During the year all of the basic

innovations, the modular system, the portfolio system,
pass-fail, and
the K-12 undergradiiate program had been discussed
generally in the fac-

ulty meetings, but no concrete research

had.

been done and no firm deci-

sions reached.
This step was a difficult one because the organization of the

pl^^aing process, focused as it was on specific programs of the interest
groups, had left the overall decisions about school policies unexplored,

and there was, at that point, no process developed for dealing with such

questions except for presentation of them to the entire group in faculty
meetings.

On February 24 the Executive Committee made a niunber of proposals
for expanding participation in the decision-making process.

It proposed

that the School spend an entire week focusing on questions of "policy,

procedure, and principle."

It appointed a series of three-man commit-

tees, two each of which were to discuss and report, independently, on

the major issues facing the School, including "Decision-Making," "Indi-

vidual Freedom," "Degrees and Target Student Groups," "Portfolios,"

”’’^Ibid.
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"Competing Programs," "Admissions,"
and "Modular Credit. "’8
ports were completed and submitted
to the writing team.

The week of

focus on questions of "policy,
prccedure, and principle" produced a
number cf hearings but by and large it
appeared that the ncrmal work of the

School continued unaffected.

At approximately this point, the morale
of the Executive Committee and the School hit a low point,
primarily because of the enormity of

the task confronting it, the absence of
successful processes for dealing

with it, and a feeling of inadequacy about
accumulating the data and

making the decisions which would be needed to complete
the Package.

Two

actions on the part of the Dean succeeded in returning
enough energy to
the organization to get it moving again.

First, he held two meetings of

faculty and doctoral students in which he listened to frustrations
and

made proposals, but more important constantly reinforced the theme that
the group was not as badly off as it thought it was.

He used a number

of times as an analogy to the School of Education, the image of an in-

ternal combustion motor which, although it works at a relatively small

percentage of its theoretical capacity, is nevertheless able to get the
job done.
But more important than the rhetoric, was his presence.

In late

February, a delegation from the writing team, which was probably the
most discouraged group of all, had approached him saying that the decisions for the package would never be made unless he stayed at School and

1ft

ject;

^Memorandum; From the Executive Council to the Commxinity, Sub"Three Man Committees" (mimeo. Mar. 4| ^9^9 School files).
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participated fully in the process.

He agreed to cancel hie
appointments

for the week of March
9 and give hie full attention to the
package. He
did so, and for the remainder of
the preparation process was
clearly its
leader. After a series of hearings
(again sparsely attended), after a
re-review of the planning coimiittee
proposals, and after submission of

position papers by various members of
the community, the writing committee, which consisted of three new
faculty, one old faculty member, and

three doctoral students, met with Dean
Allen and often the two assistant

deans and during the week of March
9 forged that data into the policy,
principles, procedure, and guideline proposals
for the interim catalogue.
The major decisions of the initial version of
the package were

only slightly amended during the review process
which ensued.

The fol-

lowing is a summary of the final version of the package
(with significant
amendments noted).

It is included both to give the reader a sense of

this document which constituted the culmination of the School's
planning

yeari and also to give an idea of the scope of decisions made by Dean

Allen and the writing committee.
tion were made by this committee

All policies in the following descrip-

—although

some of the issues, but by no

means all, had been discussed, but never voted upon, in faculty meetings.

Summary of Interim Catalogue

Section

—A
—A

I

of the package included:

specific request for "a charter to experiment" (p. I7)

rationale for experimentation based primarily on the inability
of existing educational approaches to prepare students for the
rapidly changing future (p. 5)
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—The

contention that the School s goals
were conventional, but
its means innovative (p, 6
)

—A

summary profile of School members,
emphasizing quality and
diversity (pp. 7 & 8 )

A description of School activities
during the year (featuring
Off-campus progress, and funded

—An

apology for the bad cross-campus relationships,
incongruous
grading policies, and bureaucratic chaos
(pp. 11 & 12 )

A

statement of priorities—First priority:
experimentation,
research, and teaching at the graduate level.
Second prioritvt
undergraduate education (pp. I4 & I5)

three-page description of evaluation schemata ("The
freedom
to experiment carries with it the mandate to
assess accurately
and conscientiously the results of that experimentation.")
which included evaluation of faculty by the students and
of
the administration by faculty and doctoral students
(pp. 18 - 20 )

^A

Following the above was a forty-page listing of the "Instructional Staff" (faculty and doctoral students) together with one-paragraph

summaries of their interests—which was intended as a means of communi-

cating the breadth and depth of the staff's interests and also of reinforcing the notion that the real catalogue of the School was its people
(pp. 21 - 62 ).

The document then took up the specific details of the proposed

organization and academic policies, the following of which could be described as innovative and/or controversial:

—the

Interim Constitution which included:

a) the creation of the Education Assembly as the decisionmaking body of the School. This assembly was to be made
up of faculty, all doctoral students in full-time residence, representatives from other departments of the University, and some 25 tindergradiiates and graduate students.
including doctoral and other students in the assembly,
and by the fact that they far outnumbered the faculty.
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students were theoretically given
control of the decisionmaking of the School by this proposal
(p. 63
)

b) the inclusion of faculty and
doctoral students as "Instructional Staff" (p. 63)
c) a policy of non-confidentiality
on "internally generated

documents" (the initial proposal had been
non-confidentiality
on all documents) (p, 64)

d) a statement of organizational policy
goals
autonomy and participation (pp. 64-66)

—Scheduling of two one—week marathons annually

—Pass— fail grading

—emphasizing
(p, 66)

for all courses (p, 66)

portfolio system for graduate students to replace courses
and credit hours (p, 67)

—A

modular credit system for undergraduates graded pass-no
record as an alternative to the standard semester course format (p. 67)

—A

statement that there would be no formal distinction between
graduate and undergreiduate courses (p« 68)

—A

new doctoral program, based on a series of three-man faculty
committee approvals, in effect that which had been followed by
the planning doctoral students during the year (pp. 69-72)

—A

statement on admissions, including a statement that either
the Dean's office or a faculty member might accept a student
who did not meet the normal criteria

—A

statement that the School would offer the Ph.D. as well as
the Ed.D. (p. 72 ) (amended from a specialist/generalist distinction to one based on researcher/educator)

—A

considerably more flexible undergraduate program on a K-12
basis (rather than divided between elementary and secondary as
previously), and one that provided for non-teaching majors in
education (pp. 73 - 75 )

Thereafter followed a general description of the eleven centers
and ten special programs established by the School as follows:
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Centers (pp. 97-106):

Aesthetics Education
Counselor Education
Educational Research
Hximanistic Education
International Education
Leadership in Educational
Administration

iiducet i onel Innovations

Media and Technology
Povindations of Education
Urban Education
Teacher Education

Special Programs;

Contemporary University
Early Childhood Education
Higher Education
MAT (Community College)
Program in Education and Public
Policy
Compensatory Education

Special Programs in Teacher
Education
Student Centered Degree
Systems Application in Education
Vocational/Technical Education

These were followed by an equally general description of all
courses y 208, proposed.

Volume II was a 250-page accvunulation of course request forms,
those normally required for the approval of new courses, accompanied by

2,000 pages of supporting data.

Formal Approval of the Interim Catalogue
March - May 19^9

Upon completion, by late March, of the majority of the conceptual
work involved in preparation of the package, the final task was to secxire
approval of it
sity agencies.

— first

by the School and then by the appropriate Univer-

Approval at both levels was handled primarily by Dean

Allen.

^^Summarized from School of Education Interim Catalogue , transmitted to; Academic Matters Committee, Faculty Senate, and Gred-uate
Council, from Dwight W. Allen, Dean, School of Education ([April 19^9]
School files).
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School Approval Process
It was decided that the firet
order of business at the School

level was to secure approval by the
faculty alone of the Interim Consti-

tution included in the package.

This action would permit the entire

planning group, faculty and doctoral students,
to vote on the academic
pcrtions of the package.

Approval of the Interim Constitution was sched-

uled fcr a March 20 Faculty Meeting, but a
significant number of faculty
members opposed the proposed constitution with
the result that the Interim Constitution was not finally approved until
just before the April

11

meeting at which the total package was voted upon.^^
As a result of the prolonged debate over the Interim
Constitution, the academic content of the package was addressed at only
one fac-

ulty meeting, April 2, before the final April
voted.

11

meeting at which it was

At the April 2 meeting a straw vote was taken on the major inno-

vations proposed in the package.

The writing committee proposals were

carried in all but two cases——the first was its distinction between the

proposed Ed.D. and Ph.D. degrees (the committee had proposed a generalist/
specialist distinction, the meeting favored an educator/researcher distinction), and the second was its policy of total non-confidentiality
(which was amended to apply to internal documents only).^^

On Friday, April 11, the Education Assembly met to vote on the

academic portions of the package under the direction of an old faculty
^^See pp. 267 through
difficult process.

2'J2

for a description of this prolonged and

^^"Education Assembly, April 2, 1969i" Phillip L. Edgecomb, Recorder, Tabula Rasa , April 11, 19^9? n.pag.
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who haa, as a .ssuU of
the adoption of the
InteHs. Constituti
been eleoted moderator of the
Assembly. The Assembly
oonsidered 11
amendments to the dooument and
approved six. the most
significant of
Which was a provision that
each Center be reviewed by
the Education
Assembly at least svery five
years and that their charter
to operate as
a Center expire unless
specifically renewed by the Assembly
as a result
of that review.
n.e«.ber

Five amendments, all proposed
by an old faculty member, were
rejected. These amendments all
expressed implicit dissatisfaction
with
the course of the School and were
intended to slow its rate of growth
and change. For example it was
proposed:
That the pass-fail grading practice
be tried on an experimental basis by one Center for the coming
year and that the
Assembly reconsider the question of a more
general application of this procedure one year from
this time
•That the School agree, as one
condition for getting approval
lor the package request by the University,
that it will by

the end of the next academic year, reduce
its curriculum
offerings to one-half of the number of courses and
programs
presently being proposed.

Ihe writer's recollection of this meeting is that
it was in many

ways a disappointing culmination of the planning
year.

It was not par-

ticularly well attended, especially by the faculty, in the first
place

and many left before the final vote.23

Despite the clear hostility to

22Agenda

from memorandum from Robert Wellman to the Education Community, subject: "Agenda for Community Meeting," April
11, I 969 (mimeo,
^9^9i School files). Minutes from "Education Assembly, April 11
1969 ," Phillip L. Edgecomb, Recorder, Tabula Rasa April 18, I 969 n.pag.
,
.

^There are no records of attendance at this meeting. My perception of the limited attendance is supported by my own notes taken at the
meeting, "It looks like 30 faculty here. Where is everyone?" and by a
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the paohage of eo^e of the
a«e„d.e„tB proposed, the
meeting oould best
be oharaoterized as a ..tired.'
meeting. Most seemed very
tired of debating the issues, combined perhaps
with the feeling that nothing
significant oould be Changed at that
late date, and as a consequence
seemed
willing to accept the proposals
of the package. There is no
record of
the specific vote on the
Interim Catalovue. although according
to the
transmittal letter which accompanied
it through University channels
the
vote was unanimous. The final
approval of the package was greeted,
in
my recollection, not so much with
elation but with a feeling of relief
that the planning process had finally
ended.
Thus, on April 11, a few days less
than a month after the origi.

nal target date, the Package was approved
by the School and, following
a frantic weekend of editing and duplicating,
was made available for

University channels on Monday, April I4.

University Approval Process

In order to become official policy, relevant portions
of the

Interim Catalogue had to be approved by four University agencies:

the

Provost’s Office, the administration's office on academic policy; the

Graduate Council , made up of graduate faculty elected by the departments;
the Dean's Council , made up of School, Department, and other Academic

description of the meeting given by an old faculty member at the Faculty
Senate Meeting at which the Interim Constitution was voted: "Mr.
j^said] that the vote took place late in the afternoon at the conclusion
of a meeting which he had been told would be carried through until the
bitter end. By the time the vote was to be taken less than half the
faculty was present" ("Faculty Senate Minutes," May 29, I969, p. 39 ).
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Deans; and the Faculty
K Senate ,» made up 01
of laculty members
k
elected by
their respective Schools
and departmentR
departments . its
t+o record
with these agencies
vfas as follows:

Pf ovost's Office - Approved,
„o apparent oonditione
De an's Council
- Approved, no apparent
conditions

Gr aduate Counci l - Approved,
with condition that graduate
students meet standart University
graduate student requirements^4
Fac ulty Senate

- Approved on a two-year
trial basis with small
modification of pass-fail grading
for master's
candidates, a more specific
definition of
when the pass-fail policy would
apply (to
School of Education courses taught
by School

of Mucation teachers), referral
of the studentcentered degree to a subcommittee,
provision
that other departments could
protest courses
that appeared to duplicate their own
offerings, and the proviso that the
proposed School
of Education Evaluation Committee be
selected
by the Faculty Senate Committee on
Committees, and the specification that the
Faculty
Senate Academic Matters Committee "review
specific courses in the usual way next fall
and report to the Senate in the usual way. "25

Approval by the Faculty Senate had been expected
to be the most
difficult

first, because the Senate had the reputation of
being a con-

servative body slow to move on educational change and
secondly, because
there had been many reports of the strong hostility
of many faculty

senators toward the School of Education.

Excerpts from that meeting

^^Derived from memorandum, Dwight W. Allen to the Education Commusubject: "Ratification of the New School of Education Program,"
June 2, 19691 Tabula Rasa , June 4» 1969i n.pag. and "Faculty Senate
,
Minutes," May 29, I969, p. 35 .

^^Summarized in "Unofficial Minutes, Faculty Senate Meeting of
May 29 I 19691" Tabula Rasa , June 4| I969, n.pag.
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give use..! in.,,, ,3 into
.ot, t,. , 33 tiUt,
of
senate an. the conditions which contributed
to the approval of
the Paokage-by that
body
as well as the other
University agencies.
One significant factor was
thp f-im-ivi,*
timing of au
the consideration of
the Package by the Senate.
It was the last ite. on
the agenda of the
third continuation of the
last Faculty Senate
meeting of the year, a
meeting which began two hours
before the normal starting
ti^e to assure
that all business would be
completed. One can assume that,
as with the
School Of Education Assembly.
Faculty Senators were tired and
felt under
considerable time pressure.

After discussion of other. non-School
of Education matters, the
discussion of the Package opened with
a report by the Chairman of the
Academic Matters Committee, who happened
to be an old faculty School of
Education member, describing the length
of the Package (I40 pages of
program description. 250 pages of
courses. 2.000 pages of supporting
material), the number of courses involved
(159 new courses and 86 old),
the difficulty of deciding what
elements of the Package required Faculty

Senate approval and what did not. the fact
that it was physically impossible to review all the courses by the usual
method in less than a year,

and the fact that the Package had received
approval from the Provost.
Deans' and Graduate Council.
In response to a question from the floor during this presentation, it was established by a show of hands that "a great majority"
of

26"Faculty

Senate Minutes, May 29 , I969," pp. 35 & 36.
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the Faculty Senators had
not seen the Package. 27
The Academic Matters Oc^nittee
had decided that the
Faculty
senate ™ust rule on the courses
to he offered and on
pass-fall grading.
On the former it reco^ended
provisional approval, with review
of courses
to be handled by the Committee
the following year, and
it recommended
approval of pass-fail, with a
minor amendment. 28
The debate on these two issues
was lively, at times heated,
and
in general more negative about
the procedures used by the
School in
bringing the Package tc the Senate
than about the proposed programs,
although a number of Senators questioned
the Dean closely, and to the
writer's mind, with considerable sarcasm
and effectiveness, about the

proposed methods of evaluation.

Minutes of the meeting do not quote
from

this debate, but other quotations give
a feeling for the flavor of the

discussion.
~
•
asserted that many faculty members are pleased
by the prospect of a revitalized School of
Education. However,
the faculty is bothered by the somewhat
coercive nature of the
procedures used. It seems that no matter what the
Senate believes to be the proper course of action, the
School of Education will offer its new curriculum next fall.
Dean Allen reiterated that it was not his intent to
subvert
the system customarily used in approving new courses . ^9

argued that the School of Education's undue
haste is what has upset the Senate more than anything else.^^

—————

spoke in favor of the motion to permit the
School of Education to offer its curriculum on a pass-fail basis.
[He] suggested that this seemed to be "Get the School of Education Day." He objected to the condescending attitudes displayed
by those who opposed the motion. Such attitudes were unprofessional.^'

^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.

^

p. 36.

^®Ibid., pp. 36-38.

.

p. 37

^^Ibid.

.

,

p. 40 .

^''ibid., p. 39 .
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The acting Dean of the
Graduate School, in supporting
the motion described below,

admitted that he had reservations
ahmi+
then,

to go ahead and then to
carefully

+via

evalSItf^e reeilt^™^*

There were two motions made
and passed with reference to
the
School of Education's program.
The first was to permit the
pass-fail
grading system, .*ioh passed by a
vote of 30-16,33 and the second,
more
general one was as follows
MOVED:
That the Faculty Senate approve
on a two-year trial basis the
new program of the School of Education,
including fo^ th^ fin
the new courses proposed to which
no objections are raised by

review all of the specific courses in the
usual way early next
a
and report to the Senate in the usual
wayj and that a redescribed in Senate Document 69-075
which should report its findings to the
Faculty Senate on a semssxer u3.si6 during the two years# ^4

“

A Senator, an old faculty member of the School
of Education,
moved an amendment to have the Evaluation
Committee named. by the Faculty
Senate's Committee on Committees rather than by
the School of Education,
as implied in the document.

This amendment was passed, and Dean Allen

tried, unsuccessfully, to have appointments made to that
committee by

July 1.^5

(This attempt had provoked the Senator's comment about "undue

haste" quoted above.)

^^ Ibid

. ,

^ ^Ibid .

.

p. 40.

^^ Ibid ., p. 39.

p. 39 .

fact, these appointments to the Review Committee were not completed until January 19?0| 3- time when, under its charge, it should have
been submitting its first report.
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With vary little more
diaouaaion the entire motion
was voted
and paseed by the Senate.
The minutes give no reoord
of the vote, tat
one might speculate that
it was probably similar
to the 30-16 vote
by
which pass-fail was approved.

In view of the radical nature
of the changes proposed in
the
Package and of the widespread
hostility to the School voiced
by other
members of the University, the
speed (just over a month) and
ease with
which approval was achieved came
as something of a surprise.
In retroBpeot, it seems probable that a
combination of the following factors

was primarily responsible for
the easy passage.
1

The fact that the innovations were
proposed on a two-year

trial basis, with continuous and final
evaluation by an "objective"

committee, made it very easy for those with
some doubts to temporarily

approve the plan and very difficult for those
with serious doubts to
"rationally" refuse to give the School the
opportunity to try out its

theories—especially in the context of the time pressure
described in
3-6 below.
2)

The clear support of the Provost and the Administration
for

the Package carried considerable weight in the Councils
and some weight
in the Faculty Senate.
3)

The fact that the Package had been submitted so late in the

year and did not anywhere list the specific decisions to be made by the
various bodies

meuie it

almost necessary for the ruling bodies to either

accept it or reject it as a whole if the School was to begin its pro-

gram the following year.

If, for example, specific decisions had been

outlined and requested, there is no question in the writer's mind that
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the Faculty Senate would
have had more specific
objections and probably
made many more amendments
to the Package,

For example, on page I09
of the Package there
is a stipulation
that modules would be offered
on a pass-no record basis.
Nowhere in
the minutes of the Faculty
Senate meeting is there any
mention of this
even more radical (than
pass-fail) departure from
standard grading which
also implied a system of
retroactive credit, and it is
doubtf^rl whether
many were aware of the
implications of this proposal.
And on page 71,
there is the statement,
"Doctoral students in Education
are considered
to be part of the instructional
staff. . . ." This statement,
which
opens up the possibility of a
redefinition of traditional faculty-student
roles, also went unchallenged
by the Senators.

And also, running through the Evaluation
section (pp. 18-20) is
the clear intention to do most
evaluation during and subsequent to experiments (post-hoc evaluation), rather
than screening them before the

fact—as

is the norm in most academic
organizations.

(Por instance,

all new courses in the University were
supposed to be approved by the

Faculty Senate before being offered.)

Again, no strong objection was

raised to this substantial departure from normal
procedures,
4)

The fact that the School, during the year, had made
little

attempt to "check with" the various responsible groups
again contributed
to a "take the whole thing or leave it" situation during the
final month.
5)

There were so many assumptions, conclusions, and proposals

in the Package, many of them vulnerable or highly questionable, that it

would have been impossible for any of the responsible groups to deal

with them in their normal responsible fashion in the time available.
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The course approval requests
are a good example of this
situation.
(To
my knowledge, the Academic
Matters Committee never was
able to deal with
the course proposals.) This
again tended to create a
take-it-or-leaveit situation.
6)

The timing of the presentation
of the Package proposed to

the Faculty Senate was also a
factor unique to the situation
which

aided its quick and easy passage.

Coming last on the agenda at the

third attempt to finish the year's
business, the Package benefited from
an effect similar to that by which
legislative bodies in their haste
to finish for the year quickly pass
bills which under normal oiroum-

Stances would be subject to far closer
scrutiny.

Summary and Evaluation

Since one of the purposes of this dissertation
is to describe
and analyze the process of change at the School
of Education for possible
replication, some judgments as to the relative strengths
and weaknesses,

successes and failures, of the academic planning process are
in order

recognizing that most judgments are highly tentative because of the
shortness of the period under review.
Based on the data presented above, the following judgments of
the relative success of the planning process appear appropriate;

—

^That

the School successfully achieved its conceptual goal of

developing new academic progreuns and policies

—

^That

these progreuns and policies generally satisfied the stated

goals of diversity, alternatives, and experimentation
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-That the School suooesefuUy
achieved

its political goal of

gaining the approval of all
appropriate University agencies
for its
Packaige

—That

the active participation and
purposeful leadership of

the Dean was central to the
development of the overall academic
policies of the School

—That the strategies

of the Dean were central to the
political

components of the process and that those
strategies which tended to put

reviewing agencies in a "take it or leave it"
situation were very successful strategies for dealing with the
University as a whole

—That the major strength

of the academic planning process was

the development of specific programs by the
planning committees

That "action planning" was generally the most
successful ap-

proach to the planning process

—That

the major weakness of the planning process was the rela-

tively low participation of School members in the making of decisions
on the overall academic policies of the School

—That

the qiiality of programs developed by the planning commit-

tees | although unjudgeable in the period xonder review, was not reflected
in the generally low quality of the verbal descriptions presented for

them at all stages of the planning process including the Interim Catalogue

—That

the planning period was too short relative to expecta-

tions raised for it
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—That

the organizational
ambiguities and time pressures
of the
process increased the reliance
of the entire organization
upon the de
cisions of the Dean

-That

the fact that the planning
was done primarily by faculty

and doctoral etudente resulted
in programs and policies
devoted primarily
to the interests of these
groups_to the relative exclusion
of the interests of undergraduate and
master's students

—Ind

finally that although there is
evidence by which to ques-

tion the quality of academic
programs and effectiveness of the
overall
academic policies developed during
the planning year, the School
unques
tionably achieved its most important
goal. It gained approval of its

commitment to experiment and innovate and
had thereby put itself in an
excellent position to bring to reality,
in the years to come, its goal
of developing programs more relevant to
the needs of students and of
society.
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CHAPTER VII
ORGANIZATION BUILDING /GOVERNANCE

Introduction
The second .ajor task of
the planning year was the
development
Of governance and organisational
stmotures which would promote the
continued growth and development
of the School in future
years. This task
begun at the Retreat and
culminated in the adoption of a
constitution in November I969 whioh was
predicated upon a sharing of the
Dean's
formal organisational powers with
the faculty and students.

Three highly important building
blocks of the ultimate governance of the Sohool as well as
of the organisation of the planning
year
had been formed at the Retreat.

Planning Committees

—which

were to be the major vehicle

of academic planning during the year
and, as centers, of the academic

organization of the School in subsequent years.
2)

The Executive Committee—which was to be the
most significant

non-administration group guiding the planning, developing
a governance
structure, and ultimately becoming the executive
organization of the

School's governing assembly.
The Po wer of the Dean

—^which

was to give him the leverage to

carry out his goals and desires for the School.
I

have discussed the major role of the planning committees in

the previous chapter.

The committees, as such, did not take part in the
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deliberatione on governance,
but the fact of their
existence did, in
effect, solve a major
organizational problem—how t o
organize and govern
the academic programs of
the School.
In this chapter

I

shall be discussing the
School -s effort to

develop an appropriate governance
structure in terms of two general
types
of structure, "participative"
and "leader-dominated."
The twin goals of participative
governance are (l) to give organization members appropriate
influence in decisions which affect
them
and ( 2 ) to give the organization
the benefit of the aggregate of
the
wisdom of its members in its
decision-making process. Some distinguishing characteristics of participative
governance would include: a rela-

tively decentralized and diffused
decision-making process but also one
that permitted optimum participation
in the major policy decisions of
the organization; a system whereby
power and legitimacy were derived

from those in the organization rather than
externally imposed; a system
in which resource allocation was arrived
at through processes ratified by
the group; a system of information distribution
which would permit all

members, if they so desired, to be equally well informed
on the activities of the organization; and a channel of appeal and
conflict resolu-

tion for those who felt aggrieved by any decision made in the
organization.
In my view the School of Education community set out to develop

this kind of participative organizational structure and, in large part,

believed it had achieved it in the adoption of the November I969 Constitution.

The major feature of this document was a moving away from the

unilateral power of the Dean, under which no participative organization
would have been possible, toward a sharing of power between the Dean and

244

a representative School
Council.
uncii.

ThiR sharing
This
of power, together
with

the stipulation that
the entire School
oo^unity could, hy a refere^iu.

procedure,

^he

decisions which superceded
any policy of the Bean
or
school Council and with
the adoption of systems
of mediation, arbitration. and judicial
resolution, seeded to
provide a strong f ras.eworh
fbr
effective participative
governance.

Leader domination as a
structure for governance and
organisational
decision-making is characterized
by unilateral decisionmaking
power on
the part of the leader and
the absence of an effective
countervailing
power structure by which members
of the organization can,
through institutionalized means, legitimately
overturn a decision of the leader
or make
a decision for the organization
without the approval, explicit
or tacit,
of the leader. In a leadermlominated
structure all power and legitimacy
tends to run to the leader and/or
persons designated by him. The leader
has, whether he employs it or
not, the power to make or overturn
any decision at any level of the organization.
The leader's power is derived
both from the legitimization of his
position by higher powers and from
his control over the most important
sources of power in his organization.
It is my view that thro\ighout the planning
year and at the time

of the approval of the Constitution the
School was operating primarily

under this leader-<iominated mode.
The fundamental thesis of this chapter is that the
search for

appropriate governing mechanisms was seriously hampered, and
the ultimate
governance mechanism adopted tragically flawed, by a school-wide
illusion,

never seriously questioned during most of the year, that governance should
be, would be, and was democratic and participative

—

^when in fact the

mode
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Of governance arising out
of the year was one of
leader^on.inanoe
There appear to have been
three major factors contributing
to
the emergence of the
leader^ominated mode in a group
apparently so committed to a search for a democratic
and participative fo™ of
governance.
First: Members of the community,
for reasons to be described,
maintained a very low level of
involvement in the process of
conceptullising and negotiating a participative
governance system for the School
thus leaving the job to the
Executive Committee and the Dean.

Second:

The Executive Committee, although
committed to the de-

velopment of a participative structure
of governance, did not provide
effective leadership for the community
in that effort.

And third:

the Dean, as will be described,
although apparently

genuinely believing in participation and the
sharing of his power, was

by his behavior in pursuit of his commitment
to academic change building
an organization whose major characteristic was
his domination of that
organization.
It is not my intention in this chapter to make
any judgments

about the relative merits of the two types of governance,
but rather to

attempt to answer the perplexing question of how an organization which

appeared so thoroughly committed to participative governance could end

up with a leader-dominated governance system.
This chapter begins with a description of the initial commitment
of the School to the development of a participative system of governance,

goes on to describe the reasons behind the abdication of community members in the development of such a process, and then traces in some de-

tail the work of the Executive Committee and the actions of the Dean as
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each related to the
development of governing
mechanisms for the School.

Commitment to Participate,,,

n.

The oo™it.e„t to participative
governance appears to have
arisen
out of a Widely shared goal
of governance and a belief
that participation
in governance was the most
effective means to that goal.
The goal was
first published in a series
of "understandings" presented
by the Structure Committee in preface to
their proposal for the establishment
of an
Executive Committee: "Whatever
structure we have, it will guarantee
and
^ T ^
facilitate everyone's desire to do
,.1
his own
a

—

thing.

.

This goal,

.

variously described, was a central
part of most of the Constitution
drafts
prepared during the fall. For instance,
one, attempting to use the United
States Constitution as a model, begins,
"We, the participants ... in
the School of Education, in order
to provide an atmosphere wherein
all

faculty and doctoral students have maximum
opportunity to pursue their

unique interest s"2 and another, that
proposed at the November

I

9,

I

968 ,

Faculty Meeting, begins its "First Principles"
section with "It is our firm
conviction that the overall goals of the School will
be optimally achieved
only by free and mobile individuals working through
a community which

supports individual creativity, growth, and vitality."^
1

"A Report Submitted by the Task Force on Structure to the
Entire
Group for Consideration," Tabula Rasa Sept. 18, I
969 p. 1 (School files
and University Archives).
.

,

2

Peter Wagschal, Constitution . First Draft (mimeo [November 19681.
author's files), p. 1 .
^"First Draft of Preamble, First Principles and Organizational
Principles for School of Education Constitution," Tabula Rasa, Nov. 19.
1968 , n.pag.
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This goal statement
appeared in the Interim
Catalog., as -It is
crucial that we devise
organizational structures
which promote growth
and Vitality rather than
stifle these values under
a blanket of the
motivation-managing, people-predicting
paraphernalia of conventional
organizational structures . "4
It was assumed by most
that this kind of individual
freedom

could best be achieved through
a participative system of
governance.
For instance, the Interim
Catalogue follows the goal
statement quoted
above with the observation that
the School had found no
satisfactory
models for the kind of organization
it was seeking, and then goes
on,
"The guiding principle of the
structure we are seeking is that
our organization must be genuinely democratic
and -human- with a minimum of
controls on personal action and a
maximum of support for personal risk
taking ."5 The 15-^0 Annual Report
is even more explicit, -Our primary
efforts thus far have been directed toward

.

.

.

creating a viable model

Of participatory governance within
the School."^

^hool of Educati on Interim Catalogue , transmitted to Academic
„
Matters Committee, Faculty Senate, and Graduate
Council, from Dwight W.
Allen, Dean, School of Education, ([April I969]
School files), p. 63.
.

,

^Ibid .

,

p, 63»

Annual Report , 1970 ? School of Education. University of Massa chusetts , submitted by Dwight W. Allen, Dean (mimeo, July
I970,
27
School files), p, 3. This report also contains, in a later ,
section, the
statement that "After an extraordinary year xmder a modified form
of
participative democracy, a third phase was developed——governance under a
Constitution which tried to find a middle ground between participatory
democracy and oligarchic rule" and goes on to observe that, "it became
clear to the majority of faculty and students that participatory democracy
was not viable for the School. ..."
I believe that this statement did reflect the consensus in July
1970 of those engaged in developing the permanent constitution whose
purpose, as described in the Interim Report on the Constitution, was
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thrust toward participative
governance beoaa,e .anifeet
early
in the structure of and
deoisicnMnahing processes
adopted for the Hetreat and in the charge,
described earlier, to the
Executive Oc^ittee
which included

ara^Zle
Clearly, the charge to the
Executive Committee and decision-

making processes delineated implies
a strong commitment to
participative
governance.
This commitment was manifest in two
major drafts of a Constitu-

tion prepared during the fall.

Article I, Section I, of the -U.S. Con-

stitution" draft states "Decision-making
power ultimately resides in the

faculty and student body of the School,
but shall be vested in a Council
of the School , "8 and the draft written
by the Executive Committee pre-

sented to the November

Faculty Meeting states under "First Principles"

The community of the School of Education shall
be a free and
open one, without status distinctions, in which
all members

"to provide a framework for decision-making that would result
in the
highest quality decisions made with the greatest economy and with maximum feasible participation," (p, 22) However, it is my belief that especially early in the planning year, but throughout the year as a whole,
most community members tended to see governance in the more simple dichotomy of participation versus authoritarianism.

^"Committee of the Whole," Tapias Rosa , Sept. 20,
Q

°Wagschal, Constitution , p.

1.

I

968 , p. SS-1.
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and all'^pinHnrwill^be
giverr^'^l'’

policies

This thrust toward
participative .overnanoe was
stros^ly supported both by the writings
of the most influential
organizational theorists Of the time and by
the burgeoning student
movements in the oountxy
which were calling for
greater participation by
students in the governance of university. Most
theoiy and rhetoric of the
time stood firmly
on the side of participative
governance, it would, in my
opinion, have
been unthinkable at that point
in time for any group claiming
to create
a new and more relevanf school
of education to publicly
state that its
goal for governance was to
create a smoothly functioning
system charaoterized by leader domination.

Although participation appears to
have been generally agreed
upon as the general means to effective
governance, the specific justification for such participation varied
among different segments of the
community.

Some talked of creating a system of
governance "as flexible

and innovative as the School"; others
talked of governance as a realization of their ideals of community living;
others saw governance in terms
of freeing School members "to do their
own thing"; others spoke of

creating a participatory model for other
organizations to replicate;
still others talked of participation as the most
effective way of re-

leasing the potential of the organization; and some
spoke, in thinly
veiled words, of curbing the power of the Dean.

9 .. First

Draft Constitution," Tabula Rasa . Nov. I9, I968, n.pag.
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in su._i„ October of
1968 .cet obeervers would
have been highly
opti^ietic about the realization
of a viable form of
participative governance at the School. The
community seemed in general
agreement about
both the goals of governance
and participation as the
fundamental means,
the Dean appeared to support
these goals and means (see
pp. 274 . 275).
the group had just returned
from a very successful
experience under participative governance in Colorado,
and the Executive Committee
which was
to lead the process had the
respect of both the community
and the Dean,
was committed to participatory
governance, and indeed represented
an ini.
tial manifestation of community
participation.

And in fact the School did, thirteen
months later, adopt a Constitution based to a large extent on
participatory mechanisms.
However, it will be clear from the
ensuing analysis that at the
time of the adoption of the
Constitution the School was, in fact, being

governed primarily in the leader-dominated
mode, that throughout the

planning year the leader-dominated mode
prevailed, and that all indications were that the School would continue
to be so operated.

How could this attempt at participatory governance,
so hopefully
begun, have failed so completely?

The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to an attempt
to

answer this question.

Community Abdication in the Development
of Participative Mechanisms

As will be described in a later section of this chapter, the process of developing participative mechanisms was characterized by general
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disinterest and very low
participation on the part of
ooo»unity .e.bers.
To understand this disinterest
one must go back to the
goals of such partisipation, first described in
the Structure Committee
memo as oreating
a structure which would
"guarantee and facilitate
everyone's desire to
do his own thing"-a goal
which one might paraphrase as
"the achievement
Of academic autonou«,." it was,
as previously described,
the assumption
that participative mechanisms
of governance would lead to
this academic
autonomy.
But by the second month of the
planning year a very subtle transi-

tion had apparently taken place.

Faculty and doctoral students had
found

that they had, with no effort on
their part, achieved the kind of
autonomy
that they had expected would arise
out of the participative governance

system.

Faculty saw that the administration was
not interfering, and

clearly had no interest in interfering,
with the work of individual facility

members or the programs being developed by
the planning committees.

Many found that they had almost total
control over their academic activities, their curriculum and teaching methods,
and even student admissions.

They also found that their requests for support were
being routinely

honored by the administration.

Doctoral students, for their part, found

that the freedom promised by the planning doctoral
progreun was not empty

rhetoric; that they could indeed choose their own committees and
plan

their own programs.
In these very few weeks faculty and doctoral students had come
to take for granted what was in fact unprecedented academic autonomy (com-

pared to most aceuiemic institutions)

—and

with the achievement of that

autonomy , the major impetus behind the commitment to participative
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governance dieintegrated and
faculty and doctoral
students turned their
energies to
,,,,,

pation remained, but much of
the energy had gene out
of it, and the difficult process of conceptualizing
and negotiating a viable
system of
governance was left tc the Executive
Committee and the Dean.
What community members did
not fully understand, or at
least ignored in the flush of their new
freedom, was the fact that their
autonomy
had not been negotiated and
legitimized, but had been granted
to them by
the Dean who still controlled
the major sources of power in the
School
and could, if he so desired, in
the absence cf a formal system
of par-

ticipative governance, modify or eliminate
the autenomy which he had
granted.
In sum, deluded by the autonomy which
they had achieved, many

community members did not see the necessity
of involving themselves in
the development of a formal system to assure
some control over the con-

tinuity of that autonomy, and a major source of
energy behind the thrust
for participative governance was lost.

There are some elements of paradox in this situation.

For one,

it appears that the Dean's attempt to give the faculty
and doctoral stu-

dents the autonomy they desired had the ultimate effect of defusing
the
effort to create mechanisms to assure the continuity of that autonomy.

another , it can be held that community members unwittingly gave

away the assurance of autonomy in the future as the price of "doing their
own thing" during the planning year.
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The Role of the Executive
Committee

With the abdication of most
community memhera, the responeibility
for the development of a partioipatoiy
system of governance fell to
the
Executive Committee and the Dean.

And it becomes clear in retrospect

that the Executive Committee failed
to take strong leadership for
the
community in this effort, but rather
handed the reins of governance over
to a very willing and decisive
Dean.
The reasons for the failure of the
Executive Committee to pro-

vide adequate leadership for the community
are numerous and complex.

Chief among them are;
1)

Their attempt to operate from the community
model which, as

pointed out on page 182, led them to adopt
decision-making roles which
almost guaranteed inaction.
2)

The fact that, as previously described, the major
focus of

efforts of School members had turned to program planning
had two more

implications for the Executive Committee.

First, since there was little

interest in or energy available for developing organizational structures

among the School members. Executive Committee members found themselves
"going it alone" in this area; and secondly, this interest area focus
also personally affected Executive Committee members who were often torn

between the conflicting demands of making a place for themselves in their

developing subject areas and carrying out the lonely and often unrewarding task of trying to develop overall organizational structures.
3)

The continuing eimbivalence evident in the Executive Committee's

behavior between the creation of a planned governance model and the
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adoption Of a »odel baaed on
the delineation of
prooeeeee whioh were
4)
growing organioally in the
day-to^ay operation of the
Sohool prevented
them from suooesefully pursuing
either approaoh.
The fact that the Committee
saw the oreation of the governance system as primarily a task
of theoretical conceptualisation
exposed
them to all the same frustrations,
inefficiencies, and circularities as
those of the planning committees
whioh adopted similar approaches.
5)

6)

And perhaps most important, the
Exeoutive Committee did not
realise that, in effect, a governance
system was being created while it

theorised—and that thus its aotual behavior
toward the Dean and the

com-

munity was a far more oruoial determinant
of the future organisational
structure then

wa.s

its theorizing*

Finally there was the fact that the Dean did
not effectively
support either the Committee or their work toward
participative democracy.
I

shall deal in the next section of this chapter
with the Dean's

behavior in this regard, but in this section it is
important to point out
that the Executive Committee acquiesced in the diminution
of its influ-

ence by the Dean in two important respects.

First, even with a clear

mandate from the community to develop a participatory governing
structure,
the Committee never exerted pressure upon the Dean to share with them
the

most important powers of his office—particularly those related to financial resources and personnel policies.

And secondly, when faced with

specific decisions the committee appeared all too willing to hand them

back to the Dean on the grounds that they were not yet prepared to
quately deal with such decisions.

axie—
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The analysis and description
of the development of the
Constitu-

tion which follows provides numerous
illustrations of most of these failures of the Executive Committee to
lead the School to the participative
governance which it apparently desired.

The Development of a Charter

The first three months of the Executive
Committee's work were

devoted largely to the conceptualization of
the governance system.

The

agenda for the first two meetings upon the return
to Amherst were devoted
almost entirely to communications (a central part
of any governing structure), goals and priorities, and "the role of the
Executive Committee. "^0

A crucial event in the development of a governance system
took
place at the October 2 meeting when Assistant Dean Coffing
read the group
a paper, written by himself and a doctoral student, which strongly
sup-

ported the organic growth model of governance planning on the basis
of
the organizational theories of Jay W. Forrester, an M.I.T. systems analyst.

In this paper the two made a strong case against conventional bureaucratic organizational structures and for an organization based on

11

or-

ganizational characteristics described by Forrester in an article, "A

New Corporate Design" (some of which were (l) no superior—subordinate
relationships, (2) policy-making separate from decision-making, (3) free-

dom of access to information, (4) no internal monopolies,

1

o

(

5)

balancing

"Executive Cotincil," Tapias Rosa , Sept. 20, I 968 , p. ss-2; "Minutes
of the Faculty Meeting, Tuesday, September 24 , I 968 ," Phillip L. Edgecomb,
Recorder, Tabula Rasa , Oct. 4» i9^8t n.pag. and Richard Clark, "Memorandum
to All Faculty and Doctoral Students," Sept. 23 1 I 968 (School files).
|
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Of reward and risk, and

organization).

(

6 ) individual mobility within
and without the

They further argued that many
of the oharaoteristics

enunciated by Forrester had already
begun to appear in the School
of Blduoation (for example, the reduced status
distinctions that had resulted
from the Retreat) and concluded that,
in addition to further investigation of this and other innovative
organizational models, the School should
look to its own organic growth for the
principles of a new organization.
The concluding paragraph of the paper sums
up that point.
In sum, the most significant practical lesson
to he learned from
Forrester's insights at this stage in our development
is that we
are not, and will not be, a purposeless,
structureless mass which
will grow without coherence or direction. We already
have a relatively well-formed structure, and the dynamics of shared
goals
and mutual self-interest already have headed us
in the right direction and can be trusted to do so in the future. We cannot
let
oxir \mcertainties and impatience push us
into compromising for
traditional structure. Sy doing so we would be settling for certain mediocrity when the seeds of excellence have already taken
root in our organization. ^
,

"I

The effect of this paper, which was enthusiastically received by
the Executive Committee

and reprinted in the School newspaper. Tabula

Rasa, was to increase the confidence of the Executive Committee and the

community in the organic growth of appropriate structures sufficiently
to just about balance both their instincts and the pressure from Dean

Allen described below, in the direction of a more formal, planned approach

1

Lyman B. Brainerd, Jr., and Richard Coffing, "The School of Education and A New Corporate Design," Tabula Rasa , Oct. 10, I 968 , n.pag.
1

P

'^Its impact on subsequent documents can be traced in "Charter for
Executive Council; Working Paper for October 23| 19^8 ([Oct. 21, I 968 ]
Author's files); Letter from Gerald Weinstein to G. Jon Raush, Carnegie
Corporation of New York [a proposal for documentation of the planning
year] (Dec. 11, I 968 , Author's files), p. 2; and Interim Catalogue , p. 63.
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to governance structures.

dysfunctional ambivalence.

This balance turned out to
represent a very
To have committed itself to the
development

of formal structures at the time
would have required an extensive
search
of organizational literature and
research on other organizations.
To
have committed itself to the organic
growth theory would have meant the

establishment of extensive feedback/sensing
mechanisms to determine what
was actually happening at the School.

But, perhaps primarily because of

the uncertainty involved in choosing between
the two dissimilar alterna-

tives, the Executive Committee did very little
in either direction; its

compromise solution being to respond to Dean Allen's
demands and their
ovm felt demands for more structure by developing
proposals based pri-

marily on their ovm intuitive feel for what was growing out
of the organi
zation.

A contributing factor to the Committee's unwillingness to do the
research necessary to either approach was probably the fact that Committee

members had neither the time themselves nor could they induce others to
do staff work for them because of the time and energy demands of the pro-

gram development focus on themselves and others in the School.
But the fact was that

,

in spite of the general support of the

organic model suggested by this paper, governance efforts for the remain-

der of the year tended to be focused on the conceptualization of formal
structures.

This effort soon became focused on the development of a

charter for the Executive Committee

—and,

as was clear perhaps only in

retrospect, since such a charter would delineate relationships between
the Executive Committee and all other parts of the School, the charter

was, in effect, a constitution for the School.
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Pressure for the charter surfaced
in the October I5 Faculty
Meeting in an interaction between the
chairman of the Executive Committee
and
the Dean which illuminates the
conflict between the participative
and

leader-dominated modes of governance.

(See comments.)

ihn operation of the Executive Ooltiiee • * •
requested that the Faculty and
Executive
r‘ recommendations on the
Co^ittee make
role of the Executive Comrecommendationsv"

the process!]^

Dick Clark [Chairman of the Executive
Committee] requested
suggestions on the development of a charter
the Executive
C»ttee. [Ccmmenti An attempt to put the for
responsibility for
Charter development back on the Executive
Committee.]
Dean Allen requested that the Executive Committee
develop
a charter. LComment: Note that it was Dean
Allen who made this
request, not the Community to whom the Executive
Committee was
theoretically responsible.]'-^
The Executive Committee decided that it would be
unable to de-

velop a satisfactory charter under the normal day-to-day
pressures of the
School, and so scheduled a one-day retreat at the Northfield
Inn for

October 23 to accomplish the task.

Expectations were that most of the

groundwork for a charter could be accomplished at that time.

In fact

these expectations were unrealistic since insufficient data on the desires of School members had been generated and the group still had not,

and did not, address itself to the inconsistencies between the organic

growth model, to which most seemed implicitly committed, and the structured growth model, the demand for which had provoked the meeting.

As a

result of this pressure the group arrived at the Inn without an agenda

^

^"Minutes of the Faculty Meeting, Tuesday, October 15i 19^8,"
Phillip L. Edgecomb, Recorder, Tabula Rasa, October 18, I968, n.pag.

259

and the meeting itself was
disorganized and unfocnsed-creating
a high
level of frustration, resolved
by devoting the final three
hours of the
".eeting to a brain-stonsing
session on specifio organizational
polioies
which members of the group felt
would foster the growth of the
School in
appropriate directions.
Specific policies agreed upon at
that meeting included the elimination of tenure, the elimination
of 10 per cent of the School's
programs
each year, the non-confidentiality
of all School doouments, the
establish
ment of off-campus learning centers,
the appcintment of a large number
of
adjunct faculty members, a Retreat to
be held at the beginning of each
year, and the commitment of 40 per cent
of faculty recruiting funds for
the following year to black and minority
recruitment. ^4

Feeling somewhat relieved because they had at
least accomplished
something concrete, the group returned to Amherst.

However, it should be

noted that some of these decisions were proposed as
motions at a subsequent faculty meeting to the considerable discredit of
the Executive Com-

mittee—as will be described.
In total this retreat, which lasted from 10 a.m. until midnight,

was not a success, and in fact did not even appear to constitute
a useful

beginning to the process of charter development.

A review of the minutes of Faculty^ 5 and Executive Committee
^4t«Policies Decided at the Retreat," Memorandum (mimeo [October
1968], Author's files).

^5as a result of a vote at the opening Faculty Meeting, planning
doctoral students were allowed to attend all Faculty Meetings with voice
but not vote. During the year Faculty Meetings were thus the equivalent
of meetings of the entire community.
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meetings of the fall provides a
painful panorama of the Exeoutive
Oomn,ittee's seeming paralysis in the
faoe of its task of developing
a oharter.
In these minutes we see the pressure
brought by the Dean on the Committee
for a oharter, we see their inability
either to develop a satisfactory
one themselves or design a process
for doing so, and we see their
inoreasing willingness to turn major decisions
over to the Dean.

Thus we find a report from the Executive
Committee to the

October 29 Faculty Meeting that:
Most items [on the charter] are still in
the discussion
stage , . . They will report later.

And the agenda for the October 30 Executive Committee
meeting
notes;

The single order of business planned is continuing
the discussion of one week ago—developing a charter.
Except for emergencies, it is requested that all other items
be deferred until next week.^
The November 6 minutes of the Executive Committee laconically

observe;

Two additional policy decisions were discussed;
a) Faculty of the School of Education will no longer be
granted tenure
b) Forty (40) per cent of all recruiting funds will be
spent on minority groups.

And then go on to report;
Dick Coffing will order ash trays for the School.^®

^

^'Faculty Meeting, October 29, I968," Phillip L. Edgecomb, Recorder, Tabula Rasa , Nov. 7 i I968, n.pag.
^

^

^Tabula Rasa , Oct. 29 , 19 ^ 8 , n.pag.

^'Minutes of the Executive Committee, November 6, I968" (Author's
files)
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Executive Committee meeting
attended by Dean

Allen was focused squarely on his
demands for a charter.

The minutes note

as follows:

Dean Allen brought three concerns
to the Committee:
1) The administration of the School needs
a formalized
structure, not as a conservative factor,
but as clarification of the method of decision-making to
members of
the community so they can get feedback
on what is hap^
pening.

2) There is an immediate necessity for the committee
to

set groxmd rules for recruiting new faculty.

3) There is a feeling within the commvinity that there is
an "in-group,” a Royal Court, that certain people
get
asked to help him more and more. He feels that
a systematic feedback to the community might be the answer
so
that people feel they have a real access to decision
making.

And the minutes continue, almost unbelievably in view of the
work
the committee had done previously:

In beginning to work on a charter

.

.

.

And another paragraph neatly illximinates the inaction of the committee, the reasons why they chose to be inactive, and their

ness to leave important decisions

to

willing-

the Dean:

In Personnel Recruiting it was decided that the urgency of the
matter and the need for a well thought out system for recruiting outweighs the importance of having that decision made by
the Executive Council this year. It was eigreed that hiring
will be in Dean Allen's hands this year because he knows the
40^ minority groups rule and he has all the resources available.

In other words the Executive Committee did not feel it could come up with
a "well thought out system," did not consider delegating it to a school

community committee, and thus, without even consulting the community
^^Tabula Rasa, Nov. 19, 19^8, n.pag.
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returned the power of recruiting
to the Dean'e hands.
The minutes of the November
19.

lofia

Faculty Meeting note that

First draft outline of proposed
School of Education Constitution was distributed, Nine
policy statements were also
presented.
The Executive Committee was
asked to develop a rationale

p"u:.

s^::mLr::vi:rd:;e.v»-

The events of this meeting
merit additional attention,
primarily

because they make clear the loss
of contact between the Executive
Committee and the community and because
it was this meeting which discredited
the Executive Committee in the eyes
of many community members.

The "first draft of the proposed
Constitution" was a document

based primarily on Forrester's eleven
principles ("It is our firm convic-

tion that the overall goals of the School will
be optimally achieved only
by free and mobile individuals working through
a community which supports
individual creativity, growth, and vitality"

stated as principle but

without any attempt to operationalize them in the
context of the School,
The document was intended to be read and commented
upon by community

members
The "nine policy statements" were, however, a different story.

They are clearly labeled "Policy Proposals to be Voted on at this meet-

mg

22

and included the policy that all personnel files would be non—

confidential, that there would be no degree requirements for hiring of

20
21

22

Phillip L, Edgecomb, Recorder, Tabula Rasa

.

Nov, 26,

I

968 , n,p£ig,

"First Draft of Constitution," Tabula Rasa

.

Nov,

I

968 ,

I

9

,

Author's files (distributed at Nov, 19t 19^8, meeting).
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faculty or admission of students,
that 10 per cent of the
School. s pro61-as.e would be disoontinued
annually, and that 40 per
cent of all recruiting funds would be directed
toward minority groups. These
policies
were presented to the meeting
by a doctoral student member
of the Ibcecutive Committee.
The Executive Committee apparently
had selected what it had

thought were the least controversial
proposals of the Northfield retreat
(for example the recommendation
to eliminate tenure had been
discaiMed)
to be voted upon. But it had
misjudged the tenor of the community,
many
members of which expressed surprise
and shock at the fact that such
proposals had been presented for decision
without prior notice and without

written rationale and documentation (and
incidentally by a doctoral student); and the Executive Committee agreed
to restudy their recommenda-

tions and resubmit them with notice and with
rationale

—which

was never

done, although some of them resurfaced in the
package.

This incident, combined with an increasing awareness
of the impotence of the Committee, all but totally discredited
it in the eyes of

most community members.
But the Executive Committee's anguished labors over the constitution, and increasing reliance upon the Dean to make current decisions,

even those with long-term implications, continued unabated

—and

the meet-

ing minutes march on giving a depressing sense of the paralysis of the
group.

Prom the Executive Committee minutes of November 20 ;
We decided to refer all on-going business to the Dean until we
can come up with the Charter.
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sst:.s

But at the November 26 meeting:

Two proposals for a constitution
were studied and discussed.

The Council decided that:
1 ) Greater effort would
have to be used in developing a
constitution which reflects and guides
the aspiration
01 this school
2) ^ch member of the Executive Council, next week, should
become actively involved in ascertaining
the status and
problems of all planning groups in the
School and
i) Any decision needing immediate action
should be referred
directly to the Dean.24

And at the December_^ meeting:
Dick C offing and others will continue work on
the document
which will be presented to the Executive Council
before

Christmas,*^^

But no ’'document” was presented.
Thus, after two months of hard labor, it appears
(from the

November 26 minutes) that the Committee had begun to
realize that the
constitution could not be written in a vacuum and that research
on the
state of the rest of the community was needed.

It did not realize that

by referring decision-making to the Dean it was putting hopes of a par-

ticipatory form of governance further and further out of reach.

^

Tabula Rasa . Nov. 26, I968, n.pag.

^^"Executive Council Minutes," Tabula Rasa

.

Dec. 3, 1968, n.pag.

^^"Executive Council Minutes,” Tabula Rasa , Dec. 6, 1968, n.pag.
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Executive Committee members did
approach the planning groupsbut work by the Committee on the
constitution effectively ceased
shortly
after the November 26 meeting, which
was followed by Thanksgiving
vacation and Marathon II, an expansion
of Marathon I, held December
I7

through 19 which commanded the energies
of most Executive Committee members. After that came Christmas
vacation and then work on the prepara-

tion of the Interim Catalogue began.
Thus, from early December no additional
work on the constitution

was done either by the Executive Committee
or the community until the pre

vious work done by Executive Committee surfaced
as the major part of the

proposed interim constitution.
There is a somewhat ironic final footnote to the futile
efforts
of the Executive Committee to develop a set of formal
structures for the

School.

In the December I7, I968, issue of Tabula Rasa Dean Allen wrote

a cover page editorial summarizing his view of the progress
of the plan-

ning year.

In this editorial, apparently seeking to quiet the fears of

those who had become concerned about the lack of formal structure. Dean

Allen surprisingly takes the organic view of organizational growth:
And we are, at times, immensely frustrated by the very
unstructured process which has so helped us achieve what we
are achieving. ... This is not to say that structure, organization, and the setting of limits to our pursuits are
alien to the planning as a whole. The limits are being set,
priority areas are being defined, and organizational structures will emerge as they should out of the work and interests of us all.

—

This statement, from a man who on November 13

had.

told the

Executive Committee "the administration of the School needs a formalized
structure," is a dramatic illustration of the conflict between the planned
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and organic approaches to
organization-building which had
plagued both
the Executive Oc^ittee and the
Dean during the first four
months of the

planning-and which was a major hindrance
to the development of appropriate governing prooeduree.

Constitution Development
January - November I969
The governance section of the package
and the Interim Constitu-

tion 26 proposed in it was prepared by
three members of the Writing Committee who had worked with the Executive
Committee in its futile efforts
to develop an acceptable charter during
the fall.

The initial version

of the Interim Constitution and the governance
section of the package

thus reflected much of the work done by the
Executive Committee.

The proposed Interim Constitution, a mere one and
three-quarter
pages in length, devotee a relatively large proportion of
its focus to

dealing with the powers of the Dean vis-a-vis those of the
community and
the other administrators

—seemingly

an indication of the concern of the

group with the level of power which the Dean had accumulated during the

planning year.
The document begins with a delineation of the relationship be-

tween the Dean's powers and those of the community as follows:

Although final responsibility in the School of Education resides
in the Dean, under the rules of the University of Massachusetts,
the general philosophy of the School of EJducation is that decisions about policy, curriculum, procedures, programs, and personnel
26
°The document was labeled "interim" in acknowledgment of the fact
that the work of the fall had not produced an acceptable document and
that task would have to be completed the following year.

—
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Assembly of the School of
Education.
Dean disagrees and adopts contrary
nolirv Vio ov i
writing and to the entire AeeemMyJ?

If the

The document then goes on to a
general definition of the membership and powers of the Education
Assembly and the Executive Committee,
then to a surprisingly specific
(in view of the level of generality
of
the rest of the document) descripticn
of the duties of the Dean and each
of the assistant deans, and concludes
with the proposal that a moderator
and parliamentarian be elected to
preside over Assembly meetings, and an
ombudsman and Mediating Committee be elected
to explore and arbitrate
disputes.

As

I

have previously described, the first order of
business lead-

ing to approval of the package was the approval,
by the faculty, of the

Interim Constitution since otherwise the planning doctoral
students would
have been excluded from voting on the results of the
process in which
they had played such a large part.

The approval of the Interim Constitution proved to be a
prolonged,

conflict— laden, chaotic and often bizarre process which led to the revision and final adoption of an Interim Constitution on April
to another grievance, eventually denied, against the Dean.^®

11

—and

also

The pro-

longation of this process also had the effect of substantially reducing
the time available for consideration of the academic portions of the

package
27

'"A Proposed Interim Constitution for the School of Education,"
Tabula Rasa , April 4» 19^9? n.pag.

^®Grievance Submission 01-70 Before the Tenure and Grievance Comt
mittee, University of Massachusetts, Amherst (submitted Dec. 12, 1969)*
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The vote on the Interim
Constitution was initially
soheduled to
take plaoe at a Paoulty meeting
on Monday, Maroh I7.
However, Assistant
Dean for Academic Affairs
Seidman, responding to
ooncem about the proposal expressed to him by
various faculty members,
postponed the decision
meeting until Thursday, March
20_and proposed that the March
meeting
time be used for further
discussion of the proposed Interim
Constitution.29 It is my recollection
that that meeting was not well
attended
and produced no amendments to the
proposal.

When the March 20 meeting was convened
by Dean Allen

it was dis-

covered that, according to the
minutes, -Approximately two-thirds
of the
faculty were absent"—a very surprising
situation in view of the importance of the vote to the success of the
planning year and one which can

probably be ascribed to a combination of the
previously described disinterest in the governance discussion; feelings
of impotence about changing
I

the Constitution; and perhaps a protest, by
abstention, by some over the

manner in which the faculty had been excluded from
the deliberations
which led to the constitution.

The group, therefore, voted to defer a

vote on the Constitution.
However, as the meeting progressed, a number of other faculty

I

I

members drifted in, and later it was decided that a vote could be
taken,

'

(in the Faculty Meeting of October
7i

Dsan Allen had announced a

ground rule for faculty meetings that members present at any meeting would
I

I

ject:

I

29Earl Seidman, "Memorandum to Faculty and Doctoral Students, SubProposed Constitution," March 13| I969 (School files).
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onetitute a quorum. )30

meeting, with something less

than half the faculty present
and voting, 31

tenm

30

Constitution, 3 against, and 2
abstaining.

However, prior to the vote at
that meeting which, as previously
noted, did constitute a lawful
vote of the faculty under the
groundrules
established by the Dean, the Dean
suggested that in view of the relatively small faculty attendance at
the meeting a written vote
confiiming
the oral vote should also be taken
among the total faculty. Therefore a
two-day balloting procedure in which
faculty members voted by means of

Siaied ballots was instituted.32

Before the announcement of the outoome

of this vote, it was protested by a faculty
member, and to my knowledge,
the outoome was never published.

the vote was 40-26 in favor33

<,f

According to a grievance filed later
the Constitution and aooording to Allen's

notes in preparation for defense of the grievance
the vote was 36 -27.34
However, at the April 2,

I

969 , Faculty Meeting a member of the old

faculty objected to the signed ballot procedure on the
grounds that since

^°"Minutes of the Faculty Meeting," Phillip L. Edgeoomb, Recorder,
Tabula Rasa . Oct. 10, I 968 , n.pag.
the result of an agreement made at the initial faculty meeting,
some 15 faculty members at Mark's Meadow, the School's observation school,
were considered faculty members of the School of Education and thus were
eligible to vote on these ballots.
32
19691

"

Three previous paragraphs derived from "Faculty Meeting, March 20,
Phillip L. Edgecomb, Recorder, Tabula Rasa , April 4i I 969 .

^^

Grievance Submission 01—70 [^submitted to Faculty Senate Tenure
and Grievance Committee], Grievances #1, d) occurrence, Dec. 12, 196 Ti
n.pag.

^^wight
(School files).

W. Allen, "Response to [Constitution] Grievance," p. 6
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the administration could
see how faculty memhere
had voted. e«e faculty
had felt coerced into voting
for the Constitution (which
was ass^ed to
be what the Dean favored).
It was moved that a new
ballot be taken on
the Constitution, this time
by secret ballot. The members
present passed
the motion and Dean Allen
agreed to it. 35 on the secret
ballot, the reBults of which were announced on
Tuesday, April 7 the Interim
,
Constitution was defeated by a vote of
36-33.36 ^ result which sent
shock waves

through the School, especially the
administration and Writing Committee.
This vote galvanized the Dean into
action.

Not wishing to ex-

clude the doctoral students from
voting on the package and anxious to end
the year with the formal approval of
the generally accepted innovations
in governance embodied in the proposed
Interim Constitution, Dean Allen,

with the advice of a few close associates, sat
down to personally revise
the Constitution.

His major focus in this effort was on alleviating
the

objections to the original proposals which had been
voiced by new and
old faculty in previous meetings.

These objections centered on the fact

that the faculty as a distinct group with distinct
interests had been

merged into the Educational Assembly, in which students were a
majority,
thus leaving no vehicle for the expression of distinctly faculty con-

cerns.

Other criticisms included the fact that the document did not give

sufficient power to the community vis-k-vis the Dean, that the document
was not sufficiently clear and specific on many important issues, and

^^"Education Assembly, April 2, I 969 ," Phillip L. Edgecomb, Recorder, Tabula Rasa , April 11, I 969 n.pag.
,

^^Earl Seidman, Memorandum to Faculty and Doctoral Students, Sub"Report of the Vote on the Constitution" (mimeo, April 7t 19^9f
School files).
ject:

271

that there was no termination
date proposed in it.

(Thus, the Sohool

could have continued operating
indefinitely under its interim
rules.)
The Dean's effort resulted in
two separate proposals, A and
B.
Both inoorporated the addition of a
Graduate Faculty Assembly, made up
of a majority of faculty members,
to represent faculty interests; and
both included a more specific
description of Assembly membership and
responsibilities, a process for the creation
of a Constitutional Committee to design a permanent constitution,
and a redefinition of the rela-

tionship of the Dean and the Assembly which
appeared to increase the
relative power of the Assembly

—as

follows:

Governance of the School of Education is the
responsibility
of the Dean of the School of Education with
the advice of two
faculty bodies, the Education Assembly and the
Graduate PacThe Dean will override faculty recommendations only
rarely and f or compelling reasons which must be stated
in
writing . [Italics mine.J
'

Proposal B was more comprehensive than A, including a termination
date, a specific description of the membership and responsibilities
of
the Executive Council, a delineation of the powers and responsibilities

of the Dean and Assistant Deans, and the creation of moderator, parlia-

mentarian, omb\idsman, and mediating committee as described in the original
document.
The Dean presented his proposals to the faculty on April 8, and

again a vote was taken by secret ballot with the result that proposal A
was passed by a vote of 35-32 and proposal B passed 40-27.^®

Proposal B

^^ Proposal A and Proposal B , Proposal for the Governance of the
School of Education, University of Massachusetts in Tabula Rasa April 18,
1969 , n.pag.
,

,

^®Minutes of "Education Assembly, April 11, 1969i" Phillip L. Edgecomb, Redorcer, Tabula Rasa, April 18, 1969 *
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thus became the official
Interim Constitution of the
School with the approval of the ballots by the
faculty at the beginning of
the April 11

meeting at which the Interim
Catalogue as a whole was discussed,
amended,
and finally approved. -^9
Two aspects of this process of
developing a Constitution are sig-

nificant to the analytical portions
of this dissertation.
First, the pattern of the shifting
of leadership from the Ereou-

tive Committee to the Dean pointed
out in the section on development
of
the academic policies of the School
is equally evident in the creation
of

the governance policies of the Constitution.

In fact the continuum moves

from the earliest work done almost exclusively
by the Executive Committee
to the final work done entirely by the Dean,
who wrote the document which

was finally accepted.

Also, it was the Dean rather than the Executive

Committee who shepherded the interim constitution
proposals through the

faculty meetings to final approval.
Secondly, again as with academic policies, apathy appeared to
prevail.

At no point in the process was a significant number of community

members involved in the development of the document.

During the fall

when the major principles were being adopted, the Executive Committee
worked almost entirely on its own, and opportunities for participation
by the community (the hearings and the November

I

9 faculty meeting, for

example) were generally greeted by apathy and disinterest.

At the time

the Interim Constitution appeared, some hearings were held but were sparse-

ly attended.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of the faculty apathy

about the constitution was the fact that less than half of them attended
^^Ibid.
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the meeting at which the
conetitution was to be voted-although
thie vote
did set off the prolonged voting
series by which the group did
shake off
some of its apathy to make a
successful challenge of the original
proposal,

As specified in the approved
Interim Constitution, a Constitution
Committee was named in early May to
develop a permanent constitution.
This committee did its job in a
careful, well-researched, well-organized

manner (partially the result of the
fact that it was not operating under
the time pressures of the planning
year) making unprecedented efforts,

even though much of its work was done
during the summer, to keep the oom-

munity abreast of its progress^O and to
involve as many as possible in
the development of the document.

This permanent governing constitution maintained
the major aspects

of the interim document including student
participation, power shared be-

tween the comm\inity and the Dean, the Graduate Assembly, and
the ombudsman.

And there were some significant additions.

In anticipation of the

increasing size of the School the Education Assembly (which included
all
members of the School) was replaced as primary policy-making body of the
School with a representative body of about 30 (the School Council) elected
by the Centers and at large.

The Executive Committee, to be elected by

the School Council from its own membership, was to be the primary coordi-

nating body.

In addition the Centers were formally recognized as the pri-

mary programmatic vehicles of the School.

Finally provisions for conflict

resolution, amendment of the Conetitution, and referendum procedures by

4^or example, in August, 1969i the "Interim Report on the Constitution" ( School of Education Profile ), containing extensive notes on the
draft constitution was sent to all comm\mity members for comment, and
additional drafts were distributed on October 10 and November 13 (School
files).
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which the entire oo^unity could
overturn a decision of the
Dean or School
Council were incorporated.^^

on November 26,

I

969 , it was announced that the faculty
had for-

mally approved the new Constitution
by a vote of 56 -I 3
(95 per cent of
the total faculty voting). 42
for a formal governing document was
begun, the task was accomplished.

The Role of the Dean

As

I

have previously observed, it is clear in
retrospect that

while the Executive Committee was busy
theorizing about appropriate gov-

erning structures, the Dean by his actions was
establishing such mechanisms in the School; that by the time the task
of conceptualization had

been completed, the actual system of governance had
in fact become firmly
established; and that while the theoretical model of governance
was pri-

marily participative, the actual operating model of governance
was pri-

marily leader-dominated.
In this section

I

shall focus on the role of the Dean in the

creation of this situation.
First, there is every reason to believe that from the beginning
of the planning year and throughout it, the Dean was committed to the idea
of participatory governance.

It is the writer’s recollection that from

the beginning of the year Allen's talks and speeches had been highly

Constitution and Interim Report on the Proposed Constitution,”
in School of Education Profile May 1971, pp. 3-14«
4‘li»The

,

^^Dwight W. Allen, "Memorandum to Education Commvinity," Nov. 26,
1969 (School files).
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supportive of participation in
governance, althcugh

I have been able to
find no written or verbal record
of such statements from early
year reo.
ords.
There is considerable evidence,
however, to support my recollection. For example, one can see
indications of his support of
participation

his willingness to hand over
control of the activities of the

Retreat to the community
^his

strong support of the idea of an executive
committee to

represent the commiinity in the governance
of the School
^his

strong support of the inclusion of students
in the govern-

ing mechanisms of the School
^his

agreement, in late October

I

968 , to bring his disagreements

with the Personnel Committee (if any) to the faculty
as a whole for decision^^

—

^his

acceptance and personal strengthening of the wording of the

Interim Constitution which delineated a sharing of power between the
Dean
and the community

—and

finally in his strong support of the proposed constitution

to the extent that dissident community members accused him of coercing

faculty members into accepting it.^^
There are some later written statements which are strongly indicative of the fact that the Dean did, and had throughout the year, espoused

^^Minutes of "Faculty Meeting, Oct, 29
Recorder, Tabula Rasa Nov. 7i 19^8, n.pag.

,

I

968 ," Phillip L, Edgecomb,

,

^Grievance Submission Q1-7Q| Grievance #1, No.
n.pag.

2, Dec,

12,

1969i
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the goal of partioipative
governanoe.

The Interim Catalo^e .
prepared,

as has been desoribed, under the
Dean's leadership in Maroh I969,
oarries
the statement (previously quoted)
.'The guiding prinoiple of
the struoture
we are seeking is that our
organization must be genuinely demooratic
and
'human' with 3 minimum of oontrols
and a maximum of support for personal

k taking.

The same statement appears in the
Dean's I968-69 Annual

Report to the University ,46
(prepared

in summer I97O following the fall I969
approval of the Constitution) Dean

Allen states "Our primary efforts thus far
have been directed toward

.

creating a viable model of participatory governance
within the School"^?
and "In the area of governance we have moved
to decentralize much of the

power vested in the School's administration, and
recentralize it within
the larger School oommunity "48 ^nd,
considerably earlier, in his testimony

before the Tenure and Grievance Committee, he had stated "I want
to find
and build the mechanisms whereby the faculty can have a greater share.
In view of the fact that Dean Allen's behavior during the year was

such as to build an organization of a different type, one that he con-

trolled and dominated, one must ask whether he was consciously building

an authoritarian system under the smoke-screen of democratic rhetoric or

^^ Interim Catalogue , p. 63 .
^^ 1968-69 Annual Report
^^ 1970 Annual Report

^^ Ibid .

,

p.

,

,

p.

p.
3

12 (School files).

(School files).

5.

^^Transcript , Dwight W. Allen, "First Dean Dwight W. Allen Testimony" [before the Faculty Senate Tenure and Grievance Committee] [May
1968], p. 28.
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whether, in fact, he was not himself
aware of what was taking place.
believe that the latter was the fact
for two reasons.

i

The first can be found in the Dean's
side of the paradox of fac-

ulty autonomy described in an earlier
section of this chapter.

Dean Allen

apparently believed that by giving faculty
and doctoral students unprecedented autonomy in academic matters he was
in fact freeing them rather
than dominating them.

The importance of this freedom for faculty
and

students is not to be underestimated.

It was during the planning year

freely given, real, and an important facilitating
mechanism for the plan-

ning work.

It was also in a very real sense, granted at the
expense of

some of Allen's freedom since he took on the responsibility
of finding
the resources to allow community members to "do their own thing."

Allen

has stated that no request for financial support for programs was
refused

during the planning year.
But, as previously described, this granting of faculty autonomy

also served to defuse the participation issue.

Apparently neither Dean

Allen nor many community members saw that faculty and student autonomy
granted by the Dean was not the equivalent of the legitimization of that

autonomy

—which

could come only through a formal document delineating a

sharing of power and the employment of that power by the community.

Thus,

while the Dean thought that he was promoting the goals of participation
he was, unwittingly,

I

believe, contributing to a situation in which those

goals were not achieved, and one in which he maintained control over the
most important aspects of School governance.
Secondly, and more importantly,

I

believe that the inconsistency

between the Dean's rhetoric and his behavior stemmed from a conflict of
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his o«n most seriously held
values, a conflict between his
commitment to
educational change and his commitment
to participative decision-making.
Pair and humane treatment of
individuals, and the concomitant
that people
ought to have a voice in decisions
which affect them are in my opinion,
central to Dean Allen's value structure.
They are also central to Baha'i
,

teachings which he has stated represent
his fundamental beliefs.

It be-

came clear, however, from his behavior
that he valued educational change

more than he valued organisational
participation.

Thus, when these two

values came into conflict as they inevitably
would in the pressure of a
too short planning year and in the formative
stages of the development of
a new governance system, Allen consistently
opted for change and took

over the reins himself to achieve change

—at

the expense of the develop-

ment of participation in organizational decisions. 50

After a time, being disappointed by the Executive Committee's
inability to act, the Dean apparently began to accumulate power to act
in anticipation of the fact that the governance system could not react
as quickly or as decisively as he felt the situation demanded.

This valuing of change over participation becomes even more clear

when one looks closely at Allen's change strategies (to be described in
more detail below [p. 280] and in Chapter VIII ), most of which depend

upon the power of the leader and, in fact, tend to have the consequent
effect of increasing the power of the leader as they are employed.

5^This conflict was strongly implied in a statement made by Allen to
the Tenure and Grievance Committee in May I 968 : "I have not intended to
be autocratic, I don't desire to be autocratic, I do however have a very
fierce desire to build a quality School of Education" (Allen Second Tesimony, p. 33 ).
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It appears that subsequent
to the planning year
Allen did see

this conflict between change
and participation in himself
and the inconsistency Of his earlier rhetoric.
In my interviews with him in
the summer
1971 he stated that his ideal
for the organization of the
School was

"to maximize change, not
necessarily freedom" because "there
is a regression line on participation" and
went on to say that he saw
himself operating as a "benevolen.'t dicbaiiore*'
In the remainder of this chapter

I

shall describe the five major

sources of the Dean's success in the
domination of the organization and
then summarize the implications of his
domination for the outcomes of
the planning year.
The first source of his success in
dominating the organization

may be found in his success in achieving
control over the major sources
of power, both legislated and unlegislated,
in the School.

I

shall de-

scribe how he went about establishing this control
in my discussion of

his leadership style and strategies in the next
chapter, but for the purposes of this chapter the implications of this control
are relevant.

The

major implication was that by his control of the major legislated
and
unlegislated power in the organization the Dean established himself as
the single clear focal point of power in the School——a locus of power

backed by the mandate of the trustees and the clear support of the Uni-

versity administration and a majority of the faculty and doctoral students, confirmed by an unparalleled (in the School) national stature and

access to outside funding sources, and sustained by a compelling personal

charisma and control of the available financial resources in the School
and its reward system.

280

The eeoond means by which
the Dean achieved
crganizational dcminance are, as suggested on page
218 , embedded in his approach to
and
strategies of organizational change.
I shall explore these
strategies
in greater detail in the
following chapter, but their
relevance here is
that all are based cn the
implicit assumption that the
leader must lead,
and lead strongly, if organizational
change is to be achieved. This

assumption is clear in Allen's
observaticns tc me quoted above that
"There
IS a regression line in
participation,"
that his goal was "to maximize

change, not necessarily freedom"
and that he saw himself operating as
a

"benevolent dictator."
This assumption comes through equally
strongly in the description
of the strategies used to achieve
organizational change.

strategies used to motivate people in
effective educational change.

^

They are

^

organization to bring about

For example,

^ uses

the default position

(essentially acting before others) to assure that
opportunities for change
are not lost by default (inaction);

achieves financial flexibility and

1;^

controls the flexible money in the organization so that

^ can use

it to

reward people or support programs which

^ feels

creates organizational ambiguity (e.g.

discontinuing the catalogue) so

,

are most promising; he

that his people can think and act more creatively;

^ maintains

ignorance

of University channels and procedures so that the entire organization can

plead ignorance when they are not followed; he hires young faculty to

bring energy and fresh perspective to his organization;

^ gets

his or-

ganization off the chart with simultaneous change to protect it from premature evaluation; and

^ chooses

a policy of multiple risking to protect

his organization from premature evaluation.
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Thus, throughout the year as
Dean Alien pursued those
strategies
which he felt would bring about
the greatest organisational
change he was
also, by the very use of those
strategies, accumulating power
in the organisation both because the strategies
are, in themselves,
leader-centered
Which tends tc lead to the
dependence cf the organisation
upon him, but
also because many of these
strategies were power accumulation
as well as
change strategies. For example,
financial flexibility and control
both
lead to increasing personal power;
organisational ambiguity and hiring

young faculty tend to increase the
dependence of those in the organisation on the leader; and use of the default
position tends to center the
responsibility on the decision-maker since
he can always act faster than
a group.

A third means of achieving organizational
dominance was his
neutralization of the power of the Executive Committee,
which was elected
to represent the community and which represented
the major potential

power source inside the School outside of the Dean's
office.

He achieved

this neutralization primarily by omission rather than
commission (as was
the case with his use of change strategies).

Dean Allen, as previously described, began the year in a position
of enormous power .

In addition to those formal powers legislated to all

Deans by the Trustees which gave him responsibility for all aspects of
the School, he also had developed enormous personal power as a result of

the fact that most of the 120 new School members had come chiefly in re-

sponse to himself and his vision for the School, because of his personal
charisma, and because of the solidification of his power vis—a—vis the

faculty the year previous.

Clearly, if he was committed to participatory

I
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governance he would have seen that
his major task was to transfer
much
of his power to the community
through the Executive Committee.
He did not effectively do this,
although he made some attempts
to do so.

Had he been really serious about
transferring power he might

have, for instance, worked more closely
with the Committee, shared knowl-

edge of and power over financial aspects
of the School with them, con-

sulted with them on appointments, permitted
them to run meetings, and

consulted them on faculty proposals for new
programs and activities.

And in addition to these major steps he could have
in more minor ways
made it clear that the Executive Committee held
power for the School
and the community.

He might have made sure that more important memos

came out under their name, that they had sufficient
support help, and

even that they were aware of his travel schedule.
In fact he did none of these.

He chaired and dominated the

early meetings of the School; filled certain positions (Director
of the

Center for the Study of Educational Innovations, Director of the Plan-

ning Year, and the initial School committees); and he personally approved
or disapproved of individual faculty plans without consultation with the

Executive Committee.
There were, of course, in meuiy cases good and compelling reasons for his making many of these early decisions.

However, had he,

perhaps in consultation with the Executive Committee, made them in such
a way as to help solidify the position of the Executive Committee rather

than his own, he would have done much to put them in a position where
they would have felt more power and more responsibility for leading
the School toward an effective and participatory system of governance.
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In fact the Bean's general
attitude toward the Executive
Committee throughout the year could
best be characterized as one
of benign
neglect. He rarely attended
meetings (which could be interpreted
as not
Wishing to interfere with their
functioning, but the major problem
was
not his interference, but rather
the task of transferring
large parts of
his power to them which required
significant amounts of contact with
them).

When he did attend meetings it was
usually to request specific actions

giving the subtle impression that he viewed
the Committee as an agent of
the Bean's office, rather than an independent
body with major responsibility for the decision-making in the School.
The nature of his personal interaction with
the Executive Council

also tended to undermine its independence.

Although he rarely met with

the group as a whole, he did spend considerable
time with two members,
the two most influential members of the group.

Thus, rather than promot-

ing the power of the group as a whole, he tended to promote
the power of

these two individuals based on their access to him

—a

reaffirmation of

his own power position.
In sum, it seems clear that, whether by design or by neglect,

most of Dean Allen's actions vis-a-vis the Executive Committee during the

crucial period of the establishment of their power position tended to
erode rather than promote their power.

It should be reiterated here that

this undermining of the power of the Executive Committee cannot be ascribed

solely to the behavior of Dean Allen

—since,

as I have previously pointed

out, members of the Committee seemed to have willingly acquiesced to the

diminution of their power position.
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A fourth source of the Dean's
power over the .ajor deoisions
of
the planning year was the
overwhelming emphasis of the
community on
specific program and content areas
(the Planning Committees) and
the

autonomy granted community members
which, as previously described,
left
most community members with little
interest in, or any decisionmaking
process for, the overall decisions
about academic and organizational
policies which were to characterize the
School in the future. With the failure of the Executive Committee and
abdication of the community, these

decisions were left to the Dean who,
uniquely in the School, had the

breadth of perspective, knowledge of the
School as a whole, and knowledge
of the probable parameters of the University's
acceptance of new programs

to make informed deoisions on overall policy
deoisions.

The fact that

the Dean did make such decisions was a strong
confirmation of his present

and future power in the School

—both

because of the precedent for decision-

making by the Dean which was established and because hie making
of those
decisions left the community with no process for community
decision-

making— leaving them dependent upon the Dean for such decisions.
A final source of the development of Dean Allen's domination of
the School can be traced to some of the goals which he attempted, with

considerable success, to inculcate into the organization.

Some of the

more important of these were "the freedom to fail," "risk-taking, ex-

ploration and experimentation," "diversity and creativity," "social change
through education," "alternative routes to educational goals" and "rapid
and thoroughgoing change. "5^

These goals were foreign to most of the

51 See "Portfolio of School
Commitments," School of Education Profile .
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academic organizationa fro. which
School .e.bera had come, and
therefore
there were no accepted ground
rulea about what apeciflc
behaviors were
appropriate in fulfilment of such
goals or how such behavior might
be
evaluated (i.e., how many times may
one fail? how radical social
change?
or how much time can one devote
to creative work?).
This uncertainty

surrounding these new goals had the
effect of forcing community members
to look to the Dean, the chief
exponent of the goals, as major source
of
approval or disapproval of behavior according
to them.

A major outcome of

this situation was, inevitably, an
expansion of Dean Allen's power and

domination of the organization.

Summary and Implications

The Dean's ultimate domination of the organization
is dramatically

demonstrated in the inability of the Executive Committee and
community to
prepare the Package without his leadership and participation.

described (pp. 225-226

),

As

I

have

the Package preparation process had seriously

bogged down in late February, when members of the writing committee
asked
him to cancel his travel plans and, in effect, take over leadership of
the process.

He did so, and during the week that followed most of the

decisions on the Package were made.

Thereafter Dean Allen managed nearly

all aspects of the Package including the writing of it and steering it

through the various School and University approval mechanisms.
What were the implications of the Dean's domination of the organi-

zation during the planning year?
First

—^Dean Allen's

domination of the organization was, unques-

tionably, the major factor in the achievement of the radical changes which
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occurred during the planning year.

It allowed the School to realize
hie

unique and powerful vision for academic
reform.

It permitted the quick

and decisive decision-making needed
under the time pressures of the planning year and allowed the School to
operate on a cutting edge of innovation, which might have been fuzzed by
compromise.

His domination of the

organization also allowed him to pursue his
various change strategies—
so crucial to the success of the effort at
thoroughgoing change.

In sum, without the Dean's domination it would not
have been

possible to achieve the academic change of the planning
year.

Time alone

would have been prohibitively short to develop and follow
participative

mechanisms to make decisions in the year of planning.

Second——The advantages of speed and decisiveness of the Dean's

domination carried with them the corresponding disadvantages of relatively
low participation in the process of developing overall governance and academic policies

—as

seen in the almost unbelievably low participation of

the faculty in the crucial decision-making meetings of March and April.

Thus, while the package clearly benefited from the imagination and vision
of the Dean, it had the disadvantage of being limited primarily to his

vision—when the School theoretically had

at its disposal the imagination

and vision of I50 diverse people of high competence.

Third

—One

cannot help but lament the inestimable waste of time,

energy, and focus expended by the leadership of the comm\anity on the de-

velopment of mechanisms for participative governance which proved to be
of little or no value to the organization, and were perhaps even dysfunc-

tional to the progress of the School as a whole.
but this writer believes that

haid

It is sheer speculation,

the School from the beginning agreed
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upon a leader^ominated organization
the aoaden.io reforms would have
been better oonoeived, better organized,
and better implemented-and,
even further in the realm of speoulation,
it is oonoeivable that

mechanisms might have grown out of an
initially leader-dominated system to allow members whatever voice they
desired in decisions which
might affect them.

Fourth-^nother implication of the Dean's domination
of the
organization, especially in view of the increasingly
perceived di-

chotomy between his verbal support of participation
and his authori-

tarian behavior, was a growing sense of distrust,
frustration, and
paranoia among many members of the organization who, although
they
had eschewed involvement in the process, remained committed to
partici-

pation as an ideal of governance.

These highly unhealthy organizational

conditions were most prevalent aunong old faculty and those new faculty
and doctoral students most committed to democratic organization, but

also many others were affected by contact with the Dean's authoritarian
methods when they had expected participation.
One might also with considerable confidence make two predic-

tions about the future co\irse of governance at the School on the basis
of the above analysis of events.

First

—That

the model of leader domination had become the

established model of the governance of the School and would not be

significantly changed by the adoption of the Constitution
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and Seoond-That the inherent
oonfliot between the participative
model propoeed in the Conetitution
and the leaderMicn.inated
.cdel actually in operation would be a
source of serious conflict
until that incon
sistency somehow fo\ind a satisfactory
resolution.

SECTION III

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
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CHAPTER VIII
ON LEADER-DOMINATED CHANGE

Introduction

This chapter will be devoted to an examination of
the single most

important determinant of the success of the change effort at
the School
of Education—the change strategies employed by Dean Allen,
the effective-

ness of which depended both on his position of dominance in the
organiza-

tion and on factors unique to the strategies themselves.
This chapter will have four sections.

In the first section

I

shall support my contention that the Dean's

strategies were the most important factor in the success of the change
effort by means of a retrospective force field analysis of the forces

affecting change at the School during the period under review.
In the second

I

shall describe the means by which the Dean

achieved dominance over the organization.
In the third section

I

shall describe the major change strategies

used with specific reference to the case material.

And in the final section

I

shall delineate some principles derived

from the aggregate of change strategies which may provide guides to the

development of other change strategies by other leaders in other organizational settings
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How Change Occurred /Force Field
Analysis

Introduction
The powerful and profound effect of
the change strategies pur-

sued by the Dean on the change process
becomes clear when the forces tend-

ing toward change and those resisting
change are viewed through the medium
of retrospective force field analysis.

It would be by no means an under-

statement to summarize the results of such analysis
as indicating that
the forces toward and away from innovation were
generally in equilibrium
at a low level of innovation—until the
introduction of the forces in-

herent in the Dean's change strategies, which had the
effect of moving
the entire organization toward a high level of innovation.

Force field analysis was developed by Kurt Lewin as an analytical
tool for guiding interventions designed to stimulate organizational
change.

The theory on which force field analysis is based views organi-

zational change in terms of driving forces which tend to produce and

maintain change, and restraining forces, which tend to inhibit change.

Each of these forces is assigned a strength.

Under this theory when the

total strength (the sum of) the driving forces is equal to the total

strength (the sum of) the restraining forces the system is said to be in

equilibrium

—

^no

change is occurring.

In order to produce change in an organization which is in equi-

librium the sum of the driving forces must be increased relative to the
sum of the restraining forces.
a number of ways

—by

This disequilibrium can be achieved in

increasing the strength of the driving forces, by

reducing the strength of the restraining forces, or by altering the
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Btren^h or direction of any one or
more forces.

In fact meet change

occurs as a result of some combination
of these factors.

A correlate of

the theory is that changes tend to
be more permanent if they result
from
a decrease in restraining forces, since
an increase of the driving foroes,

although producing change, also tends to
produoe tension and consequent

volatility within the organization.

According to the theory the change cycle has
three components:
the initial level of equilibrium at which the
organization is frozen, an

unfreezing brought about by manipulation of the forces,
and a subsequent
refreezing at a new level of equilibrium.^
I

shall view the forces at work at the School of Education
at

three separate times.

Pirst—At September,

I967, prior to the arrival of the new Dean

when the driving and restraining forces were in equilibrium at a relatively low level of innovation.
Second

—In

the period January through August, I968, when the

Dean's critical mass strategy was increasing the driving forces to build
an innovation— oriented organization.

Third

—During

the planning year September I968 through May I969

when the Dean's change strategies had provided driving forces to swing
the balance toward chauge and academic innovation.

During the period under review the organization had not reached
the refreezing point postulated by the theory.

^See Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Mane^gement of Organiza tional Behavior , second edition (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1972 ), pp«
100 & 101, for a more complete summary of this analytical tool.
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Force Field Analyses

Introduction

There ie one general net of restraining
forces which was operating in all three periods which will
be noted specifically here and referred to in the three separate analyses.

This is the set of restraining

forces described by J. B. Lon Hefferlin as
applying to institutions in

general and then those unique to academic
organisations.
scribed in Chapter II,

p.

45

These were de-

of this study, and are reviewed below.

Resistances to change;

AS AN institution/organization
Organizations are inherently passive
rout ini zat ion of behavior

—they

exist for

Voluntary organizations attract members who agree with
their activities
Organizations tend toward institutionalization and ritualism
Organizations that are livelihoods for people tend to come
to exist only as livelihoods for those people
The maintenance of institutional effectiveness or achievement (such as students* learning) is only one problem
that organizations must face in order to survive. Other
problems must take precedence over it.

AS AN ACADEMIC ORGANIZATION
Their purposes and support are basically conservative
The educational system is vertically fragmented

Within higher education institutional reputation is not
based on innovation
Faculty members have observed their vocation for years
as students before joining it
The ideology of the aceuiemic profession treats professors
as independent professionals
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Academics are skeptical about the
idea of efficiency in
acad.emic life

Academic institutions are deliberately
structured to
resist precipitant change
A second preliminary observation
on the force field analyses concerns the problem of assigning
relative strengths to the forces
involved.
The estimation of the strength of a
given force must be either clearly

subjective, or an attempt at objectivity
can be made by the creation of

"sophisticated” measuring indices.

Since the intent of these analyses is

primarily to demonstrate the critical importance
of Dean Allen's change
strategies to altering the balance of forces in the
direction of innovation, and since the case study provides ample
evidence of the general

magnitude of the importance of these strategies, there
appears no need
to attempt to devise more sophisticated measuring techniques.

Thus, the

force number used in the charts are intended more to outline
orders of

magnitude than as an attempt at an exact rendering of the strength of
the

driving and restraining forces.
The following pages include charts of forces operating during each

of the periods, followed by a verbal summary of each.

In the September prior to Dean Allen's arrival the School can be

considered to have been in a state of equilibrium at a relatively low
level of innovation, as described in Chart I.
The primary forces tending to restrain change at this time were:

—The high

emphasis on smooth bureaucratic functioning of the

organization brought with it an emphasis on maintenance of the status quo
and consequent low rewards for innovation, a substantial restraint on

change
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Chart I

Time

I

Prior to Dean All en’s Arrival/September
I967

Driving Porces/22

Restraining Porces/22

Ch
CJ,.

Quo

^OV,ati
Oft

Desire for parity with
other schools of education

Emphasis on bureaucratic order/
stability

Individual desire for personal competency
Interest in problems of iirban
education

^
SI
(

Emphasis on status quo/low rewards for innovation

Other Hefferlin resistances

11,
enchantment with School

41)

^

versity approval of innovation

^(1)

De-emphasis on outside funding

1 )

^(1)

Student passivity

Geographical isolation

—Those other forces tending to restrain change

in organizations

in general and academic organizations in particular described by Hefferlin

were similarly operating.

—

^The

fact that the University ewiministration was disenchanted

with the School combined with the fact that there was an interim Dean
made it difficult for faculty members to get support for, and assurance
of continuation of, innovative programs.

—The

perceived difficulty of attaining approval of innovative

courses and programs by University channels tended to discourage attempts
at innovation, as did the de-emphasis on pursuing outside funding.

—Student passivity provided no incentive for curriculum changes.

—The geographical

isolation of the University tended to insulate

it from the ferment and change taking place elsewhere.
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Balancing these considerable
forces against innovation,
one aust
assume was primarily the pressure
to innovate enough to stay
current with
other schools in the field-for
example to adopt new programs
or approaches
which had become a part of the
curriculum of most other schools
of education. Another relatively strong
force, it can be assumed, was
the desire
of individual faculty members to
maintain their level of competency
in

their own special field.

And finally, a number of faculty members
were

becoming interested in the problems of
urban education in which the
School had previously had no interest.
Chart II shows the restraining and driving
forces at work during
the period in which Dean Allen was attempting
to build a critical mass

of change-oriented educators in preparation for
the planning year.

At

this point the system was moving from equilibrium,
with the balance of

forces shifting toward change in response to the critical
mass strategy.
The major restraining forces at this time were:

—The

general organizational resistances described by Hefferlin

were working against change.

—The

fact that the "new school" existed only as Dean Allen's

vision for it and that the existing school was contrary to this vision,
both were major problems in attracting new faculty.

—The

fact that the new faculty positions granted, although

doubling the faculty size, were not sufficient to assure the establishment of a critical mass of chainge-oriented faculty was a limitation on
the building of a change-oriented organization.

—The

fact that there was insufficient money available for fac-

ulty support services, recruiting, and student stipends for the School
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Chart II

Time II

Buildi ng the Critical Mass/january-August 1968

Driving Porces /47
Change/statuB

Restraining Porces /29

Qu^
ion

(d

__ Hefferlin General Resistance

TT
^Unique
growth position of

u
a

University

o
Stockpiling of faculty
positions

iiL

M^j^^upport of "good men" hirQ>tQT-ing philosophy

144

g
>aH

+»+»

^

*1

Ml

Pact that "new school" was only
vision

Ml

Insufficient faculty slots to
assure critical mass

Ml

Insufficient support, recruiting, and student stipend money

M>

Limited and late reciniiting time

f'—"'

-3

<

Support of change at the
School

144
\M'>

Planning Doctoral Program

m
©w
•H

Resistance of existing faculty
(pressure for "slot hiring" and
"appropriate procedures")

(0

© ©
as i
M
© oS
ts H

c-p

Allen vision, energy, commitment to recruiting

,0)

Low status of University

Fund raising success and
financial risk taking

,(i)

Inappropriateness of existing
School to vision

Allen reputation & contacts

© o
0 bo Personal recruiting
^
1

OTi Other recruiting strategies
” h
fac( 1 st class recruiting,
©;Q ulty recruit selves, high

rH

Conventional academic hiring
criteria

144
,(i)
144
144

Isolated geographical location

salaries)

Ignoring dissent

144

envisioned by the Dean was a major hindrance to the achievement of that
vision.

—The limited recruiting

time available and the lateness in the

recruiting year of the effort was a potential constraint on both the numbers and the quality of faculty recruited.
^The

resistance of the old faculty as evidenced by their pressure
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for "slot hiring" and for "appropriate recruiting
procedures," and also

by the grievance brought by the tenured faculty was a
potential limita-

tion on the recruiting effort.

—The relatively

low status of the University and its geographi-

cal isolation made it difficult to hire upwardly mobile faculty
and those

interested in racial and urban problems, both central to Dean Allen's

vision for the School.
However, the driving forces, particularly the strategies pursued
by the Been, were more than sufficient to overcome these restraining
forces, and as a result during the period the Dean was able to recruit

change -oriented educators for the planning year to outnixmber conservative

educators in a ratio of about four to one.

The major driving forces in

the accomplishment of this critical mass were;

—

^The

availability of new positions at the University, the result

of a imique growth situation arising out of the state's previous neglect

of its higher education system, made it possible for the School to double
its faculty size in one year.

—

^The

fact that the University

heid,

for the three years previ-

ous, been stockpiling faculty positions for the School of Education also

contributed to the doubling of the faculty at the School in the first
year.

—The

fact that the University administration clearly supported

change at the School and specifically the Dean's "good men" hiring

philosophy helped the Dean overcome the resistance of the existing faculty to his hiring practices and the changes which he was bringing about
at the School
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—Dean Allen's recruiting strategies

(Chapt. IV, pp.

133-I40),

were crucial to the building of a change-oriented
faculty, chief among

them
1)

His powerfully communicated vision for the School
and the

energy with which he criss-crossed the country seeking and
interviewing

potential faculty members
2)

His development of the Planning Doctoral Program which, by

that 85 doctoral students joined the School, unequivocally

swung the balance of the School toward change and innovation

6uid

which

also provided an additional incentive for faculty to join the School
3)

His fund-raising success and financial risk-taking which pro-

vided money for the recruitment of faculty, stipends for most doctoral
students, and an additional level of support services for faculty members
4)

His own reputation and contacts which put him in touch with,

and made him attractive to, competent and innovative people who shared

his vision for a new school of education
5)

His personal recruiting approach, by which he focused on peo-

ple whom he personally knew and had worked with, and in turn relied on

their personal contacts to build a faculty which met his requirements
for both quantity and quality
6)

His other recruiting strategies, particularly the payment of

high salaries to young educators, his first-class recruiting policy, and
his strategy of letting potential faculty recruit each other were all

central to overcoming the problem of recruiting for a relatively lowstatus university in a geographically isolated location
7)

His unwillingness to allow existing faculty objections to

impede the recruiting effort
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Ti me III

Low

a)

U
C
0)

0)

The Planning Ye ar/September

Driving Porces/87
Change/statue
Quo

^
w National,
publicityCM

regional & local

C5

> C ro strong support of Univ.
aidmin.

Student involvement
Critical mass

Creation of ambiguity

Changing structures

Freedom to fail

Modeling
©
ti

M

— Ignoring
C\J

Dissent

Juxtaposition/unity &
diversity
Organizational peaks
Hawthorne effect
Rewarding innovation

©
©
•H
t©

©
a
h

+»

Chauinel clogging

+»
CO

Creative hole digging

©

^

©

^ ,,-JIxpanding credit by coniOsuming it

XI

o

+»

a
©

^

Conservatism of old faculty and
some new

Insufficient financial resources

Outcomes of the Retreat

w

+»

Hefferlin General
Resistances

Time constraints

Activities of planning
committees
o
o
o

Restraining Porces/29

Weakness trumpeting
Multiple risking/ off chart/
moving target
Radical change

Using precedents
Creative use of ignorance
rH ^^ost hoc evaluation
© CO
^^Ends over means
Appearance/reality
Conserving organizational
energy
Default position

Perceived resistance of Faculty
Senate

Slow University approval mechanisms

Irregular participation of faculty and inconsistent morale

Difficulty of some changeoriented faculty in dealing
with ambiguity causing them to
retreat to more conservative
approach
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The euooesB of the critical
mass strategy provided the
foundation
of a strong driving force toward
innovation for the planning year.
As
Chart III ™akes dramatically clear,
during the planning year the
sum of
the driving forces toward innovation
far outweighed the restraining

forces-and the major components of those
driving forces were the change
strategies emplcyed by the Dean working
from the basis of the critical

mass achieved and his unchallenged
power position in the School.
There were, however, a number of substantial
restraining forces

operating during this period, particularly:

—Again, the general restraining forces described by
Hefferlin
slowed the change process*

—The conservative orientation

of most old faculty and some new

faculty and doctoral students tended to slow the pace
of change.

—The

time constraints, combined with the high expectations
for

the year, tended to limit, and at times prevent, attempts
at well-planned,

solidly-based, innovation.

—The insufficient financial

resources, particularly in the area

travel and secretarial support, tended to reduce opportunities
or time available for the development of innovative programs.

—The

fact that many in the School believed that the University

Faculty Senate would resist more radical forms of experimentation and
was, as a body, hostile to the School of Education potentially depressed

the level of innovation.

—The

fact that historically University approval mechanisms for

new progreuns and courses had been careful, cumbersome, and slow, a factor which tended to inhibit innovation University-wide, was a potential
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inhibition to the School of Education's
attempts at innovation,
partxcularly beoause there was no way
in which changes of the
magnitude contemplated by the School could be
approved in the normal way by
normal
channels for the following year.

—The

low participation of faculty in
overall academic policy

decisions and problems of morale also
adversely affected attempts at
innovation.

—dnd

finally, many among both the new and old
faoulty found the

ambiguities of the planning year difficult
to deal with, causing in some

an ineffioient use of energies and in others
a tendency to retreat to
safer, more conservative approaches.

On the driving force side of the equation were a
few general,

University administration, and school-centered forces,
with the vast majority of driving forces arising out of Dean Allen's change
strategies.
The chief forces, exclusive of the Dean's strategies, can
be summarized
as follows:

—The

fact that the School received considerable publicity, most

of it favorable, in national, regional, and local media.

Chief among

the publicity was an article on the School in the January 18, I969,

Saturday Review , and articles chiefly in Massachusetts and Amherst/
Springfield papers, but also other cities nationwide, usually reporting
speeches made by Dean Allen under headlines such as "Teaching Pattern

Uprooted at UM," "Change Highest Education Priority," "Break with Tradition," "Creative Education," and "Priority:

—The

Change Society."

fact that throughout the year the School received strong

support of its efforts at innovation from the University administration.
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—The general

euooess of most planning ooraitteea
in developing

new programs, course content, and
methods.

—The highly positive

outcomes of the Retreat which gave
the

School a fast start on the planning process
and provided many of the
structures and processes, and considerable
momentum for successful in-

novation during the planning year.
^The

involvement of students in the planning which
provided new

perspectives, important manpower, and a high level
of commitment to the
success of the planning process.

These forces, although substantial, were, as Chart
III makes
clear, in total far less significant than those change
strategies em-

ployed by the Dean in providing driving forces for innovation at
the
School.

The second half of this chapter deals in detail with these

strategies and the way in which the power central to the success of
these strategies was achieved by the Dean.

The specific strategies delineated on Chart III and their effect
on the level of innovation at the School are described in pages
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through 333 below.

On Achieving Organizational Dominance

The philosophical basis of Dean Allen's change strategies appears
to be that change is superior to stability and that it is the responsi-

bility of the leader to create an environment conducive to chauige within
his organization and to protect that organization from premature re-

straint from outside.^

Educationally, Dean Allen seems to view change

^A philosophy consistent with that proposed by Ladd ( Change in
Educational Policy , p. 206) as a result of his study of change in higher

education.
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in terms of the creation of a
wide number and variety of
promising alternative educational paths. Thus,
although the leader is responsible
for creating a change environment,
he does not necessarily
dictate or
control the specific changes adopted
by the organisation. For
example,
as previously described, Dean
Allen was willing to permit a
lower emphasis on teacher education in the
School than would have been his
prefer-

ence and greater emphasis on humanistic
education, human relations, and

student-centered teaching, areas not so high
on his level of interest
and priority*
Since the leader is responsible for the
achievement and protec-

tion of change in his organization, he must,
according to Dean Allen's
approach, also have the power to create and maintain
the necessary change

environment.

Thus, the formula for a successful leader-dominated
change

effort can be succinctly stated as
1 )

Get the power

2)

Use it right

with a corollary that power "used right" tends to create more power.
practice, neither is easily achieved*

In

Bean Allen was extraordinarily

successful both in accumulating power in the School and in using it in

highly imaginative, highly effective ways.
dependent in this view of change.
gies would be ineffective.

The two are mutually inter-

Without the power, the change strate-

Without effective change strategies, the

power would be useless.
Dean Allen, in common with all deans at the University, had been
delegated formal power over all aspects of the operation of his School
by the Board of Trustees

—subject,

of course, to conformity with University
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policy.

One can thus reasonably
ask two questions:

-Why

do not other deans, some
of whom are oommitted to
change
as thoroughly as Dean Allen,
use their power to bring
about change in
the same way he did?

-Why, if Allen had absolute power

in the beginning, did he
need

to accumulate more power to carry
out his strategies?

The answer to these two questions
comes primarily from the same
source.

The success of change and innovation
in a school depends pri-

marily on the cooperation and
participation of the faculty who are responsible for the actual implementation
of new programs. A dean who
tries to force change on a faculty will
probably (a) get more resistance

than change, (b) alienate his faculty, and
therefore (c) not stay dean

very long.

Most deans,

I

would speculate, address this problem by at-

tempting to work closely with the faculty, one
aspect of this approach

being the delegation of power (in fact, if not
formally) to the faculty.
Such an approach tends to slow the pace of innovation,
primarily because
the tenure system combined with traditional academic
values tends to result in a powerful conservative force in faculties and
also because of

the inevitable difficulties of getting agreement cunong large
groups of

people on a new course of action.

Dean Allen did not attempt to work closely with the faculty he
fo\ind at the School.

Rather his strategy was first to build a critical

mass of change-oriented faculty to assure general acceptance of the
change thrust, and then to direct and maintain that change thrust by

^See the conclusions of Hefferlin, Ladd, and Fasching and Deutsch
on "the limits of collegiality" (Chapt. II ).
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systematically achieving control of all
the sources of power in the
School so that his change strategies
were backed by a total power,
both
legislated and uni egi slated.
I have

already described the legislated sources
of power.

Un-

legislated power came primarily from five sources.

First—and foremost, unlegislated power was derived
from control
of the flexible (imcommitted) financial resources
in the School, most

particularly the flexible portion of outside funding
which could be used
for student stipends, secretaries, travel, telephone,
office equipment,

consultants, and often faculty members, but also the flexible
portion of
state money which went for salaries, promotions, and merit increases.

Dean Allen achieved this control over flexible money primarily
by his personal success as a fund raiser and consequent control over the

flexible portion of funds he had raised.

As

I

have previously described,

he brought one large grant, the CAM grant, to the School with him.

In

addition, his contacts and efforts were primarily responsible for the
METEIP and EPDA grants, for both of which he was

codirector.

Beyond

these grants, he expanded his sources of flexible money in the first year
by inducing the University to provide a total of 20 supervisory assist-

antships to be used for stipend money for his new students;^ by donation
of his innovation films series to the University on the condition that

income from them could be used by the School as desired; 5 and by arranging for the proceeds of summer workshops given by the School to be

^Videotape, "What Makes Dwight Tick," Florissant, Colorado, Sept.
19i 1968 (School of Education Media Center under title "I Have a Dream"
speech)

^Interview with new faculty member, April 1972.
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returned to the School .6

(These latter two souroes, together
with two

small foundation grants, oomprised
the funding for the Retreat. )?

His

control of the state's discretionary
money came primarily from his willingness to use his legislated power and
was confirmed by his success in

influencing merit pay and promotions during
the first year.

During the planning year he was able to
significantly increase
his supply of flexible money by negotiating
a return to the School of
part of the overhead from outside grants, all
of which had previously

gone to the University.®

Second

—^Unlegislated

power also came from control of the non-

^^^^-acial rewards intrinsic to the system——tenure office assignments,
,

status positions, faculty hiring and student selection.
Part of his control of the non— financial rewards was derived from

his willingness to use legislated power.

Thus he granted tenure in the

first year to a faculty member not recommended by the Personnel Committee and denied it to two others who had been recommended.

He also suc-

cessfully decreed that faculty offices would be reassigned with the
arrival of the new faculty. ^

In addition to his willingness to use

legislated power, he drew from his control of flexible money to name

^

Ibid .

^Interviews with Dwight W. Allen, July 1971 - May 1972.
® Ibid .

9some Tenured Faculty Members, "Grievance Against Dean Dwight
Allen, "Submitted to the University Tenure eind Grievance Committee
(April 10, 1968 ), p. 6 , and transcript of "Testimony of the Tenured
Faculty," pp. 34 & 35*
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project directors and grant student
stipends, and from his support
from
the University administration to
recruit most faculty and doctoral
students for the planning year and in
subsequent years to negotiate
"wild
card- positions for faculty and
students which he alone controlled.

Third-^llen came to the School with considerable
personal
power.

He had a national reputation as an
innovator, connections with

prominent educators throughout the country,
and established relationships with major funding sources.

In addition, as previously described,

he expanded these sources of personal
power in the School through

his

critical mass strategy, most of the new people coming
to the School pri-

marily because of him, and during the Retreat he continued
to widen the
range of his personal power by establishing close
personal contacts with

many of those present, by assuming strong leadership in the
decisions of
the Retreat, and by impressing his powerful personality and
unique style

upon the group.
This charisma is clearly a major component of Allen's personal
power.
9'li'ty

Speculation as to the how's and why's of his compelling person—
are outside the purview of this study, and only their outcomes are

being dealt with here.

The principal outcome was that every speech,

every appearance before the group, and all his interactions with the

group or members of the group tended to result in the expansion of his

personal power.

Fourth

—Support

of the faculty, a result of his critical mass

strategy, was a major source of unlegislated power.

This support, as

previously described, came primarily from the fact that he had recruited
most of them, they shared his vision for the School, and they looked to
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him for leadership, from the
fact that he controlled the
major power
sources in the School (as presently
being described); and from the
fact
that many cf the new faculty were
young, and having no independent
base
of aohievement tended to lock
to the Dean for personal support,
oonfima.
tion, and rewards.

Pifth~-nie full support of the University
administration was an
important source of power on innumerable
occasions and Dean Allen used
It.

It was available because Allen was
specifically hired to bring

about change, had put the Administration
and Trustees on notice that he

intended radical change, and had by his actions
from the beginning es-

tablished the precedent, and expectation on the part
of the administration, that thoroughgoing change would be the
norm of the School.

He was

thus able to garner the consistent support of the
administration for his

efforts; as Dr. Tippo observed, "We brought him here
to change the place

and naturally we supported his attempts to do so."'*0

On Leader-Dominated Change Strategies

Dean Allen had thus, from the beginning, acted in such a way as
to accumulate power in the School for use in the change effort.

It was

this power which provided the leverage for his change strategies which
in themselves were, as will be described, unique, imaginative, decisive,

often high in risk, and often counter to generally accepted practices of

bureaucratic manaigement.

^^Interview with Oswald Tippo, May 31

|

1972.
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My description of Allen's change strategies
is based, in large
part, on a series of discussions of his
leadership style with him.

I

am most grateful to him for the enthusiasm
and frankness with which he

pursued those discussions.

At the same time it should be made clear

that the analysis and descriptions which follow
are my own construction

and interpretation of his change strategies

—^views

which are derived

from my own observation and interpretation of his
actions during the

period under review, from the record of his actions which
emerges from
the documentary records of the time, as well as from my
discussions with

him.

In preface, also, the potential replicability of Allen's leadership strategies should be considered.

It has been observed by many that

Allen is a highly unusual individual, particularly in his capacity for
risk-taking, the persuasiveness of his rhetoric, his commitment to change,
his high energy level, his high tolerance for ambiguity, and his clear

charismatic qualities

—and

for these reasons his leadership style and

strategies are not generally replicable.

I

concur in part with this ob-

servation, but believe a close examination of his strategies useful for

these reasons.
First

—^While

all the strategies pursued by Dean Allen at the

School of Education are probably not transferable to a given person or
situation, some surely are and would be useful to a given person or or-

ganization working for change in a given University.
Second

—By

looking closely at the strategies it is possible to

delineate some general principles behind such strategies.

Such princi-

ples can be helpful to those interested in deriving their own change
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strategies based en their own
personality, styles, strengths
and the
nature of the specific environment
in which they are working.

Third-The delineation of these
principles can also lead to some
generalizations about the points at
which academic organizations
are
most susceptible to change efforts—
which can also lead to the developSient of new strategies
specific to the people and situations
involved.
For descriptive purposes, the change
strategies employed by the

Dean can be divided into three categories:
1)

Those strategies used primarily to
motivate and support

innovation within the organization
2)

Those strategies used primarily to protect the
organization

from outside intervention
3)

Those strategies useful for both purposes*

As will become evident, most strategies could be used
for both
purposes and my distinctions are based primarily on Allen's
use of them

during the planning year.

To motivate and support innovation
within the organization

The creation of ambiguity

The emphasis on order, stability, and predictability common to

most organizations tends to narrow perspectives, limit imaginative horizons, and restrict opportunities for innovation.

To counter these or-

ganizational tendencies. Dean Allen deliberately set out to create

ambiguity in formal expectations, working relationships, and power and
status relations in the organization.

He discontinued the entire
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curriculum for the School; he dismantled
the existing organizational
structures of the School; he disoriented
the traditional status relationships of the School; he generally
supported the ambiguities inherent
in the "organic growth" model of planning
organization; and he suspended

evaluation for most of the year

—all

of these having the effect of

plunging School members into an environment extremely
high in ambiguity
where they were, at the same time both forced and
permitted to develop

new perspectives, new expectations, new forms of
organization, new working relationships, and new status relationships based
more on present

resources and needs than on unquestioning acceptance of structures

created in the past.

Changing structures

But Allen did not allow the organization to exist entirely in

ambiguity.

Where he believed that structures were useful in changing

behavior and encouraging innovation, he did not hesitate to introduce or
support them.

The Retreat, for example, represented a structure designed

to facilitate creative planning and the center concept appeared an appro-

priate restructuring of the School for the development of innovative
progreuns.

The modular credit system, which forced teachers to ask them-

selves how their material might be presented in other than a semesterlong, classroom experience is another example of how changed structures

were used to stimulate new behaviors.
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Critical mass

The metaphor implicit in thie
strategy ie derived from atomic

physics in which the critical mass
represents an amount of fissionable

material just large enough to set off
a ohain reaction.

As used by Dean

Allen, the oritioal mass strategy suggests
that a ohain reaction of in-

novation or any other kind of change is best
produced by building a
oritioal mass of change-oriented people.

Allen used this approach most

Significantly, as has been described, when he
recruited a sufficient

number of innovation-oriented faculty and doctoral
students to overcome
the resistance of the existing faculty and thus get
the School started

in the direction of innovation.

The simple critical mass concept also

includes the more complex concept of variable critical

mass—that

the

necessary critical mass for innovation varies according to the
specific
situation.

Thus, for example, the Marathons, which grew to encompass

most of the School, were instituted by a handful of people as was the

emphasis on the elimination of institutional racism.

Sensitivity of the leader to the critical mass necessary for any
significant move on the part of the organization is a critical aspect of
the leader—dominated leaxiership style as it is the principal means by

which the leader keeps in touch with the needs and desires of those in
the organization and thus avoids one of the major pitfalls of leader

domination

—a

loss of touch with the organization, and its consequences,

the making of decisions inconsistent with the needs

ajid

desires of the

organization which will tend not to be supported by the organization.
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Allow the freedom to fail

Pear of failure can paralyze one's
capacity for significant innovation. Although Allen clearly valued
successful innovation most
highly, he also continually reiterated
that he recognized that true ex-

perimentation carried with it the strong possibility
of failure.

"...

if all our experiments succeed, or if we
can assure the success

of experiments before they are tried, we
are not really experimenting—
or, at best, we are operating somewhere
short of the outer limits where

experimentation is most needed."^

During the planning year Dean Allen behaviorally reinforced
this
policy by refusing to dwell on a faculty or student's lack of
success at
a given effort, but encouraging him to take on a new project, and
subse-

quently has shown, on a number of occasions, his willingness to give
people a second chance or even a third

—most

notably, a person whom he

deposed as center head in I970 was promoted in I972.

Leader behavior as model for
organizational behavior

An importeint subcomponent of the use of precedents
the setting of precedents by the behavior of the leader.

(p.

323) is

A leader who

dominates his organization to the extent Dean Allen did inevitably becomes a model for many in his organization.

Allen appeared highly sen-

sitive to this fact and used it to influence the behavior and attitudes
of those in his organization.

^

For example, the Dean's informal behavior

^Quoted from Allen in "A View, A Review, A Vision," School of
Education Profile, ed. Lyman B. Brainerd, Jr. (Amherst, 1971 )i P* 17*
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toward those In his organisation
and his allowing of similar
behavior
toward himself was a significant
factor in the breakdown of status
distinctions early in the year. Also,
his personal style-flamboyant,
active, and high risk-became an
operating style for many in the School
during the year.

Ignore dissent when appropriate

Dean Allen felt that the dissent of the old
faculty during the
initial year was based primarily on a blind
resistance to change at the

School by a group who did not share the vision of
change for which he

had been hired.

He therefore saw no productive ends being served
by at-

tempting to acknowledge and deal with their dissatisfaction.

His strategy

therefore was to build the critical mass which would overwhelm
their attempts to change the course he had set for the School

to, in effect,

roll over their objections.

He also used this strategy from time to time during the planning
year, particularly in response to criticism implying that the emerging

program was not sufficiently rigorous and to accusations of the neglect
of the \mdergraduate program

— sit\iations

where he felt that to focus on

such criticisms would be divisive and unproductive, and a threat to the

momentum of the change effort.

Juxtaposit ion/unity and diversity

An important component of the strategies of structure changing
and creating ambiguity is the principle of juxtaposition which postulates
that a particularly productive route to creative innovation is the
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development of new task groups based on differences
in backgrounds and
special fields of interest rather than on
similarities.

Such differ-

ences tend to eliminate possibly unproductive
initial assumptions and

to bring fresh perspectives to bear on educational
problems.

strongly encouraged the development of such groups.

Dean Allen

Thus, for example,

the aesthetics core group included a psychologist, a secondary
school

administrator, a reading specialist, a musician, a sculptor, and a high
school curriculum specialist; and what was to become a successful
proposal for funding of a new program in educational administration was

developed by

ein

American historian, an ex-business administrator, a pri-

vate school administrator, an English teacher, a University administrator, an ex-county administrator, an ex-USOE official, and an ex-assistant

school superintendent.

Welcome and plan organizational peaks

Recognizing the proclivity for stability and

oi*der in

an organiza-

tion, and realizing that such stability tends to promote a relatively

low level of energy in the organization. Dean Allen adopted a conscious

strategy of using organizational challenges when they occurred to mobilize
the energy of the group, and of planning such challenges when they did
not occur naturally.

Examples of planned organizational peaks are the

Retreat, the discontinuation of the curriculum, and marathons subsequent
to the first.

Examples of using organizational challenges when they

occurred naturally are the development of the Interim Catalogue and the

use of a University racial crisis to commit the entire School to sponsoring a remediative course open to all University students and employees.
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The Hawthorne effect rides first
class

A general principle implicit in
the Hawthorne experiment is
that
one gets more commitment, activity,
responsibility, and even intelligence
out of those in his organisation
if he treats them as the uniquely
special, committed, responsible and
intelligent people he wants them to be.

Especially in the early days of the School,
Dean Allen worked this fact
to the hilt as seen in his dramatic
"first-claso" recruiting of new fac-

ulty members; the high salaries paid new
faculty; the giving of "responsibility before their time" to young faculty
and doctoral students; the

opening School meetings; the Retreat in a chartered
plane to a distant
and beautiful setting; and his constant reinforcement
in his speeches
of the idea that those in the School constituted the
most outstanding

group of faculty and doctoral students anywhere in the country.

Reward innovative behavior

The rewarding of appropriate behavior with money, promotion,

status or the like is perhaps the most common of administrative strategies, although many cannot use it to its potential because they do not

have sufficient control over the reward system.
control, as

ways—but

1

Dean Allen kept this

have previously described, and used it in the conventional

he also developed some novel kinds of rewards.

prominent of these was access to him.

The most

Since he was so busy, he was very

difficult to see, and only those highly in his favor enjoyed easy access
to him.

This was both a status reward and of practical benefit because

the more time one spent with the Dean, who was at the oenter of the
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School, the more knowledge of end
influence over the School one
tended
to have. Another means of access
to Dean Allen was to be asked
to go
on one of his many trips with him.
The Dean consciously used this
invitation both to reward people and as a
lever to change the behavior of

those who he felt were working unproductive
ly.

Another method of reward, often financial and
always status, was
to be asked to take the Dean's place for
the consulting jobs or speeches

with which he was constantly being deluged*

Another highly effective reward which Dean Allen used
often to
good advantage was to unconditionally give away to people
in the organi-

zation a part of the power which he had accumulated.

For example, he

haul

negotiated a substantial number of "wild card" faculty positions
and
st\jdent admissions which he alone controlled.

At times he "gave" one

of these positions or admissions to a faculty member or doctoral student
to use for his own purposes

—a

unique and highly valued reward.

Protecting the organization
from outside intervention

Channel clogging

The channel-clogging strategy, which can be defined as giving a

reviewing agency more material and items for decision than they can
possibly deal with in the time allotted, was used with great success in

securing Faculty Senate approval for the package.
Based on their past behavior, it seemed unlikely that this body

would approve a large number of the courses being proposed and many of
the overall academic policies.

Had these been proposed singly, the
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Faculty senate would have been
able to debate them, table
them, amend
them, return them to committees,
return them to the School for
further
study, or any number of other
delaying tactics such bodies oan
use for
frustrating innovation. However, by
submitting the entire 2,400-page
package at the same time and at year-end,
the Faculty Senate's normal

channels of review were hopelessly clogged,
and they were put in the

position of either approving the whole
thing or rejecting it in total—
and the pressures for approval as a whole,
especially since the package

represented a year's work of the whole School,
proved insurmountable.
Up and out through creative
hole digging

Most administrators have a great fear of "getting into a
hole,"

Dean Allen did not fear it, and in fact welcomed it as a means
of expanding the potential of his organization.

For example, during the planning

year he overspent his budget by some $125,000 and was bailed out by the
Provost's Office.

Rather than feeling abashed and indebted to the

Provost, Bean Allen used this situation as a means of establishing a

new level of funding for the following year.

Expanding credit by consuming it

Benjamin Franklin once observed that the best way to make a
friend was to consciously become indebted to him, for instance to borrow

something from him.

Allen used a similar strategy, which might be called

expanding credit by consuming it, in his relationships with many at the
School, but especially with the University axiministration during the
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first two years of the School.

His approach, which runs
counter to that

of many who feel that noredif
(good will) with others is
finite and
Should be conserved, is to draw
freely on good will in the
belief that
more, rather than less, will
be forthcoming. This strategy
proved very
effeotive in the Dean's dealings
with the Provost's Office, which
granted
him increasing financial and
personal support culminating in
the financial
bail-out described above and their
support of the package during the
review process.

Trumpet your weakness when appropriate

It is likely that any attempt at radical
change will produce

some weak points at various stages in the
change process.

Rather than

inviting attack by offering a weak defense of
these vulnerable areas,
It IS often useful to freely acknowledge the
weakness and outline plans

for rectification of it.

Dean Allen used this strategy very effectively

during the planning year to blunt criticism of the
undergraduate program
and of the insensitivity of the School to cross-campus
relationships.
Indeed, in any situation in which these were potentially
issues, he

could be coimted upon to raise them first, anticipating and disarming
his critics.

Many risks are safer than a few;
Getting off the chart with simultaneous
change; Becoming a moving target
multiplying everything
These three closely interrelated strategies were the major reason that conservative forces were not able to nail the School at its

more vulnerable point—at the early staiges of innovation when the chaos
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and disorientation were at
their high and results were at
their low.
"Many risks are safer than a
few" in the san,e way that a
diversified investment polioy is safer
than investing all one's money
in a
single company. With many risks,
those that fail can be covered
by
those that win. Thus in the planning
year, the failure of the School
to serve undergraduates effectively
was mitigated by the other suooesses
of the planning process.

"Getting off the chart with simultaneous change"
is a way of

frustrating attempts to prematurely judge
innovative programs.

One gets

off the chart by changing so many things that
it is impossible to isolate a single element for criticism.

Thus any attempts to zero in on

the pass-fail system during the planning year would
have been vastly

complicated because along with the pass-fail came new
educational goals,

modular credit, new course content, innovative teaching methods, doctoral student teachers, and more experiential approaches.

"Becoming a moving target" has a similar goal.

This strategy

includes expanding the options available for a given educational goal,
thus making the judgment of one option relatively useless; and also in-

volves changing at such a rate that judgment of an existing practice is
frustrated by the fact that that practice is to be replaced in the near
future.

Thus, attempts to judge the School's course offerings were

frustrated by the School's announced intention to move to a completely

modular curriculum.
It should be pointed out that these strategies are not intended

to frustrate internal evaluation of new progreuns, although they unques-

tionably do make it more difficult, but rather they are designed to
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impede premature jtidgments by
those outside the
organization—and it is
generally safe to assume that those
judgments in an existing
university
can be counted upon to be
predominantly conservative.

Dual strategi es which both motivate
the organization and protect it
from outside intervent i on

Go for radical change

Dean Allen has often been quoted as
observing, »A little change
hurts.

A lot of change hurts only a little
more«~and his approach to

change during the first two years of the
School clearly reflects, and
to a large extent supports, this contention.

For example, one might

speculate that if any one or two of the reforms
of the year, such as

pass-fail grading and modular credit, had been
proposed as the only reforms of the year they would have been met with
much the same resistance
from, and proved just as painful to, people both
within and without the

School as was the entire range of reforms proposed in the
package.

It

is further a reasonable speculation that if only a few
reforms had been

proposed, it would have been easier to defeat them than it was to attempt to address the wide range of reforms actually proposed.

In sum, one can speculate on the basis of the evidence in the

period under review that a highly effective route to change is to go
for radical change on the grounds that radical change has a better

chance of succeeding than slow change and that resistance to, reaction
to, and indeed the pain from radical change is not significantly greater
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than that to less thoroughgoing
change. ^2
Use precedents

Precedents are powerful motivators,
for better or for worse.

Dean Allen made sure that they were
for the better.

Where he found a

useful precedent he used it; where he
found a hannful one, he eliminated
it; where he needed a precedent, he
made one.

This strategy proved useful both within
and without the organization.

Within, the stage for his ability to manipulate
precedent in

this way was set from the beginning, when he so
flaunted and violated

precedents (such as the precedent of faculty control
over new appointments) that the entire set of precedents affecting the
School was thrown
into chaos, thus leaving him free to rewrite tradition
himself.

He used

some of the old precedents that were useful to him, chiefly
the approval

of the faculty Personnel Committee to legitimize new appointments
and
the precedent of a strong dean established by Dean Purvis.

He eliminated

some traditions, chiefly the formality of relationships among faculty

and between the faculty and the students, the traditional definition of

behavior representative of faculty achievement, and the traditional
power of the faculty over certain academic areas.

And he created new

traditions, "retreats” as a legitimate means of focusing energy around
a given problem, reduced status distinctions eunong faculty and between

12 Bennie,

however, reaches an opposite conclusion on the basis of
his experience at Buffalo.
(See Chapt. II, pp. 59“60.)
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faculty and studenta. and
action and change over
contemplation and
stability.
He used this strategy of
precedent-setting in dealings
outside
the organization with particular
success in the establishment
of new
limits for his own behavior by
the administration. For
example, by his
initial conditions for employment whioh
included considerable autonomy
in staff selection, and by his
statement to the Trustee selection
committee that he would be neither a cheap
Dean nor a safe Dean, he established new precedents for his own behavior.
This autonomy and flexibility,

beyond that enjoyed by most Deans, contributed
substantially to his oapacity to bring about change at the School of
Education.
The creative use of ignorance

Academic bureaucracies have the effect of stifling
innovation

under a blanket of "appropriate channels and procedures,"

In the early

days Dean Allen chose not to learn about these and thus,
in pursuing
his change goals, was able to make immediate commitments
to people,

when bureaucratically he should not have been able to; was able to announce the discontinuance of all degrees, certification, requirements,
etc, when he did not technically have the power to do so; to make ex-

penditures technically illegal under University policy; and to send a
"package" to the Faculty Senate with which they could not possibly deal
in the time available.
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Develop an independent power baap

Allen's national reputation
served him in two vei^
significant
ways. First, it assured him
of mobility_a good job
elsewhere, which
gave him the freedom to take greater
risks at UMaes than he might
have
had his entire reputation been
based on his success at UMass.
And
secondly, this reputation gave his
ideas and actions greater
credibility
in the School and University than
they would have had, had he not
been
nationally known as a leader of educational
reform.

Serendipity

The concept of the use of serendipity as a
strategy is difficult
to explain, since it consists primarily of
actions resulting from a way

of looking at things.

The approach is somewhat akin to that advocated

by some in the human potential movement

—to

look at things as they

really are (not what one wants them to be) and trust one's
intuition.

Translated to Allen's strategy, this approach might be described
as
"Don't try to plan and structure everything.

As long as good people

are working together good things will emerge, although what will emerge

cannot be predicted—and when good things do emerge
them."
include:

,

nurture and support

Some examples of the serendipity strategy at work in the School
the emergence of the Aesthetics and Humanistic Centers and

integrated day program, the genesis of racial awareness at the Retreat,
the development of the marathon as a major educational format, the re-

cruiting strategy by which candidates recruited each other, and the
emergence of the Planning Doctoral Program as a major component of the

planning year.
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Emphasis on post hoc evaluation

Allen made it clear from the beginning
that he preferred people
to implement programs based on their
best estimates of what would be
most effective, and then to evaluate
the program while in progress,

using the evaluative material to make
appropriate changes, or if the
data were sufficiently negative, to
discontinue the program. This
strategy, which prevented programs from a
premature death, became in-

stitutionalized in the Interim Catalogue and was
a significant facili-

tator of innovation.

In most institutions, proposed new programs
must

be approved by some group before they can be
offered.

This pre-hoc

evaluation tends to stifle attempts at innovation since
it is both
threatening and time-consuming

—and

because it is a test of the theoreti-

cal base (and thus subject to theoretical biases of the
reviewing group)
of the program, rather than its practical outcomes.

This emphasis on post—hoc evaluation also appeared in the evalua-

tion proposal in the Interim Catalogue , by which the success of the
School was to be judged on a continuing basis over a two-year period
a proposal which, as I have previously described, was a major factor
in the acceptance of the package by University agencies.

Valuing ends over means

As described by Dean Allen, "My goals are absolute, but my means
flexible."

This distinction is a highly useful one for change-oriented

administrators who can expect resistance to their efforts and must
therefore be prepared to adopt alternative means to their original ends.
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Dean Alien showed this flexibility
a nun.ber of times during the
period
under review, for example, in proposing

that the reforms of the package

be temporary and conditional, rather
than final as he would have preferred; by creating new funding from
sources both within and without
the University when it became clear
that the School budget would not

support a change effort of the magnitude
he desired; and by using the

Planning Doctoral Program to establish a
critical mass of changeoriented people when insufficient faculty
positions were available for
that purpose.

Appearance can create reality

Dean Allen has observed to me;
If you are great and people think you are great, that's ideal.
If you are not great, and people think you aren't great, that's
hopeless. But if you are not great, but on the road there, and
people think you are great, then they will help make you great.
In other words, to say you are something can be an aid to getting you
there.

Dean Allen used this strategy both as a motivator for those in

the organization and as a magnet to draw new people to the organization.

As a motivator, it was in many ways akin to the Hawthorne effect strategy, and was achieved primarily through the Dean's persuasive

rhetoric.

It began in the initial recruiting, when Allen was able to

convey an image of what the School could be sufficiently powerful to

draw the people who could make it that way.

In this effort he concen-

trated not on present realities and problems, but future possibilities.
In the same way, in his talks to the School during the planning year he
was inevitably highly optimistic and highly positive, refusing often to
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acknowledge, and always to dwell on,
real problems that existed
in the

organization—but rather choosing to emphasize
the progress that had
been made and the possibilities for
the future.

Such speeches, for

example the "internal combustion engine"
speech given at the low point
in the package preparation process,
more often than not had the effect

of recharging the energies of those in the
organization and refocusing

them on the realization of the Dean's vision
for the School.

In the

writer's opinion, the Dean's skillful use of
rhetoric in support of
this strategy was a central reason for the
maintenance of focus and

energy on the planning in spite of many very real
difficulties and
frustrations.

The Dean also used this strategy in speeches throughout the
coiintry and in national publicity to recruit new people to the
organi-

zation.

The "image" of the School as the most creative, innovative, and

exciting school in the country which he portrayed would have been criticized by many at the School as unreal and misleading as it did not reflect the problems and shortcomings of the School.

However, whatever

the reality, the "image" of the School presented by the Dean did draw
a large number of creative, competent, and enthusiastic people to the

School for the I969-7O year (and thereafter), people who made major

contributions to the quality, creativity, range and excitement of the
School's program.
It should be pointed out here that this can be a dangerous

strategy when the image becomes too far out of joint with the reality.

Under such conditions the effect of positive rhetoric tends to lead to
frustration and alienation on the part of members of the organization
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who see the leader as unwilling to
deal with real problems which are

affecting them, and to disenchantment and
disaffection on the part of
those who have joined the organization on
the basis of what they came
to see as false and inflated expectations.

1

3

jn fact, during the period

under review, some did become alienated and
disaffected for these reasons, but overall the strategy was successful
in maintaining the focus

of organizational energy on innovation and attracting
highly competent

people to the organization.

Conservation of organizational energy

One of Dean Allen's fundamental principles of leadership is the

conservation of organizational energy for focus on innovation.

Perhaps

the clearest example of this principle is Dean Allen's approach to

"flank—protecting"

—a

major occupation of most administrators.

Dean Allen, quite simply, doesn't do

it—doesn't

waste organi-

zational energy on preparing for contingencies that might or might not
occur.

Such flank-protecting is costly both in its use of organizational

time and in the fact that it tends to focus the organization on protective, defensive postures rather than on maintaining the momentum of the

change effort.

Thus, Dean Allen preferred to act, to see what the real

outcomes of his actions were, and then to address those real outcomes.

As he describes it, "Good people are the best contingency plan"

— in

sense that he trusted people in his organization to be able to deal

with whatever contingencies arose.

^^Bennis encountered this problem at Buffalo (see Chapt. II,
p.

59).

the
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Thus, during the period under
review, Alien spent little
time
preparing for ..«hat if •s.'_..what if
the faoulty bring a grievanoe
against
him?" "What if the community does
not approve the Constitution?"
"What
If we overspend the budget?" but
successfully overcame these problems

when

"they

actually occurred.#

Being a leader-learner

A second major pitfall to the leader-dominated
form of organization^5 is the organization's inability to
be much better than its
leader, who, having achieved hie position on
the basis of his knowledge

and ability , more often than not tends to stop
learning in the press of

maintaining his organization.''^

Thus, a leader must change and grow

in order to enable his organization to do the same.

The evidence of the first 26 months indicates that Dean Allen

did indeed grow and change while maintaining his position as
unquestioned leader of the School.

The fact that the School became far more

and quite different than he had anticipated is the strongest indicator
of his ability to learn and grow.

Other indications observed by the

writer over the period include changes in racial attitudes and opinions;
increased sensitivity to the needs of his subordinates, especially his
A

Jk

^Perhaps the most impressive example of this strategy occurred
during the third year when the School of Education Evaluation Committee
issued a highly critical report on the School ^which was rebutted with
devastating effectiveness in a formal reply prepared by three faculty
members in two months' time.

—

1 'S

^The first, previously mentioned, being loss of contact with the
organization.
1

tion.

°Dean Purvis' administration appears an example of such a situa-
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Assistant Deans; increasing ability
to listen to and support ideas
not
necessarily consistent with his own, and
growing interests in areas with

which he had previously not been
particularly personally concerned,
particularly urban education, futuristics,
and creativity.

Using the default position

A basic principle of Dean Allen's strategy is
to make sure that
what he calls the "default position" works to
his advantage.

As de-

scribed by the Dean, the Default Position appears to
have three inter-

related components.
First, the Dean is very aware of a fact often ignored
by those
in decision—making positions——that not to make a decision
is in effect

a decision in itself, usually "by default" a conservative one.

Allen

was thus during the planning year highly sensitive to decision points

and quick to step in to make decisions (as has been described in

Chapters VI and VII ) when no one else, particularly the Executive Committee, seemed willing or able to do so.

During this year Dean Allen

made most decisions, and took action upon the crucial issues confronting the School including faculty recruitment, student admissions, and
the establishment of School priorities and policies so that the oppor-

tunity for innovative approaches to these issues would not be lost "by
default."

A second aspect of the use of the default position
someone else in the default position

—to

is to put

make a decision or take an

action before they do so that they are faced with a fait-accompli

,

ing it considerably more difficult to impose a different action or

mak-
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decision— since not only must the new action be
conceptualized and argued, but the existing action must be
somehow proven inappropriate.

Dean Allen's decisiveness during the planning
year resulted in a large
number of situations in which potential opponents
were placed in the
default position.

Some of the more significant of these were
the de-

cision to discontinue the catalogue, the decision to
take on the METEP
and EPDA grants, the decision to recruit by the "good
man" approach
rather than by slot, the decision to create a Planning
Personnel Com-

mittee to make personnel decisions about new faculty members,
and the

decision to take on the race relations course.
One can get a sense of the effectiveness of this kind of

strategy if he imagines himself, for example, an opponent of the METEP
grant on the grounds that it would force the School to adopt a behavioral model of teacher training when he feels a more informal, humanistic, and student—centered approach is a superior approach.

How much

easier it is to argue against applying for the grant in the first place
than to attempt to repudiate the grant once it has been won by the
School.

A third aspect of the use of the default position is closely
related to the second
to

s t o p

—and

both might be summed up as "It's far easier

a proposed program than one that is in operation."

In its

third application this facet of the default position implies considerable benefit to taking action, to getting things tinder way no matter
what the difficulties or expected opposition.

In this sense the ap-

proval of the package with the proviso that it be evaluated over a two-

year period reflects a use of the default position on a grand scale.
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For, with two years of real operation
establishing the new policies and

programs of the School and integrating
them into the statue quo of the
University, it is difficult to imagine
that any University agency would
have been willing or able to stop, or
significantly amend, any significant policy or program of the School
without provoking a major upset of

the School—which University agencies would
be loath to do.

It would

have been far easier to have changed or stopped
the program before it
went into operation.

Change Principles

Summary of Change Leadership Principles

Prom the leader-dominated change strategies enumerated in the
previous pages it is possible to extract a number of principles of successful change leadership which appear to underly these specific strategies.

These principles are significant in that, from them, those

interested in change leadership can derive other strategies appropriate
to their own personality and leadership style, and to the specific or-

ganization and organizational environment in which they are working.
There appear to be five major principles underlying the change

strategies pursued by Dean Allen.

The principles, and the strategies

from which they were derived, are as follows:
1 )

Risk

Big—Operate

**on

the Edge of Viability ”

—Derived

from

"Many Risks are Safer than a Pew/Oetting off the Chart with Simultaneous

Change/Becoming a Moving Target," "Creative Hole Digging," "Expanding
Credit by Consuming It," "Trumpeting Weaknesses," "Channel Clogging,"
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"Ignoring Dinsent," "Creation of
Ambiguity," and "Conservation
of Organizational Energy,"
2)

Dream

Big—Derived

from "Go for Radical Change,"
"Havrthorne

Effect," and "Image as a Means to Reality."
Right Side of the Default Position

—Derived

from "Using the Default Position," "Changing
Structures," "Critical

Mass," "Many Risks are Safer than a
Pew/Getting off the Chart with

Simultaneous Change/Becoming a Moving Target,"
"Radical Change," and
"Use of Precedents,"
4)

Conserve o rganizational energy for, and focus it
on. the

change effort

—^Derived

from "Welcoming and Planning Organizational

Peaks," "Post Hoc Evaluation," "Valuing Ends over Means,"
"Critical

Mass," "Ignoring Dissent," "Freedom to Pail," "Appearance Can
Create

Reality," and "Conservation of Organizational Energy."
5)

Don*t Stifle by Overplanning

—Derived

from "Creation of

Ambiguity," "Welcoming and Planning Organizational Peaks," "Conservation of Organizational Energy," "Juxtaposition," "Creative Hole Digging,"

"Serendipity," "Valuing Ends over Means."

Summary of Institution Susceptibility
to Change Points

As Hefferlin and many others have effectively described, large
academic organizations appear to be uniquely resistant to change.

The

success of Dean Allen's strategies in bringing about change at the Uni-

versity of Massachusetts does indicate, however, that there are some
points at which at least that University was susceptible to change.
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Looking at such points may be of help
to others attempting to bring
about change in large educational
organizations.
/

Speoifioally, it appears that the existing
faculty at the School
of Education were susceptible to:

critical mas s strategy

—^which

had the effect of chang-

ing the character of the original organization
in the direction of

change and innovation.
The influence o f a leader from outside with
relatively hi^h

national status
^

)

The

—^which

may have intimidated potential resistance.

i nfluence

University administration

of a leader with the clear support of the

—which

removed an important element of support

from potential opposition.
4)

Anti-bureaucratic behavior

—Since

the Dean did not use the

customary channels of decision-making or honor precedents he did not
like, those opposed to him, initially at least, had no "regular" way

to resist his decisions.
5)

Confrontation

—

^The

Dean's "risk big" style, his boldness

and brashness, and use of the default position tended to create potential confrontation situations

—from

which, at least initially, the

existing faculty backed away.
The affected decision-making bodies of the University as a whole

appear to have been susceptible to:
1 )

The influence of a leader from outside with a relatively

high national status
2

)

The influence of a leeuier with the clear support of the

University administration
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^^^.^^-^^reaucratic behavior-especial Iv in
"unloading" the

In terim Catalo^e at the last minute with
no previous attempt to fit
it into the regular bureaucratic
machinery

Confrontation
5)

—especially

the use of the default position

Channel clogging—which created a "take it or
leave it"

situation, the "leave it" option appearing highly
unreasonable

Getting off t he chart with simultaneous change

—which

made

it very difficult, especially in the time available,
for these groups

to fully comprehend the nature and implications of the
proposed changes.
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CHAPTER

IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

This final chapter contains two sections.

In the first

I

shall

review the data of the case studies in the perspective
of some of the
literature of change in higher education and organizational
change de-

scribed in Chapter II as a means of providing some perspective
on and
insight into the change effort at the School of Education.

The second

section will include a recapitulation of the major conclusions of the
case analyses together with a series of extensions of those findings
in the form of significant hypotheses, speculations, and questions based

on or arising out of the material presented.

The Reform Effort in the Perspective
of the Literature

In this initial section

I

shall attempt to provide some insights

into and perspectives on the change process at the School of Education

and on the achievement of the School by looking at the data in the case

analyses in the perspective of the literature stunmarized in Chapter II.
Because of the relative shortness of the time period involved in this
study and the unsystematic form of the data available no attempt will
be made to reach definitive or comprehensive conclusions.

Rather the

data from the summary of the literature will be selectively used to provide some insights into and tentative conclusions about certain aspects
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of the change effort and ite
leadership at the School of
Education.

On

"the

Change Process

Levels of Chane^e Model

Looking at the data in terms of Hersey and
Blanchard's Levels
of Change Model, it appears that the
changes at the School were brought

about by a combination of the participative
and coerced change cycles,

probably more heavily weighted toward the
coerced end of the continuum.

Coerced change, according to the model, occurs
when changes in group
and individual behavior are imposed prior to changes
in individual attitudes and knowledge.

Clearly most of Dean Allen's change strategies were

aimed more at changing individual and group behavior than
individual
attitudes and knowledge.

For instance, the strategies of structure

changing, the creation of ambiguity, the creation of precedents, the

use of the default position, the use of the Hawthorne principle, the

rewarding of innovative behavior, and most other of the Dean's strategies tend to be behavior change strategies as opposed to means of intro-

ducing new knowledge or changing attitudes.
There were, however, also substantial elements of the partici-

pative change cycle integral to the planning year, chiefly in the form
of the introduction of new knowledge through the diversity of field,

philosophy, background and experience of the 120 new members who joined
the School in September

I

968 .

In a very real sense most members of the

total group represented new knowledge in themselves, knowledge which
was diffused through the entire group as a result of personal contact
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in the mobile and flexible environment
of the Retreat and initial
months
of the planning year. This mode of
knowledge diffusion is representative
of the participative cycle.

As a generality, though, the change cycle
was more coerced than

participative—as was evidenced, among other things,
by the swiftness
of the change.

As such, one might, on the basis of the
Levels of Change

Model, question the permanence of the changes,
especially in the ab-

sence of a leader such as Allen, and also question
whether the coercive

approach was most appropriate for a group which appeared
to be more mature (independent, active, and responsible) than immature
(dependent,
passive, and low in responsibility).

Maslow's need hierarchy

Allen's management of change at the School would appear to
have been generally consistent with management strategies indicated by

Maslow's need hierarchy.

In the absence of any test data, one can only

speculate as to the general motivational level upon which most in the
School were operating.

However, it seems likely that the majority were

bunched at the affiliation and esteem levels, on the assumption that
most on the basis of prior education and financial success or the po-

tential for it were beyond security fears and that few

heid

firmly

reached the self-actualization level.
Most of Allen's change strategies appear appropriate to these
two need levels.

Esteem needs were addressed through the Dean's use of

the Hawthorne principle, through his granting of academic autonomy and

freedom to fail (indicating his confidence in the competence of the
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group), through rewards (such as
personal contact with him) which
appealed to esteem needs, and through
his constant reiteration of
his con-

viction that the instructional staff were
the best and most exciting
in
the country. Affiliation needs also
appear to have been well-addressed
in the flexible and free-flowing group structure
by which the planning
was done, allowing participants far greater
freedom in choosing groups

to be related with and permitting greater
interaction within and among

groups than would presumably have been possible in
a more structured and

pre-planned mode of organization.
To the extent that participants were operating at
the self-

actualization level, the Dean's strategies, many of which had
a large

manipulative component, were probably neither appropriate nor
effective.
In total, though, it appears that most aspects of the organizational

environment created by the Dean during the planning year were, in terms
of Maslow's need hierarchy, highly appropriate to the motivation level
of the group.

The Hersey-Blanchard synthesis

A number of elements of the Hersey-Blanchard synthesis also
offer some insight into aspects of the change process.

In order to use

this synthesis, some assumptions must be made as to the phases in the

life-cycle in which the group was operating and the leadership style of
the Dean.

As with the use of Maslow's need hierarchy, the absence of

test data requires that some gross assumptions be made on the basis of

evidence in the study.

341

It appears that the group was
generally operating in the area

of phases two and three as described
by the life-oyole model-as indi-

cated by the fact that most came to
the School committed to the task of
educational innovation and were able to
structure their work toward its
accomplishment, but that good, well-functioning
relationships among

people had to be built during the year because
of the newness of the
associations between people.

As to Allen's leadership style in life-cycle
terms, it is clear
from the data that he is a high-task leader

—that

his major focus is

on the task and that he is highly willing and
able to provide struc-

ture for the achievement of the task.

He is also, as a generality, a

low-relationship leader, as evidenced, perhaps most clearly, in his
hectic and busy schedule which, for the most part, leaves him insufficient time for the development of relationships with those in the
group^
or to have much influence on the relationships among people in the

group.

In terms of life cycle theory, Allen's leadership behavior

toward the planning committees must be distinguished from his leadership of the entire group in academic and organizational policy issues.

As previously described, Allen for the most part took a handsoff posture toward the work of the planning committees

—what

described as a low-task, low-relationships leadership style.

would be
While

^As one indicator, in the midst of the personnel action disputes
during his first year, Allen scheduled interviews with all the exist(Albert S. Anthony, Memorandum
ing faculty at ten-minute intervals.
Grievances to Provost Oswald Tippo [Copy to Dean Dwight W. Allen],

Peb. 21, 1968, p. 12.)
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such behavior would, according to the
theory, have been appropriate
to a phase four group, the fact that most
were operating at phases two

and three meant that they were not getting
appropriate leadership from

Allen himself, although in some cases appropriate
leadership did arise
out of the group.

The fact that some groups did not get effective

leadership may account, in part, for the mixed results of
the planning
groups

Allen's leadership of the group in academic and organizational
policy matters was, as previously described, high task, low relationships, a style which, according to life-cycle theory is appropriate

only to groups in phase one.

This observation offers an interesting in-

sight into a significant aspect of Allen's leadership during the plan-

ning year.
It can be convincingly argued in terms of life-cycle theory

that since Allen's leadership style was most appropriate to phase one
in the face of the fact that most of the organization was operating
in phases two and three, it was necessary to push the group back to

phase one for his lesidership to be most effective

—and

many of his

strategies did have the effect of putting group members in phase one
where task accomplishment was the major focus.
The return to phase one was achieved primarily by the creation

of crisis situations in the organization

—situations

where participants

were required to focus on the achievement of the task with little time
or energy for relationships.

The planning year as a whole can be looked

at as a year of crisis created by the Dean, since it was, as previously

described, clearly too short for the accomplishment of the goals set
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for it.

And many of the Dean's change strategies
tended to create crisis situations. For instance, his
generally unplanned
approach to the

work of the planning year tended to produce
the crises of tight deadlines and organizational decision points (see,
for instance, the package

preparation process) and his emphasis on radical change,
risking big,
serendipity, organizational ambiguity, encouraging
organizational peaks,
not protecting his flanks (when flanks had to be
protected it was

usually in a crisis situation) and his use of the default
position
(which tended to put others in a crisis situation) were all
strategies

which tended to place those in the organization in a crisis situation.
One can speculate on the basis of life—cycle theory that the

group as a whole, operating in phases two and three, may have had some
resistance to this attempt to push them back into

one—and

that, as a

generality, although Allen's desire to put the group into a phase where

his leadership style was most effective probably had considerable merit,
it would have been preferable if he could have varied his style in the

direction of an increased relationship focus.

The low participation of

School members in the interim constitution and catalogue deliberations
may have been a symptom of the group's lack of response to Allen's
high-task, low-relationship style.
One might also speculate on the basis of life-cycle theory
that the group's movement into the fourth and most mature phase will
be difficult unless Allen can reduce, or more appropriately channel,
his high task style of leadership.

Viewing Allen's leadership behavior in the perspective of
Herzberg's Motivation—Hygiene construct is appears that the success of
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the change effort is attributed in
part to the fact that Allen found
a

generally appropriate balance between
task-related motivators (achievement, recognition for accomplishment,
challenging work, increased re-

sponsibility, and growth and development) and non-task
related hygiene
factors (policies and administration, supervision,
working conditions,

interpersonal relationships, money, status and seciirity),
with the pro-

viso that his strategy of leaving hygiene factors (except
for money and
security ) to the planning committees tended to result in
irregular

satisfaction of these factors depending on the leadership of the
plan-

ning committees.
Allen’s approach to management appears to have been centered

primarily in System 3 as described by Rensis Likert ("Management is seen
as having substantial but not complete confidence and trust in subordi-

nates.

While broad policy and general decisions are kept at the top,

subordinates are permitted to make more specific decisions at lower

...

levels.

Rewards, occasional punishment, and some involvement are

used to motivate workers").

On the basis of the Hers ey-Blanc hard Syn-

thesis, this system is most appropriate for phase two of the life cycle,

and one can postulate that Allen's leadership would have been more effective had it consisted more of System 4 components which, according
to the theory, are appropriate for phase three groups.

System 4 compo-

nents appear more participative in nature and include:
Mcinagement is seen as having complete confidence and trust in
subordinates. Decision making is widely dispersed throughout

2

Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Management of Organizational Behavior, Second Edition (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall 1972)t p* 61.
,
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the organization, although well integrated.
Workers are raotivated by participation and involvement in
developing economic
rewards, setting goals, improving methods,
and appraising
progress toward goals.
I have

used Force Field Analysis in Chapter
VIII to describe the

forces at work in the change effort.

As evident from that analysis,

change was achieved principally by an increase in
the number of driving
forces.

One can speculate on the basis of the theory that
this method

of bringing about change brought with it an increase
in tension in and

volatility of the organization in the sense that the driving
forces would
have to be maintained to maintain the change focus of the organization.
The Greiner change sequence

The change effort at the School of Education followed the first

six steps of the Greiner sequence (pp. 81-83) of successful change quite

closely

—as
1)

follows:

Top management (the University awimini strati on) was under

pressure (the pressure to upgrade the School and University) to improve
the School of Education, and performance and morale at the School were
low.
2)

A new man "known for his ability to introduce improvements"

was hired as head of the organization.
3)

His initial act was to encourage exaunination, not so much

of past practices at the School, but of appropriate practices for a con-

temporary School of education.

%bid.

,

p.

62.

346

4)

He and hie associates did, for the most
part, assume a "direct

and highly involved" role in conducting the
examination.
5)

All levels of the organization were involved in
the program

planning phase of the planning year, although participation
in overall
policy decisions was considerably more limited.
6)

The Dean clearly "provided others with new ideas and
methods

for developing solutions to problems."

According to Greiner's findings, the change effort will tend to
fail if it does not follow all eight steps of the sequence, the final

two of which are (7) solutions and decisions are tested on a small scale

before any attempt to integrate them into the organization as a whole

and (8) the change effort is gradually absorbed into the organization's
way of life.
It seems clear from the case analyses that the School's reform

effort did not follow these final two steps.

Rather, its approach to

change was to go for fast, radical change rather than gradual and its
reforms went directly from the conceptualization phase to full-scale im-

plementation in the approval of the Interim Catalogue without any significant small-scale testing.
Since Greiner's hypothesis offers no alternatives except success

and failure, one can only conclude on the basis of his sequence that the

School's change effort will not be successful

—a

conclusion not consist-

ent with the evidence that the change effort appears, during the period

under review, to have met with considerable success.
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Planned change

The School, during the planning year,
occasionally used outside

consultants to aid in the development of parts
of its program.

For in-

stance, there was at the Retreat a consultant
from Synectics Incorporated

who did creative problem solving with a number of
the interest groups.

However, no consultants were used to facilitate the
development of the

program and organization as a whole and the entire change
effort was

clearly not in the planned change mode.

Many of the strategic princi-

ples of planned change (p. 85) were, however, followed, most
particularly
the integration of the change into all levels of the organization, the

participation of all levels of the organization in program planning,
the fact that the change thrust came from the top level of the organization, and the fact that the change effort appeared to be supported by

both the informal and formal structures of the School

—all

of which

would seem to be indicative of the success of the change effort in the

perspective of the planned change model.
The major strategic principle that the School was unable to

follow was the condition that relevant aspects of the surrounding environment also be changed.

At the end of the period under review, the

University as a whole was relatively unchanged and the University Faculty Senate remained generally hostile toward the change attempt at the
School

—

^both

factors which could inhibit the change effort in the future.

Change process model strategies

Many components of the School's change effort appear to have

been described in Schein and Kelman's delineation of strategies commonly
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used in the unfreezing-changing-refreezing process
model.

It should be

noted, however, that this model does not apply to the
School in its con-

ventional usage.

Because a large majority of those participating
in the

change effort at the School were new to it, one must view
the unfreezing

phase not so much as a freeing up from existing organizational
patterns,
but as a freeing up from old assumptions about schooling carried
from

previous experiences as students and teachers in conventional schools.

Similarly , one must

loolc at

the changing phase not so much as changing

organizational patterns, but creating patterns where none had previously
existed.

The change effort at the School compares with the model as

follows:

The unfreezing stage:

Schein has identified four common elements of the unfreezing
process, two of which are

—the

physical removal of the individual[s] from accustomed

routines, sources of information, and social relationships

—the

undermining and destruction of all social supports.^

In a very real sense these two components were intrinsic to the

situation of most in the School in the initial months of the planning
year.

The 120 new instructional staff had left their accustomed rou-

tines, sources of information, and social relationships and come to a

new environment where there were few established relationships or social
supports for them.

And then, to further intensify the removal, shortly

after their arrival in Amherst the entire group was flown to Colorado,

4chapt. II, pp. 83-84
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where participants were removed even from the
normal social support of

their families.

Additionally, the unstructured approach both
to the

Retreat and to the planning deprived participants of
the normal organizational structures and routines— further intensifying
the unfreezing

pressures.

Schein goes on to describe two further elements which appear to

work in the unfreezing process

—demeaning and humiliating experiences to "help" persons

see

their old selves as unworthy and thus be motivated to change

—the

constant linkage of reward with willingness to change and

punishment with unwillingness to change. 5
The former component was not particularly in evidence, primarily

because the critical mass strategy had brought people already committed
to change and thus not requiring "motivation" to change.

The old faculty,

however, did have to cope with a quickly developed norm that change was

superior to stability and that most of what had been done previously in
the School

value.

(ajid

by association those who had done it) was not of much

Thus those, particularly in the old faculty, who tended to sup-

port the status quo had to undergo the "demeaning and humiliating" ex-

perience of being perceived as reactionary and conservative by most
others in the group

—and

it is probable that the more conservatively

oriented in the new group took this lesson to heart.
The latter element, the linking of rewards and punishment with

willingness to change was clearly, as described in Chapters IV and VIII,
a part of the gestalt of the School during the period under review.
3lbid.

,

p. 84«
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The changing stage:

The three major elements of the changing stage
as described by

Kelman (p. 84) were operative in the School during
the planning year.
Identification

—was

encouraged, especially with the Dean, but

also with many of the new faculty who represented models
for new behavior for those who needed such models

Internalization

—was

promoted by the new environment created for

those in the School, one high in ambiguity and low in conventional
aca-

demic structures, which required new behaviors on the part of those
in
the School if they were to survive and prosper

Coercion

—was

evident in the reward system which throughout the

year was geared to success in participation in the change process at the
School.
The refreezing steige:

Because of the shortness of the time period under review, there
is no firm basis for speculation as to the extent to which new behaviors

had become integrated into participants.

The refreezing process, how-

ever, is, according to Kersey and Blanchard, accomplished primarily

through continued rewards for new behaviors.

On the basis of this study,

it seems clear that as long as Allen remains Dean and maintains his in-

fluence over the organization that reinforcement will be forthcoming

indicating a successful refreezing of the change process began during
the period under review.
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On the Achievement of the School
By viewing the accomplishments of the School
in the period under

review in the context of some of the literature
described in Chapter II,
we can come to some assessment of the achievement
of the School during
the period under review and some insights into the
means by which change

was brought about.

First, it is clear that the School was able to accomplish
sub-

stantial reform in a system which historically has been highly
resistant
to change,

(pp. 25 -29 )

Secondly, the aceidemic reforms accomplished were generally in
the direction of flexibility, diversity, experimentation, individualiza-

tion, student responsibility, increased field experience, and experien-

tial learning—directions consistent with the recommendations of the

major commissions on higher education of the last five years, (pp. 29 - 32
)
and thirdly, the success of the reform effort can be traced pri-

marily to the Dean's success in avoiding the pitfalls of collegial decision making, which appear to be the major factor in resistance to reform
in higher education, (pp. 46-47

1

49-51* 53-55)

Comparison of the change process at the School of Education with
that described in the four case studies described in Chapter II yields

additional insight into the School's accomplishments

—as

described below.

Comparison with Dennis' conclusions

The chcinge effort at Buffalo described by Bennis bears many

similarities with that of the School of Education.

Both were instigated

by new leaders with substantial national
reputations, considerable

charisma, and a powerfully articulated vision
for change and national

prominence.

Both began in institutions with undistinguished
reputations,

brought in what was intended to be a critical mass
of change-oriented
staff, and committed themselves to rapid and
thoroughgoing reform.

Both

leaders also had to cope with resistance from established
faculty members.

And there were also some major situational differences.

The

Buffalo attempt involved the entire institution and considerably larger
numbers of people.

Thus, at Buffalo, Meyerson could not personally man-

age the change effort, as did Allen, but had to rely on layers of manage-

ment with the attendant possibility of inconsistent and diffused goals

and erratic quality of leadership.

Also highly significant was the fact

that Meyerson was apparently not able to reach the critical mass of

change-oriented staff that Allen achieved, since despite the fact that
75 per cent of the faculty were Meyerson people, the remaining 25 per

cent were apparently sufficiently strong in numbers and power to success-

fully oppose the change effort.

And finally, the environment which af-

fected Buffalo, primarily city and state political forces, was not as

predictable or controllable as was the academic bureaucracy of the Uni-

versity of Massachusetts.
Given these points of similarity and difference the major issue
in comparing the Bennis study with this one is the question of the degree
of parallel between the two institutions.

Can one view the School of

Education as near the beginning, perhaps the high point, of the four-

year cycle of high hopes and disintegration described by Bennis or is it
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sufficiently different both in situation and
management style so as to
avoid the collapse portended by the Buffalo study?

Looking only at the period under review we can
speculate that,

although there are significant differences as described
above, there are
enough areas of similarity to make some meaningful
comparisons and perhaps point to some areas of potential difficulty in the
future.

Four of Bennis' conclusions stem from problems which arose
out
of the gap created when high expectations were not fulfilled.

According

to Bennis these expectations ran up against the realities of
insufficient

financial resources, inadequate and fragmented space, resistance on the
part of existing faculty, and inability to deal with the inevitable dif-

ficulties which accompany an attempt to create new academic and organizational norms and structures.

The result, at Buffalo, was disillusion

and disaffection on the part of new faculty, loss of momentum,

euid

in-

ability to deal with present problems since participants preferred to
deal with dreams of the future.
Many came to the School of Education with parallel expectations,

and there were, during the period under review, some symptoms of disillusionment (low participation in academic and organizational policy and the

unexpected difficulties over the interim constitution) and inability to
deal with present realities (the neglect of undergreuiuate education and

cross-campus relationships).

However, as a generality these problems

appear to have been avoided during the year under review
reasons.

— for

three

First, the fact that the first year was designated a planning

year both fulfilled the hopes of participants for opportunities to design
new programs and largely avoided the necessity of dealing with the reality
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of existing students and implementing real
programs.

Secondly, the

autonomy granted the new faculty and doctoral students
apparently more
than fulfilled their personal expectations, and thirdly
the Dean through
his change strategies was successful in continuing the
momentum toward
the generally shared vision of this relatively small
group.

On the basis of Dennis' observations, however, one must
wonder
if the School will be able to continue to avoid the vision-reality
gap
in the future as it grows in size and the programs conceived during the

planning year enter the implementation and evaluation stage.
The School also, during the period under review, appears to have

avoided most of the problems implicit in Dennis' second, third, and
fifth recommendations,

(pp. 59-6o)

Although there were some who might

be defined as "crazies," their activities did not become a significant

lever against the School.

Some (although there is no way of knowing if

all "like minded") existing faculty members and doctoral students did

wholeheartedly join the change effort, and those who did not appear to
have been neutralized by the critical mass strategy.

And the School, al-

though clearly engaged in some rhetorical change, did also achieve substcintive change in a niunber of important areas including pass-fail

grading, modular credit, doctoral portfolios, individualized and more

flexible graduate programs, and the center concept of academic organization.

The one area where change appears to have been primarily rhetori-

cal was in governance, where the rhetoric of participation masked the

reality of leader-domination—a problem which, as previously described,
had the potential for creating significant problems in the future.
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Bennis' admonition not to "allow those who
are opposed to change
to appropriate such basic issues as academic
standards" appears not to

have been followed—a common criticism of the School
by both dissident

faculty and outsiders being based on low academic
standards and a loss
of faculty prerogatives, a similar basic issue.
6

But during the period

\inder review these criticisms had not been particularly
effective.

The final major group of conclusions reached by Bennie
concerns
the means by which change was achieved and the speed of change.

His gen-

eral thesis is that change should be incremental and gradual and that

those affected by change should be involved in the planning of it.

His

major argument for this thesis is that fast, radical change imposed on a
group tends to invite strong reaction.
The change effort at the School of Education was clearly on the
fast, radical end of the continuum with a relatively large amount of

participation in progreun development and considerably lower participation in the development of governance and academic policies.

During the

period under review, however, no significant reaction to the change effort
had developed.
One can speculate that the absence of reaction resulted from the

inclusion of participants in the program planning and from the successful
I

critical mass strategy which, at least during the period under review,
j

I

overwhelmed any potential sources of reaction.

i

i

I

^Criticisms explicit and implicit in the later Final Report of
the School of Education Review Committee , Donald Pairbairn, Chm. (Senate
Doc. 71-021), Feb. 18, I97O, See especially pp. 10 & 11, and 28.

!

I

1

In sum, it appears that during the period under
review the School
of Education did, contrary to Bennis' conclusions,
accomplish the goal

of achieving radical change in a short period of time.

And one might

also hypothesize that it would continue to avoid the problem
of reaction
so long as it was successful in recruiting change-oriented
staff for the

School and continued to give them relative autonomy in the design of

academic programs.

Comparison with Hefferlin study

J. B. Lon Hefferlin concluded that the three dominant sources of

change in higher education were new resources available for innovation,

new advocates (people committed to bringing about change) and the openness of the system to change.

The change effort at the School of Educa-

tion seems to have been derived from these sources, with greatest impetus
for change coming from a single euivocate from outside the system

—the

Dean.
Once Allen was hired, he proceeded to create new resources for

change, the $620,000 in incremental funding secured for the planning

year; to fill the School with euivocates of change, the 120 new change-

oriented educators recruited; and to exploit the openness of the system
to change (which was initially evidenced in the understandings of his

employment) considerably beyond, it seems clear, the expectations of

those who had hired him.

Hefferlin also concluded that situational factors, particularly
small size, financial instability, dependence on student tuition, high

faculty turnover, and urban location of the institution were central

357

factors in bringing about academic innovation.

The University of Massa-

chusetts and School of Education clearly do not
fit this pattern.

The

University was one of the 507 largest in the country,
enjoying at the
time a growing level of support from the state
for its operations, hav-

ing a relatively stable and growing faculty, and
being located in a
rural setting.
Thus, it appears that the impetus for and success of the
change

effort did not come from the situational factors, but rather from
the
®f^*orts of one man who, once hired, raised the incremental money,
re—

bruited new people, and successfully exploited the opportunities available within the system to bring about change.
This type of analysis provides a useful insight into the potential
for the continuation of change at the School.

Since situational factors

do not appear to be a motivating force toward change, the impetus for
change must continue to come from those within the organization and from
the institutionalization of change in the organization as there appear
to be no penalties intrinsic to the system for unwillingness to change.

Viewing Hefferlin's ten "likely contributors" to continuous
academic change (pp. 44-47) one can be generally optimistic about the

possibility of maintaining change at the School.

For instance. Dean

Allen appears, by his support of innovation and rewards for it, to have
created a "market" for innovation within the School; the School appeared
to have been headed in the direction of the inclusion of "marginal mem-

bers," particularly through its off—campus activities; certainly the

^Kenneth A. Simon and W. Vance Grant, Digest of Educational Statistics (Washington: DHEW, 1971 )i P* ^5*
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reorganization was brought about through the
introduction of new members
and the course of growth upon which the
School was embarked would seem
to assure the continuous introduction
of new members; the circulation

of ideas appeared relatively open as a result
of the flexibility of the

center concept and the emphasis on off-campus
projects; initiative, par-

ticularly for academic programs, had clearly been
decentralized to fac-

ulty and to students; collegiality had been avoided
(described below);
and the institution could not be described as patriarchal
(which system,

according to Hefferlin, is characterized by a centralization of
power
based primarily on seniority).

In fact, it appears that many aspects

of the decision-making process which actually existed in the organiza-

tion were very close to those described by Hefferlin as avuncular, in

which "initiative is neither permanently centralized nor dispersed

.

.

.

and while power is diffused it is occasionally centralized."®

Comparison with Ladd study

Dwight Ladd's review of the general failure of the study and
report approach to academic reform offers some insight into the means by

which change was effected at the School and some perspective on the direction of that change.

As to means, the School clearly did not use the

self-study method, which Ladd sees as generally unproductive for significant
change, but rather, having achieved a critical mass of change-oriented
people, chose to undertake the planning of a new school from a tabula
rasa, as if no school had previously existed, rather than focusing on

®Chapt. II, p. 47*
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the analysis and correction of deficiencies in the
existing school.

Further, the new school was developed far more in the
organic mode, out
of the aggregate of the program planning of individuals and
small groups

working in specific fields, than it was out of a comprehensive
study and
planning model in which the major part of the energies of those
in the
School were devoted to the study, conceptualization, and development
of
the academic policies and programs, and organizational structure of the

School as a whole.
It is probable that this approach, which refused to dwell on

the past and allowed the energies of participants to flow into the areas

of greatest interest to them, was instrumental in the avoidance of many
of the problems of the self-study approach

—particularly

the necessity

of evaluating and defending the past, of having to prove that the new is

superior to the entrenched old, of having to deal with those with vested
interests in the status quo, and of the problem of collegial decision-

making on institution-wide issues (to be described below).
As to the direction of the changes, Ladd observed a high degree
of similarity in the recommendations of the eleven committees (p. 49 ) on

the five major components of an academic program.

In at least three of

these areas the new program of the School was clearly in line with the

recommendations.

—Gurricultim:
curriculiun.

)

(Ladd found little support for requirements in

The School's flexible, individualized curricul\im required

only courses necessary for state teacher certification, and provided

many options for the satisfaction of those requirements

—Grading:

(Ladd found that the committees saw
grading as

••threatening" and not giving students an
adequate sense of their strengths

and weaknesses.)

The pass-fail and portfolio systems adopted
by the

School of Education were designed to alleviate
these problems.

—Academic structure:

(Most studies saw conventional academic

departments as limiting and constricting.)

The School's center concept

was an attempt to create a more flexible, free-flowing,
transdisciplinary

academic structure.
The reports, according to Ladd, were agreed on the ''often
routine and sometimes deplorable quality of the teaching done by many
col—
lege and university professors." Although there is no objective evidence
on the quality of teaching at the School during the period under review,

the School was clearly committed to improved teaching and there are some

indicators that it may have been taking place.

For instance, one can

look to Allen's recruiting criteria by which he sought the best and most

exciting teachers; the atypical backgrounds and experience of many of
the instructional staff; the more experiential approach to teaching and

learning

developed by many of the planning committees; and the modular-

ized curriculum all of which seem to lead in the direction of improved

teaching

—one

indicator of the success of which might be the dramatic

increase of undergraduate and graduate students at the School.
The fifth area of concern of the committees was the failure of

advising systems both as channels of information and as instruments of
contact between faculty and students.

During the period under review

very little, save for the increase in contact between faculty and doctoral students, was done at the School to implement an effective advising
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Byetem.

Thie neglect, it seeme likely, wes
brought about by the preee

of other priorities and the fact that
there was no effective organised

pressure from master’s and undergraduate students
to meet their advising
needs

^needs not felt by the faculty and doctoral
students who were re-

sponsible for the planning.
In his conclusions, Ladd delineates the type of
leadership that
he feels is necessary for successful academic
reform, ",

.

.a

primary

task of academic leadership is to try to counter the
pressures favoring
the status quo by creating or maintaining an atmosphere
of receptivity

to change. ''9

it is clear, on the basis of the analysis in Chapter
VIII,

that the major focus of Allen's leadership and his leadership strategies
was to create and maintain such an organizational environment.

Comparison with Fashing and Deutsch study

Fashing and Deutsch attribute the failures of innovation in their
studies primarily to destructive reactionary forces, sometimes political,

sometimes academic, and sometimes community and to the inability of the

collegial structure to deal with those forces and to provide effective

leadership for change.

As to the former, the School of Education during

the period under review had not, probably because it was a subcomponent
of a large university, received significant outside pressure and it

seemed to have been able to deal effectively in the academic politics
of gaining approval for its programs

—although

it had, by its methods

of approval, not gained many friends among the Faculty Senate and would

9lbid.

,

p.

51*

probably, for the foreseeable future, have to rely on
its other sources
of support and political strategies to maintain the
needed approvals

from that body.

The School's method of resolving the collegiality
di-

lemma will be described immediately below.

Avoiding the tyranny of the collegium

All three studies conclude that the collegial form of decision-

making is inappropriate to the achievement of academic change and point
to the inertia, intrinsic conservatism, and collective lack of perspec-

tive of collegial bodies as the single most important factor in the

failure of reform efforts.

In view of these conclusions, the commitment

to the development of participation in governance (which system would

presumably have closely approximated the collegial structure) which, as

described in Chapter VII, was enunciated by both the Dean and most com-

munity members, was in fact a thrust in the wrong direction.
That this thrust did not produce a working system of participative governance despite continued rhetorical support for it from both
the Dean and the commxmity is attributable, as described in Chapter VII,
to a disinterest on the part of the instructional staff in taking the

steps necessary to formalize participation (as a result of the high

degree of academic autonomy granted them by the Dean) and a strong proclivity on the part of the Dean to make policy decisions for the organization whenever he felt that participation in decisions would have

hampered the change effort.
It becomes evident that the decision-making model just described
is
which emerged out of the Dean's domination of the planning process
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very similar to that described by Hefferlin as
avuncular—a system in
which overall policy decisions are centralized and
specific program

decisions diffused among the instructional staff, and
a system which

Hefferlin sees as most appropriate to academic chemge.
Further, as previously described, the Dean's leadership
style,

which focused on the creation of an organizational environment
conducive
to change, appears very close to that espoused by Ladd
for change leader-

ship.

In sum, it appears that the actual decision-nnaking structure

which emerged during the year of planning was, at least according to
Ladd and Hefferlin, a highly appropriate one for avoiding the tyranny
of the collegium and achieving successful academic change.

It is some-

what ironic that this system did not appear to have been sought, at
least in terms of stated commitments, by either the Dean or the community, and that what was previously described (Chapter VII

)

as a failure

to achieve the goal of participative governance could, in faot, in the

perspective of Hefferlin and Ladd's conclusions, be viewed as the successful achievement of an appropriate governing mechanism for change.
It should also be pointed out, however, that at the point in

time at which the study ends the issue of appropriate governance for
the School had by no means been resolved.

The final Constitution

adopted appears strongly weighted on the participative end of the continuum, delineating a sharing of policy-making power between the Dean

and School Council and allowing the entire School community to create

policy that would supercede that of the Dean and School Council.

It

also, however I confers a number of powers on the Dean that would seem

364

appropriate to an avuncular or leader-dominated organization
including
an executive budget of up to 10 per cent of general
support fxmds, the
right to appoint up to 20 per cent of new faculty and

I

5

per cent of

new doctoral students, the right to approve the budget of all
grant
money projects, and the right to make policy decisions in all
areas,
subject to the review (but not approval) of the School Council.
Thus, those in the comm\mity still committed to participation

could see this document as a blueprint for participation in governance
and the Dean could view it as a legitimization of the continuation of
his previous style

— leaving

the conflict between participation and

lecider domination essentially unresolved.

Conclusions and Extensions

In this final portion of the dissertation

I

shall focus on each

of the five major analytical sections of the study, beginning with a

recapitulation of the major conclusions of each section and, for each
section, continuing with a series of extensions based on the analytical
data.

These extensions will be of three kinds:

—^hypotheses:

in effect predictions based on my analyses which

might be confirmed by subsequent events

—speculations:

opinions which

I

have formed based on the data

and my own biases which there is no way of confirming

—questions:

in areas in which I have no firm opinions, but

which are relevant to the data and which may or may not be susceptible
to confirmation by subsequent events.
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I

have followed my recapitulation of conclusions
for each sec-

tion with these hypotheses, speculations, and
questions based on my

analyses for three reasons.

First, as a test of my analyses.

If the

extensions tend to be reflected in subsequent events,
that will tend to

confirm the validity of my analyses. '•0

Secondly, in the expectation

that such observations might be useful to others attempting
a similar

process of reform in avoiding pitfalls or anticipating problems
not
evident in the period under review.

And thirdly, because many of the

issues covered in my hypotheses, speculations, and conclusions remain

crucial issues in the School of Education at this writing.

It is hoped

that these observations might contribute to the resolution of such
issues.

Establishing a Foundation
for Change (Chapter IV)
Conclusions

1 )

That the "critical mass" strategy successfully moved the

orientation of the School from conservatism to innovation
2)

That the success of this strategy, in the face of enormous

difficulties, was due primarily to the imagination and energy of Dean

Allen

^^It can be objected that, since three years have passed since
the period under review, I am engaging in a hindsight kind of exercise
for example, hypothesizing the occurrence of events which actually did
occur. This criticism has some validity as far as the testing of my
analyses is concerned. However, I have attempted to avoid this pitfall
by making a determined attempt to limit my hypotheses, speculations, and
questions to those arising only out of the text of my analyses— in effect, to write as if I had no knowledge of subsequent events.
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3)

That the support of the University administration
was cru-

cial to the success of the critical mass strategy
4)

That the unique growth situation of the University
was an

important facilitating condition to the success of the
strategy
5)

That Dean Allen's fund-raising abilities and his
control of

funds raised was crucial to the success of this strategy
6)

That the adoption of the planning doctoral program was cru-

cial to the success of this strategy
7)

That the concentration on the critical mass strategy by Dean

Allen and his staff had the effect of alienating most of the existing
faculty, a factor which did not significantly blunt the innovative

thrust of the School because of the success of the critical mass strategy.

Speculations

1)

That the personal recruiting approach used was uniquely

appropriate to the new school since it tended to assure good informal

working relationships cunong people
2)

That the "good man" recruiting philosophy was important

since to have hired by "slot" would have tended to predetermine the

structure and focus of the new school
3)

That, without the planning doctoral program, the existing

faculty would have been considerably more powerful and attempts at
radical innovation more difficult, acrimonious, and less successful
4)

That the planning doctoral program provided the imagination

and manpower without which the planning year would have been considerably more limited in scope and substance
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5)

That the fact that the School was funded approximately
50

per cent hy outside, temporary money will require it to
continually

renew such funds just to stay even.

Such efforts may be successful,

but are subject to two potentially dysfunctional outcomes:

(I) that

such money cannot be raised, resulting in a painful contraction
of the

School or (2) that the necessity of obtaining available funds pulls
the School in directions unsuited to its educational goals.

Questions

1)

Will the personal recruiting strategy, which leaves the

Dean open to charges of "cronyism," become a significant lever for
criticism of the Dean?
2)

Will the financial costs of "first—class recruiting" and

high salaries similarly become a lever for criticism?
3

)

Can and should the School move from personal recruiting of

the Dean to more institutionalized recruiting
4)

—and

if so, how?

To what extent will the old faculty become integrated into

the School in the fut\ire?

The Retreat (Chapter V)

Conclusions

1)

That the Retreat was crucial to the success of the planning

year in that it provided a sense of identity to an initially inchoate
group and facilitated the development of a planning process and the

mechanisms to support that process in the months to come
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2)

That the Retreat provided an important
opportunity for the

Dean to expand his informal power in the
organization
3

)

That the Retreat provided the breeding ground
for the

School's subsequent commitment to the elimination
of institutional

racism
4)

That the Retreat also gave rise to the "myth of
community,"

which was to hamper, to some extent, the School's attempt at
academic
and organizational innovation in the months to come.

Speculations

1)

That,

hewi

the Retreat not occurred, the ultimate nature of

the School would have been quite different, probably in the direction of

being more limited, less visible and dramatic, more conventionally structured, and less humanistically oriented
2)

That the Retreat, while crucial to beginning the planning,

was equally important in building the informal structures which were to

form the basis of the organization of the School.

Therefore, in future

years it will be necessary to hold a Retreat or find its equivalent, as
a means of integrating new members into the organization if the School
is to retain its informal and flexible structures.

Academic Reform (Chapter VI
Conclusions

1 )

That the School successfully achieved its conceptual goal

of developing new programs and academic policies
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2)

That these programs and policies generally
satisfied the

stated goals of diversity, alternatives, and
experimentation
3)

That these goals were generally consistent with
those advo-

cated by contemporary proponents of educational innovation
4)

That the School successfully achieved its political
goal

of gaining the approval of all appropriate University
agencies for its
packaige
5)

That the Dean's domination of the organization and his be-

havior and strategies were the central component of the School's success
in achieving both its conceptual and its political goals
6)

That the major strength of the planning process pursued was

in the development of specific programs by the planning committees
7

)

That the major weakness of the planning process pursued was

the relatively low participation of School members in the making of

decisions on the overall academic policies of the School
8)

That "action planning" was the most successful approach to

the planning process
9)

That the fact that the planning was done primarily by fac-

ulty and doctoral students resulted in programs and policies primarily
devoted to their own interests

—to

the relative exclusion of the inter-

ests of undergreiduate and master's students
10)

That the planning period was too short relative to expec-

tations raised for it
11)

That the organizational aunbiguities and time pressures of

the process increased the reliance of the entire organization upon the

decisions of the Dean

370

12)

That the quality of programa
developed, although un judge-

able in the period under review, was
not reflected in the generally
low
quality of the verbal deaoriptiona contained
in the package
13)

That the process which resulted in
"take it or leave it"

decisions for the University reviewing
agencies was a very successful
one for dealing with the "impeding structures"
of the University as a

whole.

Hypotheses
1)

That irrespective of the actual quality of the
programs at

the time of package consideration, approval of the
package provided the

opportunity for conceptualization and implementation of new
programs at
a more careful, considered pace—a, fact which would tend to increase
the potential for success of such programs
2)

That for hoth internal and external reasons the new programs

must develop appropriate evaluation methodologies if the School is to
fulfill the potential of its strong beginning
3)

That the construction of these methodologies will be diffi-

cult for the School since it will involve behavior in many ways inimical
to the values and attitudes of those in the School at November I969

particularly since for evaluation specific goals must be explicitly
stated, programs must be carefully documented, and results conscien-

tiously examined.

The tenor of this kind of behavior is different from

that of November I969 which, in general, emphasized innovation without

particular reference to explicitly stated goals, and activity as opposed
to documentation and examination of activity
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4)

That in subsequent years the School
will move from the

period of innovation and entrepreneurial
activity to one of implementation and consolidation not necessarily
an easy transition

—

5)

That, since not all participated in the
decisions about

overall academic policies, it is possible that
many policies will not
be followed or enforced by the faculty
6)

That, for this reason, there may be considerable
altera-

tions in academic policies in the future
7)

That the ’Hake it or leave it" strategy used so
successfully

for approval of the package by the Faculty Senate and
other reviewing

agencies also had the effect of creating considerable ill-will,
and may
have created a backlash effect which will hamper rational dealings
with
these groups in the future.

Speculations

1 )

That in two important areas the School was not as innova-

tive as it might have been.

The Center concept, for one, was proposed

as "Structure Alpha" by the Dean in July 1968 ^^ and elaborated by two

faculty members in August of that year.^^

In the entire planning year

no important improvements were made on the concepts of these two documents.

The Doctoral Progreun, for another, which was finally adopted

was almost identical to that established by the Dean in February

I

968

^Dwight W. Allen, Memorandum "Strategies and Logistics for Planning" to Faculty and Planning Staff, July 23, 19^8, p. 3.
^

^[Robert L. Woodbury and F. Thomas Clark] "The School of Education, University of Massachusetts" [August 19^8], distributed in memorandiim from Earl Seidman to Faculty and Special Doctoral Stvidents,
September 10, I 968 .
^
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as the Planning Doctoral Program.

No important changes were made
in

that program during the entire year of planning.
2)

Had there been more attention paid by the Dean
to the work

of the planning committees, perhaps a requirement
that they report

their progress more often, more productivity would have
resulted.
3)

Had the planning groups paid more attention to the
process

of planning, for example by exchanging data on how they were
going

about the planning, it is possible that the inefficiencies of
"theoretical planning" would not have been perpetuated so long.

Questions

ized?

1 )

Can this innovative spirit be successfully institutional-

Caji

one institution handle innovation, implementation, evalua-

tion and cessation of programs all at once and also handle the

education and credentialing of graduate and undergraduate students?
2)

Can new directions be sustained in the absence of the normal

academic rigor/intellectual honesty evaluative criteria?

Governance/Organization Building (Chapter VII
Conclusions

1 )

That although both the Dean and most members of the commu-

nity proclaimed their commitment to the development of a participative
form of organization, the School emerged from its year of planning with

a leader-dominated form of organization
2)

That the responsibility for this failure to achieve the

stated goal lies with the Dean, with the Executive Committee, and with

the entire School community, each of whom was
responding to different
needs, but all of whom suffered from an ambivalency
between the achieve-

ment of academic change and the achievement of participative
governance,
not realizing the extensive areas of incompatibility between
the two,

and opting for change over participation at all important
decision
points
3)

That in fact neither the faculty nor the students were as

a group particularly interested in becoming involved in the overall

governance of the School except as it affected their own personal and

professional interests

—^which

concern seemed to have been fulfilled in

the autonomy granted them by the Dean
4)

That the leader-dominated form of decision-making which

emerged was, in fact, highly appropriate for the reform effort at the

School
5)

That the time, energy, and focus futilely expended by mem-

bers of the Executive Committee on the conceptualization of a democratic

constitution represented an important lose of leadership for the community
6)

That the conflict within the Dean between change and par-

ticipation precipitated a growing credibility gap between the Dean

euid

many members of the community
7)

That while the Executive Committee avoided making specific

decisions to theorize about a constitution, the Dean, by making such
decisions, was in fact establishing governing mechanisms in the School.
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Hypotheses

1 )

That the leader-^iominated mode of governance will not
be

significantly altered by the adoption of the constitution
2)

That the inherent conflict between participation and

leader domination will be a source of serious difficulty until satis-

factorily resolved
3)

That as the School moves into its implementation phase

issues of power and authority will become increasingly important
4)

That one result of the leader-dominated strategy will be

that upon Deem Allen's departure there will be no organized group at
the School with sufficient status and power to ensure that the ideals

espoused by the Dean are carried on in the School.

Speculations

1)

That had the Executive Committee been willing to confront

Dean Allen on the basic issues of power and authority early in the
period, out of that confrontation would have come a compromise more in
the direction of participation, but still satisfactory to the Dean
2)

That had Dean Allen moved to really share power with the

Executive Committee, they would, had they accepted it, have come to
operate pretty much as an "Assistant Dean Committee."

Questions

1)

What would have happened if, from the beginning, the Dean

authority
had announced his intention to maintain most of the power and

over major decisions of the organization?
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On Leader-Dominated Change (Chapter
VIII

ConcluBions

1 )

That the most important factor in the achievement
of radi-

cal change at the School of Education was the change
strategies of Dean

Allen, which strategies, to be effective, required that he
dominate
the organization
2)

That the achievement of domination over the organization

depended on the accTimulation of most of the formal and informal power
in the organization, the latter involving particularly control of the

flexible sources of money in the organization
3)

That the successful employment of many of these change

strategies in the organization tended to increase the Dean's domina-

tion over the organization
4)

That many of these strategies are replicable by other per-

sons or organizations, even in non-leeuier-dominated modes of organiza-

tions
5)

That leadership principles implicit in these strategies are

useful in deriving other strategies for other leaders in other organizational settings
6)

That the principles of organizational susceptibility to

change are also useful to the development of other change strategies
7)

taking

— for

That leader domination is an excellent platform for risk-

operating on the edge of viability.
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Hypotheses

1)

That as long as Allen remains Dean the School
will remain

fundamentally leader dominated and generally innovative
2)

That Dean Allen's domination of the organization has
put him

in a highly vulnerable position personally, as all blame as
well as all

credit runs to him and it is a characteristic of innovation that
criticism arises before credit
3)

That during Dean Allen's tenure the School will continually

remain in a highly volatile condition since it lacks the cushion which

bureaucracy and "normal procedures" afford
4)

That the Dean must maintain the support of the University

administration and a critical mass of faculty to retain his position.
His style has created a pack of predators howling in the distance, waiting for him to stumble
5)

That to successfully lead the implementation stage of the

School's existence Dean Allen will have to alter his style to some extent
to increase the value put on conscientious implementation and evaluation
6)

That the glue which holds the School together under the

Dean's domination, control of flexible money, charisma, knowledge of most
of the activities of the School, and personal contact with most members,

will tend to crumble with increasing niimbers, and new forms of control

and governance must be found.

Speculation

1)

That considerably less radical and thoroughgoing change would

have taken place had Dean Allen chosen to govern the School in a more

participative mode.
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Summary

The change effort at the School of Education
under the strong

and decisive leadership of Dean Allen represented
a bold attack on the

most pervasive problem confronting contemporary
higher education, its

inability to change in response to rapid change in the
social and tech-

nological environment surrounding

it—a

problem which many have taken on

and few have made significant progress in overcoming.

The academic reforms

actually achieved by the School during the period under review are of
considerable significance viewed in this perspective and the nature of
these reforms, in the direction of experimentation, options, student responsibility, social action, and continuing innovation appears consistent

with directions proposed by the major commissions on higher education of
the past five years.
The means by which reform was achieved are equally significant,

particularly in the perspective of recent evidence that the collegial

decision-making system employed by most institutions of higher education
appears inappropriate to the accomplishment of institution-wide academic
change.

The principal components by which change was achieved at the

School of Education included the establishment of a critical mass of

change-oriented people to create an organization committed to reform

rather than to the maintenance of the status quo, the suspension of business as usual to focus the energies of the entire group on change for a
year, the uniquely effective leswiership strategies of the Dean who con-

trolled the major sources of power in the orgajiization and used his position of dominance to motivate those within the organization toward change
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and to protect the organization as a whole
from premature intervention
from without, and the emergence of a
decision-making model in which

institution-wide policy decisions were centralized
in the Dean and specific academic program decisions were diffused
among the entire instructional staff.

This decision-making model appears to be highly
appropriate

for change leadership in that it avoids the tyranny
of the collegium,

while permitting substantial input into the change effort
by members of
the instructional staff.

As one views the achievement of the School of Education it is
easy to become overenthusiast ic over the School's accomplishments in

conquering age-old problems during the period under review.

One must

balance this optimism with the realization that the 26 months are only
a beginning, albeit a remarkably strong one, and that the specific aca-

demic reforms adopted will require successful implementation and evaluation; that at the end of the period described the School had not as yet

resolved the tension between participative and leader-dominated governance; that the approval of the School's new programs and policies was

still conditional, and that many were waiting in the wings to hasten
its return to "normality"

;

that the leader-dominated mode of decision-

malcing, while proven effective for quick and radical change, had yet to

be proven in the long run for an orgajiization which, to be successful,

would have to include a large number of strong, independent educators
who might not as easily accept the domination of one man once the initial thrust of radical change had been passed; and finally that during
the period under review the School had not even begun to address the prob-

lems inherent in the course of growth which it appeared to have charted

,1
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for itself, most particularly in the effect of
growth on the maintenance
of the Dean's leadership style and of a shared sense
of purpose and

cora-

mxmity in the School.
Despite the above caveats, however, one must conclude
on the
basis of this study that the achievements of the School of
Education in
the period under review represent significant progress in
overcoming the

chronic problem of inertia which has plagued American higher education
throxxghout its history, and that its efforts are worthy of close study,

analysis, and consideration by those seriously interested in change in

higher education.

APPENDICES

381

00

o

>H

rO
'iS.'jO
ov ctn

lAOOVO t^rOp-TtO OP~OOir\
VO U>VO VO VO VO «o VO »o VO LTv^
^'^'£'0
ov ctv ctv ov ov ov
ov ov

o>

ctv

ov on ov On o\ on on

Hc
o

1

1

a

(3

0

cd

—' H
P

•

© Cd
© u
rH a

U
©

rrt

•H

•H
Ch

a

p
H

0 0
0
0 0
CO 0
^ P
0
© to
©
p ©

Q)

Eh

VO

Cl)

<H

d
0

•

fH
nq

P
©

XJ

rH

a

a

ft

^

—a

E
©

)

(D

-

Cx<

o

OV

(3N

M pq
0 §_ ro
LTV'^r~LP\p— »^t-OVO
rOrOLTNr^rOrO-^rOrnrnrOrO
a
OOOCVI

>i

'id-

p

rH
:s

o

)h
<D

rn

mvo

lO» l/>

00
rO ro

CTV

p

a
o

©
43
+»

R

O

o
0
+»

o.
0)

& w

o

c
•

N

rO
0)

P

0)

«

>

O

cd

o

•H

CO

P

fH

•

•

(1)

(h
I

cd

cfl

cd

cd

S»

!
I

•

I

•

I

o

-rH

a

93

rH

I

•

!
I

>
•H
o

P

•
0 © e •
> -P fS
>
•H CO ft
•H
c o o
f)

D mo

D

!
I

m cd Cd
a © 0
0 © d

P

P

cd

M

cd

rd

35

M

x) Ch

fH

a 0 ©
©
P
E >j 0
E P cd
0 •H ©
0 © Eh
© ft
« © Ch0
>
00 H
VO f3 d
ON P 0
T—

•H

P

1

f3

VO

r>

CTv

o
H

O

<H Cm

Ch Cm

o o

fH

a,

O O
fH

a

a

Ch

O

O

Ch Ch Ch

fH

a

ft

a
a a a

a

O O O
ft

fH

o
ft

x)

d
©
©

fil

a
0
fH

a

VO

School

cd

p

•H

>

and

•

©
Report

>
•H

fH

>>«H
rH

fH

z

a

J3

O

Annual

Ch -P

O

d
©
rH
rH

Ch

ft

CVJ

(0
(0

I

o
Hg 4)O
ft
O

a <

5

©

©
d

cd

B o
o

Ch

pa
p©

t*
ft

rd
•H

(d

Ch

©
©

cd

r- +»

Ch

•

IZ

•H

pd0 •H
P

cd

0)
+»

E
0
Ch

H
p

a

'Z.

m a
0

<Jj

C«C

O
O
o

p
VO

©

0

•Oj

P

q
cd

fH

Ch

Q)
(X|

P

CO

p
p
p
p ©
©

VO

p-

Ch

ft

(i4

(6

T—

c
g

<<

cd

CJN

V
rH

VO

cd

3

(d

LTV

•H
<H

«

fH
oS

P

p p
•H p
E
E ^
0 Pr"^
0 VO

Mo

0
a
©

f3

.a rH

Eh Eh

fi

>
©

rH Ch
0)

•

p

i

a UV
^
rO

a CO

w

1966-67

Tj Ch

© o

o
N

C3

H

IS)

O

0)

5S

rO

rH fH tJ
rH d (U
0) (d rH

a
o

a
a

0)

cd

jc]

0

o

4)
+»

Sri
na t>D iH
-O Tj 0)

OOP H M a

0)

•H
Ch
Ch Ch iH
Ch H r^

o

ft

fl

cd

o f3
© H o
ft

CO

-p

(d

oo w

^ M
- 0
)

CO

o

P
W) >»
0) rH
c:
fH

CD

>
O H

W«P

-P •H
+»
Cd
fz;

t)

H
P
M

C\i

tJ
•H

P
M
'ct

00

382

^

^

LT\

'JD

—

—

VO
LT\
IP\
VO VO VO VO VO VO
t

t

— IT\ Co
LTV 0\ iT\

r

ro Cvj
VO VO

Trl-

o^o^o^o^o^a^o^o^o^o^o^o^o^o^o^o^o^

Mo
cd

m

0\ ON

N

+»

•H

O
•H

d
o

o
pE4

pC4

VO

ON

u
0)

,o

P>^

irNCVJVOCSJt~rOirNOP~
*^vo
*n1rO

e

rO ITWO

0)

+»

A

0)

0>

*51

m a

m

M
CM

*?d-

rO

r<N ITN

rO

tiC

cd

to

a

H

•

r-i

Pi
PJ

>
H

O

Cd

O

fl

Pi
Cd

to

to

•H

•

00
CO

O

cd
7t

•H

o

!o «M

I

O
<u

t)0

•

o

M

o
0)

+»

(h

O

nS

rH

o
o
o

1
1

+»

o
os

cd

'H
rO

•
P
> 3
n o

n

•

Xi

Ao

0)

•H

I

1

(d

I

W

•

o

•

Fh

-p

O,

o

W

+»

o
o

(Q
c:

(Q
EQ

•

a)

•

•

o

fH

a,

ca

GO

a

•H

pp
•

O
o

<d

•

•

•
•

Cm Cm

Cm Ch

O

tH

O o

o o

aa

aa

o

•

0)
(a

0)

•

o

M>J<J

o
o

•

•

+»

ca
CO

ca
CO

<d

<sj

•

p

•

-p

CO

00

Ma

hH

3
cd
g

•

o o
o o
CO
CO

^

00
00

<s

•

Ch

o
Pi

a

Pi

Pi

•

•

D

Sa

cd

p

•

> o
•ri

•H

Pd

D o
•

•

Cm

o O
Pi

Pi

•

•

aa

o o
o o

+* +»

OQ
CO

CO
CO

00
00

<{ <1

•*4

<«J

CO
00

0)

>
Pi
<U

0)

-P
PS >{
00
PS 43 -P is tJ Ch 3
•H O -H tcO PS •H g (D
cd
rH Pi td •H -H o
:s ts 3: c3
to
0)

0)

•

D

0>

•p

to

•H •H

Cm

+»

o

(d
rt

•

o
o

•

a
Cm

d

1

a,
+»

o

•

+*
CO

to

!

cu
•

•

a

o
•

tM +>

a
o

•H

Cm

Q>

•

M

>
a

•
•
• o
> > +» > N
CO *H *H
a a o d Pi

•

(d

to

tH

o
1
1

>
1 •H

•H

cd

o

•

!
1

>
a

>
U

Cm

'd

tz;
1

•H rH
to

O

ca
cd

o

ri

Pi
0)

cd
CD

g
g

H
CSJ

cd
t)0

6

CiD

rH
rH

0>

PS

o

rH CD
CO :*

383

I

+»

^

o

MOH

to

a
a

a

to
Cm

(0

aureo

to

C

nS

+*

(4

+»

C/l

CO

+»
CO

^
fH

4)

c

«h'

(U

3c
4)

4)

a

o
o

0)

a

+* rH +»
ca <)
ca

<<

U

^

(0

>i
43

ctj

1:5

4>

CJ

s

CO

CT\

•

>»
rH

J
00

Pi

•

•

•

Pi

S

gPT’^T3

^
9
4)
Si a
(0
4)
E-i

S!
CO
4)

«

Pi
4>

fJ
t)0

H
n

Pi
4>

Pi
4>

4)

4:1

•iH

Cl)

tJ

4)

u
a

4)

Si

H

Pi

4:3

(0

*r^

t3 CJ

;3

Td

CO

Tj
rH

CO

0
0

Eh

>

E-i

+»
-f*

.rl

4>

^JO

>
Pi

u

•H

Id
CO
(0

a
0

d

£

^^TJOUTW

1

1

JC|

^^aanuaj,

2
—
0
0
r*
»M
0

(0

(4

4>

s

Eh

0
u

>

rH

•H

Si

0

'H

H

CJN

a
a
0

•

(0

(d

>»

VO
iH

•

0)

a
0
Pi

£

r-

Pi

Cm

Cm

3tOBTff

0

a-[euj95

+»
•H

M
g

4)

CO
Pi
4)

•H

tH

Pi

$

•

a.

rH

CQ

I968

rH
*H
•

Pi

^
Profile
September

0

crO rn

^9/6

0

rO

0
rO

rO

On
CM

CM

t^
rO

H>
a

tiC

n

0
JQ

•
•

•H

4)
cd

P

Faculty

Id

ga^vejo^vood
New

0 0

rH

t0

Cm Cm

0)

Cm

'E'g

t0

t0

Cm

'y

:d

n)

Td

-p

CO
4)
C!

1

ps

p3

CO

CO

:*

«

•

Cm

•

Cm

Cm

Cm

Cm

Cm

0
U

0

0

0

0

•

>5

a

•

•

Pi

0
Pi

Pi

Oh

Oi

Oi

•

0 CQ
^ m

0

Pi

£

Pi

£

•

•

•

-P

0
0

•

+»

+»

+*

0)
CO

(0
CO

CO
00

CO
CO

CO

<5

«*5

H«J

<

0
—
0
0
A0

r

f
1

>>

P

fH
s»

•

•

Cm +»

M

Cm
1

CO

g

0

cu

0

1
+»

3 3

+* +*
CO CO

•

4)

+»

Pi

M

u
0
<1

p
•H
>

Ti
•H

>

a
0

•

auiau
Ir

ti
4)

rH
rH

E-*

< W

K

Pi
n5

—

t

0

Pi

a
rH

0

Pi

•H

4)

Cm
Cm

Oi

0

0

0
0

0

Pi

0>»

n)

<

Pi

a
0

£

VO

CTV

•
4)

•

»

4)

>>
rH

a

•H

rH

4)

»
0
A

•H

>
Pi
4)

P
fH

Pi

•H

Pi

Oi

rO

0

Pi
4)

CO
Pi
4)

0

>

•

•»H

t)
•H
Si

P

U)

—

1

a
0

CO

Pi

Pi
4)

—

•»

rH

^
V

•

rH

Pi

4)

u
4)
a
H

Pi
4)

PX

Cm

tJ

p

Pi
4)

H

Cm

•

CO

Pi

£
Pi

Pi

0

•H
T)

•H

§

4)

P
H

rH

0

CO
(0

h
M

rH

P3

0

Faculty

0)
•rH

to

M

CM

rH
rH
.

a
0

£

lTi

a
0

t
CO

384

to
-tj

0)

•

•

o

^

+»

9UTB0 MOff

CO +»

0)

)

+»

CO

fi

a

a>

o>

0)

rH
rH

^

<1)

§

<0

o

S
a
_
0) a 9)
0 0 ^ 0
O
e r^
0 >>
iH +»
OEi ,n
S •«] m

P

o
H
+»

PT^

p

S'E

o

be Cm

,Q

S
0)
(D
a a

o

Cm
fi
(d

O

+»

IK

a

0)

0)

IK
0)

rO

fl

a
a

'xi

p

rO

n

,0

^

^ >>co
,0 +»
p
O O
® Cd

fH
0)

tJ
rH
>j
x>

•

a>

P:^

rH
rH
Ch .<

ta

tJ

«

P
O

p
o
•H
+*

+*
Cd

+»

+»

,P

2

0)

m

,0

t1 as Tj

(Cent.)

(4

(d
d>

ra
a>

“*4

Eh

as

rO
rO

(X3

«

£>S

H

0)

CO

a

P

Cm
Cm

CO

Cm

P

P
0
P P
P P
P ri
P •H
0 P

43

•H
iH

p
M
P
P
P
«

o
ra
0)

V
a

>)
rO

0)

a
a

(Q

-«d

a

P
u
+»
p

CO

<M

Cm

g p
o o O CJ o o o o O
0)
0)
o 0) O 0) O Q) p

«

o
«
P JO
cd
a

O

rH

IK

<0

*iH

(d

2

p
0>

I
c

as

0

r~

IT\

<M

rO

C5

s
0

H
+*

P
u
0

>

eanuej,
I968

7Jv?Joiirfw

JO

3^

09 X 3

September

eX^uie^

99/6 e»V

r-

cu

rO

W

CM

rn

rO

e^<^

o\
ITN

rO
rO

rO

Faculty

M

New

P

-

V

<H

1
1
Profile

0

0

P
0

•H
rP

•H
43

0

0

0

<M

•

Cm

•

P
P

+»

>
'H
p

P
P
+»

>
•H
p

CO

!=)

CO

<M

•

•

Cm

Cm

0

0
h

Pt

^ttren

0

P)

•

+»

+»

p
p

P
P

0
0
p
p

<«J

-P

<d

0

0
Cm
P
P

p
Ch
0
rH
0

0
P
P
0
rH
0

rrt

+»
CO

1
1

1

1
1

1

0

0

•

•

Cm

•

•

Cm

0
h

Cm

Cm

0
U

0
P

0

0

U.

£

•

•

+*

+*

P
P

p
p

•
•

'p

Cm

o.

OU

•

+»
CO

CO

rrt

P
<6

r
U
P
as

•

•
Faculty

•

+•

cu

a.

O.
•

-d

<

0
0
p
p

•

•

•

•

•

•

+»

+»

+»

+»

+»

Cm

P
P

0
p

0
P

0
P

P
P

0
P

rJ

rP

hS

Q<

P
p
p

p
p
P
3

<s

H»

O
P

h|c«

I

eorefi
0)

m

•H

o
rH
P
P

£

+»
43
(d)

•H
rH
pH

P
P
3
+»
p
0

xi
+*

0)

p
p
0

q
m
L

Ph

Ph

A0

P
P
P

£

+»

a

P3

>>

p
>

M

p
0
p
g
43
0

385

•

e

0)

t1 ,Q
h S bo oa bo m
0 0) q +» C +» H :s
•
s
0 •H o « o
> ri
;q v6 X] n)
Cm •H •H q
•
(0
n)
IQ -p
0 c rH +» 0 (d q d a
s
0 CO q IS 0 IS o
0)
Cm
(0
0
o
+» E q B
S
0
0
cO
» 0 q o O
3
(U

0

rH
rH
<j

9 ureo

MOH

•H

u

1

0
£0 h
£

V

fl

0

£

S

[«a: 9 U 9 £)

CO

(Cent.

(Q
a>

rH

(q

CD

0)

B
0 ® q
Cm B H
q . q
(0
p 0 (0(d

q

p

)

0)

«w

c

1*4

4

4

•

q
0

M
q

q

-p

+»

ca

q
q
q

•q
•H

•H

CO

p
0 q

•H

q

t)0

-H
C5 tq

0

•

q
B

(i>

0)

*xj

&

0)

-p

q

q

Mq
q

•

•rl

® w
u
q ^
a <0

0)

n

q
0

q

•

pq

rH

•H
+*

<=«

=« •H
rH

0
a q
0 •H

1

a
0
0
q
q
p
+» IS
® p
a z : q e CO at S c
0
g>
c^.
Cm
0
0
S +* E q E
0 cQ 0 q 0
§ q
h ® q pa q ® q 0
(0 tZ q Pc
£ a £ p
•rH

1

CJ

0
0

•

o>

0
q
q q
3 'ti
0 •H
0 q

u

«

+»

o
qq q

•

I

Mq

•
-rt

q
0
q0
a
0

q
V
q0
q
4>

q
+> +» ®
q CO q
q COH 0
q
s
0 CQ ®

E-t

Eh

«q Eh

0

*

•

•

S

S

3

^

9 JnU 9 J,
I968

7!vtjouiji
Jo"“^oix 0

liS

September

9 -[^U19 j

99/6 aSv

1^

VO
rO

<j*

iTv

CVJ

a

rO

t-

CT\

rO

CM

m

OD
rO

CM

w
rO

m

O

CM

rO

rn

Faculty

0
New

S’

9 ^i.eao!}.oo(i

/

q

q
CJ

^

t0

•

®

>H

rH

q

•

D

•

1

•

0
Faculty

o)

>H

•

0
q

fr.

p

q
0

CO

C3

>
q

•H

•

•

.

Cm

«M

a*

.

p
03
03

Ou
•

P

0
®

«

0
0

C3

03
03

p
«

q
•H
—
q

0

0
q

cq

0.

(X,

.

q0

rH

(0

0)

®
0

o

I

1

(H

•H

qu

q
q0

P

iH

03

q

bO

<«1

54

q
0
q

•H
43

•H

u

®

CO

CO

•H
CO

.

cq

<a
(0

•H

*

p
Mq

p

03
(0

rH
(4

•

p

03

q

q

Prof.

•

P

CQ

Cm

Cm

0
q

<1

oS

03

.

Univ.

to

0
q

0
q

Penn

•

(0

Cm

eurejii

O

Cm

•

£
Cm

®
Eh

Cm

0
q

3tueH

>•

P9

>
•H
q

Profile

03

—

u

•H

—

03

0
q

.

p

0
<0

0
0
n
n

Asst.

0.

03

®

s

CD

•H
rH

rH

at

q
®

:=>

5B

IS

o3
Yarington

'CJ

•iH

q

•iH

o
o

Is

IS

386

oo

o

^ — °0 O^O^vo
On VO 0\00 00 oo CO CO cn cn
VO VO VO VO VO Co VO S S S ® S
^

rr> rrs

^

.

it

o
o
o

JC3

03

I:

t^

VO

Mo

+»

•H
I

rH
PQ

u
o
n

Ti

H

•H
as

43

M
VO

LT\

o
c—

0)
i—J

ca

ON

e

0)

pt,

t)0

Cm

'd
0)

V

O
X
M
M
a,

^

crvl

fH

<3N|

•H

VO

Vh

CJN

O

Jh
(1,

VO

OO

O

CO VO ir\T-r-

ONCVJ

O VO CO

•^;J-CVJ

ON VO

s»

o

03

•H
-f»

fH
0)

0)

OV

()C

4Q
+»
rH

a
o

G
o

:)

rO'^LPvrOrOrOrJ-rOrOcOrOrOrj-rOrOCVJ rOrOrO

T**

iH

O
O
4
O

VO

a
V
>
O

d
o

(d

o
o
m
u

m

<u

«H

rH
&4

rO

V
+*

%tt to

s
O
+»
C3

O

<H

<d

1
p

^ ^

03

(d

cd

<d

WW

Cm

Cm

o

1
1

G
(d

+»
03

•

•

+»
03
*

> ^
H O
d H

1

•

O

fH

so ro

Cm Cm

O o

O O

fH

fH

fH

QL,

Oh

1

(d

1

Cm

O
fn

(0
03

clh

<:

fH

fH

Oh Oh
•

•
•

<M +> +> -P +»

p

03
03

0>

o

(0

fH

m

fx,

<!

O

0)
1-3

03
03

<C

Cm Cm

o

to

I

Cm

1

o

CQ
03

43

-p
CO

St

•H
+»

o

•

03

"d

G

cd

>»

+*

cd

1

•

G
S
0

»

•

•

Cm

Cm <M

«M

O

fH

ft

Oh

Oh Oh

Oh

fH

o

ft

o
d
'd

O
fH

03
ft

Cm
0

0

Cm Cm

O O
ft

ft

0
•

p

03
03

a
a

«d

<j{

•

-P
CQ
03

0

P

0

+»

o O
3)
V

0

P
CQ
03

0

C3

-p

O

CQ

03
CQ

d

<! h3 h3 <4 HH

o
o
43
u
CO

0

0k

03
03

r?

^ ^

o
O
9

ft

•H
pq

O

0

to
t3

G
o
T*“

o
s

1

1

03
fn
d>

d

fH

>5 0)

G

F3

0)

G
b

•

rH
rH

•H
O O a
d
0)
X] rH o d rd (d
iH -d +* fH (d 3 Tf rO
d (d
rH d fn V rH
<d «*{ <2 pq pq pq

0»

V a
3

0)

fX

fH
Cd

f

0

Eh Oh

.

M M
fH
cd

ft
Cd

rH
^ w o o o iH
oo
cd

Q

-

3

•

0

0)

9

Oh

p

Cm

O

cd

H
>

rH

H
o
-p
o
0

*3

d
>

fH

•rH

•H
pq

•d

d

•H

0

a
o

(G

»

43

G G

fH

•H •rH
Cm Cm
Cm <M

0)

Pt

o
O O o

C3

H
43
M

0

+» +»
03
03

rH

9
g
O

9

p

Oh

Oh Oh

•

o O
o o

G
o

0)

1

CO

O o

o
o

0

0
•

a,
ITN

Cd

G

03 03

o

0

1

•

Cm Cm

CU

o

tt
o o

•H

«

•

Cm

Oi

o
O

•

rH
rH

> G G G
cd
cd
a G o +» p

H>

^3 as

•

o

•

O

•

«M

CM

Cm

ft

c
1

•

«

rH
fe

•
•fH

CM

>3
fH

a
O
O
«

^4-d W)
Cd

oo oO

as

1*

a
o

a
o

Ixt

pct

>
CM

ft

rO

•H
43

M

00

387

(4

Mo
ci

rH

m

H

+»
•H

s

U
O
n

s

'H

s
(Cont.)

19^9

(iq

0O'“ CVJ '^CJN'r- mcvj UAOCO OCOr— VOlT\OOCOVO O'-'O Osr- ^-r-C30 Ooo ^-CM
CM '^rOr'^rO'^'<;|-rOrOrOrOMD rOCM CM «^CM CM CM rOrOrOrnrOU^r^i^^^iPiCM

November

<t
-

o
t©
©
o

O
tiO
©
o

•H
+a -d xi
t© h

•H
jd

S3

rs

Profile

Faculty

©
+»
©
Pi
o
+»
u
o

S3

o

1

S3

o

•

S3

>

:* CO

D

.c

m ©
© +»

Q

•
•

Ch

O

o

Pi

O
Pi

03

n
CO

ca
CQ

Sh Cm

Pi

•

Pi

O

Cm

1
1

o

CO

•

•

Cm

Cw «H

o
Oi

O o

Pi

o
Pi

Pi

Pi

O,

QU

IX,

1

1

1

1

I

S3

Pi

> O
•H rH
o
S3

•

•

Cm

O

Pi

Pi

Oi Oi

o.

Pi

%

ao

O O

Pi

•

Cm Cm

•

•

<

•

13S,

SO
•

•P

bp

Pi

©
o

©

2
o

CO

C3

S3

O
Pi
O

•H
xl

'2'2'S
• © ©
©
>
•H t t t
S3
© © ©

Xi
Oi ro

W

33

1
1

W

•

*©

1-3

<Jj

•

o

©

rH CO •H
XI
rH

CJ

O O O O O
Pi

Pi

Pi

•

O

Cm

Pi

Oi

Pi

Do D
•

O

o

Pi

Pi

SU

Oh

O
•

D

•

•H
•

hO -3 hO *3 <© <3 <3 <3 *© Oh

M

<1 •© Oh

S3

D

•

•

Cm <M

O O
Pi

Pi

Oi Ui

O
O
Cm P O P Cm P Cm o
o •M +» +» o +» -M +» +»
© O o O © © © © m © o U © © O © O ©
© © © © © © © u © © Pi S3 © © Pi U Pi ©

^

•

>

in

•

•

•

a

•

•

Cm

Cm

•

c •
© S3 > p >
rH Pi •H rH H
© O d o S3

©

3>h

Cm Cm Cm Cm Cm
Pi

•

o

Eh
•

rH

O

Oi Oi Oi Oi Oi
•

<J Di <©

!

1

E3

o • • • • O • o
+» +» o -f» O
+» o +»
m © © o © u © o ©
to
to
m Pi © © © © ©
«jj

1

•H

•
•

Oi

>

S3

CO CO t3

•

+»
CO

g
© o

•H
:*

•d

> O S3
© © •H rH ©
-H +» S3 o +»
$3

•
ji

o
©

•

<5

-«©

tt
o
o o

•

•

+»

+»
CO

o

•

•

•

O,

Oi

o
o

t=»

•

Ch

Oi

•

S3

•

Pi
pL,

u
H
m

-H

Ch

«w

O

O

Cm

1

H

C

>

•H

•

O
o +>
© O
© 0)

Oi 1©

a
o
00

^5
i::

a
S
0)

m

o

V

iH
0)

+»

H
W M

CO
c:
o5

fn

(5 1§

© Pi 4S h* S, ^
O © O M t)0^
fn +»
10 +»
P! -P
S3 -d
© © S3 O Pi
fi
Pi
O O h Pi Pi © Q> O
(l5

©

p

H
Cm
Cm
H
Pi

S3
S3

©

O

P©

o
©

•

o
© •H
r1
u
© P rH © X!
d
© © x» M O
P
©
IK
X3
M
©
o
© ro § © 3 > ->

|x;pC4pE<|jC4[x,(Z4[Z4fX|0C}0 C3 33 33 33 33 33

•

33 03
S3

S3

M

M a a
* d © tiD ©
© © © o © o ©
©
© SJ V •H S3
J
Pi
d d m
O
o
O
o
o

*-3

1-3

*-5

hJ

388

w
CO 00 ON ON 00 VO

s.

rS. 'jS.

>H

^— LTN — oo
ON CTs — ir\ m m
VOVOVOVOcOvovOVOvO'vO
r

t"

rr^

VO

0)

a
o

•H

Ert

MO
a

rH

m

Eh

>s|

+»
•H

u
o
c

•H

(Cont.)

[Z4

19^9

OOVOCVJ ^CVJ o r~-mc\j ONl/NrOr-OOvo^ ON^tf^ON
rOrOr'NrO's^fr'NVO '=^lfNr<NC\l rO'^CVi rOrOrOt/NrOm

November

®L.
t>C

<S
-

>

•H

J3

m
U

Profile

0)

+»

FP
0)

^o

<H

a>
Faculty

•

c:
dt

>H

+»
flj
>H CO

•
S2!

rH

> >

•

Cm

Ch

o

(X.

(X,

o

o
u

+»
CQ

p:

M

a

t=>

>H

CQ
CQ

O O
0> U

"S}

-3 a*

h
9

ca
CO

<

<jj

•

Ch

•

«H

•

O
X

o O
X X

O
O X
X Pu,

Ch

IX

IX

o

«H +* +» +» +» +» Ch

oa

o

<D

CO

Fh

bD

0
•H

rH

CQ
CQ

P

O

IP

•H

FX Si rH

CO CO CO CO

o o 01 o
o o 0 u

hP -p

D

M

t> 3B 3S :s

o
CQ
CQ

Ch Ch +>

O O
U U

IX <5 IX IX

d
d d cd
si rd (d a
o +» B p
4P (0 H o .d Ch
O l»D 3 tJ M rH
Pi
cd o •H •iH o
d)

(d

0)
n)

01
01

<

rH

rH rH

•

•

o

Pi
(d

O

pp :o

•

•

hP <) (X <]

•H

O o
o S a
j3 h H
(X

GQ

IX IX

+» +» Cm +» +»

01
01

o

f:

CO

a
o

•H rH

•

<{

•H

+>

4h Cm

IX,

•

o
o

> O

•
•

(H

fX.

•

B

M

^
J
y
D

•

o

I
o

-H

H
3
rU
Ti

o
o

3E 3:

01
to

O
O
CQ
to

< <

o

0)

P

d 0)
2
d S
3 •H s
a Pi

•H
0>

s

cd •H
:s >H bQ

389

SOURCES CONSULTED

Published Sources
Arrowsmith, William. "The Future of Teaching," in Campus I98O. Alvin C.
Eurich, ed. New York: Dell, I968.
Axelrod, Joseph. "New Organizational Patterns," in Higher Education in
the Revolutionary Decades . Edited by Lewis B. May hew. Berkeley
Calif4 McCutchen, I967.
Baskin, Samuel, ed.
McGraw-Hill
Bennis, Warren G.

Higher Education:
1965^

,

Changing Organizations .

The Leaning Ivory Tower .

.

Some Newer Developments.

New York:

San Francisco:

’

New York*

McGraw-Hill, I966.

Jossey-Bass, I973.

Brainerd, Lyman B. Jr. "A Thrust Toward Relevance:
in Trend , Spring 1969*
,

The Year in Review,"

Campus Unrest Panel, William W. Scranton, Chmn. Report of the President's
Commission on Campus Unrest , in The University Crisis Reader
Vol. II, edited by Immanuel Wallerstein and Paul Starr. New York:
Random House 1971*
,

,

Committee on the Student in Higher Education, Joseph F. Kauffman, Chmn.
The Strident in Higher Education. New Haven: Hazen Foundation,

w

Conant, James B. The Education of American Teachers .
Hill, 1963.

New York:

McGraw-

De Bell, Garrett. "Education and Ecology," in The Environmental Handbook .
Edited by Garrett De Bell. New York: Ballantine, 1970*
Ehrlich, Paul R. and Ehrlich, Anne H. Population/Resources/Environment .
San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1970.
Eurich, Alvin C., ed. Campus I98Q: The Shape of the Future in American
Higher Education . New York: Dell, 19^6*

Reforming American Education: The Innovative Approach to Improving Our Schools and Colleges. New York: Harper, I968.
,

Politics
Fashing, Joseph and Deutsch, Steven E. Academics in Retreat: The
New
of
University
Albuquerque:
of Educational Innovation .
Mexico Press, 1971*

390

Gardner, John. "Agenda for the Colleges and Universities,"
in Campus
^
^ 980 .
Edited by Alvin C. Eurich. New York: Dell, I
96S,

Greiner, Larry E. "Patterns of Organizational Change,"
in Harvard Business Review Flay-J^ine I967.
.

Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Pall Enrollment in
Higher
Education, I969: Supplementary Information . Washington, I970.
Hefferlin, J. B. Lon. Dynamics of Academic Reform .
Jossey-Bass, 19^9*

San Francisco:

Hersey, Paul and Blanchard, Kenneth H. Management of Organizational
Behavior: Utilizing Hxunan Resources Second Edition. New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1972.
,

Hodgkinson, Harold L. "Reflections on the Newmein Commission."
Magazine , May 1972.
Insights

,

Change

Newsletter of the New School of Behavioral Studies in EducaGrand Porks: May 1972.

tion.

"Is The Education of American Teachers Influencing the Education of
Teachers?" Phi Delta Kappan , June, 1964 *

Jacob, Phillip E. Changing Values in College: An Exploratory Study of
the Impact of College Teaching . New York: Harper, 1957*

Jencks, Christopher and Riesman, David.
York: Doubleday, I968.

The Academic Revolution .

New

Jenkins, David H. "Force Field Analysis Applied to a School Situation,"
in The Planning of Change . Edited by Warren Bennis, Kenneth
Benne, Robert Chin. New York: Holt, I96I.
Koerner, James D. The Miseducation of American Teachers .
Houghton Mifflin, 1963 *

Boston:

Change in Educational Policy: Self-Studies in Selected
Colleges and Universities . The Carnegie Commission on Higher
Education. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970*

Ladd, Dwight R.

Lippett, Ronald; Watson, Jeanne; and Westly, Bruce. The Dynamics of
Planned Change . New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958.

Maguire, Louis M. Observations and Analysis of the Literature on Change .
Philadelphia: Research for Better Schools, 1970.
Mas low, Abraham H.

Motivation and Personality .

New York:

Harper, 1954.

391

Mayhew, Lewis B. , ed. Higher Education in the Revolutiona
ry
Berkeley, CalifTl McCutchan, I 967 .

*

Newcomb, Theodore M. and Feldman, Kenneth A. The Impact of
College
° on
Students Vol. I. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, I
969 ,
,

Newman Task Force, Frank Newman, Ghmn. Report on Higher Education.
'
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, I 971 V
President's Committee on the Future University of Massachusetts, Vernon
R.
Alden, Chmn. Report of the President's Committee on the Future
“
University of Massachusetts . Boston, I 97 I.
Resnick, Harry. "Are There Better Ways to Teach Teachers?" in Saturday
Review March 4 I 972 .
,

Roberts, Wallace.

,

"Clean Slate at UMass," in Saturday Review, Jan. 18.

1969.

Rudolph, Frederick. The American College and University;
York; Alfred Knopf and Random House, I 962 .

A History

New

.

Sajaford, Nevitt, ed.

The Americaji College; A Psychological and Social
Interpretation of the Higher Learning . New York; Wiley, I 962 .
.

Where Colleges Fail .

Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr.
Spring 1971 *

Sein

Francisco;

Jossey-Bass, 1967*

"The Historian as Participant," in Daedalus

Simon, Kenneth A. and Grant, W. Vance.
Washington; DHEW, 1971*

,

Digest of Educational Statistics .

Special Committee on Campus Tensions, Sol M. Linowitz, Chmn. Ceunpus
Tensions; Analysis and Recommendations . D.C.; American Council
on Education, 1970.
Taylor, Harold.
.

How to Change Colleges .

Students Without Teachers.

Toffler, Alvin.

Future Shock .

New York;

New York;

New York;

Holt, Rinehart, 1971-

McGraw-Hill, 1969*

Random House, 1970.

Toynbee, Arnold. "Higher Education in a Time of Accelerating Change," in
Campus 1980 . Edited by Alvin C. Eurich. New York; Dell, I 968
.

Wallerstein, Immanuel and Starr, Paul. The University Crisis Readgr , Vol.
New York; Random House, 1971*
II.
.
Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations
Oxford University Press, 1947*

New York;

392

Webster’s Dictionary of Synonyms ,

Springfield, MA:

Merriam, I951.

Wolin, Sheldon S. and Schaar, John H. The Berkeley
Rebellion and
New York: New York Review, I970T

Revnnrt

^

School of Education and University Files

Ad Hoc Graduate Faculty Election Committee. Memorandum, "Election,"
to
members of Education Assembly. Sept. I9, I969.
'

Allen, Dwight W.
1 968-69 Annual Report ,
of the School of Education, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. May, I969.

Annual Report, 1970 . of the School of Education, University of
•
Massachusetts. July, I97O.
Letter to Oswald Tippo.

.

May 16, I967.

"Memorandum to Education Community" [subject Constitution vote].
.
Nov. 26, 1969*
.

Response to [Constitution] Grievance,

[informal notes, undated.]

Memorandum "Strategies and Logistics for Planning" to Faculty
.
and Planning Staff. July 23 I968.
|

Transcript, First Dean Dwight W. Allen Testimony before the
.
[Univ. of Mass.] Faculty Senate Tenure £ind Grievance Committee.
Undated [late May, I968].
Transcript, Second Dean Dwight W. Allen Testimony before the
[Univ. of Mass.] Faculty Senate Tenure and Grievance Committee.
Undated [late May, I968].
.

Anthony, Albert S. and Thelen, Laverne J. Grievance Submission 01-70
Before the Tenxire and Grievance Committee, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Dec. 12, 1969*
t

Anthony, Albert S. Memorandum "Grievances," to Provost Oswald W. Tippo
[sent only to Dean Dwight W. Allen]. Feb. 21, I968.
.

^to

Memorandum "Proposal for Increase of Special Doctoral Students"
Graduate Faculty. April 25 1 I968.

Memorandiun, "Responsibility for Faculty Personnel Decisions"
To Dean Dwight W. Allen. Feb. 12, I968.
.

393

Brainerd| Lyman B* ^ Jr«, ed. School of Education Profile . May,
197 .
Including »A View, A R^iew, A Vision," "Constitution and
Report
on the Interim Constitution," "Degree Programs," "Portfolio
of
School Commitments."

Chenault, Joan, Recorder.
May 9 , 1968."

"Minutes of the Graduate Faculty Meeting
’

Clark, Richard. "Memorandum to all Faculty and Doctoral Students."
Sept. 23, 1968.

Coffing, Richard T. Memorandum "I969-7O Space Allocations," to Faculty
and Doctoral Students. Aug. 11 , I969.

"Doctoral Student Support, I0/8/68."
Edgecomb, Phillip L.
February 5
1

,

Recorder.

1

^8 .

"Minutes of the Graduate Faculty Meeting,

Evaluation of the School of Education [prepared by the School of Education]
by National CoTincil for Accreditation of Teacher Education.
November I966.
Executive Committee memorandum. "Programs and Offerings for September;
Proposal for Refinement and Approval Process (for community action, Feb. 3 , 1969)."

Executive Council.

Jan. 29, I969.

Memorandum "Three Man Committees" to the Community.

Mar. 4 » 1969*

Faculty Senate Long Range Planning Committee.
ties . Sept. 1971*
French Committee.

Directions for the Seven-

"There is Less Here Than Meets the Eye."

[Feb. 1969 *]

1967-1968 Bulletin, Graduate School , University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Long Range Planning Committee of the University of Massachusetts.
Future » . . Our Commanding Concern . Summer I968.

T^

Media Center, School of Education, Videotapes;
"Colorado Springs Airport."

Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Sept. 21

1968.

"Group Meeting of September I6, I988." Florissant, Colorado.
"West Side Study Center Presentation."
1988.
Sept. 17
t

Florissant, Colorado,

,
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"What Makes Dwight Tick." Florissant, Coloraxio, Sept. I9, 1968
(under title "I Have a Dream Speech").

Minutes of the 143rd Faculty Senate Meeting

.

Third Session.

May 29, I969.

Office of Institutional Studies, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Facts and Figures:
['1968]
1967 *
"

.

1969-1970 Enrollment Statistics."

Purvis, Albert W.

Annual Report [I966-I967].

The School of Education;

June I5, I967.

A Ten Year Projection .

Oct. 14i I968.

School of Education Interim Catalogue , Transmitted to Academic Matters
Committee, Faculty Senate, and Qreuiuate Council, from Dwight W.
Allen, Dean, School of Education. [April, I969]
School of Education Review Committee. Final Report of the School of Education Review Committee, Donald Fairbairn, Chmn. Senate Document
71-021, Feb. 18, 1970.
Seidman, Earl.
1968."

"Minutes of the Faculty Meeting, Monday, September 4i
Robert Wellman, ed.

Memorandum "Proposed Constitution" to Faculty and Doctoral
.
Students, March 13 1969*
1

Memorandum "Report of the Vote on the Constitution" to Faculty
and Doctoral Students, April 7i '1969*
.

Some Tenured Faculty. Grievance Against Dean Dwight Allen April 10,
1968. Addressed to Tenure and Grievance Committee.
,

Transcript, Testimony of the Tenured Faculty before the Fac—
ulty Senate Tenure and Grievance Committee, May 12, I968.
.

Tabula Rasa .

Collected September I968 - April 1970:

Allen, Dwight W. Proposal A and Proposal B , Proposal for the
Governance of the School of l^ucation. University of
Massachusetts . April 16, 1969*
.

"Ratification of the New School of Education Program."

^June 2,

1969*

Black, Jeunes. "Executive Council
Sept. 26, 1968.

—^Formation

and Function."
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Brainerd, Lyman B. , Jr. and Coffing, Richard. "The School of
Education and A New Corporate Design." Oct. 10 I968.
,

Edgecomb, Phillip L. , Recorder. "Minutes of Faculty Meetings"
Sept. 1968 - April 1969*
Editors.

"Committees Formed at the Retreat."

Sept. 26 , I968.

Executive Committee. "First Draft of Preamble, First Principles
and Organizational Principles for School of Education
Constitution." Nov. 19 19 ^ 8 .
f

Minutes of the Executive Council, September 20 , I968 - May

2

,

I969.

"A Proposed Interim Constitution for the School of Education."
April 4 1969*
1

Task Force on Structure. "A Report Submitted by the Task Force
on Structure to the Entire Group for Consideration."
Sept. 18 , 1968.

"Total Bag Sacks It to the Commxmity."
"Vfhy

Retreat?"

Sept. 20 , I968.

Sept. 26 , I968.

A Thrust Toward Relevance .

[October I968]

Ulin, Richard and Seidman, Earl. Memorandum "Procedures for Planning
Doctoral Students." Oct. 23 19 ^ 8 .
|

Undergrad-uate Catalogue of the University of Massachusetts, I967-I968 .
[Nov. I968]

Wagschal, Peter.

Constitution , First Draft.

Wellman, Robert.

"Agenda for Community Meeting.*'

April

11

,

1969*

"Research, Development and Training Projects AdminisWolf, William C.
tered by the School of Education, University of Massachusetts,
during Fiscal Year I966."
of Education,
[Woodbury, Robert L. and Clark, F. Thomas] "The School
in memoUniversity of Massachusetts" [August, I968] distributed
Doctoral Students
randum from Earl Seidman to Faculty and Special
Sept. 10 , 1968.

Committee History" to Faculty and
Wyman, Raymond. Memorandum "Personnel
Doctoral students. Sept. 23 19 ^ 8 .
1
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Author's Piles
"Charter for Executive Council:

Working Paper for October 23,

I

968 ."

[Oct. 21, 1968 ]

Executive Conunittee, "Policy Proposals to be Voted on at this Meeting,"
Nov. 19» 1968 . [Distributed at meeting]
Interviews:

Allen, Dwight W. Twelve Interviews, averaging one and one-half
hours each. Taped July I 97 I - May 1972.

Coffing, Richard. Two interviews, averaging two hours each.
Taped March 1972.
Schirarael,

Gordon.

One interview, two hours.

Taped February, 1972.

Three Faculty Members. Interviews averaging two hours each.
Taped May-June, 1972.
Tippo, Oswald.

One hour interview.

"Policies Decided at the Retreat."

[Oct.

I

Taped May 1972.
968 ]

Weinstein, Gerald W. Letter to G. Jon Roush, Carnegie Corporation.
Dec. 11, 1968 .

'1

/

